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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that the Australian Labor government's (1983 -1996) security policy 
is best explained from within, what I describe as, a liberal -realist framework. This 
framework challenges the mainstream views in the International Relations (IR) Iiterature 
that security policy can be explained by either realist or liberal conceptions of security 
and most commonly by realism and that Labor's policy is essentially realist. 
The liberal -realist perspective is derived from three schools of thought in the IR 
literature which suggest that both liberalism and realism are required to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of security policy and that such a combination is not 
necessarily a contradictory approach. These schools- comprising Grotian, neoliberal 
institutionalist and the `new security' school -share the belief that the international 
system is characterised by both anarchy and society and by both competition and 
cooperation. Assumptions about anarchy /competition and society /cooperation are the 
intellectual foundations of realism and liberalism respectively. If anarchy and society co- 
exist then the insights of both realism and liberalism are required to explain the security 
problematique. 
The thesis draws out the security implications of these assumptions in detail and 
concludes that the liberal -realist perspective orientates scholars towards a more sensitive 
and complex conception of security for explaining the basis of security policy. This 
argument is based on an examination of Australia's security policy during the Labor 
government, policy makers' views of security policy obtained from a survey and 
interviews, and the IR theoretical literature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis seeks to show that an examination of the Australian Labor government's 
security policy reveals a weakness in mainstream academic theoretical analyses that 
adopt a one -dimensional, usually realist, explanation of security policy. In addition the 
thesis aims to demonstrate that the International Relations (IR) literature also includes a 
theoretical perspective that can give a better explanation of Australia's security policy, 
though this potential has not been adequately shown by scholars. 
Like its predecessors, the Labor government (1983 -96) sought to maintain a relatively 
self -reliant defence of Australia policy while remaining in an alliance with the US; 
indeed both self -reliance and the alliance relationship were considerably strengthened 
under Labor. But the new Labor government differed from previous governments in 
introducing novel policy concepts and unprecedented levels of security cooperation with 
the states in South East Asia. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) not only developed 
confidence -building and transparency measures with other military forces in the region, 
but also helped them to increase their operational and combat skills. Labor actively 
sought to increase Australia's security through arming itself against regional states 
(`security against') while also dramatically increasing cooperation with them (`security 
with'). 
On the face of ít, a policy that significantly strengthens self- defence capabilities and the 
alliance relationship and at the same time pursues such extensive regional cooperation 
with possible adversaries is contradictory. The same could be said of the key policy 
concept,' `cooperative security', introduced by Labor to guide regional security policy. 
`Cooperative security' embraced an extraordinary amount of practical military 
assistance to other military forces in the region. Yet the ADF stiII declined to share the 
skills and information considered vital for the defence of Australia and gathered 
intelligence during cooperative activities with the regional military forces that it was 
training to be better warfighters. 
The term `policy concept' refers to concepts used in policy statements. Some of these concepts, 
like 'common security', may or may not share the same meaning as the `theoretical concept' by the 
same name in the IR literature. Both the declaratory and practical levels of policy are analysed. 
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Realism and liberalism, the two dominant IR theory security paradigms, reflect the two 
different approaches taken by Labor. Realism, the dominant theory for explaining 
security, posits that self -help strategies and alliances enhance security. Liberalism 
suggests that states may improve their security through cooperation with potential 
adversaries. The mainstream academic theoretical analyses of security policy, however, 
rarely embrace both approaches at the same time.2 The convention is to adopt a one - 
dimensional approach overwhelmingly a realist one. 
The architects of Australia's security policy disagree that there is anything contradictory 
about both cooperating with, and even enhancing the military capabilities of, potential 
adversaries while also building up a military capability to possibly use against them. For 
example, Hugh White, Deputy Secretary of Strategy and Intelligence in the Department 
of Defence,3 notes that `[t]here is an instinctive feeling that [regional engagement and 
defence of Australia]...must conflict, or be contradictory; that they cannot be dealt with 
together'? But White is emphatic that this `instinctive feeling' is misplaced and that `the 
overall structure is [noti contradictory'.5 If White is correct then attempts to explain 
Australia security policy in terms of either realism or liberalism -which are based on 
competition and cooperation respectively -must fail. Paul Dibb, one of White's 
predecessors, has argued repeatedly that academic theories are of little use to policy 
makers.6 
2 Possíble exceptions are some analyses by scholars, for example Joseph Nye, who have been either 
practitioners or closely connected to policy making. However, even these scholars usually fail to 
systematically link the policy with the range of possible underlying theoretical assumptions about 
security. See Joseph S. Nye Jr, `The New National Interests', Foreign Affairs, Vol.78, No.4, 1999, 
pp.22 -35. 
3 The position of Deputy Secretary of Strategy and Intelligence is second in importance only to the 
Secretary of the Department of Defence. 
4 Hugh White, Regional Engagement and the Defence of Australia', in Jack McCaffrie and Dick 
Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, Australian Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996, p.63. 
5 White, `Regional Engagement and the Defence of Australia', p.63. 
6 Dibb has made this point on several occasions in public forums and in an interview with the author 
in October 1998. Dibb recently wrote that `the two different worlds of international relations theory 
and policy prescription rarely come together in Australia. This is a serious deficiency given the 
strategic challenges ahead'. See Dibb, `Australia's Defence Policies in the Post -Cold War Era', in 
James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 
1991 -1995, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, p.77. The same kind of argument is the 
subject of an article by a well known American scholar, James Kurth, see Kurth, `Inside the Cave: 
the Banality of I.R. Studies', The National Interest, No.53, Fall 1998, pp.29 -40. 
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Australian scholarly writing on Labor's security policy generally reflects the tendency in 
mainstream analyses of security to adopt a one -dimensional approach and asserts that 
the security policy is realist.? However, very few scholars examine either the 
assumptions behind the policy or the theories in depth and try to relate one to the others 
In other words, few have taken the advice given over thirty years ago by two respected 
American IR academics, that scholars should try to systematically match the 
assumptions behind policies `with assumptions...contained in theoretically orientated 
literature of international relations'.9 No study has surveyed policy makers' views about 
the security assumptions that are behind the policy. And no scholarly analyses start from 
the proposition which is central to this thesis, namely that the policy comprises `security 
with' as well as `security against' elements, that it embraces cooperation as well as 
competition and that the former is based on liberal assumptions about the nature of the 
international system. 
This thesis seeks to answer three questions. First, what are the security assumptions that 
underpin Labor's security policy? Second, how can they be explained? Third, what does 
this tell us about the adequacy of mainstream 1R approaches to explaining Australia's 
security policy in particular and security policies generally? The first question is 
addressed in Part One of the thesis, which examines the different elements of Labor's 
security policy from 1983 to 1996. The second and third are covered in Parts Two and 
Three of the thesis, which, respectively, examine the assumptions which underpin the 
two mainstream theoretical literatures on security and the extent to which each on its 
own can explain the assumptions behind Australia's security policy. 
7 See, for example, the works of various liberal and realist scholars such as Graeme Cheeseman, The 
Search for Self -Reliance. Australian Defence Since Vietnam, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
1993; Graeme Cheeseman and Michael McKinley, `Moments Lost: Promise, Disappointment and 
Contradictions in the Australian- United States Defence Relationship', Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.46, No.2, 1992, pp.203 -220; Paul Dibb, `Australia's Defence Policies in 
the Post -Cold War Era', in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), Seeking Asian Engagement: 
Australia in World Affairs, 1991 -1995, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, I997, pp.61 -77. 
Among the few who at least attempt to do this are several contributors to the book by Graeme 
Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence 
and Security Thinking, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, Sydney, 1996. These scholars provide a 
critical theory perspective and confirm the arguments of most other scholars that the policy is 
realist. 
9 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contending Theories of International Relations, 
J.B. Lippincott Company, New York, 1971, p.394. 
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From this analysis the thesis concludes that both liberalism and realism can best explain 
the assumptions about security (and therefore the conception of security) that underpin 
Australia's policy. What I call a `liberal realist' perspective is derived from a largely 
unexplored field of IR scholarship (at least with respect to security studies) which 
assumes that anarchy and society-the intellectual foundations of liberalism and realism 
-co -exist in the international system and that the means for achieving security include 
both competition and cooperation. This argument challenges the conventional scholarly 
explanations that rely on either realist or liberal security theories to analyse security 
policy. 
The argument is developed as follows. Chapter One describes the official policy 
concepts and practices that support defence of Australia and the alliance with the US. 
Chapters Two and Three describe the policy concepts and practice of regional security 
policy. This first part of the thesis confirms the proposition that Labor's overall security 
policy is based on the assumption that security is enhanced by adopting strategies 
against states, on the one hand, and, with them on the other hand. I also argue that 
Australia's `security against' policy contains several strategic dilemmas that give rise to 
tensions within the policy. In a similar way there are tensions within the cooperative 
`security with' policy. 
The second part of the thesis asks how the different theoretical traditions address 
security, in particular the classic questions: security of what, from what, and with what 
means? Chapter Four examines the assumptions which the two main theories- realism 
and liberalism make about security and the extent to which each is driven by the logic 
either of competition or cooperation. A logical consequence of this argument might 
seem to be that the original hypothesis, that Australia's security policy is contradictory, 
is valid -since it too is based on principles of `security against' and `security with'. 
Chapter Five reviews other theoretical literatures that might support the policy makers' 
claim that a policy that embraces both arming against and cooperating with potential 
adversaries is not contradictory. I argue that three schools of thought- Grotian, 
neoliberal institutionalist, and what I call the `new security' school -suggest that both 
theories are needed to explain the security behaviour of modern states. The key 
assumption of each of these schools is that anarchy and society co -exist and that each is 
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important for understanding the nature of the international system. However, these latter 
literatures do not systematically explore the implication of the `anarchy and society 
assumption' in ways that are helpful for policy analysis. Therefore I draw out these 
`hidden' implications with the help of the three questions posed above and develop an 
analytical framework which draws on the three schools and which I label the 'liberal - 
realist' perspective. I propose that it is a more coherent framework for describing 
Australia's security policy than either liberalism or realism on its own. 
The third part of the thesis moves from the general to the particular and examines the 
extent to which Australia's security policy can be explained from the three different 
perspectives -realism, liberalism and Iiberal- realism. Chapter Six examines the 
documentary evidence, described in the first section, in the light of the three approaches. 
This chapter concludes that the documentary evidence shows that no single theory can 
satisfactorily explain the policy. However, if both theories are invoked then the policy 
can mostly be explained within the liberal -realist framework. 
In Chapter Seven I examine additional evidence, obtained from a survey /questionnaire 
and interviews with security policy makers, from the three theoretical perspectives. The 
data also show that policy makers' assumptions about Australia's overall security policy 
are most comprehensible in terms of the liberal -realist framework. The worldview of 
policy makers -which assumes that the international context is one of competition and 
cooperation and assumes that `friends today could be enemies tomorrow' -embraces 
both liberal and realist assumptions. In the Conclusion I show how the liberal- realist 
conception challenges some commonly held views in the literature about security in 
general and Labor's security policy in particular. 
Finally, a word or two about methodology. The thesis takes Labor's security policy as a 
single case study to illuminate the conventional conception of security that relies on 
either of the two mainstream theories, realism (the most common approach) or 
liberalism to explain security policy. An historical and qualitative account of the 
policy based on official documents and declaratory statements and practice -as well 
as quantitative evidence obtained from a survey of policy makers' views, is subjected to 
a theoretical analysis using an analytical framework that includes both realist and liberal 
conceptions of security as the basis for explaining security policy. This sensitising 
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conceptual framework is developed from three schools of thought whose security 
assumptions have received little attention and have to made explicit. The aim is to see if 
the security assumptions underpinning the policy can be related to the assumptions and 
conceptions of security contained within the framework. 
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Chapter One 
LABOR'S `SECURITY AGAINST' POLICIES: 
DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA AND THE AUSTRALIA -US ALLIANCE 
The relative peace in Asía may not last. 
Australia's security environment could deteriorate, perhaps quite 
seriously in the future.1 
(Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994) 
Australia is doing more with the United States than ever before and benefiting 
more from it. The country's defence posture depends on that alliance, and will 
keep depending on it for many years to come. 2 
(Hugh White, Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence, Department of Defence) 
One of the most enduring features of Australian strategic perceptions is the 
presence of direct and active threats to Australia's security and well -being -t 
perception made only the more remarkable by the almost complete absence 
of such threats throughout Australia's history.3 
(Professor Desmond Ball, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU) 
Throughout Australia's history, governments have assumed that defence against other 
states was the highest priority for Australia's security. At various times Australia had 
been perceived to be under threat from Russia, France, Germany, China, Japan and 
Indonesia. With hindsight these 'threats' were shown to be illusory. Nonetheless, the 
strategic documentation during most of the post -war period was replete with 
assessments of anticipated threats. And, in more recent times, particularly since the end 
of the Cold War, the overwhelming perception has been one of increasing strategic 
uncertainties in the region. The official record also shows how governments have 
responded to such assessments' in terms of doctrine, operational strategy, defence 
Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Australian Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1994, pp.4 and 7. 
Hugh White, `New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', in Helen Hookey and Danny Roy 
(eds), Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers, Canberra Papers on Strategy 
and Defence, No.120, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997, p.17. 
3 Desmond Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision- Making in Australia; the Strategic Background', 
Reference Paper No.93, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1979, p.27. 
4 It is assumed that the governments' responses were not determined exclusively by perceptions of 
the strategic environment and its strategic implications but also by political and budgetary factors. 
8 
Defence of Australia and the Australia -US Alliance 
planning concepts, force structures, practice and, equally importantly, military arrange- 
ments, most obviously the alliance with the US.6 
When the Australian Labor Party (ALP) won the general election on 5 March 1983,6 one 
of the first undertakings of the new government was to put a new codified defence 
policy in place which would make Australia even more secure against other states. 
Labor further refined the plans and concepts, which had been evolving during the 
previous decade, for the defence of Australia. Special attention was given to developing 
a strategy for `defence -in- depth', a doctrine of `self -reliance' and defence planning 
concepts such as `warning- time', `lead- time', `force -in- being', `expansion base' and 
`technological edge' (over other regional military forces). Several of these elements 
continued to evolve over the period that Labor held office and a number of dilemmas, 
which had vexed defence planning in the past, persisted. Nonetheless, under Labor, 
Australia was better prepared than at any other time in the country's history to fight 
against other states using its own resources. 
Integral to the formulation of a codified defence of Australia policy was the Australia - 
US alliance. Despite the strong emphasis on a doctrine of self -reliance, the alliance grew 
in significance under Labor. The US was important, not as the provider of military force 
for the defence of Australia as it had been presumed in the past, but as the continuing 
source of intelligence and military technology. Paradoxically the alliance supported self - 
reliance. As a consequence, long- standing dilemmas about how much emphasis should 
be given to defence of Australia, on the one hand, and to the alliance on the other, 
continued to underpin Labor's policy. Nonetheless, both these policies, which supported 
`security against' other states, were significantly strengthened during Labor's period in 
office. 
To demonstrate the above claim this chapter will examine Labor's `security against' 
policies in some detail. Defence of Australia will be analysed in terms of its: (a) 
For an account of the strategic documentation up to 1979 see Ball, The Politics of Defence 
Decision -Making in Australia', pp.1 -61. For an account of Australian defence planning during the 
Labor period and the first years of the Liberal/National Party Coalition see Stewart Woodman, 
Unravelling Australia's Strategic Dilemma', in Ian McLachlan, Michael O'Connor, Stewart 
Woodman and Derek Woolner, Australia's Strategic Dilemmas: Options for the Future, Australian 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1997, pp.11 -71. 
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strategic assessments of threats, uncertainty and levels of conflict; (b) responses in terms 
of doctrine, strategy, defence planning concepts, force structure, and practices; and (c) 
responses in terms of alliances and other defence arrangements. In the first section of the 
chapter the development of these elements of defence of Australia will be discussed 
from an historical perspective (when `forward defence' and the alliance were dominant) 
using official sources that have rarely been publicly referenced before.? k the second 
section the key strategic documents produced by Labor -the 1986 Dibb Report,s the 
1987 White Paper9 and the 1994 White Paperw -will be examined at much greater 
length. In the final section the nature and purpose of the alliance is explored, historically 
and under Labor. Finally, the three sections of the chapter will discuss the strategic 
dilemmas that characterised defence planning during this period. 
`SECURITY AGAINST': PRIOR TO LABOR'S ELECTION IN 1983 
On 5 September 1983, some six months after Labor came into office, Defence Minister 
Gordon Scholes submitted the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1983 to 
Cabinet for endorsement." The two recommendations made by the Minister were that 
first, it should be: 
6 The ALP had been the federal opposition to the conservative LiberaUNational Party Coalition for 
the previous seven years. 
7 This historical analysis is based on classified documents from the 1960s and 1970s known as the 
Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy papers. The rare public references to these documents 
have usually omitted direct quotations and details such as page numbers. According to official 
sources, `[t]he "Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy" (SB), [is] prepared by the Defence 
Committee (DC) about every three years, [and] deals with circumstances and trends affecting 
Australia's security. It advises the Minister of Defence, and through him the government, on how 
the government might counter prospective risks and exploit opportunities to promote our security'. 
See Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1983, Background, 
Department of Defence, Canberra, 5 September 1983, p.3. The Defence Committee consisted of 
the permanent heads of the departments of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister and Cabinet and 
Treasury, the four service chiefs of staff and secretary of the Department of Defence. The Defence 
Committee's last recorded meeting was in November 1985. Defence planning is now 
predominantly an in -house process. 
8 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, a Report to the Minister for Defence, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986. 
9 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1987. 
10 Department of Defence, Defending Australia. 
11 According to Stewart Woodman the Strategic Basis paper 1983 was originally drafted in 1982 and 
`revised prior to Government agreement in 1983'. See Woodman, `Unravelling Australia's 
Strategic Dilemma', fn 36, p.65. 
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Labor's defence policy...to develop a more self -reliant strategic posture...based on the 
principle of developing independent national defence capabilities to deter conventional 
attack on Australian Territory.12 
And second, that the Cabinet endorse Strategic Basis 1983 'as guidance for [the] 
forthcoming review of defence planning and for the development of...defence 
planning'.13 Together the two recommendations amounted to a significant evolution in 
Australian defence thinking. However, although Labor is correctly given most credit for 
this advance in defence policy, the genesis of its plans was to be found some decades 
earlier. 
The historical context: from threats to strategic uncertainties and dilemmas 
about means 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Australia's strategic assessments and responses 
focused on anticipated Asían threats both to regional stability and directly to Australia's 
security. Defence planners were most concerned about Japanese remilitarisation, 
communist regimes in North Korea and North Vietnam, communist insurgencies in 
many areas of Southeast Asia and, above all, the communist regime in China. Closer to 
home the major and direct threat to Australia was perceived to be Indonesia. As 
Strategic Basis 1968 stated: 
[fit is from or through Indonesia that the possibility of hostile action against Australia or its 
Territories is most likely to arise.14 
However, by this time defence planners were in a dilemma about the most appropriate 
means for enhancing Australia's security.15 Doubts were raised in Strategic Basis 1968 
about Australia's traditional responses, namely `forward defence' and reliance on 
alliances. Defence planners suggested that Australia's current defence policy concept of 
12 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1983, Background, Attachment, 
P.1. 
13 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1983, Background, Attachment, 
p.1. 
14 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968, Part II, Department of 
Defence, Canberra, 1968, p.59. 
15 This is not to suggest that dilemmas about how best to ensure Australia's security were not evident 
in earlier Strategic Basis papers. 
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`forward defence' with big -power alliance partners, the British and Americans, 
'hardly...represents...an independent strategy of our own'.16 Rather, they argued that: 
[It has] been the case that we deliberately, doubtless in our own interests and perhaps 
inescapably, tied Australia to the strategy of others. We have had such a tradition, first to fit 
comfortably into British strategy and more recently into that of the US-17 
This tradition had led decision makers to deploy troops alongside those of alliance 
partners in several Asian wars18 and to plan Australia's force structure with these 
contingencies in mind. Tellingly, Strategic Basis 1968 noted that: 
[Als a result [of not having an independent strategy] we find ourselves involved in 
situations not of our choosing and in the formation of which we have negligible, if any, 
influence. 19 
Discontent with the lack of an independent strategy and its consequences for Australia' s 
security was only increased by a growing awareness that Australia's traditional 
dependence on alliance partners was hardly prudent in the light of recent developments. 
Britain had already announced plans to withdraw East of Suez by the mid -1970s and the 
US commitment to continuing the war against Vietnamese communists was becoming 
uncertain. The US was also signaling to allied governments in the region that they 
would have to take more responsibility for defending their own territory. President 
Richard Nixon's Guam Doctrine, made known the year after Strategic Basis 1968 (on 
25 July 1969 in Guam) officially confirmed that US combat support was unlikely in 
future regional conflicts. 
As a result of changing perceptions of the regional environment Strategic Basis 1968 
announced that Australia should aim for `strategic flexibility', by which it was meant 
that: 
16 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968, p.48. 
17 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968, p.48. 
18 Australia became involved in the Emergency (between British and Malay government forces 
against indigenous communist Malays), in Confrontasia (between Malaya and allegedly communist 
forces from Indonesia), the Korean war (between communists in North Korea -supported by China 
and Soviet Union -and UN forces led by the United States), and the Vietnam war (between 
indigenous communist Vietnamese, supported by China, and the US -led coalition with the South 
Vietnamese government). 
19 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968, p.48. 
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[O]ur forces would have to be organised, equipped and trained so that they would have to 
the maximum possible extent a dual capability i.e., for effective deployment in South East 
Asia as well as for the direct defence of Australia.20 
`Strategic flexibility' amounted to little more than some rhetorical modifications to 
`forward defence', which shifted the focus from distant theatres to counter- insurgency 
operations in Southeast Asia. The Australian territory of Papua New Guinea was also 
thought to be vulnerable to Indonesian forces in neighbouring Irian Jaya. As already 
mentioned, the assessment at that time was that lilt is from or through Indonesia that 
the possibility of hostile action against Australia or its Territories is most likely to 
arise'.21 
This perception of Indonesia as a threat was a major reason why the alliance with the US 
was seen as necessary for Australia's security. The view in Strategic Basis 1968 was 
that Australia `could expect assistance under the ANZUS Treaty in the event of a major 
threat developing or in the case of limited war with Indonesia'.22 The alliance was also a 
critical source of intelligence for Australia. Without this intelligence Australia's ability 
to sustain its declared dual strategy -`forward defence' in Southeast Asia and direct 
defence of Australia -was doubtful. In Strategic Basis 1968 it was made clear that 
Australia: 
[M]ust do all [it] can to sustain the present arrangements which ensure two way exchanges 
with the US, UK, New Zealand and Canada of intelligence data.23 
All these countries were members of the secret UKUSA intelligence agreement (see 
below) under which the US provided invaluable information to Australia. 
The Strategic Basis 1968 illustrated clearly the dilemmas for Australian defence 
planners. The disadvantages of alliances were clearly understood, on the one hand, but, 
on the other hand, there was the judgment that Australia still needed the US; in 
particular for defence against major attacks, for limited war with Indonesia and for 
intelligence. It was believed that Australia had few choices other than to rely on the 
alliance with US since at that time direct defence of Australia was an aspiration with no 
matching capability. But at the same time little was done to reduce this dependence: that 
20 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968, p.49. 
21 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968, p.59. 
22 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968, p.60. 
23 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968, p.61. 
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is, to develop doctrine, strategy, defence planning concepts, or force structures for the 
independent and self -reliant defence of Australia. There was no discussion in Strategic 
Basis 1968 that indicated the forces required for the different elements of the policy of 
`strategic flexibility' were different and that it was necessary to have a coherent strategy 
(either for choosing between them or for allocating resources). 
Strategic Basis 1971 
In subsequent strategic assessments the perception of threat to Australia was modified 
and refined.24 The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971 stated that `the 
likelihood of Australian combat involvement outside Australia is less than we assessed 
in 1968 and is not great'.25 `Indonesia', it was argued, `is the country from or through 
which a conventional military threat to the security of Australian territory [TPNGI could 
most easily be posed'. However, the critical change in threat perception in Strategic 
Basis 1971 was that lilt is very unlikely that any Indonesian Government in this decade 
would develop a capability or intention to mount a serious and sustained attack on the 
Australian mainland'.25 These kinds of judgments indicated that for the first time 
defence planners were canvassing `the prospect of varying Ievels of threat developing 
over increasing time -scales' .27 
The Guam doctrine was reflected in the statement that the `maximum degree of self - 
help...and the responsibility for handling significant insurgency problems in South East 
Asia lies primarily with the countries in the region'.28 And, as the Strategic Basis 1971 
24 According to Desmond Ball, apart from Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, two 
other important documents were produced during 1971 that attempted to describe and assess 
Australia's changing strategic environment. See Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in 
Australia', pp.14 -18. The first of these, The Environment of the 1980s (MC 2 (71)), `was a very 
general document, eschewing discussion of the question of threats to Australia' (p.15). The second 
document, the Environment of Future Australian Military Operations (EFAMO), was intended to 
`fill the gap between the general review of the environment and the more particular requirements of 
the Services with respect to force structure planning' (p.16). According to Ball, writing in 1979, 
` EFAMO remains the most valuable piece of Australian documentation from the point of view of 
force structure planning' (p.I8). Neither document was available to the author. 
25 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, Department of Defence, 
Canberra, March 1971, p.57. Nonetheless, it was suggested that although counter -insurgency 
operations involving combat troops were unlikely, `Australian policy should provide for an 
Australian capability to deploy air and naval support'. See ibid. 
26 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.57. 
27 Díbb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.24. 
28 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.9. 
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put it, in Australia's case it meant that `a higher level of uncertainty, especially in 
relation to United States military action, will obtain'.29 But it was still thought that if 
there was a major threat to Australia from a big power, for example China or the USSR, 
`the ultimate United States commitment to Australia under ANZUS is not in doubt'.30 
Australia now hosted US defence and space facilities at North West Cape (1963), Pine 
Gap (1966) and Nurrungar (1971) and according to the 1971 Strategic Basis paper 
`United States' strategic interest in Australia is enhanced by [Australia's] growing 
importance to the United States for defence and space purposes'.3l 
Other statements in Strategic Basis 1971 also indicated that Australia's commitment to 
defence of Australia remained largely declaratory. For example, there was little detailed 
discussion about planning for the direct defence of Australia and, with regard to force 
structure, there was just the general comment that: 
[Ilincreased emphasis on the defence of Australia itself in the long term will almost 
certainly call for a blend of offensive and defensive naval and air forces supported by highly 
mobile and hard hitting army forces.32 
Clearly `a blend of offensive and defensive naval and air forces' was a very limited 
defence planning concept. As it happened, the strategic assessments and responses in 
Strategic Basis 1971 were discarded as official guidance for defence policy when Labor 
replaced the Liberal -Coalition government in the March 1973 election. 
Strategic Basis 1973 
The new assessment of Australia's strategic environment in the Strategic Basis of 
Australian Defence Policy 1973 paper, carried out under the new government, repeated 
many of the judgments in Strategic Basis 1971 but it also added some new ones. 
`Australia is at present one of the more secure countries in the world'33 the Strategic 
29 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.11. 
30 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.12. 
31 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.12. 
32 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.68. 
33 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, Department of Defence, 
Canberra, 1 June 1973, p.1. 
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Basis paper noted, and `the present likely trends identified have not indicated any 
likelihood of threat of direct attack' 34 With regard to Indonesia it was stated that: 
In the twenty years since achieving independence, Indonesia had never threatened Australia 
nor sought to acquire the capability necessary for it to launch significant military operations 
against Australia. Indonesia has never politically attacked Australia. 35 
This perception of Indonesia was even more sanguine than that in Strategic Basis 1971 
and quite remarkable given previous threat assessments. 
Furthermore, in Strategic Basis 1973, it was stated that the nature of future conflict 
would most likely be `low- level' and that the `forces in being' should be determined by 
this fact.36 Self- reliance was also endorsed in stronger terms: Australia, it was said, 
`must now assume the primary responsibility for its own defence against any 
neighbourhood or regional threats'.37 Moreover, this was underpinned by some modest 
conceptual developments, for example, the argument that: 
lTjhis need for greater self -reliance and the capability to act independently call for the 
maintenance at all times of defence strength which is adequate for immediate purposes and 
may be expanded if necessary.38 
This thinking was supported by several defence planning concepts such as `warning - 
time and lead- time', `in being forces', and an `expansion base.39 Finally, the difficulties 
and dilemmas involved in developing a defence policy in the absence of a direct threat 
were acknowledged. The paper noted that `the improbability of threat or direct military 
34 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.50. 
35 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.37. 
36 Desmond Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.33. 
37 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.84. 
38 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.84. 
39 In the 1973 Strategic Basis, `warning -time' is defined as `the time from Government acceptance of 
a perceived threat to the time it is judged it will require operational response. Warning -time will 
not be effective unless relevant measures are taken to develop a response'. (This definition of 
`warning -time' was changed in subsequent documents. See below.) `Lead -time' is `the time 
required to develop a force capability or components of a force structure from when a Government 
decision to develop is given'. An `expansion base' is the base from which build -up commences, for 
example, the material and manpower resources which the government will direct in an emergency 
to defence development (pp.86 -87). The definition of `in being forces' was very general. It was 
stated that such forces should be `adequate in size, skills and in equipment to allow for expansion 
at the rate called for' (p.5.) and that they would need to `cope with intrusions into our territorial 
waters or the surrounding fishing and resource zones' (p.83). See Strategic Basis of Australian 
Defence Policy 1973. There was no mention at this stage of the `core force' concept. 
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pressure against Australia...poses difficult problems of judgments for Australian defence 
force development'. 40 
hi what appeared to be an important initiative, with regard to these `difficult problems', 
Strategic Basis 1973 announced `that a comprehensive study should be initiated on 
continental defence' and that indeed, `these studies have been started'.41 However, 
according to Desmond Ball, the studies in question, which were referred to as the 
`Defence of Australia Studies', had not in fact started and it was quite some time before 
work began.42 When The Defence of Australia 1974 study43 was finally completed and 
circulated within the defence establishment it became clear that `the bureaucracy was 
not willing to seriously examine continental defence'.44 Among the reasons for this, 
according to Ball, were that direct defence of Australia was, `contrary to the tradition of 
dependence, would cause change and require strong decisions, and would probably be 
expensive' 45 
It was evident, as Ball indicates, that despite a growing conviction that Australia 
required its own defence strategy, in practical terms defence planners continued to 
adhere to the view that: 
Australia's alliance with the United States is an assurance of ultimate security against 
pressure backed by overwhelming force in the unforeseeable circumstances of the more 
distant future 46 
Other justifications for the alliance continued to emphasise that it provided `valuable 
intelligence associations'; that for Australia `there is no comparable alternative sources 
of advanced technology...open to us'; and that `[Australia's] association with the United 
States is welcomed in the region'.47 Overall, in Strategic Basis 1973 some conceptual 
40 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, pp.5 -6. 
41 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.90. 
42 Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.20. 
43 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1974, Policy Planning Branch, Department of 
Defence, 4 March 1974. 
44 Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.20. 
45 Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.20. 
46 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.89. 
47 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.89. 
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advances were made towards direct defence of Australia but in practice there was little 
progress. 
Strategic Basis 1975 
The next strategic assessment, the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, 
challenged previous claims about threats to Australia in the strongest terms yet. It 
argued that `Australia has been free of any major threat of attack on our country since 
the defeat of Japan thirty years ago'.48 In keeping with previous judgments, the 
likelihood of limited war with Indonesia was now assessed to be highly unlikely. Indeed, 
according to defence planners: 
It is most important that Australian Defence thinking should not see Indonesia, because it is 
a near neighbour from which these contingencies could arise, as a menace to Australia 49 
Indonesia was even considered to be a strategic advantage to Australia: `a friendly 
Indonesia could be expected', it was suggested, `to deter or least impede a conventional 
assault on Australia'.50 
With regard to anticipated levels of conflict, the Strategic Basis 1975, like the 1973 
Strategic Basis, focused on `Iow -level contingencies'. Moreover, Australia's operational 
environment concerned Australia's own physical environment and national geography. 
As Ball points out, `the policy guidance...restricted the operational environment 
essentially to the Australian continent, Australia's island territories, and Australia's 
maritime resources zones' .51 
Another important judgment made in Strategic Basis 1975 concerned the purpose and 
nature of defence policy in the current no- threat strategic environment. In the absence of 
imminent and serious threats to Australia, defence policy was now intended to: 
48 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, Chapter 1, 3 October 
1975, Canberra, p.2. 
49 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, Chapter 6, Department of 
Defence, Canberra, p.66. 
50 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, Chapter 4, p.32. 
51 Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.46. 
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[Provide] insurance for Australia against uncertainty...[and that] requires the maintenance, 
at all times, of basic military capabilities and competence capable of expansion, and sound 
international defence associations.52 
This notion of `uncertainty' about the future strategic environment now formally 
underpinned Australia's plans for direct defence of Australia. The defence planning 
concepts in Strategic Basis 1975, such as `warning -time', `lead- times, `a technological 
advantage' and a `core force', were developed with this strategic context in mind.53 As a 
result of there being uncertainty, rather than direct threat, Strategic Basis 1975 
emphasised that low -level contingencies were the most likely form of conflict and that a 
`core force' should be planned. This force should be able to undertake peacetime tasks 
and be sufficiently versatile to deter or cope with a range of low -level contingencies but 
would provide an `expansion base' that would enable Australia to expand its forces 
rapidly in response to emerging threats. The `core force' was to be guided by a strategic 
concept that took account of the nature of Australia's sea and air approaches, however, a 
major problem was that Strategic Basis 1975 only attempted a `sketch [of a] a long -term 
strategic concept' 54 
The task of planning a defence force in the context of uncertainty presented new 
dilemmas. As the 1975 Strategic Basis paper noted, `[t]he lack of a palpable or likely 
threat complicates the task of planning the defence of Australian territory'.55 Although 
advances were being made towards an independent defence policy, uncertainties about 
the strategic environment meant that the alliance was still important for access to US 
intelligence data and technology. Indeed, the alliance continued to be stressed in 
Strategic Basis 1975 in the improbable event of a major threat and in the light of the 
nation's inadequate capabilities. As it was stated, `Australia would for the foreseeable 
future, require external support [and] the alliance with the United States should 
therefore be preserved'.56 But at the same time, defence planners continued to stress 
their doubts about the `credibility of United States alliance commitments' and the 
52 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, Chapter 1, p.2. 
53 For example, in 1975 Strategic Basis attention was drawn to other determinants of Australia's 
force requirements such as geography (e.g., the sea and air approaches), population size and 
distribution, civil infrastructure, and so on, as well as the need for doctrine which addressed joint 
operations by the three services in defence of Australia. 
54 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.25. 
55 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, Chapter 6, p.67. 
56 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, Chapter 6, p.61. 
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`uncertainties about an effective US response where vital US interests are not 
engaged'.57 
The defence establishment undertook more `Defence of Australia Studies', but, like 
previous efforts, these became stalled for the same reasons noted above, and thus little 
eventuated in practical terms to doctrine, strategy, or force -structure. In any case, 
Strategic Basis 1975 was never given approval by Gough Whitlam's Labor government. 
In November 1975 the Prime Minister was sacked by the Governor - General and in the 
subsequent election Labor lost office to Malcolm Fraser's Liberal -Coalition party which 
called for another strategic assessment. 
ASADPO 1976 and the 1976 White Paper 
The Liberal government's new assessment, the 1976 Australian Strategic Analysis and 
Defence Policy Objectives (ASADPO), reportedly `refined the concepts of the 1975 
paper'.58 For example, ASADPO redefined `warning- time',59 discussed lead -time' in 
greater detail and examined the `Defence of Australia Studies' proposal that two levels 
of conflict should be stressed the notion of low -Ievel conflict', which had featured in 
earlier plans, and the more recently introduced concept of `escalated conflict'.60 The 
ASADPO concluded that: 
Major assault against Australia was the least conceivable contingency, and [the] capability 
related to it should command a low priority in force structure (subject to the requirements of 
the expansion base).61 
57 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, Chapter 2, pp.4 -5. 
58 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.25. (Reference to this document is from 
commentary that does not give reference details.) 
59 According to an official report, the definition of 'warning -time' in the I976 ASADPO, 'accepted 
that the actual emergence of a threat and Government recognition of it "would be a late stage in a 
series of developments and Governments would need to act well in advance of it ". Defence 
planning and preparations needed, therefore, to "be responsive to any strategic change perceived as 
having potential for harming Australia's interest ". This might involve "shaping and expanding the 
force structure, developing defence facilities and other infrastructure, security of supply lines, and 
other external support"'. See Department of Defence, `Key Elements in the Triennial Reviews of 
Strategic Guidance since 1945', submission to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, April 1986, Senate Hansard, 17 February 1987, Australian Parliament, 
Canberra 1987, p.314. 
60 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.25. 
61 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.25. 
20 
Defence of Australia and the Australia -US Alliance 
Many of the themes in the 1976 report were further developed in the 1976 White Paper, 
presented to Parliament in November 1976. 
The 1976 White Paper retraced familiar ground but it also advanced defence thinking. It 
noted that, '[d]espite the major changes in Australia's circumstances in the last thirty 
years, we have been free from threat of military attack since the end of World War Ií'.62 
It also claimed that `[f]riendly relations between Australia and its major neighbour 
Indonesia have prevailed for thirty years'63 and that `Chinese support for insurgencies in 
South East Asia appears now to be lower in level than for many years' 64 But the 1976 
White Paper dealt somewhat obscurely with the levels of conflict that might be 
anticipated with little mention of low- level' or `escalated low -level' conflict that had 
featured in the 1975 Strategic Basis paper. Instead, `shorter -term' contingencies were 
stressed, though the responses that were suggested were similar to those required for 
dealing with 'low- level' conflict: for example, sea -control, detection and response, and 
maritime surveillance.65 
Like the Strategic Basis 1975 paper the 1976 White Paper stressed that `the basic 
principle of [Australia's] defence planning' was [i]nsurance against uncertainty'.66 The 
planning concept that was at the centre of the policy was `a substantial force- in- being'.67 
Along with the elevation of `a substantial force -in- being' defence planners also decided 
that it was necessary to redefine the meaning of `warning- time'. Now it was no longer 
related to `Government acceptance of a perceived threat' as it had in the 1973 and 1975 
White Papers. The 1976 White Paper stressed that such acceptance would likely be `a 
late stage in a series of developments' and that it was therefore important that 
62 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 
1976, p.2. 
63 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.7. 
64 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.6. 
65 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.13. 
66 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.12. The policy was guided by five defence planning 
elements, among them several concepts from the past that were given a different emphasis and 
meaning. See ibid. 
67 A `substantial force -in- being' had to be capable of several important `current and foreseeable 
tasks': for example, the maintenance of a training base; the ability to deal with shorter -term 
contingencies; the conduct of surveillance operations and exercises with allies; independent 
operations; the demonstration of `Australia's serious attitude to defence matters'; and the capacity 
to operate with the US. Department of Defence, Australian Defence, pp.12 -13. 
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governments `act well in advance of it'.68 Defence planners were very concerned that 
governments would not act quickly enough and hence the redefinition.69 It is more than 
likely that the same concern Ied to the perceived need to create a `substantial force -in- 
being'. As the White Paper put it, `a capable and versatile "force -in- being" would 
substantially reduce the time necessary to organise an effective defence response' .70 
As far as doctrine was concerned the 1976 White Paper stated that `a primary 
requirement...is for increased self- reliance'71 and that: 
[O]perations are much more likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some distant or 
forward theatre, and...our Armed Services would be conducting joint operations together as 
the Australian Defence Force.72 
But beyond this there was little elaboration on `increased self- reliance'.73 
With regard to the ADF' s operational environment, the 1976 White Paper described the 
`areas of Australia's primary strategic concern' as follows: 
[Flor practical purposes, the requirements and scope for Australian defence activity are 
limited essentially to the areas closer to home...These are our adjacent maritime areas; the 
South West Pacific countries and territories; Papua New Guinea; Indonesia; and the South 
East Asian region.74 
As Ball points out `[w]hile the Australian continent was clearly central...it was also clear 
that greater attention was again paid to thè areas adjacent to Australia' 75 Indeed a short 
time later, according to Ball, the Liberal government: 
[A]ctually viewed the possibility of external operations as being sufficiently likely and 
important to Australia's security interests as to even require the acquisitions or development 
of specific capabilities 76 [Emphasis added.] 
58 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.12. 
69 See footnote No.122. 
70 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.12. 
71 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.10. 
72 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.10. 
73 The paper did note, however, that `Australian self -reliance would enable us to contribute 
effectively to any future combined operations with the US'. Department of Defence, Australian 
Defence, p.11. 
74 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.6. 
75 Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.47. However, as far as very distant 
defence was concerned it was categorically stated in the 1976 White Paper that `[e]vents in distant 
areas such as...Northeast Asia...are beyond the reach of effective defence activity by Australia'. See 
Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.6. 
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The dilemma for the Liberal government was where to draw the boundaries of the 
operational area to Australia's strategic advantage. 
The 1976 White Paper proposed capabilities and force structure that were centred on 
intelligence collection, maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, offshore patrol, strike, 
reconnaissance and deterrence.77 The idea that Australia should aim for a technological 
superiority over its potential regional adversaries was not explicitly raised. What was 
needed was `suitably' high technology and for Australia to `maintain its present 
relatively favourable position and be prepared to increase [Al selectively'.78 
The alliance was described as an arrangement that `greatly assist[ed] Australia's defence 
capability'79 and Australians were assured that `in the event of a fundamental threat to 
Australia's security, US military support would be forthcoming' .89 But even though 
Australian security might be ultimately dependent upon US support, `we owe it to 
ourselves to be able to mount a national defence effort'.81 These views, like others in the 
1976 White Paper, indicated that cautious, albeit mostly rhetorical, progress had been 
made towards endorsing `self -reliance' but there was still some way to go. 
1979 ASADPO 
Later strategic announcements, in particular, the 1979 ASADPO, `built selectively on the 
foundations of the documents of 1975 and 1976'. B2 This paper `attempted to give more 
focus to defence planning through an examination of credible contingencies' and it 
`attempted to set out-for the first time -a summary of defence policy objectives and 
6 Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.47. 
77 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, pp.15 -29. 
78 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.14. 
79 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.11. 
80 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.10. 
81 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.11. 
ß2 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.25. 
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capabilities requirements'. 83 Some parts of the ASADPO drew on the `Defence of 
Australia Studies' that were finally nearing completion,84 
By the early 1980s the process of developing concepts and plans for the defence of 
Australia via self -reliance had made progress. Exercises that concentrated wholly on the 
defence of Australia (the Kangaroo series) had started in the early -mid 1970s. The 
Liberal government had in principle recommended a `more self -reliant' policy and the 
Defence Minister Ian Sinclair had endorsed ít.85 However, the policy had still not 
adequately overcome the shortcomings which Ball had highlighted in 1979, namely that: 
The strategic documentation does not address itself in any clear or comprehensive way to 
the fundamental questions of Australian defence planning. Most critically, there is little 
positive guidance as to the operational concepts and strategies to be pursued for the defence 
of Australia...There is still no conclusive official study of the specific defence requirements 
and actual force structure for defending continental Australia against foreign attack. 86 
It was not until Labor came to office in March 1983 that these problems were addressed 
in a clearer and more comprehensive way, though again, as we shall see, several 
dilemmas continued to vex defence planners. 
SECURITY AGAINST' UNDER LABOR: DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA 
The first Strategic Basis paper presented by the new Labor government appeared in 
1983. It reiterated and consolidated earlier proposals for the defence of Australia and 
recommended, for the first time, `the development of military strategy and operational 
concepts for the defence of Australia'.87 These objectives became the centrepoint of the 
two major statements on defence that followed, the 1986 Review of Australia's Defence 
Capabilities88 and the 1987 White Paper.89 
83 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.25. 
84 At least one reason why the Defence of Australia studies were finally completed was that the 
defence establishment had been criticised strongly by the Katter Sub -Committee of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence for its failure to produce adequate 
strategic guidance. See Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.23. 
85 Interviews with Defence Department officials, Canberra, November 1998. 
86 Ball, `The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia', p.58. 
87 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.26. 
88 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities. 
89 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987. 
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Many of the security assumptions from the past continued to underpin the two policy 
documents whose focus was the military capabilities needed to defend Australia without 
outside assistance. As the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, stated in the preface of 
the 1987 White Paper: 
The first aim of defence self -reliance is to give Australia the military capability to prevent 
an aggressor attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on 
any part of our territory, or extracting concessions from Australia through the use or threat 
of military force.9° 
As the Minister stated, `defence self- reliance' was now the specific approach or doctrine 
for security. In both documents defence planners judged that no potential threat to 
Australia could be identified and that while Indonesia was not an enemy, the border 
between PNG and Irian Jaya was a possible source of friction. The dominant view was 
that there was no specific threat that could give practical guidance to policy and the 
purpose of defence policy was thus to plan against the unknown, to provide an insurance 
against uncertainty. There were however differences in the rhetoric of the two 
documents about how much uncertainty pertained to the region and what the policy 
responses should be, particularly in terms of force structure and defence strategy. 
`Security against' in The Review of Australia's Defence Capability 
The Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities91 was an important step towards 
developing an Australian defence policy for use against others. Indeed, in comparison to 
subsequent strategic documents, it was the most defensively oriented `security against' 
approach proposed during the Labor government. It avoided worse -case thinking and, as 
stated in the Report, `any tendency to prepare for unrealistically high levels of threat'.92 
As the author, Paul Dibb, later argued it was aimed at `planning a defence force without 
a threat' 93 The Dibb Report, as it was known, also attempted to determine the 
capabilities required for the defence of Australia. 
90 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.vii. 
91 The Dibb Report, as it became known, was written by Paul Dibb, an academic at the Australian 
National University, at the request of the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley. 
92 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.6. 
93 See Paul Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, p.I8. This small book was written some ten years 
later and explains some of the thinking that supported this view of defence policy. 
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A core assumption was that 'Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world'94 
but that `it would not be prudent to assume that we will always be able to conduct our 
affairs without challenge' 95 `Australia faces no identifiable military threat and there is 
every prospect that our favourable security circumstances will continue', it stated.96 
Moreover, invasion by another state would 'take at least ten years' and there would be 
ample `warning -time' for Australia to prepare.97 
Anticipated levels of conflict, doctrine, strategy, force structure, and planning concepts 
The prospect of major confrontations was unlikely but the Report emphasised that `there 
are possibilities for lower levels of conflict -some of which could be very 
demanding - arising within shorter warning- times'98 The two lower levels of conflict 
discussed in the Dibb Report were low -level and escalated low -level conflict. It was the 
judgment of the Report that `priority should be given to more credible low -level 
conflict, which would be limited because of limited regional capabilities' .99 
The Dibb Report had provided, for the first time, a comprehensive blueprint for the 
defence of Australia that consisted of a distinct doctrine, strategy, force structure, 
operational areas and defence planning concepts. The Report argued in doctrinal terms 
that Australia could provide for its own defence against the most `credible military 
situations' and that this could be achieved through a `strategy of denial'. The strategy 
amounted to `a layered strategy of defence within our area of direct military interest'.100 
It was `essentially a defensive policy' and it would `force an aggressor to consider the 
ultimate prospect of fighting on unfamiliar and generally inhospitable terrain'.101 This 
articulation of a clear defensive `strategy of denial' marked a major -and 
controversial- departure from conventional defence thinking. 
94 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.l. 
95 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.l. 
96 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.l. 
97 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.l. 
98 Dibb, Review of Australia '.v Defence Capabilities, p.l. 
99 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.5. 
too Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities. p.5. 
tot Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.5. 
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The capabilities and force structure required for a strategy of denial generally supported 
defence, not offence: for example, the assets were mainly for intelligence and 
surveillance, anti -submarine warfare, mine countermeasures and counter- offensive 
strike and interdiction. Importantly, during the most probable contingencies, the strike 
and interdiction capabilities were designated to a deterrent rather than combat role. The 
Report stated that strike and interdiction assets `would not play a significant part in low - 
level contingencies, except for display and patrol purposes to inhibit escalation'. 102 
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, to support the defensive nature of the strategy, it was 
proposed that `preference should be given to strike against maritime targets...[and] the 
development of land -strike is a lesser prioríty'.103 Again in support of a defensive 
strategy, the Report recommended that the `enhancement of the land -strike capacity of 
the F -111 force is not required at this time'104 and that `acquisition of any strike 
capabilities with ranges greatly in excess of 1,000 nautical miles from our northern 
coastline could not be justified'.105 (See Map 1.1 `Australia's region') Most 
importantly, the operational area that was to guide capability- acquisition was the area of 
`direct military interest' and it comprised continental Australia and the sea air gap. This 
area was distinct from a sphere of `primary strategic interest', which encompassed South 
East Asia and the South Pacific.106 The overall force structure requirements of the Dibb 
Report consisted of offensive and defensive elements, but the strategy for using those 
assets, including offensive platforms like the F -111, was oriented towards defence rather 
than offence. Offensive platforms could perform defensive tasks. They could also react 
to aggression with counter -offensive strikes. 
The main defence planning concepts in the Dibb Report-'warning-time', `lead- time', 
`an expansion base', `a force -in- being' and `a technological edge' -were for the most 
part supportive of a defensive approach. These concepts had been discussed in previous 
102 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.7. 
103 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.7. 
104 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.7. According to Desmond Ball, `Mr Dibb's 
view is that if the F -III aircraft were not already in the inventory, the strike capabilities which they 
provide could not be justified'. See Desmond Ball, `Notes on Paul Dibb's Review of Australia's 
Defence CapabiIities', Reference Paper No.143, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 
1986; p.10. 
105 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.7. 
106 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, pp.3 -4. 
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Source: Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities. Report to the Minister for Defence, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986. 
reports107 but the Dibb Report drew out their force structure implications. For example, 
the force structure was mostly concerned with a strong `force -in- being' which 
maintained a technological edge over other the military forces of regional countries. In 
this regard, the Dibb Report recommended that, 'it should be Australian policy to 
maintain an advantageous position in technology and operational skills in critical 
capabilities'. 108 The concept of `warning -time' was given particular attention because it 
addressed Australia's military responses to `future uncertainties'. The Report noted that 
`like any other nation, Australia faces some uncertainties' but that `no country could 
undertake a large conventional attack on Australía...in less than ten years'.109 In other 
words, the Dibb Report was confident that the contentious concept of `warning -time' 
107 The Dibb Report concluded that the `concept of a core -force does not provide an entirely 
satisfactory basis for force structure decision -making'. Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence 
Capabilities, p.35. 
108 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.I75. 
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was valid and provided a reliable way to address future uncertainties and the nature of 
an expansion base (see below). Indeed, `warning -time' provided a rationale for 
limitations on the expansion base. As Dibb later pointed out: 
[T]he concept of warning assumed a salient role in Australia's defence planning: without it, 
Australia's politicians would have had to accept military arguments for an expansion base 
force structure at the higher end of the capabilities scale. t 10 
Overall, the emphasis on `warning -time' and a restricted expansion base supported a 
defensive approach which anticipated that high Ievels of threat did not have to guide 
immediate defence planning, and that such threats could be detected and prepared for in 
sufficient time. 
The defence budget required for implementing the recommendations in the Dibb Report 
amounted to some $25 billion over ten years'tL -the largest capital expenditure in post- 
war years (see Table 1.1). The focus was on capital assets for intelligence and 
surveillance (e.g., the Jindalee over the horizon radar network (JORN) and the Defence 
Signals Directorate (DSD); strike and interdiction (e..g., new submarines); anti- 
submarine warfare, surface maritime forces (e.g., new frigates); mine countermeasures; 
maritime air defence; continental air defence; and ground forces. With regard to the new 
replacement submarines, the Report considered that they were a 'desirable rather than an 
essential increment' to the existing force structure112 and that the need for them 'is 
dictated primarily by expansion base considerations of the need to develop submarine 
skills' .113 Equally interesting were those recommendations not to proceed with certain 
existing assets: for example, not to modernise and replace the F -111s and not to 
introduce specialised ground -attack aircraft or helicopters for close air support. There 
were also recommendations not to automatically replace some assets: for example, it 
was suggested that the role of the Army's tanks be reviewed and that limits on the 
Army's use of artillery should be examined. Even more interesting was what the Report 
109 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.175. See pp.32 -34 for the Dibb Report 
justification for these concepts. 
110 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.18. 
I Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Department of Defence, 
Canberra, 1992, p.I. 
112 Graeme Cheeseman, 'White Paper in the Red', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44, 
No.2, 1990, p.104. 
13 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.65. 
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Table 1.1 Defence expenditure /outlay as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product and 
Commonwealth budget outlays 
Year Defence 
expenditure 
$m 
GDP 
% 
Cwth 
outlays 
% 
Year Defence 
exp /outlay 
$m 
GDP Cwth 
outlays 
1901 -02 1.9 0.4 8.4 1949 -50 108.5 2.0 8.7 
1902 -03 1.5 0.4 6.2 1950 -51 182.0 2.6 10.2 
1903 -04 1.7 0.4 7.3 1951 -52 318.9 4.2 14.9 
1904 -05 1.9 0.4 8.3 1952 -53 430.6 5.0 19.9 
1905 -06 1.9 0.4 8.0 1953 -54 355.5 3.8 17.2 
1906 -07 2.1 0.4 8.2 1954 -55 355.1 3.6 15.7 
1907 -08 2.7 0.5 9.0 1955 -56 381.4 3.5 15.8 
1908 -09 2.1 0.4 7.3 1956 -57 377.0 3.2 13.8 
1909 -10 3.1 0.5 9.7 1957 -58 370.2 3.1 13.0 
1910 -11 6.0 0.9 14.7 1958 -59 378.6 2.9 12.5 
1911 -12 8.2 1.1 19.3 1959 -60 387.2 2.7 12.8 
1912 -13 8.7 1.1 18.8 1960 -61 396.3 2.6 11.5 
1913 -14 9.5 1.1 19.9 1961 -62 406.2 2.6 10.7 
1914 -15 8.9 4.6 58.3 1962 -63 428.1 2.5 10.7 
1915 -16 9.5 9.5 58.1 1963 -64 520.9 2.8 11.9 
1916 -17 9.0 12.5 62.1 1964 -65 583 2.4 12.9 
1917 -18 7.4 12.4 61.8 1965 -66 711 2.5 14.1 
1918 -19 7.1 11.6 57.1 1966 -67 912 2.4 16.2 
1919 -20 7.1 7.5 48.2 1967 -68 1065 2.5 17.1 
1920 -21 11.3 4.3 33.2 1968 -69 1100 2.5 16.6 
1921 -22 12.5 2.1 18.5 1969 -70 1044 2.4 14.2 
1922 -23 8.5 0.8 8.6 1970 -71 1091 2.4 13.5 
1923 -24 13.5 1.0 9.4 1971 -72 1157. 2.5 12.8 
1924 -25 10.5 0.6 6.0 1972 -73 1225 2.6 12.1 
1925 -26 16.3 1.0 7.5 1973 -74 1268 2.4 10.4 
1926 -27 11.4 0.7 5.2 1974 -75 1558 2.4 8.7 
1927 -28 17.1 1.0 6.7 1975 -76 1759 2.3 8.0 
1928 -29 10.5 0.6 4.2 1976 -77 2071 2.4 8.5 
1929 -30 9.5 0.6 2.9 1977 -78 2248 2.4 8.4 
1930 -31 8.0 0.6 2.4 1978 -79 2456 2.3 8.4 
1931 -32 6.9 0.6 2.9 1979 -80 2839 2.3 8.9 
1932 -33 6.9 0.5 2.9 1980 -81 3347 2.4 9.2 
1933 -34 8.2 0.6 2.9 1981 -82 3886 2.5 9.4 
1934 -35 11.4 0.8 4.2 1982 -83 4501 2.6 9.1 
1935 -36 14.4 0.9 6.1 1983 -84 5056 2.6 8.8 
1936 -37 16.0 0.9 6.9 1984 -85 5657 2.6 8.7 
1937 -38 19.6 1.1 7.9 1985 -86 6333 2.6 8.9 
1938 -39 28.8 1.5 11.5 1986 -87 6823 2.6 9.0 
1939 -40 108.7 5.3 33.0 1987 -88 6967 2.3 8.8 
1940 -41 319.0 14.7 61.7 1988 -89 7295 2.1 8.8 
1941 -42 596.8 23.4 70.6 1989 -90 7913 2.1 9.0 
1942 -43 998.8 34.0 71.6 1990 -91 8480 2.2 8.8 
1943 -44 886.1 29.7 61.6 1991 -92 8731 2.3 8.5 
1944 -45 704.7 24.2 54.8 1992 -93 9158 2.4 8.9 
1945 -46 644.3 21.4 58.5 1993 -94 9746 2.3 8.5 
1946 -47 243.2 7.5 25.3 1994 -95 9731 2.1 8.0 
1947 -48 143.2 3.6 15.0 1995 -96 10011 2.1 7.9 
1948 -49 122.1 2.7 10.9 1996- 97(est) 10027 1.9 7.7 
Source: Defence Budget Brief 1996-97, Resources and Financial Programs Division, Department of Defence, August 
1996. 
Notes: (1) Outlays are only available from 1964 -65. Data prior to this date uses expenditure from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund. All figures are in a historical price basis. 
(2) Starting in 1914 -15, Defence expenditure was appropriated under a' War and Repatriation' 
classification. Figures relating to WWI exclude the War and Repatriation elements of interest, payment 
to sinking funds, war pensions and other repatriation payments. 
(3) Figures from 1973 -74 are adjusted to remove superannuation contributions /refunds to make them 
consistent with Defence Function Outlays from 1993 --94. 
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did not recommend: for example, the acquisition of airborne early warning and control 
(AEW &C) systems, in -flight refueling and extra amphibious forces.114 In effect, these 
procurement recommendations supported intelligence and surveillance and a force 
structure that leaned towards defensive assets. 
Criticisms of the Dibb Report approach to `security against' 
The Dibb Report was without doubt a major step towards creating a coherent policy for 
the direct, self -reliant defence of Australia, and in particular the development of a 
strategy and force structure to support that policy. But getting to this point had been a 
highly politicised process.115 For example, the position that the Report adopted on the 
probable levels of conflict that should guide defence planning took a middle road 
between two differing perspectives. As Dibb pointed out, `the Department and the ADF 
do not agree on the appropriate level of conflict against which we should structure the 
Defence Force'.116 As a result the Report took a position which: 
[Accepted] the priority need to prepare for credible contingencies below the level of major 
assault -but not at as low a level as the Department argues for, nor at the higher level 
supported by the ADF.117 
Given these kinds of tensions it was not surprising that the conclusions of the Dibb 
Report were the subject of considerable debate. Some wanted the Report modified, 
others called for it to he rejected completely.118 The former group maintained that 
several changes were required to make the Report acceptable.119 The strategic 
assessment in the Dibb Report, it was suggested, while basically correct, had different 
implications for defence planning. In this vein, Desmond Ball, for example, argued that 
114 The decision not to replace the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne had been taken earlier after years 
of bitter debate. See Parliament of Australia, An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, 
Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1982. 
115 The political aim of the Dibb Report was to resolve or at least manage the entrenched and 
historical tensions over the means to security between the military and civilians in the Department 
of Defence and between the three services. 
116 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.ví. 
117 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.vii. 
118 See Ball, `Notes on Paul Dibb's Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities', pp.1 -20. 
119 Most of these suggestions are derived from Ball, `Notes on Paul Dibb's Review of Australia's 
Defence Capabilities', pp.1 -20, and various chapters by other authors in Desmond Ball (ed.), Air 
Power, Global Developments and Australian Perspectives, Pergamon Press (Australia) Pty. Ltd, 
Rushcutter's Bay, 1988. 
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`it would be a mistake...to over -emphasise the low -level contingencies at the expense of 
the more unlikely but much more consequential higher -level contingencies',12° 
Ball argued that the strategy of denial was inadequate and needed to be supplemented 
with a more counter -offensive strategy and more offensive capabilities, including long - 
range land strike capabilities.121 Ball claimed that it was therefore necessary to 
modernise and then replace the F -111 strike capability; that there should be greater 
flexibility regarding the operational environment; and that there should be more caution 
about the reliability of the defence planning concepts of `warning -time and lead- time'. 
Recognising threats early enough and persuading governments to respond to them was 
more problematic than the Dibb Report had portrayed, critics suggested.122 From this 
critique it followed that the `force -in- being' had to be stronger than the Report 
suggested (e.g., it should include the F -111 upgrade, AEW &C, and close air cover for 
the Army). The critics won many of the arguments. While most of the Dibb Report's 
recommendations were retained, the White Paper that was published the following year 
diverged from its analysis and prescriptions in a number of significant ways. 
`Security against' in the 1987 White Paper (Defence of Australia 1987) 
The 1987 White Paper was Iess sanguine than the Dibb Report in its strategic 
assessments. The differences between the documents reflected several dilemmas about 
what type of responses would best enhance Australia's security -with the White Paper 
taking a more combative stance than the Dibb Report. 
120 Ball, `Notes on Paul Dibb's Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities', p.5. 
121 Ball, 'Notes on Paul Dibb's Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities', pp.1 -20 
122 Warning 
-time had been a contentious concept for many years. Its usefulness for defence planning 
was examined in several extensive in -house studies. See, A.T. Ross, Threat Recognition and 
Response, Volumes I and II, CSE Note 53, Central Studies Establishment, Defence Science and 
Technology, Department of Defence, August 1986. The fundamental concern within the defence 
establishment was that CSE Note 53 `postuIates an arbitrary and excessively rigid model of 
warning and threat and shows little awareness of the difficulties of subjecting these concepts to 
analysis and measurement'. The Department concluded that `the concepts and situations with 
which the study attempts to deal are far more complex and difficult to analyse than its approach, 
methodology and detail would suggest'. Department of Defence, `SIP/FDA Comments on the 
Study', CDS (CP3 -4 -37) Department of Defence, 13 July 1987. 
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Anticipated levels of conflict 
AIthough endorsing the judgment that there were no direct threats to Australia, the White 
Paper gave greater emphasis than the Dibb Report, not to future uncertainties but, to 
existing uncertainties which could result in `escalated low -level conflicts' rather than 
simply low -level conflicts'. Regional states already had the capabilities, it was argued, 
to conduct low -level conflicts: or to `harass remote settlements and other targets in 
northern Australia, off -shore territories and resource assets and shipping'.123 But greater 
emphasis was given to the next level, escalated low -level conflict, which anticipated that 
Australia could be subjected to: 
[I]increased levels of air and sea harassment, extending to air attacks on northern 
settlements and off -shore installations and territories, attacks on shipping in proximate 
areas, mining of northern ports and more frequent and more intensive raids by land 
forces.124 
Indeed, it seems that the emphasis on escalated low -level conflict justified changes to 
the `force -in- being' (see below).125 
Neither Iow -level or escalated low -level conflict posed a threat to the survival of 
Australia, but each could `demonstrate Australia's vulnerability and...force political 
concessions over some disputed issue',126 The final level of conflict discussed in the 
White Paper was `more substantial conflict'. It included `high -level intensive military 
operations against Australia' but it did not include invasion. Although the prospects of 
`more substantial conflict' were not high the consequences were direr. The obvious 
dilemma for defence planners was which level of conflict should be used to guide 
defence planning and capabilities: the unlikely but more serious conflicts or the more 
likely but less serious ones. The White Paper's endorsement of the more open -ended 
notion of escalated low level conflict provided a middle road between the two other 
levels and provided a justification for a `force -in- being' which maintained the F -1 l ls. 
123 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.24. 
124 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.24. 
125 Interviews with senior defence officials, Canberra, November 1998. 
126 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.24. 
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Doctrine and strategy 
The assessment in the 1987 White Paper, implying that there was a less sanguine 
strategic environment, justified responses that had a different emphasis than those in the 
Dibb Report. Self- reliance continued as doctrine, but the 1987 White Paper proposed a 
military strategy for defending Australia which specifically stated that self reliance was 
a `wider concept' which `reject[ed] the narrow concept of "continental' defence "'.127 In 
effect the Dibb Report proposal for a defensive `strategy of denial' and layered 
defence -which supported a more `defensive policy'-was rejected. It was replaced 
with a strategy of `defence in depth' which gave greater emphasis to counter -offensive 
operations for interdicting and striking foreign forces in more distant areas of the sea air 
gap and particularly on foreign territory. As the White Paper made clear, `[t]he strategy 
on which self -reliance is based establishes an extensive zone of direct military 
interest' .128 (Emphasis added.) 
The change from a strategy of denial to one of defence -in -depth indicated that `security 
against' in the 1987 White Paper had several characteristics. Defence -in -depth was seen 
to enhance Australia's security because, in strategic terms, it provided an option to 
terminate low -level and particularly escalated low -level conflict to Australia's 
advantage. According to Desmond Ball, too little attention had been given to the 
positive role of counter- offensive capabilities for resolving escalation from low- to high - 
levels of conflict.129 The remarks of several senior defence officials, however, indicate 
that, although this was indeed a strong strategic argument, it usefully supported political 
arguments for maintaining certain `sacred cows' in the force structure, in this case the F- 
111s.130 The change in strategy also suggested that defence planners assumed that a 
strong declaratory strategy emphasising strike capabilities and ambiguous target 
plans -would enhance Australia's security through offensive deterrence; that is more 
127 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.vii. 
128 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.vii. According to The Defence of 
Australia 1987, `[t]he area of direct military interests includes Australia, its territories and 
proximate ocean areas, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and other nearby countries of the South - 
West Pacific'. See ibid., p.2. 
129 For example see Ball, `Notes on Paul Dibb's Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities', pp.3-4. 
130 Other `sacred cows' included the Army's 
. 
tanks and heavy artillery. Interviews with defence 
officials, Canberra, November 1998. 
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than one that stressed deterrence via a defensive strategy of denia1.131 And finally, the 
change indicated that Australian defence planners considered it was prudent to 
accommodate the concerns expressed by the US about the Dibb Report: namely that a 
strategy of denial and continental defense necessarily excluded operations with the US 
further afield (see below). 
Force structure 
The force structure requirements prescribed in the 1987 White Paper put more emphasis 
on a highly capable `force -in- being', that could be deployed immediately and with effect 
in escalated Iow -level conflicts, and less emphasis on an expansion base for future 
uncertainties. As Dibb commented some years later, the 1987 White Paper `gave less 
emphasis to an expansion base and it focused the priority for Australian defence 
planning squarely on the notion of credible, lower level threats'.132 The specific 
capabilities required for a `force -in- being' should, it was argued, focus on maritime 
surveillance, strike, interdiction and protection tasks, including mine countermeasures - 
all of which appeared to be similar to the Dibb Report's recommendation. However, the 
elevation of the land -strike force of F -111s, first for modernisation and then 
replacement, indicated that land targets were a far more important option in the 1987 
White Paper than the Dibb Report. The latter had anticipated the removal of the F -ll is 
when they became obsolescent in the mid- 1990s. Moreover, in the 1987 White Paper, 
the wider set of platforms designated to perform strike and interdiction --the F-11 1s, the 
FA -18s and new replacement submarines -were considered a central element of the 
`force -in- being' for active use in low and escalated low -level conflict. The Dibb Report 
had suggested that strike and interdiction capabilities `would not play a significant part 
in low -level contingencies, except for display and patrol purposes to inhibit 
escalation'.133 (Emphasis added.) And, that in `escalated low -level' contingencies, `[o]ur 
131 See Andrew Mack, `The 1986 Dibb Review: Offence Versus Defence', Working Paper No.14, 
Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1987, pp.1 -32. 
132 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.16. 
133 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.66. 
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strike operations would concentrate on the approaches to Australia in a campaign of 
forward interdiction'.134 
Like the Dibb Report, the 1987 White Paper judged that platforms and other elements of 
the defence force, particularly intelligence and surveillance assets, should be tech- 
nologically superior to other regional capabilities. As it was stated in the 1987 White 
Paper, `the ability to apply advanced technology effectively provides the only real 
solution to many aspects of defending our vast continent and our interests in 
surrounding maritime areas '.I35 The intention was, `[not] to rely completely on imported 
technology and off -shore technological support', but rather, to support `the policy of 
self -reliance [which] calls particularly for the enhancement of our own capabilities'. 136 
Defence planners were becoming concerned that Australia's military technological edge 
was being eroded and had judged that strategic advantages were best sought by being 
selective and focusing on intelligence and surveillance. However, as Paul Dibb later 
argued, the 1987 White Paper provided inadequate guidance for priorities and means: 
[W]hilst intelligence and surveillance were given first priority...command, control and 
communications came last and there was little attention to the details of how Australia was 
to retain a technological advantage.137 
In subsequent strategic documentation the issue of how to maintain Australia's 
advantage in C31 technology was pursued in greater detail. 
Operational areas 
The operational environment for Australian forces described in the two documents 
appeared at first glance to be similar, since both stressed that `the area of direct military 
interest includes Australia, its territories and proximate ocean areas, Indonesia, Papua 
134 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.65. The Dibb Report also argued that 'there 
would be fewer constraints on the Australian military response as the enemy used more of his 
limited capabilities. This may include the use of Australian submarine interdiction operations 
against the opponent's naval ships, and offensive mining'. See ibid., p.65. 
135 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.31. 
136 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.69. 
137 Paul Dibb, `The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge', paper presented at the Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre conference on Maintaining the Strategic Edge: the Defence of Australia in 2015, 
Parliament House, Canberra, 21 -23 September 1998, p.3. 
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New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South -west Pacific' .138 
However, putting more emphasis on land strike by the F -111s implied that areas beyond 
the stated zones might also be targeted. Indeed, the 1987 White Paper stated that the 
area of direct military interest `does not...mark the limits or our strategic interests nor of 
our military capabilities'.'39 
Planning concepts 
In addition to the concept of a `force -in- being', the key defence planning concepts in the 
1987 White Paper and the Dibb Report were `warning- time', `lead -time' and `an 
expansion base'. However, the White Paper was more circumspect about the value of 
some of these concepts for defence planning, though it did recognise their political 
value. As already indicated, as a result of the greater emphasis on escalated low -level 
conflict the `force -in- being' was to be enhanced, with the consequence that there would 
be less need for force expansion.140 The `warning -time' and lead -time' concepts 
suggested that Australia would both detect emerging threats early on and respond to 
them in a timely matter.141 However, neither claim was universally accepted in Defence 
or the ADF.142 The result was that the `force -in- being' proposed in the 1987 White 
Paper was more than capable of addressing the most plausible low -level conflicts and 
was stronger than that suggested in the Dibb Report. For example, the F -111s were to be 
`refurbished' and AEW &C and in -flight refuelling were firmly endorsed.143 Shortly 
afterwards the government also made the decision to replace the Oberon submarines 
with the highly sophisticated Collins class submarine which went far beyond the 
recommendations of the Dibb Report that the replacement should be guided by 
`expansion base considerations...to develop submarine skills'.144 The idea that a 
138 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.2. 
139 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.2. 
140 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.18. 
141 The White Paper stated that `substantial military expansion' by other regional states `would involve 
long lead -times and would be clearly evident to us'. Department of Defence, The Defence of 
Australia 1987, p.25. 
142 See footnote No. 122. 
143 See the relevant sections in the Dibb Report (pp.59 -73) and the 1987 White Paper (pp.34 -64). 
144 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.65. 
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combination of reliable early warning and rapid expansion provided for Australia's 
security was not well received by some in the military. 
The alliance 
A final difference between the Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper approaches to 
`security against' concerned the emphasis on the alliance. In general both envisaged that 
Labor's formulation of defence self -reliance did not in any way exclude the alliance 
with the United States. The Dibb Report emphasised the `practical benefits of the 
ANZUS relationship for our defence effort' and acknowledged that: 
We would not have the same access to intelligence information, logistic support arrange- 
ments, weapons acquisition programs, and defence science and technology transfer from 
any other country.145 
The Dibb Report made it clear, however, that Australia's involvement with the US was 
limited and already sufficient.146 The White Paper, by contrast, elevated the importance 
of the alliance stating that, 'defence self -reliance is pursued within the framework of 
alliances and agreements'147 and that such arrangements 'makes self -reliance 
achievable',148 The 1987 White Paper was more open -ended than the Dibb Report about 
Australia' s perceived obligations under the alliance. It stressed Australia' s role in the 
'Western community of nations' and directly reassured the US that `options will always 
be available to Australian governments for assistance to allies'.149 
In important respects the 1987 White Paper foreshadowed that Australia's dependence 
on the alliance would increase, albeit in different ways from the past. On the one hand, it 
showed that it was certainly the intention of defence planners to make Australia less 
dependent on US combat support for defending Australia and to provide more options 
for Australian foreign and defence decision makers to act more independently. There 
145 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.4. 
146 The Dibb Report stated that `there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United 
States contingency planning for global war. The presence of the joint facilities, together with the 
access we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through Australia of B -52 
bombers, are sufficient tangible contribution to the alliance'. See Dibb, Review of Australia's 
Defence Capabilities, p.4. 
147 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.1. 
148 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.vii. 
149 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.3. 
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was no assumption of automatic involvement in US conflicts that did not affect 
Australia's interests. On the other hand, the White Paper demonstrated that self -reliance 
required US assistance, at least for the foreseeable future. Defence of Australia still 
required US support to acquire and develop the assets for self -reliance, especially high - 
tech military platforms and technology, logistics, resupply of stocks and transfers of 
technology for domestic research and development programs. Indeed as technology and 
maintaining a technological edge became more important, dependence on the US was 
hound to grow. The emphasis which self -reliance put on `warning -time' clearly 
depended on intelligence, much of which was gained from US technical means, 
including that from the facilities at Nurrungar (which processed information about 
ballistic missile developments from satellites) and Pine Gap (which provided satellite 
SIGINT). Any question of Australia being independent in these ways was assumed by 
defence planners to be strategically and financially unrealistic. Given that a key 
judgment in the 1987 White Paper was that conflict -be it low- level, escalated low - 
level or more substantial conflict -was always possible and that the best response was 
to develop more sophisticated technological assets for intelligence and combat than any 
likely potential adversary, then it was obvious that the alliance had to be central to 
Australia' s security. 
In terms of defence procurements, the 1987 White Paper introduced several changes but 
also retained many of the recommendations in the 1986 Dibb Report.15° In both 
documents capital spending focused on C3I, six new submarines, eight light ocean patrol 
frigates, six minehunters, as well as Seahawk and Blackhawk helicopters. However, as 
already mentioned, the 1987 Paper decided that the F -ills would be upgraded and that 
AEW &C systems and in- flight refuelling would he confirmed. And later the Labor 
150 Because of this Andrew Mack argues that the main difference between the Dibb Report and the 
1987 White Paper was rhetorical and not substantial. Obviously the argument in this chapter 
stresses the differences in declaratory policy between the two documents. However, it gives more 
weight to the decision in the 1987 White Paper to maintain the F -1115 m the force structure for 
foreign land targets and considers that to be a difference of substance. Another substantial 
difference concerns the practical implications of the different views of Australia's obligations 
under the alliance in the two documents. If the Dibb Report view, stating specific limits to 
Australia's obligations, had been policy at the time of the Gulf war it would have been much more 
difficult for the government to justify its participation in the war, notwithstanding its support of UN 
collective security. Clearly Mack's argument does not detract from the other argument being made 
here that Labor's `security against' policy evolved and built upon existing positions and that the 
dilemmas about means continued. See Mack, `The 1986 Dibb Review: Offence Versus Defence', 
pp.1 -32. 
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government decided that the highly sophisticated and very expensive Collins class 
submarine would replace the existing Oberon submarines. The expected cost was some 
$25 billion over twenty -five years.151 There were few differences in terms of practice. 
Defence cooperation with regional countries remained much the same and the Kangaroo 
series, which had started in the early -mid 1970s, continued to be the main exercises for 
the defence of Australia. Moreover, the exercises continued to be conducted in the far 
north of the country and in the sea -air gap, and to be focused on `reactive' strategies. 
Overall, the 1987 White Paper emphasised a more outwardly combative approach to 
`security against' than the Dibb Report. Its emphasis on self -reliance rather than reliance 
on allies appeared to resolve the earlier dilemma about how Australia's security would 
be achieved but in many respects self -reliance depended on the alliance. As critics were 
quick to argue, this undermined the objective of self -reliance. The contradiction between 
claims of self -reliance and increasing technological dependence became more obvious 
in the next White Paper published in 1994. t52 
151 For a critical review of defence expenditure for the 1987 White Paper see Graeme Cheeseman, 
White Paper in the Red', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44, No.2, 1990, pp.101- 
118 
152 Three other documents, related to the discussion but not discussed in this chapter, were published 
before the 1994 White Paper. The first was the Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s 
(ASP90) endorsed in 1989 but not published until 1992. See Department of Defence, Australia's 
Strategic Planning in the 1990e, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1992, Until September 1992, 
ASP90, or rather a version of it, was -a classified in -house document which set out some directions 
for moving beyond `protection', or defence of Australia, and towards 'promotion' of Australia's 
security interests in the region. According to Stewart Woodman, it marked the realisation by the 
Department of Defence that apart from the `narrow confines of the direct defence of Australia...a 
no less important aspect of effective planning was a more proactive role aimed at promoting 
stability within Australia's immediate region and ensuring that the prospects of a military threat 
emerging in the future was even more remote'. See Woodman, `Unravelling Australia's Strategic 
Dilemma', p.10. The second document published before the 1994 White Paper was the Force 
Structure Review. See Department of Defence, Force Structure Review, Report to the Minister for 
Defence, May 1991, Defence Publications 35/91, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1991. 
According to Woodman, the Force Structure Review was the Department's response to the 
declining defence budget and it 'introduced a number of significant but subtle changes to the 
existing program. These included creation of a new Ready Reserve Force in lieu of two 
understrength Regular Battalions, a move to two rather than three tiers of surface combatants, 
delays in the purchase of some lesser priority capabilities, reduced operational usage of combat 
aircraft to extend their life -of -type, rationalisation of defence bases in the south and consolidation 
of many training and support functions on a tri- service basis'. See ibid., p.12. The third document, 
published by the Department of Defence, was the Strategic Review 1993 (SR93). See Department 
of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, Defence Publications, Canberra, December 1993. This 
document addressed regional security policy and introduced the concept of `strategic partnership' 
which embodied Labor's new emphasis on seeking `security with' Asia. This approach contrasted 
with the other two parts of defence policy, the defence of Australia and the alliance, which sought 
'security against' others. As such SR93 will be discussed in the next chapter examining Australia's 
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`Security against' in the 1994 Defence White Paper 
The next White Paper, Defending Australia.- Defence White Paper 1994,153 offered the 
most pessimistic official formulation of `security against' during Labor's time in office. 
Like previous strategic documents it judged that Australia was not directly threatened 
and that uncertainties, not threats, should guide Australia's defence planning. But unlike 
the assessments from the past two decades and the 1987 White Paper, the 1994 White 
Paper stressed that the end of the Cold War had introduced `new uncertainties', which 
suggested `the relative peace in Asia may not last' and Australia's `security environment 
could deteriorate, perhaps quite seriously in the future'.154 
Anticipated levels of conflict 
The 1994 White Paper anticipated that there would be an `increasingly demanding range 
of conflict' and that `short- warning conflict' was the most likely contingency. 
Furthermore, it was implied that the `range of conflict' would include higher levels of 
conflict since it was anticipated that `the nature and scale of forces that could be brought 
to bear against Australia...will increase steadily' .155 This strategic assessment contrasted 
quite dramatically with that in the Dibb Report and, notwithstanding the qualifications 
above, with that in the 1987 White Paper. The emphasis that these last two papers gave 
to low -and escalated low -level conflict as the most likely form of conflict had been 
replaced with more dire predictions about `short- warning conflict' and higher levels of 
conflict.156 Defence planners were far more pessimistic about the regional environment 
than their predecessors in recent decades, certainly since Labor had been in office.157 
`security with' approach. Notwithstanding this new direction, the then minister of defence, Robert 
Ray, made it clear in SR93 that 'the defence of Australia will continue to be the focus of our 
defence planning. That reflects our highest national priority'. See ibid., p.40. 
153 Department of Defence, Defending Australia. 
154 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.4 and 7. 
155 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.9 -11. 
156 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.24 -25. 
157 For several scholarly views of the strategic environment in East Asia which were tess pessimistic 
than that portrayed in the 1994 White Paper see Stuart Harris, and Gary Klintworth (eds), China as 
a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia -Pacific, St Martin's Press, 
Melbourne, 1995; Harry Harding, `Cooperative Security in the Asia- Pacific Region', in Jame 
Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Brookings 
Institution, Washington D.C., 1994, pp.417 -446; Robert S. Ross, `The Geography of the Peace: 
East Asia in the Twenty-first Century', International Security, Vol.23, No.4, 1999, pp.81 -118. 
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Pessimism about Australia's strategic environment was based on several strategic 
developments since the end of the Cold War. Defence planners stressed that the rapid 
economic growth which most countries were experiencing would enhance their 
`strategic potential', that is, their `capacity to develop and support military forces'.t58 Of 
particular concern in this regard were the major powers in the region, China and Japan 
(and outside East Asia, India). Changing regional defence balances, it was argued, had 
implications for global and regional power relations.159 While the Paper noted that these 
developments were not necessarily destabilising it also argued strongly that regional 
`military developments over the next fifteen years will...add to the scale and intensity of 
combat'.160 Indeed, although these perceptions of uncertainty were based on several 
sources161 there is little doubt that a major cause was the expanding military capabilities 
of regional states.162 According to Paul Dibb, `[t]his focus on capabilities rather than 
threats enabled the ADF to give priority to the demands of so- called short -warning 
conflict'.163 
If pessimism about the possible relations between the major powers in Northeast Asia 
was a cause of uncertainty in the 1994 White Paper, then optimism about Australia's 
relations with Indonesia -its nearest neighbour and the biggest power in Southeast 
Asia -was equally pervasive. The White Paper stated that Australia's `defence 
relationship with Indonesia is our most important in the region and a key element in 
Australia's approach to regional defence engagement'.164 The argument, that had been 
made in previous strategic assessments, that `Australia's security is enhanced as 
158 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.9. 
159 The I994 White Paper predicted that China's economy would be the second largest in the world 
within fifteen years. Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.9. 
160 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.9. 
161 Defence planners also referred to `other problems' which could `produce an unstable and poten- 
tially dangerous strategic situation in Asia', such as `ethnic and national tensions, economic rivalry, 
disappointing aspirations for prosperity, religious or racial conflict, or other problems'. See 
Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.8. 
162 In November 1993, Paul Dibb, then Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the 
Australian National University in Canberra, argued that a particular cause for concern was the arms 
acquisitions of regional countries and that in combination with other issues, `the Pacific age could 
end in major Asian wars two or three decades hence'. See Paul Dibb, `Key Strategic Issues for 
Asia and Australia', in S. Bateman and D. Sherwood (eds), Australia's Maritime Bridge into Asia, 
Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1995, p.24. 
163 Dibb, The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge', p.3. 
164 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.87. 
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Indonesia develops its capacity to defend its territory' was repeated and for the same 
reason -`because', according to defence planners, `this makes it less likely that in the 
future any hostile third power could mount attacks from or through the archipelago 
across our sea and air approaches'. 165 In keeping with this argument the 1994 White 
Paper endorsed Indonesia's capacity to defend itself through the continuing 
development of its capabilities and professionalism, and with Australia's help.166 (This 
approach appears to diverge with other judgments in the White Paper that the military 
capabilities of other states should be a key determinant of Australia's defence policy.) 
Doctrine, strategy, force structure and planning concepts 
Many issues remained unresolved in the 1994 White Paper. There was the question of 
how much defence of Australia via self -reliance should depend on information 
technology and intelligence derived from the US to provide a strategic advantage in 
information warfare. Second, there was the issue of how much the intelligence the US 
gained from the joint facilities in Australia could -and did in fact - support self -reliance 
(see below). Third, there was question of whether the US would require a quid pro quo 
in the form of Australian participation in coalition operations for the technology and 
intelligence it provided Australia. And fourth, there was the issue of whether or not 
plans for defence of Australia required distant operations in the region and US support. 
Answers to these questions clearly had implications for decisions about doctrine, 
strategy, force structure and defence concepts. 
With regard to defence doctrine, self -reliance was endorsed but with less vigour than in 
the Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper. As stated in the preface of the 1994 White 
Paper: 
While the fundamental precepts of self -reliance remain valid, the approaches we take to 
developing and sustaining our defence capabilities and strategic relationships will need to 
continue to evolve.167 
What such evolution might mean in practice was not speIIed out. 
165 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.87. 
166 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.86 -87. 
167 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, 
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Strategy in the 1994 White Paper adopted what could be called `defence in depth plus': 
that is, operational areas were more distant and defence operations were more outwardly 
offensively orientated, relative to the 1987 White Paper and certainly to the Dibb 
Report. According to defence planners, the 1994 strategy was `fundamentally defensive' 
although, like the 1987 White Paper it was `not limited to defensive operations'.168 
However, while both papers agreed about the boundaries of Australia's area of `direct 
military interest' and that operations could take place outside it, the 1994 White Paper 
went even further. It stated that the ADF would `take the operational initiative within 
that area, and in some circumstances beyond it'.169 (Emphasis added.) The strategic 
rationale was that '[t]he range at which engagements can occur is increasing',170 as a 
result of the increasing military capabilities in the region. It was not clear in the 1994 
White Paper just what type of 'operational initiative' was envisaged: that is, did it 
amount to surveillance or combat or both; or was it to be offensive or even pre -emptive 
or simply counter -offensive? Neither was it clear just how far `beyond' extended: that is, 
how far north.171 But without doubt the strategy was more ambitious in terms of 
geographical scope than had previously been suggested. It also gave greater priority to 
maritime and air assets than to capabilities for defeating land attacks. 
In practical terms, however, applying a 'defence in depth plus' strategy was difficult for 
the ADF to sustain over any length of time. According to senior defence officials, the 
ADF had too few `deployable packages' or self- sufficient air and maritime assets, and 
certainly no land forces, which could operate independently in distant areas for any 
length of time.172 A related `problem', for distant operations, was that over the past 
decade the ADF had become tied to operations for near defence of the north of Australia 
and the sea -air gap (with the exception of land strike counter -offensive operations). The 
165 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.I4. 
169 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.14. 
170 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.25. 
171 The difference between Labor's 1994 White Paper and the Liberal- Coalition 1997 strategic review 
is probably more a matter of degree than kind. As suggested by Paul Dibb's comments regarding 
military trends in the 1994 White Paper these `potential regional capabilities were emphasised even 
more in the new Government's 1997 Defence policy document'. Dibb also argued that `as in the 
1994 Defence White Paper these trends [in the 1997 paper] were seen as having an impact on the 
scale and intensity of combat'. Dibb, `The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge', p.4. See also 
Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy, Directorate of Publishing and Visual 
Communications, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997. 
172 Interviews with senior defence officials, Canberra, November 1998. 
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major exercise series, Kangaroo, was designed for reactive tactics to address escalated 
low -level conflict. As Kim Beazley pointed out, the exercise was designed to `allow an 
enemy to come to us, and only attack them when they came onto our territory'.173 In 
functional terms operations for near defence depended increasingly on `the skills and 
capabilities within the Australian community' 174 and ADF had, by the early -mid 1990s, 
transferred several key elements to private companies.175 In other words, the ADF's 
dependence on civil infrastructures and support constrained the prospects for many 
operations to be conducted away from Australian shores for sustained periods. More 
distant operations could of course be sustained but only with the US. But this is the 
antithesis of the much -vaunted claim in the 1994 White Paper that `the fundamental 
precepts of self - reliance' were in fact 'remain[ing] valid'.176 
The 1994 White Paper focused less on major platforms and weapons systems and more 
on information technology and C3I. (See Appendix I `Major Operational Elements in 
the ADF, 1994'.) This was because the region's growing military capabilities which had 
been emphasised in the 1994 White Paper had cast doubt on the aim of Australian 
defence planners to have a technological advantage in platforms. As Paul Dibb argued, 
`[s]eeking...to sustain a technological edge over the full range of capabilities that could 
be brought to bear against Australia is no Ionger feasible'.177 More importantly, Dibb 
argued, [t]his poses a serious challenge for Australian defence planning'.17' In response 
the 1994 White Paper argued that Australia would need to become more selective `about 
identifying those areas in which we need to maintain a decisive lead, and give priority to 
them'.179 (Emphasis added.) The key areas would be intelligence collection evaluation 
and distribution; surveillance and reconnaissance; command and control; key weapons 
173 Kim BeazIey, `Response', in Graeme Cheeseman and St John Kettle (eds), The New Australian 
Militarism: Undermining our Future Security, Pluto Press, Leichardt, 1990, p.211. 
174 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.15. For the justification of this policy see A.K. 
Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community, Report to the Minister for Defence, June 1990, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990. See also Report of the Inter- 
departmental Committee (IDC) on the Wrigley Review, `The Defence Force and the Community', 
May 1991, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991. 
175 For example, catering, medical care, maintenance of military platforms were increasingly the 
domain of private companies within Australia. 
176 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, 
177 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.18 -19. 
178 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.18 -19. 
179 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.27. 
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and sensors; and electronic warfare'.180 In contrast to the 1987 White Paper, the 1994 
White Paper emphasised that command, control and communications assets (C3) were 
particularly critical. They would serve as potent force multipliers for a relatively small 
defence force. The White Paper also set the stage for greater focus on technologies 
derived from the US -led revolution in military affairs (RMA). 
The 1994 White Paper's emphasis on the region's growing military capabilities also 
implied that many of the defence planning concepts previously emphasised were of 
doubtful value. Confidence in long -term `warning -time' with respect to future threats 
became less relevant as regional capabilities grew and the debate shifted to tactical 
warning to address `short- warning conflict', As Paul Dibb pointed out `stealth, 
deception, secure communications, and more sophisticated electronic warfare measures 
are all combining to reduce military warning'.181 And, as a result, there `now is a new 
doctrinal debate about the nature of short- warning conflict, its scale and durability, and 
the warning that might be expected'.182 The logic of `short- warning conflict' was that 
the `force -in- being' had to be capable of meeting existing threats and be ready for a 
range of contingencies. The fact that regional capabilities were growing meant that the 
'force -in- being' had to be robust, it was argued. Development of an `expansion base' 
received even less attention than it had in the 1987 White Paper. In effect, most of the 
defence planning concepts from previous decades, which were aimed at preparations for 
conflict in the future, were downgraded in importance. 
The implications of the strategic assessment underpinning the 1994 White Paper for the 
alliance were significant. Defence planners were unequivocal that self -reliance meant 
that Australia `should be capable, without combat assistance from of other countries' of 
defeating any attack that could be credibly be mounted against ít.183 But as with the 
1987 White Paper this did not mean that the alliance was any less relevant. Indeed, the 
increased focus on C3I and information warfare made the US, as the most 
technologically advanced military in the world, even more desirable as an alliance 
partner. The two militaries' interest in interoperability, especially in C3I, had also 
180 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.27. 
181 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, pp.18-19. 
182 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, pp.18-19. 
183 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.14. 
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increased, if for somewhat different reasons. The ADF, especially the RAAF and RAN, 
wanted to increase their exercises with the most sophisticated forces in the world to 
improve levels of readiness, particularly in C3I. The US sought interoperability with the 
ADF as preparation for possible coalition operations. 
The practical responses in the 1994 White Paper were several. The Kangaroo series was 
continued, but there was growing discontent with the design, expense and outcomes of 
the exercise. The last straw was the Kangaroo `95 exercise when the `enemy won' 
because the defending forces could not predict where and when the raids would 
occur.184 The Kangaroo exercise was subsequently canceled and planning began for a 
new series called Crocodile. This series would focus on `an Australian Army task force 
operating independently offshore, or as part of a combined force with an ally'.185 A 
preparatory exercise, Tandem Thrust, took place in 1996 and the first Crocodile 
scheduled for 1999 is expected to involve the US and be `absolutely huge' .186 In other 
words, exercises for defence of Australia via self -reliance had now moved away from 
defensive and reactive responses to attacks on the mainland towards off -shore task force 
defence `somewhere in the sea -air gap "87 involving US forces. This suggested at the 
very least that the dilemmas about means to Australia's defence were well and truly 
alive. 
Overall, the 1994 White Paper presented a much more pessimistic strategic assessment 
than either the Dibb Report or the 1987 White Paper. It still left many questions 
unanswered. How would it be decided exactly where Australian forces would meet 
future threats? How would the balance between dependence and the needs of self - 
reliance be resolved, and so forth. In the 1994 White Paper, dependence on the US 
increased because the best counter to the growing military capabilities in the region was 
judged to be an Australia advantage or an edge in US- derived information warfare and 
other technologies, and later US -led RMA technology. This trend continued until Labor 
184 Interview with senior defence officials, Canberra, October 1998. 
185 Max Hawkins, `Army Learns to Fight Smart', The Australian, 20 November 1998 (a special Report 
on Defence Update '98). The Crocodile `99 `is expected to be carried out with US forces and 
commanded by a senior Australian officer'. See ibid. 
186 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, December 1998. 
187 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, December 1998. 
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lost office in March 1996 and increased in intensity when the new Liberal/National 
Party Coalition took office. 
Expanding `security against' post -1994 
In the time between the publication of the 1994 White Paper and the end of Labor's 
period in office in March 1996, several of the arguments that had been made in the 
White Paper were expanded. Huge White, the influential Deputy Secretary, Strategy and 
Intelligence, in the Department of Defence, argued that `Australia needs to redefine self - 
reiiance'.188 Self- reliance should he extended, he said, to `cover the defence of Australia 
in higher levels of conflicts than have been envisaged so far'.189 According to White, 
`Australia's capability planning will shift away from...low- intensity conflict' because of 
the growing military capabilities in Asia- Pacific.190 Self- reliance now required 
` increase[] in defence capabilities so that Australia could defend itself with its own 
force'.191 White argued for a greater emphasis on maritime capabilities and less on 
ground forces.192 He also argued that self -reliance required pro -active strategic options 
not just reactive strategies that had mostly guided strategy and the major exercise series, 
Kangaroo. 193 In White's judgment, 'it may be necessary to focus more on options which 
would allow Australia to seize the initiative early in a conflict, and use its assets more 
efficiently, both to dictate the development of the conflict and to increase an opponent's 
costs'.194 Whether or not `seizing the initiative' meant pre -emptive operations was not 
clear. Finally, White argued that `the focus on a narrowly defined concept of the defence 
of Australia as the determinant of its defence planning' should be expanded so that 
`forces chosen for the defence of Australia are those which provide the government with 
the widest possible range of options to contribute forces to operations elsewhere in the 
region'.195 Quite clearly the key partner for such operations was the US.196 Despite these 
188 White, 
`New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.26. 
189 White, 
`New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.23. 
190 White, `New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.23. 
191 White, `New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.23. 
192 White, `New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.24. 
193 White, 
`New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.24. 
194 White, 
`New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.24. 
195 White, `New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.26. 
196 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy. 
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Table 1.2 Evolution of 'security against' under Labor, 1983 -96 
DIBB REPORT 
1986 
1987 WHITE 1994 WHITE 
PAPER PAPER 
1994 -MARCH 1996 
ASSESSMENT: 
Strategic 
environment 
Anticipated levels 
of conflict 
RESPONSES: 
Doctrine 
Strategy 
Operations area 
Force structure 
Defence planning 
concepts 
Alliance 
arrangements 
'Australia is one of 
the most secure 
countries in the 
world' but 'ít would 
not be prudent to 
assume that we will 
always be able to 
conduct our affairs 
without challenge' 
Low -escalated low - 
level conflict 
Self -reliance 
Denial /continental 
Near defence of 
sea -air gap and 
continental Australia 
Strike and 
interdiction assets 
for defensive ops 
(phase-out land 
attack F -111s) 
+ surveillance and 
other assets 
'Warning -time'; 
'lead- time'; 
'expansion base'; 
'force -in- being'; 
'technological 
advantage' 
Practical 
benefits...of 
ANZUS'; 'no 
requirement for 
Australia to be 
involved in US 
contingency 
planning' 
No direct threat but 
stronger emphasis 
on existing 
uncertainties 
Low -level but more 
emphasis an 
escalated low -level 
conflict 
Self- reliance is 'a 
wider concept' which 
'rejected the 
narrower concept of 
"continental 
defence "'. 
Defence in depth - 
counter-offensive 
Near defence of 
sea -air gap and 
foreign land targets 
Strike and 
interdiction assets 
for counter -offensive 
operations for near 
defence of sea -air 
gap plus foreign 
and targets; + 
surveillance 
'Force -in- being'; 
'technological 
advantage' 
'Defence self - 
reliance...within the 
framework of 
alliance'; 'options 
always 
available...for 
assistance to allies' 
Exercises Kangaroo series- Kangaroo series- 
reactive 
No direct threat' yet 
the relative peace in 
Asia may not last'; 
'Australia's security 
environment could 
deteriorate, perhaps 
quite seriously'. 
Increasing regional 
military capabilities 
'Increasingly 
demanding range of 
conflict'; 'short- 
warning conflict'; 
and higher levels of 
conflict 
'Precepts of self - 
reliance remain valid 
[but]... the 
approaches... 
continue to evolve' 
Defence in depth 
plus (i.e., taking 
initiative) 
The sea -air gap and 
'beyond' 
Strike and 
interdiction assets 
for areas 'beyond'; + 
C31 
Technological 
advantage' in C31 
The alliance 
'supports the 
capabilities that 
Defence maintains 
for the self -reliance 
of Australia'; 
`Australia stands by 
its obligations under 
ANZUS to cooperate 
with the United 
States to meet 
common dangers in 
the Pacific'. 
Kangaroo series- 
reactive reactive 
No direct threat but 
even more concern 
about regional 
military capabilities 
'Higher levels of 
conflict' 
`Redefined serf- 
reliance' 
Emphasis on `pro- 
active strategy' and 
'seizing the initiative' 
The sea -air gap and 
'beyond' 
'Increase in 
capabilities'; focus 
on C31 derived from 
RMA 
Technological 
advantage' in C31 
derived from RMA 
Australia's 'defence 
posture depends on 
[the] alliance'; forces 
for defence of 
Australia provide the 
'widest possible 
range of options to 
contribute to 
operations 
elsewhere in the 
region'. 
Planning for 
Crocodile series - ? 
proactive 
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arguments made by White some two years after the 1994 White Paper, there was little 
evidence that significant changes to practice were underway, apart from plans for the 
new Crocodile exercise series. 
In sum, over the thirteen years of Labor government the strategic assessments and 
responses indicated that `security against' through defence of Australia evolved quite 
considerably. (See Table 1.2 The evolution of `security against' under Labor, 1983 -96.) 
What had started as a largely defensive project in the Dibb Report had evolved, in the 
1987 White Paper, into an approach that focused on counter -offensive operations and 
capabilities. By the time the 1994 White Paper was published the approach included the 
proposal for `taking the initiative' in areas `beyond' Australia's direct area of military 
interest. Finally, if the 1987 White Paper had appeared to resolve a key dilemma by 
emphasising self -reliance then the reality was that many aspects of self -reliance 
depended on the alliance. 
'SECURITY AGAINST': THE AUSTRALIA -US ALLIANCE UNDER LABOR 
Labor's defence of Australia policy was clearly connected to the Australia -US alliance 
policy. As the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, had stated in the 1987 White Paper, 
`defence self -reliance is pursued within the framework of alliances'.197 And as the 
Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence, Hugh White said at the end of Labor's 
time in office: 
Australia is doing more with the United States than ever before and benefiting more from it. 
The country's defence posture depends on that alliance, and will keep depending on it for 
many years to come.198 
These accounts suggest that the relationship between the two policies is straight forward 
and symbiotic. But, as argued in the previous section, there are tensions and dilemmas, 
not least of which is the fact that Australia's self -reliance policy depends heavily on the 
US. Furthermore, the alliance sustains `security against' other states, not only because it 
supports a policy of self -reliance, but also because it is an arrangement which anticipates 
that the US and Australia will form political and military coalitions against other states. 
197 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.1. 
198 White, 
`New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', p.17. 
50 
Defence of Australia and the Australia -US Alliance 
A closer examination of the alliance, historically and under Labor, shows more precisely 
how the connections between the two policies confirm this argument. 
Historical context 
The Australia -US alliance was originally intended to enhance each country's `security 
against' other states. For Australia, the original aim was to enlist US military combat 
support in the event of conflict. During the Pacific war Australia had turned away from 
Britain to seek US protection in a wartime alliance against the Japanese. As the Prime 
Minister, John Curtin, stated some two weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor and some 
weeks before the fall of Singapore: 
Without inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of 
any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.199 
A significant component of that wartime alliance was intelligence cooperation which 
included SIGINT (signals intelligence). Cooperation was later formalised as the 
UKUSA Agreement in 1947-48.200 The secrecy that surrounded the arrangement and 
continues to the present day obscures how important intelligence exchanges are to the 
strength and continuation of the alliance. 
The most public manifestation of the post -war alliance, the ANZUS Treaty, signed on 
1 September 1951, was intended to secure US combat support in the event of Japanese 
re- militarisation and an attack on Australia. Ironically, whilst Australia sought `security 
against' Japan, the US agreed to the treaty because it facilitated a `soft' peace treaty with 
Japan which would set the foundations for the US to establish `security with' Japan 
against what was perceived as a growing communist threat. Later, as the Cold War 
divided most of the world into the Western alliances and the Warsaw pact, ANZUS 
became the vehicle for the US to engage Australian support for `security against' Soviet 
and Chinese communism and associated versions in North Korea and North Vietnam. 
Australia's unquestioned support for the alliance and for US security policies against 
199 Cited in Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian American Relations and the Pacific War, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1977, p.47. 
200 See Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation 
Between the UKUSA Countries-the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1985; Desmond Ball and David 
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communism was based on the perception that if Australia supported the US, it would 
give Australia combat support in the event of attack. 
So focused were Australian defence planners on maintaining the `security guarantee' 
from the US via the alliance that the main focus of Australian defence policy was 
preparedness for operations with US combat forces, All three military services, the 
RAN, the RAAF and the Australian Army, aimed for interoperability with their US 
equivalents rather than with each other. Operational concepts and plans for Australian 
personnel and military forces to defend Australia together as an integrated force were 
virtually non -existent. Defence planners also hoped to encourage the US to provide a 
security guarantee by agreeing to host several US communications and intelligence 
facilities on Australian soil.20' 
When it was finally recognised in Strategic Basis 1975, that `Australia has been free of 
any major threat of attack...since the defeat of Japan thirty years ago' and the US was 
most unlikely to provide combat support to Australia, the original justification for the 
alliance no longer was credible. But the alliance had other rationales. One was that it 
enhanced global security, or rather `security against' the Soviet Union, because it was a 
part of the broader Western alliance. Australia's agreement to host the US facilities was 
said to improve the prospects for `stable deterrence' between the two nuclear 
superpowers. But the most important justification for the alliance by the mid -1970s was, 
somewhat ironically, the expectation that it would provide the main means for Australia 
to develop its own self -reliant defence policy. This policy was itself directed against, if 
not overt threats, then future uncertainties which could result in various levels of 
conflict. However, the exact role of the Australia -US alliance in the defence of 
Australia had yet to be determined. When Labor became the government in 1983 and 
developed a detailed and comprehensive policy for direct defence of Australia via self - 
reliance that role became much clearer. 
Homer, Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 
1998. 
201 See Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, Hale & 
Iremonger, Sydney, 1980. 
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The evolution of the alliance under Labor 
When Labor first came into office in March 1983, domestic factors played an important 
role in the Australia -US alliance.202 Within the three main factions of the Australian 
Labor Party there were differing views about the value of the alliance: the left were in 
the main sceptical; the right were generally supportive. Given the devastating electoral 
consequences of previous factional fights about security and defence policy in the ALP 
the Labor leadership felt it was imperative that a new Labor government find a way of 
accommodating these views. In addition, Labor had to consider the widespread public 
support for the alliance and try to engage US support for the upcoming defence policy 
which would stress self- reliance, and which the Americans had some concern about (see 
below). Hence, one of the first tasks the new government set itself was a review of the 
alliance which predictably sought to publicly address the concerns of all factions. 
Nonetheless, the strongest conclusion made in the review was that the alliance remained 
central to Australia's security.203 
Factional politics within the ALP continued to influence the government's handling of 
the alliance during much of the 1980s. In February 1985, Prime Minister Bob Hawke 
precipitated a mini -crisis when he agreed to a US request for USAF aircraft to use air 
bases in Australia when monitoring tests of the first -strike MX nuclear ballistic missiles 
which were due to splash down in waters off Australia. The Left faction, which opposed 
US nuclear warfighting strategies, objected to the tests. The Right faction, to which the 
Prime Minister belonged, was aware that support for the Prime Minister's position 
would divide the party in the up- coming ALP conference. Resolution of the issue, 
without further acrimony was made possible when the US Secretary of State, George 
Schultz, withdrew the request. A second request from the US to Australia to participate 
in another nuclear- related program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was also 
refused by the Labor government. To accept the invitation would have raised questions 
about Labor's public support for the Anti -Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was 
strongly supported by the Left faction. The Left's opposition to the hosting of US 
facilities in Australia at North West Cape, Nunungar and Pine Gap, was also 
202 See David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds), Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian 
Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1997. 
203 See Bill Hayden, `Review of ANZUS', statement to the Parliament, 15 September 1983, AFAR, 
Vol.54, No.9, September 1983. 
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instrumental in the government's plans for renegotiating the terms of the bases with the 
US in 1986.204 Australia was accorded a `joint' role in operating the facilities. Although 
the Left may not have accepted the argument that, on balance, the bases supported arms 
control and stable nuclear deterrence, they were not prepared to make a major stand on 
the issue. Factional politics in these cases largely explained why Labor in the first years 
of being government appeared to have qualified and not always supportive positions on 
the alliance. 
However, notwithstanding these domestic political considerations, Labor not only 
endorsed the alliance as a sensible `security against' insurance policy, but also sought to 
strengthen it. For the US, the alliance was a means to militarily, but more particularly 
politically, engage Australia on America's side in a number of regional conflicts. The 
US had made that point unambiguously when Australia introduced the new defence 
policy of self -reliance in the Dibb Report. The US argued that the Report's proposed 
continental and defensive strategy gave Australia few options for participating in 
operations with US forces, or for operations against others. According to the Minister of 
Defence, Kim Beazley, `[f]or CINCPAC...a central rationale for the alliance's existence 
appeared challenged'. 205 The Pentagon concurred with CINCPAC that the Australian 
strategy and force structure could become a military concern for the US. As Beazley 
pointed out, '[t]he 1986 meeting of ministers in San Francisco, saw detailed exchanges 
on the questions of Australian strategy and force structure'.206 The Labor government 
had to work hard at persuading the US that `a central rationale for the alliance', US 
coalition operations against others, was not in danger. 
Various arguments were employed by Australia to reassure the US. The government 
pointed out that the Dibb Report was about force structure requirements, not strategy. 
The Americans were persuaded that, as Beazley put it, `the force structure would 
include elements that would serve purposes beyond the defence of Australia's 
204 Bill Hayden, Uranium, the Joint Facilities, Disarmament and Peace, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984; the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Disarmament and Arms Control in the Nuclear Era, 
Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1986. 
205 Kim Beazley, `Australia -United States Relations' in Helen Hookey and Danny Roy (eds), 
Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers, Canberra Papers on Strategy and 
Defence, No.120, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997, p.55. 
206 Beazley, 'Australia-United States Relations', p.55. 
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approaches'207 The other argument which helped to reassure the Americans was that 
Australia's commitment to the Western alliance was unswerving and clearly stated in 
the 1987 White Paper, the key defence policy document. According to Beazley: 
They accepted our argument that Australia had fundamental and unambiguous support for 
the Western Alliance and our readiness to take tough, and sometimes politically unpopular, 
decisions to support that commitment 268 
The Americans were persuaded, in other words, that Australia understood that the 
alliance was intended, not just to assist with preparations for the defence of Australia, 
but, if necessary, to support political and military actions against other states. 
The US apparently `tested' Australia's commitment to this position on several 
occasions.209 President Reagan's administration made it clear that it expected Australian 
political support in the Gulf during the late stages of the Iran/Iraq war, As a result 
Australia volunteered to send a mine countermeasures team to assist the Royal Navy 
escort shipping in the area. According to Beazley, `it was made evident that non - 
participation would be seen as a pretty decisive turn away from shared interests' and a 
-worst case" interpretation of Australia's White Paper' .210 Australia's participation was 
rewarded with `privileged access to much information and important technologies and to 
more joint scientific projects'.211 
Intelligence and military technology 
Access to advanced US intelligence and military technologies had always been 
important to development of self -reliance and it became increasingly so from the early 
1990s.212 As discussed in the previous section, the 1994 White Paper sought to acquire 
C3I technologies which would give Australia a `knowledge edge' over the growing 
military capabilities of regional states. This emphasis on advanced C3I technologies 
from the US became part of a broader focus on technologies derived from the US -led 
207 Beazley, `Australia- United States Relations', p.55. 
20g Beazley, `Australia- United States Relations', p.54. 
209 Beazley, `Australia- United States Relations', p.57. 
210 Beazley, `Australia- United States Relations', pp.57 -58. 
211 Beazley, `Australia- United States Relations', p.58. 
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revolution in military affairs (RMA).213 As Desmond Ball points out, from Australia's 
perspective, `the...RMA is dependent upon the US alliance' .214 Therefore, it is more 
than likely, as Ball also argues, that `exploitation of the RMA over the next couple of 
decades will involve a closer and stronger Australia US alliance.215 
The Joint Defence Facilities are another source of intelligence which are linked to the 
alliance and which assist with the defence of Australia. In the Labor government's view 
not only were Nurrungar and Pine Gap critical for global stability, because they 
supported nuclear deterrence and verification of arms control treaties, but both were 
growing in importance for Australia's own defence of Australia policy. As Beazley 
states: 
[T]he facilities were beginning to support direct Australian defence needs [and indeed] the 
balance of the direct value of the facilities has shifted more heavily to Australia.216 
The Joint Defence Facility at Nurrungar potentially has a role in the tactical defence of 
Australia, in addition to supporting theatre missile defence systems for countering inter- 
continental or submarine launched ballistic missiles and intermediate range ballistic 
missiles. According to the military analyst Jeffrey Richelson, the US Defense Support 
Program (DSP) satellites can also be used for `detecting aircraft flying on afterburner, 
monitoring the movements of other spacecraft and providing data on events such as 
explosions at weapons depots and airplane crashes'.217 The first class of sightings - 
detection of aircraft flying on afterburner -is performed by the SLOW WALKER 
Reporting System (SWRS) and the JOGGER reporting system.218 These programs have 
been a permanent part of the DSP since the early 1980s. And since mid -1985, they have 
212 Just over a year since Labor lost office, the new Liberal -Coalition government published their first 
strategic document which stated that `[olur highest capability development priority...is the 
"knowledge edge "". See Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy, pp.56 -57. 
213 The Liberal/National Party Coalition government decided at the annual 1997 AUSMIN meeting 
between Australia and the US to `intensify interaction between Australian and US military units 
exploring the ramifications of the information revolution'. See Australia -United States Ministerial 
Consultations 1997 Joint Communique, 8 October 1997, p.8. 
214 Desmond Ball, `The US- Australian Alliance: History and Prospects', Working Paper No.330, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1998, pp.13 -14. 
215 Ball, 'The US- Australian Alliance', pp.13 -14. 
216 Beazley, 'Australia -United States Relations', p.58. 
217 Jeffrey T. Richelson, America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security, University 
Press of Kansas, Lawrence Kansas, 1999, p.xi. 
218 Richelson, America's Space Sentinels, pp.105 -106. 
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been supported by a US Navy contingent based at Nurrungar -known as the Naval 
Space Surveillance Centre (NAVSPASUR) Detachment Echo.219 
In 1992, a test to determine the value to Australia of using DSP's SLOW WALKER 
aircraft detection capability was conducted by the Department of Defence in conjunction 
with the US.220 Designated Hairpin -3, it tested the use of Mobile Ground Terminals 
(MGTs) for such purposes 221 It followed a joint US Australian exercise, designated 
Anchor Ready 92 -1, and announced by Defence Minister Robert Ray on 17 July 1992, 
which was designed to test the ability of Mobile Ground Terminals (MGTs) to take over 
Nurrungar's mission `in the event of unforseen circumstances such as natural 
disaster'.222 The results of the Hairpin -3 Trials were the subject of discussion between 
the US Air Force Space Command (USAFSPC) HQ and DSTO on 5 May 1993 and 30 
April 1993.223 
These new DSP surveillance capabilities had a clear potential to contribute to the 
defence of Australia. As Richelson points out: 
DSP's ability to monitor aircraft and spacecraft, and to provide measurement and signature 
intelligence on a variety of events in addition to missile launches, [makes] it a valuable asset 
to additional consumers in the military services and intelligence community.224 
It is reasonable to assume that if these additional capabilities of the DSP are further 
developed then some of them will become part the existing trend towards combining 
various C3I assets belonging to the US and Australia for the defence of Australia. 
This is already underway at the level of R &D. The potential role of the Joint Defence 
Facilities in combination with other US and Australian C3I assets is indicated by the 
statement in the Defence Department's annual report for 1996 -1997 that: 
219 Richelson, America's Space Sentinel, pp.105 -106. 
220 Richelson, America's Space Sentinels, pp.155 -156. 
221 This was of course in addition to the capability of the main ground station at Nurrungar to perform 
SLOW WALKER functions. 
222 Richelson, America's Space Sentinels, pp.155 -156. 
223 HQ AFSPC/HQ, History of the Air Force Space Command (U), January 1992- December 1993, 
Vol.1, p.201. Declassified from `Secret' to `Unclassified' and obtained under FOIA by Jeffrey 
Richeleson. 
224 Richelson, America's Space Sentinels, p.235. 
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[T]be potential of using satellite, aerial and ground based sensors for maritime surveillance 
and for ballistic missile detection has resulted from the development and use of simulation 
models and the staging of several trials.225 
Work which had started under the Labor government has culminated in several recent 
trials involving the US and Australia. During 1996 -97, research between AustraIia's 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and the US Ballistic Missile 
Defence Organisation, under Project Dundee, included firing of US Terrier ground -to- 
air missiles off the north -west coast of Australia. The project aims to enhance the 
missile detection capability of JindaIee, whose `viewing area' includes the north -west 
coast. According to the then Defence Minister, Ian McLachlan, `the aim of Project 
Dundee is to investigate the possibility of detecting missile launches in their boost stage 
immediately after the launch' .226 Thus, R &D programs were already seeking to combine 
US and Australian C3I for the defence of Australia. 
Indeed, there is already a high degree of C3I operational interoperability between the US 
Navy and the RAN. For example, the RAN's Maritime Command Headquarters in 
Sydney is the C3I centre for US carrier battle groups (CVBGs) in- transit in the sea -air 
gap.227 Overall, it appears that there is increasing cooperation between the US and 
Australian research and military establishments on technologies which have relevance 
for defence of Australia. And part of it concerns the Joint Defence Facility at Nurrungar. 
In interviews, senior defence officials, although not willing to discuss the various 
programs, confirmed that such programs underscored the value of the alliance for 
defence of Australia. 
The changes that are planned for Nurrungar in the future are unlikely to diminish its 
potential role in Australia's defence.228 The transition from DSP satellites towards a 
newer satellite system, the Space -Based Infrared System (SBIRS), will mean that the US 
will close the ground station at Nurrungar around 2000 -1 and establish a Relay Ground 
225 See Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, Government Publishing Service, 
1997, p.186. 
226 Don Greenlees, `Anti -Scud Tests Win Approval', The Australian, 9 August 1997. 
227 Interviews with retired senior defence official, Canberra, November 1998. 
228 The `Joint Defence Facility Nurrungar will be collocated with the Joint Defence Facility at Pine 
Gap' as a `relay ground station' in about 2000. See Department of Defence, Defence Annual 
Report 1996-1997, p.142. 
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Station at the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap.229 This means that the processing and 
analysis activities conducted at Nurrungar will be relocated to the Mission Control 
Station (MCS) at Buckley.230 However, these developments will be unlikely to alter the 
potential role of the DSPISBIRS satellites in defence of Australia. 
Importantly, Australia's hosting of the facilities is the quid pro quo for technology for 
defence of Australia via self -reliance. According to Desmond Ball: 
[H]osting the facilities...represents Australia's most meaningful contribution to the alliance, 
in return for which the US provides the sophisticated technology necessary for Australian 
self -reliance in credible contingencies.231 
And this situation will continue for the foreseeable future. As it was stated in the 1994 
White Paper, Pine Gap, for example, `will remain a central element in our cooperation 
with the United States into the next century'.232 
Because the alliance, and the access it provides to intelligence and military technology, 
was so important to Australia' s own plans for defence of Australia it grew substantially 
during the Labor period. Several examples illustrate the point. In the first place Australia 
unhesitatingly supported the US -led coalition against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
1991.233 Second, there was increased cooperation with the US military. According to 
Beazley, he was 'staggered...to look at some of the objective measures of cooperative 
activity [between the two militaries] and find that they have increased dramatically since 
the end of the Cold War'.234 For example: 
229 Richelson, America's Space Sentinels, p.224. 
230 Richelson, America's Space Sentinels, p.224. 
231 Ball, `The US- Australian Alliance', p.8. 
232 Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p.98. 
233 The argument that Australia's decision was not so much a sign of commitment to the alliance with 
the US and more an indication of support for the UN' s new role in the post -cold war period to 
establish collective `security against' a clear aggressor, whose tactics also had global con- 
sequences, has to be taken seriously. On the other hand, so too are the arguments that even support 
for the UN operations should be constrained to regions of direct interest to Australia. However, 
given Beazley's comments above, that the US suspected that Australia's doctrine would have 
restricted support for US operations, it would have been almost impossible to stand aside and 
jeopardise the assistance which the US gives to Australia for intelligence and technology for 
defence of Australia. 
214 Beazley, `Australia- United States Relations', pp.52 -62. 
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the number of visits by two -star and more senior officials in 1995 was six times that 
of the last year of the Fraser government in 1982 -48 against eight 
the number of exercises conducted with the United States and the number of service 
personnel and aircraft involved increased by about one -third 
Australian/US exercise planning was raised from the previously tactical operational 
level to include greater strategic focus 
the ability of Australia and the US military forces to exercise together was enhanced 
by the move from a three- to a four- exercise planning cycle which aligns with the 
CINCPAC's cycle 
military exercises were also enhanced by the redrafting of the 1978 ANZUS 
Planning Manual (APU), which provides strategic guidance and more detailed 
exercises and contingency planning. Some 250 legal arrangements and agreements 
on defence related matters now function between Australia and the US 
a `willingness [from both the US and Australia] to continue to explore and if 
possible develop...elements of the United States ballistic missile defence program' 
was confirmed.235 The first experiments were conducted in 1995 and preparations 
for `further activity' arranged236 
a joint security declaration and `additional access for US forces to training facilities 
in Australia, and the Joint Defence Facilities' was agreed upon in 1995.237 
Moreover, these developments in the alliance took place with very little comment from 
the critics of the alliance. As Beazley remarked, the fact that his successor, Defence 
Minister Robert Ray, could offer in 1994 to support research with the US on ballistic 
missile defences without causing criticism was in `stark contrast' to the `extensive 
235 Beazley, `Australia -United States Relations', pp.52 -62. 
236 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, Government Publishing Service, 
1996, p.125. See Greenlees, `Anti -Scud Tests Win Approval'. 
237 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.125. 
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agitation' which Beazley would have expected when he was the Defence Minister in the 
early days of Labor's office.238 
From the US perspective Australia's commitment to the alliance -in terms of its 
political and operational coalitions against others -was confirmed by Labor. As a result 
the US was content to support the formulation of self -reliance which Australian Defence 
planners had developed. According to Beazley a new generation of American leaders 
concurred with the proposition that: 
[A]s a close ally of long standing and a major buyer of United States defence equipment, 
Australia would continue to receive preferential access to United States intelligence and 
military science and technology so as to assist Australia in maintaining defence force 
readiness and capability at the level of sophistication envisaged in Australia's defence 
policy.239 
Under Labor the purpose of the alliance continued to support Australia's `security 
against' policy, the defence of Australia, and as that depended more and more on 
information technology from the US so too did the alliance grow stronger and closer. 
According to senior defence officials, from the US perspective, the alliance under Labor 
became the closest in the region.24° 
CONCLUSION 
During the thirteen years of Labor government both defence of Australia and the 
alliance with the US evolved in significant ways and each policy enhanced Australia's 
ability to defend itself against other states. Defence of Australia via self -reliance clearly 
expanded from a more defensive approach to `security against' to one that anticipated 
operations against sophisticated maritime and air military assets much further afield. 
Certainly the reactive elements first elaborated in the Díbb Report gave way to ones 
which took `the initiative'. Even some of the more defensive concepts such as `core 
238 Beazley, `Australia- United States Relations', p.61. 
239 Australia- United States Ministerial Talks: Communiqué, Canberra, 8 -9 March 1994. 
240 Interviews with senior defence officials, Canberra, November 1998. For a wider coverage of the 
alliance relationship under Labor and the subsequent Liberal/Coalition government see William T. 
Tow (ed.), Australian and American Relations: Looking Toward the Next Century, St Martins 
Press, New York, I998; William T. Tow, `The Future of Alliances: AUSMIN as a Case Study', 
paper presented at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre conference on Maintaining the 
Strategic Edge: the Defence of Australia in 2015, Parliament House, Canberra, 21 -23 September 
1998, pp.1 -42. 
61 
Defence of Australia and the Australia -US Alliance 
force', `expansion base' and `warning -time' which allowed for minimal force structures 
were either dropped or questioned. 
Paradoxically the alliance became more important for self- reliance. Although the Dibb 
Report and the 1987 White Paper had officially resolved those dilemmas it was evident 
that defence of Australia via self -reliance would depend in many respects on the 
alliance. The 1994 White Paper, however, exposed that dependence and increased it. 
Notwithstanding these serious and unresolved questions about means, policies for 
'security against' under Labor increased significantly. 
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LABOR'S `SECURITY WITH' POLICY: 
THE POLICY CONCEPTS OF REGIONAL SECURITY 
Instead of seeking security from Asia, we should seek security in and with Asia. t 
(The Prime Minister, Mr Bob Hawke) 
In this model, traditional elements of realpolitik...are replaced by new forms and 
institutions of multilateral cooperative behaviour.2 
(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans) 
During its time in office from 1983 to 1996, the Labor government significantly 
enhanced Australia's `security against' policies. Concurrently, the government pursued a 
regional security policy based on `security with' other states, which went beyond 
previous efforts to develop security, based on cooperation with Southeast East Asian 
countries.3 Indeed, never in Australia's history had `security with' other states been 
pursued so vigorously. 
To support this claim this chapter describes the evolution of Australia's regional 
security policy under Labor. The first and second sections examine the policy and the 
changing regional context while Bill Hayden and then his successor Gareth Evans were 
the foreign ministers. The key policy concepts formulated by Evans,4 namely 'common 
security', `comprehensive security' and the umbrella concept of `cooperative security' 
are examined. So too is the strong opposition to the policy from the US, regional states 
2 
3 
4 
Bob Hawke, 'Australia's Security in Asia', address to the Asia -Australia Institute, Sydney, 24 May 
1991, p.3. Also quoted by the Foreign Minster, Gareth Evans in `Managing Australia's Asian 
Future', address to the Asia -Australia Institute, Sydney, 3 October 1991, The Monthly Record, 
October 1991, p.660. (Unless otherwise indicated all speeches by Foreign Minister Evans are 
published in the 'Minister for Foreign Affairs Speech Series', published by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade). 
Gareth Evans, `The Asia Pacific in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation ?', address to the 
1995 Pacific Rim Forum, Bangkok, 1 December 1995, p.6. 
Australia had been a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) from 
September 1954 to June 1977. However, unlike the `security with' focus of Labor's policy, 
SEATO was a security arrangement directed against communist expansion in Southeast Asia and 
only Thailand and the Philippines were members. Furthermore, the extent of Australia's military 
cooperation with these states was limited because both had small and unsophisticated forces. See 
Lezek Buszynki, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy, Singapore University Press, 
Singapore, 1983. 
Most of the policy concepts were developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
to a lesser extent the Department of Defence. 
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and the Liberal/National Coalition Opposition and, in the face of this criticism, Labor's 
continuing commitment to pursuing a policy of `security with' others. The final section 
examines the limitations and apparent contradictions in the policy. 
SECURITY COOPERATION UNDER FOREIGN MINISTER BILL HAYDEN (1983 -88) 
When Labor won the election in March 1983 many in the ALP were acutely aware that 
the party's previous attempts to acquire and hold government had been seriously 
undermined by factional fights over foreign and security policies.5 Thus when the 
inaugural Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, explained Labor's security philosophy he was 
careful to give a balanced account of future policy directions: 
As democratic socialists we advocate and seek to practice non -military appraisals of 
power problems. We are averse to military interventions and solutions...[b]ut...we are 
not a pacifist party...[w]e are sober realists and certainly we would aim at a sufficiently 
capable defence force structure to look after this country's interests in the event it was 
subjected to some sort of threat or attack.5 
Hayden's comments indicated that the government was committed to a strong defence 
posture and at the same time rejected interventionist military means for regional security 
policy. For many in the Labor Party the failure of past Australian military policies in 
Asia had been painfully demonstrated by the Vietnam war.7 Hayden felt a personal 
obligation to find a settlement to the continuing conflict in Indo- China, even arguing in 
a statement to the parliament, which endorsed the sacrosanct ANZUS Treaty, that: 
Much more important to the future peace and security of Australia than any treaty... 
must be the achievement of a stable [and] harmonious...Asia -Pacific region.8 
5 See David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds), Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian 
Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1997. 
6 Bill Hayden, `The Australian Government's Foreign Policy Philosophy', Australian Foreign 
Affairs Record (AFAR), Vol.55, No.4, April 1984, pp.305 -307. 
7 Criticism from the ALP was not so obvious when Australia first became involved in Vietnam but 
increased as the war went on. Many members of the ALP became leaders of the anti- Vietnam 
movement. When Gough Whitlam became the Prime Minister in 1972 he immediately withdrew 
Australian troops from Vietnam. For accounts of Australia's role in Vietnam see Peter King (ed.), 
Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo -China War, George Allen & Unwin, St 
Leonards Sydney, 1983; Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam, Allen & 
Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1987. 
Bill Hayden, `Review of ANZUS', statement to the Parliament, 15 September 1983, AFAR, 
Vol.54, No.9, September 1983, p.517. 
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The government saw regional issues as providing an avenue to `strongly assert [its] 
regional interests and to present and pursue [its] own distinctive policies' for regional 
security.9 
Early set -backs for Labor's regional security policy 
Labor's intent to develop `distinctive policies' for regional security, in this case for 
Indo China, underpinned one of the first cooperative initiatives taken by the 
government. Although at that time Labor had formulated very few policy concepts to 
guide the policy it was founded on the idea that cooperation with states enhanced 
security. For example, at the 1983 ASEAN -PMC, Hayden informed regional leaders that 
Australia sought to change its policy and to engage the communist regime in Vietnam.'° 
In a period some called the Second Cold War the Foreign Minister's intention to visit 
Hanoi, resume bilateral aid and to end Vietnam's isolation from the region was not well 
received by the ASEAN countries or the US.11 As a result not only were Australia's 
efforts to cooperate with ASEAN foiled, but its attempts to introduce security 
cooperation in Indo China and the region more generally were unsuccessful. It became 
clear that if Australia were serious about exercising some influence on security matters 
in the region its `distinctive policies' would have to accommodate ASEAN interests 
more sensitively. 
Labor's approach to regional security even at this early stage was distinctive for its 
emphasis on cooperation-in this instance by `engaging' Vietnam and seeking to lessen 
its dependence on the USSR by enmeshing it in the region. The policy stressed the 
importance of cooperative measures, such as dialogue, multilateralism, regional 
institutions and economic interdependence. Some time later when Hayden sought to 
improve the security situation in the North Pacific (see below) some of these ideas were 
further developed. This general emphasis on cooperation also informed Australia's 
1990 -91 initiative for Cambodian self- determination that brought in the UN as the 
transitional organisation to `govern' and provide for `fair and free' elections in 
9 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: in the World of the 1990s, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991, p.208. 
10 See Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations', pp.208 -218; Ken Berry, Cambodia From 
Red to Blue: Australia's Initiative for Peace, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1997. 
11 Berry, Cambodia From Red to Blue, pp.5 -7. 
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Cambodia. This time Australia's initiative was well received by the region, partly 
because the bigger powers' relationships with Cambodia and Vietnam had diminished in 
importance and partly because Australia had learned to work with the ASEAN 
countries.« 
From economic cooperation to security cooperation 
If in the mid -1980s the Labor government had little to show for its cooperative approach 
to regional security, it could nevertheless point to progress in regional economic 
cooperation. Over time this exercise in economic cooperation not only facilitated 
Australia's subsequent attempts to boost cooperative security but also, many would 
argue, enhanced security both within and between states in the region. 
From the beginning the Labor government recognised that there were synergies between 
its economic and security policies. Economic issues had dominated the election that had 
brought the ALP into office and the new government's reputation depended heavily on 
an economic recovery. That recovery was seen to have two dimensions. The first 
depended on economic reform at home, which included drastic reductions to tariffs and 
other traditional protectionist measures. The second was economic engagement with 
East Asia. Australia's trade with the region was increasing Japan continued to be 
Australia' s main trading partner and other Northeast Asian states, such as South Korea 
and Taiwan were growing in importance.13 But to ensure its economic future Australia 
needed greater access to markets in East Asia. Stronger economic cooperation with Asia 
was critical to Australia's future and Labor's re- election. 
From Australia's perspective, a regional economic environment that operated on the 
cooperative principles of free trade and open regionalism made both economic and 
political sense. Apart from the obvious economic gains, Hayden also argued that 
increasing economic development in the region would enhance Australian security, `the 
12 Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, `Strategic Involvement and International Partnership: Australia's Post 
1975 Relations With Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam', Australia Asia Papers No.68, Centre for the 
Study of Australian and Asian Relations, Griffith University, Queensland, pp.1 -14; Berry, 
Cambodia From Red to Blue. 
13 See Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989. 
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most successful contribution which can be made in our region...comes from, those sorts 
of commercial activity providing...social and political cohesion' )4 
Australia worked at both the international and regional levels to further economic 
liberalisation. But increasing scepticism about the likelihood that negotiations in the 
principal liberal trading institution, the GATT, would address Australia's economic 
concerns convinced Australian officials that a regional approach to GATT and the 
establishment of another organisation to promote intra- regional economic cooperation 
was necessary. In November 1989, Australia took the lead in establishing an intra- 
regional organisation, APEC, that was to become the key regional body supporting trade 
liberalisation.15 
These official attempts to increase economic cooperation had been preceded and greatly 
helped by considerable cooperation at the non -official level, involving business people, 
officials and academics.16 Several organisations had been established: the main ones 
were the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967; the Pacific Trade and 
Development Conferences (PAFTAD) in 1968; and the Pacific Economic Co- operation 
Conference (PECC) in 1980.17 These second -track activities (as they became known) 
were instrumental in showing that regional cooperation and multilateralism was possible 
14 Hayden, `the Australian Government's Foreign Policy Philosophy', pp.305 -307. 
15 See John Crawford and Greg Seow (eds), Pacific Economic Cooperation: Suggestions for Action, 
Heinemann, Selangor Malaysia, 1981; Peter Drysdale and Hugh Patrick, An Asia Pacific Regional 
Economic Organisation, Library of Congress Congressional Research Paper, Washington DC, 
1979; Andrew Elek, `The Evolution of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation', paper prepared for a 
symposium on The Development of Cooperation of the Asia's West Pacific Technology and 
Economy, Beijing, August 1990, pp.1 -15; C. Fred Bergsten, APEC and World Trade: A Force for 
World Wide Liberalisation', Foreign Affairs, May /June 1994, pp20 -26; Hadi Soesastro, APEC 
and the Strengthening of the Asia -Pacific', paper presented at the conference of The New Asia - 
Pacific Order, Singapore, pp.I -21. For Australia's efforts to represent regional primary commodity 
producers interests in the Cairns Group see Richard Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper, `Middle 
Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations', International Organization, Vol.44, No.4, 1990, pp.589 -632; and Peter W. 
Gallagher, `Setting the Agenda for Trade Negotiations: Australia and the Cairns Group', 
Australian Outlook, Vol.42, No.1, 1988, pp.3 -8. 
t6 See Lawrence Woods, Asia- Pacific Diplomacy, Nongovernmental Organisations and Inter- 
national Relations, UBC Press, Vancouver, 1993. 
17 See Stuart Harris, `Concepts and Objectives of Pacific Economic Cooperation', Pacific Economic 
Papers, No.213, Novemher, 1992, pp.1 -22; Stuart Harris, `Policy Networks and Economic 
Cooperation', The Pacific Review, Vol.7, No.4, 1994, pp.381 -395; Hadi Soesastro, `Institutional 
Aspects of Pacific Cooperation', in Hadi Soesastro and Han Sung -Joo (eds), Pacific Economic 
Cooperation: The Next Phase, Centre of Strategic and international Studies, Jakarta, October 1983, 
pp.3-52. 
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and in making the intellectual case for cooperation. AIthough economic and political 
concerns were uppermost, the links with security were also emphasised. Then Secretary 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Stuart Harris, argued that: 
[T]he multilateral, non -discriminatory and liberal world trading and economic system... 
[was] constructed...for common economic gain and as a fundamental and necessary 
basis for world peace.18 
From Australia's perspective, the assumption that there was a positive link between 
cooperative economic arrangements and security was another factor that justified 
cooperation. 
But Harris also argued that the nature of economic cooperation might need to adapt to 
particular conditions in the Asia Pacific. Some aspects of Australia's approach -those 
based largely on European examples of economic cooperation -did not necessarily 
apply to the region. Formal institutions, Harris suggested, may be less suitable than 
`various informal institutional arrangements'.19 In the Asia Pacific region the economic, 
cultural, social and historical differences required a `pluralistic approach', Harris 
argued. These kinds of considerations required Australia to adopt a distinctive approach 
to regional economic cooperation. 
Indeed, Australia's willingness to adjust its policy, at least in principle, to regional 
conditions was one reason why Labor's attempts to foster economic cooperation were 
more successful than its initial attempts to introduce security cooperation.2° In addition, 
economic policy was guided by widely accepted principles -the stress on free trade for 
example -and was supported by strong second -track forums. Australia's regional 
economic involvement gained it sought -after and needed recognition as a regional 
player, notwithstanding some criticism from other regional states.21 This proved useful 
18 Stuart Harris, `Pacific Economic Co- operation: Australia and Japan', 13th Annual Australia -Japan 
Relations Symposium, Sydney, 19 March 1984, AFAR, Vol.56, No.1, January 1985, p.174. 
19 Harris, `Pacific Economic Co- operation: Australia and Japan', p.175; Stuart Harris, `Concepts and 
Objectives of Pacific Economic Cooperation', pp.1 -22. 
20 According to Foreign Minister Evans, getting the ASEANs to accept APEC `involved countless 
rounds of senior official and bilateral ministerial consultations, with an emphasis throughout on 
exploration and consensus rather than prescription and pressure...we had to be acutely sensitive to 
the desire of ASEAN not to be subsumed, and institutionally overwhelmed, in the wider regional 
processes'. See Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, p.124. 
21 The ASEAN countries initially opposed the APEC idea because they argued there was no need for 
a new regional forum and that the ASEAN -PMC could coordinate regional economic cooperation. 
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when later, in 1987, the government proposed a number of guidelines for security 
cooperation in the North Pacific. 
By this time important changes in the strategic environment were underway, most 
notably the slow but steady decline of Cold War tensions and bipolar divisions and the 
concurrent elevation of arguments that security was enhanced by military cooperation 
and undermined by military competition. While these events were felt most dramatically 
and seen most obviously in Europe they also resonated in the Asia -Pacific region. 
Gorbachev's initiatives 
The push for a new security dialogue in Asia was led by the Soviet President, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, no doubt seeking to reduce the American military presence in the North 
Pacific, and especially the United States Pacific Seventh and Sixth Fleets. But 
Gorbachev had become convinced that the USSR's interests were better served by 
cooperation than military competition, in part because the USSR simply could not afford 
to do otherwise 22 In a major speech at VIadivostok in 1986, Gorbachev, argued that 
confidence -building measures (CBMs), including a `Pacific conference along the lines 
of the Helsinki conference', should be initiated to reduce the risks inherent in the 
superpower military confrontation in Northeast Asia.23 The following year, during a 
visit to Jakarta, under pressure from regional countries and continuing rejection from the 
US, Gorbachev re- framed his earlier proposal saying that the Helsinki analogy was 'a 
sort of a working hypothesis or, better to say, an invitation to discussion'24 Gorbachev 
now claimed that: 
The ASEANs then proposed another regional arrangement, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AMA) 
which excluded Australia. See John Ravenhill, `From Paternalism to Partnership: Australia's 
Relations with ASEAN', Working Paper No.1997/8, Department of International Relations, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1997, pp.1 -27: East Asia Analytical Unit, ASEAN Free 
Trade Area: Trading Bloc or Building Block ?, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1994. 
22 For an interesting account of the evolution of this thinking see Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Perestroika: Implications for Australian -USSR Relations, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990. 
23 See text of speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, 28 July 1986, reprinted in Ramesh 
Thakur and Carlyle Thayer (eds), The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power, Westview 
Press/Macmillan Australia, Boulder and South Melbourne, 1987, p.223. 
24 Merdeka, 21 July 1987. 
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The only reason I referred to Helsinki is that so far the world community has had no 
other experience of the kind. This does not mean, of course, that the European 
experience can be automatically transplanted to Asia and the Pacific.25 
In September 1988, during a speech in Krasnoyask, Gorbachev proposed discussions `at 
any level and in any composition', but perhaps beginning with the USSR, PRC and 
USA `as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council'.226 The talks 
would discuss `the question of creating a negotiating mechanism to consider Soviet and 
any other proposals pertaining to the security of the Asia -Pacific region'.27 He also 
suggested `a meeting of foreign ministers of all states concerned (or those who wish) to 
discuss the first approached to building new relations in the Asia -Pacific basin'.28 In 
September 1990,29 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed a meeting of Asia -Pacific 
foreign ministers to be held in Vladivostok in 1993. Then during his visit to Japan in 
1991, President Gorbachev suggested a `five- sided' conference of the USSR, US, China, 
India and Japan to discuss Asia -Pacific security.30 During this speech to the Japanese 
Diet Gorbachev said that `[wie do not mean some kind of multilateral cooperation or 
institutionalisation of the process. What is meant are consultations, joint spotting and 
discussion of common problems and the timely prevention of common dangers'.31 All 
through this period other Soviet officials pursued and attempted to develop (sometimes 
quite disingenuously) various arms control and confidence building measures. Soviet 
initiatives of this kind were strongly opposed by the US and particularly the US Navy, 
which viewed any negotiated arms control measures, dialogues and most confidence - 
building measures as calculated Soviet attempts to undermine deterrence and US naval 
superiority. 
25 Merdeka, 21 July 1987. 
26 
`A Time for Action, a Time for Practical Work -M.S. Gorbachev's 
Pravda, 18 September 1988. 
27 `A Time for Action, a Time for Practical Work -M.S. Gorbachev's 
Pravda, 18 September 1988. 
28 
`A Time for Action, a Time for Practical Work -M.S. Gorbachev's 
Pravda, 18 September 1988. 
29 
`Shevardnadze Gives Address' (to the conference on The Asian -Pacific 
and Cooperation), FRIS /DR/SOV, September 1990, pp.5 -7. 
30 
`Soviet President Michail Gorbachev's Speech in the Japanese Diet', 17 
Bulletin Japan, No.9, published by Press Office of the USSR Embassy in 
p.5. 
31 
`Soviet President Michail Gorbachev's Speech in the Japanese Diet', p.5. 
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Australia's initiatives32 
Around the time that Gorbachev made his initiatives for security dialogue in the Asia - 
Pacific the Australian government, while keeping a distance from the Soviet proposals, 
began to build on some of its earlier arguments in favour of security dialogue and 
confidence building for the region. In August 1987, Hayden warned of the risks inherent 
in the provocative strategies of the superpowers in the North Pacific. He urged measures 
which would dampen, `the "arms race" instability in military equations in the North 
Pacific'33 and dismissed US Navy arguments in support of some of the more 
provocative elements of the US maritime strategy as `unworldly armchair strategic 
reasoning'.34 Hayden went on to argue for a `superpower dialogue on security 
perceptions and concerns',35 for greater `transparency' on military issues, and a variety 
of CBMs similar to those which had emerged in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, or the CSCE, negotiations in Europe.36 In June the following 
year, speaking to an American audience, Hayden argued that, `we have to start a 
dialogue going among regional and other interested countries about specific problems in 
the security environment of the region'.37 
This view of security differed quite radically from other states in the region.38 Indeed, 
the government's policy was severely criticised by its alliance partner, the United 
32 Sections of the argument presented below are derived from research conducted by the author for 
several co- authored publications. See Pauline Kerr and Andrew Mack, The Evolving Security 
Discourse in the Asia- Pacific Region', in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds), Pacific 
Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Cooperation Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, 
Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1994, pp.233 -255. Westview Press published the same 
volume in 1995. Versions of the Kerr/Mack chapter have also been published in: Washington 
Quarterly, Vol.18, No.1, 1995, pp.123 -140; Brad Roberts (ed.), Weapons of Proliferation in the 
1990s, the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995, pp.391 -408; and Desmond Ball and 
Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s, 
Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1996. 
33 Bill Hayden, 'Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific' in Andrew Mack and Paul KeaI 
(eds), Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p.4. 
34 Hayden, 'Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific', p.5. 
35 Hayden, 'Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific', p.5. 
36 The first CSCE was held in Helsinki in 1975. 
37 Bill Hayden, 'Leadership in the Asia - Pacific Region', speech at the East -West Center, Hawaii, 
6 June 1988; and 'Hayden Plan to Cut War Risks in Pacific', The Age, 30 June t988. 
38 At the non -official level, academic institutions, including the Peace Research Centre at the 
Australian National University, Stanford University in California, and the Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, were all arguing in favour of CBM regimes for US and 
USSR forces in the North Pacific. See Barry M. Blechman, 'Confidence- Building in the North 
Pacific: A Pragmatic Approach to Naval Arms ControI', in Mack and Keal (eds), Security & Arms 
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States,39 for undermining security in the region. US officials argued that CBMs risked 
undermining deterrence of the USSR. `Transparency measures', they suggested, did 
little to increase confidence while providing free military intelligence to the enemy.40 
Limiting the scope of naval exercises and other `constraint' CBMs prevented the US 
Navy from practicing its offensive Maritime Strategy effectively and thus reduced US 
war- fighting efficacy.41 This in turn undermined deterrence and thus increased the risk 
of aggression. Adoption of even modest CBMs was risk -prone because it could tip the 
US down a `slippery slope' which would lead to `constraint' CBMs and naval arms 
control. From this perspective CBMs could actually increase the risk of war. 
Such arguments failed to persuade Bill Hayden and his successor, Senator Gareth Evans 
that cooperation did not enhance security. Evans not only continued to support the idea 
but also introduced strong intellectual and philosophical arguments as the basis for 
several policy concepts. 
SECURITY WITH' UNDER FOREIGN MINISTER GARETH EVANS (1988 -96) 
Gareth Evans' attempts to develop `security with' regional states were greatly assisted 
by several concurrent developments, notably the further and dramatic reductions in Cold 
War tensions, the stabilising effects of economic growth on the region and the Labor 
government's broader policy of `engagement with Asia' in virtually every sphere of 
economic and political activity. This context provided fertile ground for the evolution of 
Control in the North Pacific, pp.203 -224. See also Michael Harris, `Stanford Peace Plan', San 
Francisco Chronicle, 7 November 1987. In 1987, ISIS Malaysia ran the first in a series of annual 
regional security roundtables in Kuala Lumpur. Many of the CBM proposals currently under 
consideration were first put forward at ISIS Roundtables. See the annual publication of the 
Roundtable proceedings published by ISIS Malaysia. If news reports are correct then one of the 
few other regional countries pursuing a similar approach to security as Australia was Malaysia. It 
was reported in the New Straits Times, 19 June 1989, that Prime Minister Mahathir endorsed the 
idea of CSBMs for Asia - including an Asian Helsinki. 
39 `Hayden Plan to Cut War Risks in Pacific', The Age, 30 .Tune 1988. 
40 These arguments are well represented in an exchanged of letters between the US Secretary of State, 
James Baker, and the Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans leaked to The Australian 
Financial Review (hereafter The AFR), 2 May 1990. 
41 See Pauline Kerr, Eyeball to Eyeball: US and Soviet Naval & Air Operations in the North Pacific, 
Monograph 11, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991. 
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Australia's policy of cooperative security. Evans' ministerial statement in December 
1989 was the first major articulation of the new line.42 
The 1989 ministerial statement: `multidimensional' means to achieving 
security 
The `89 Statement, as it became known, revealed a peculiar mix of new and old security 
thinking and reflected a number of peculiarly Australian political and historical 
sensitivities,43 The stated objective of the statement, `protecting Australia's security', 
meant protecting Australia's `physical integrity and sovereignty...from armed attack or 
the threat of armed attack'." What made this quite traditional argument different, 
however, was the stress on multidimensional means for achieving security: 
The instruments available to protect Australia's security are multidimensional They go 
well beyond strictly military capabilities, essential though these are. They also embrace 
traditional diplomacy, politico -military capabilities (in the border -zone between 
defence and diplomacy), economic and trade relations, and development assistance. 
And they extent to immigration, education and training, cultural relations, information 
activities, and a number of other less obvious areas of government activity.45 
[Emphasis in the original.] 
The stress on multidimensionality also underpinned the statement's two other policy 
concepts: `comprehensive engagement' (for Southeast Asia) and `constructive 
commitment' (for the South Pacific). Comprehensive engagement in Southeast Asia 
involved Australian support for economic development and military linkages: the first 
through trade and economic organisations like APEC; the second through defence 
cooperation programs, regional security arrangements and military assistance. With 
regard to the Iatter the Minister suggested a number of cooperative measures, including 
`maritime surveillance...bilateral exercises and [broadened and intensified] 
exchanges'.46 Moreover, he argued that Australia wanted to develop `a regional security 
community framework based on a sense of shared security interests'.47 Notably absent 
42 Gareth Evans, Australia's Regional Security, ministerial statement, December 1989, Management 
Information Processing, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1989. 
43 See Greg Fry (ed.), Australia's Regional Security, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1991. 
44 Evans, 'Australia's Regional Security', p.1. 
45 Evans, 'Australia's Regional Security', p.2. 
46 Evans, 'Australia's Regional Security', p.20. 
47 Evans, `Australia's Regional Security', p.44. 
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from this was a developed discussion or understanding of common security and such 
measures as confidence -building and transparency. 
Although Evans had argued for `multidimensional means' to achieve security that would 
go `beyond strictly military capabilities', the ADF's historic attachment to military 
deterrence was also endorsed. Deterrence was to be provided not just by Australia's 
defensive military capability but also by long -range strike aircraft...F -1I 1 s and 
submarines' for `offensive tactics to achieve defensive goals'.48 Evans claimed that what 
was needed was: 
(A] combination of capabilities...to carryout this defensive strategy...and [a] sufficient 
capacity for offensive tactics...so as to constitute a strong message of deterrence against 
any attack on Australian territory.a9 
In this respect the Foreign Minister's views of security at this time were quite similar to 
those of the Department of Defence, except that the means were multidimensional. 
At that time the Department of Defence had virtually no policy concepts to guide 
regional security, apart from the decades -old notion of `defence cooperation' (see next 
chapter). The 1987 White Paper had largely ignored regional security and focused on the 
`security against' strategy of defence of Australia. Following the release of the White 
Paper, Defence Minister Kim Beazley, visited Southeast Asian states50 to `explain' 
Australia's defence posture.51 Beazley sought to reassure neighbouring states that `self - 
reliance requires rather than precludes active defence relations with...neighbours'.52 
However,'the arrangements that he announced were little more than up -dated versions of 
those already in place.53 
48 Evans, `Australia's Regional Security', p.17. 
49 Evans, 'Australia's Regional Security', p.17. 
50 See for example, Kim Beazley, 'Australian Perspectives on Regional Security Issues', Alumni 
International Singapore, Singapore, 19 November 1987, in Beazley, Compendium of Speeches: 
1985-1989, pp. 171-178. 
51 Kim Beazley, 'Self- Reliance and Cooperation: Australia's Regional Defence Policy', parlia- 
mentary statement, 23 February 1988, in Beazley, Compendium of Speeches: 1985 -1989, p.187. 
52 Beazley, 'Self- Reliance and Cooperation', p.188. 
53 The Minister said these would include: rotational deployments of F -111 long range aircraft and the 
new F /A -18s to Malaysia and Singapore (the latter for about sixteen weeks of the year) to replace 
the removal of the outdated Mirage aircraft which had been based at Butterworth and Singapore; 
the continuation of a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) presence in the region which allegedly 'would 
be substantially increase[d]' with `the continuous presence of a major combatant'; and the 
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Beazley also claimed during his visit to Southeast Asia that Australians often discussed 
regional security too negatively, particularly with respect `prospective threats to 
Australia'.54 Yet, by the end of that year the Minister was arguing that `in Southeast 
Asia, the strategic environment is becoming increasingly complex', and that there had 
been `[s]ignificant change to Australia's strategic environment' .55 `Securi ty policy is not 
simply about direct military threat, but the ability to manage the strategic outlook', 
Beazley argued.56 In subsequent statements he continued to argue that `there are 
uncertainties in the region which, could, if not carefully managed generate concern' .57 
For academic sceptics the argument about increasing uncertainty in need of management 
indicated a certain alarmist assessment of regional threats which showed that the 
government's position was reminiscent of `forward defence'.58 This view gained 
credence for some when, in May 1989, retired Indonesian ambassador, Lt General 
Hasnan Habib argued that: 
Australia is developing itself into a formidable military power, perhaps one of the 
strongest in the region [and that] such a hawkish military posture is obviously out of 
place and may cause misgivings as to the real motivation and intentions of Australia. 
Viewed from the military point of view such a military posture cannot be regarded as 
defensive, as acknowledged by the Defence Minister himself.59 
continued presence of P3C long range maritime patrol aircraft and the Royal Australian Regiment 
(RAR) at Butterworth in Malaysia. Overall, Beazley argued that Australia's current capabilities and 
its modernisation program for defence of Australia provided the foundation for expanded security 
cooperation and `the capability to play our part in maintaining regional security'. See Beazley, 
`Self -Reliance and Cooperation', pp.I89 -I91. 
54 Beazley, 'Self- Reliance and Cooperation', p.189. 
55 Kim Beazley, `Australia and the World: Prologue and Prospects', Canberra, 9 December 1988, in 
BeazIey, Compendium of Speeches: 1985 -1989, p.237. 
56 Kim Beazley, `Australia and the World', p.237. 
57 Kim Beazley, `Australia and the Region: the Next Twenty Years', 17 January 1989, in Beazley, 
Compendium of Speeches: 1985 -1989, p.237. 
58 See Graeme Cheeseman and St. John Kettle (eds), Threats Without Enemies, Pluto Press, Sydney, 
1992; Graeme Cheeseman, `Back to "Forward Defence" and the Australian National Style', in 
Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers. Australian 
Defence and Security Thinking in the Cold War, AIIen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1996; Alan 
Thompson, `Australia's Strategic Defence Policy: A Drift Towards Neo- Forward Defence', 
Working Paper No.29, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 
Canberra, 1994, pp.1 -15. 
59 Lt. General (Ret.) A. Hasnan Habib, `Australia- Indonesia Relations: Politico -Defense Dimension', 
paper presented to the Fifth Australia -Indonesia Conference, the Australian National University, 
Canberra, 25 -27 May 1989, pp.11 -12. Also printed in Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson (eds), 
Strange Neighbours, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1991, pp.16I -182 and p.168 for quote. 
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A concern to avoid the potentially destablising consequences of this sort of `worst -case' 
thinking was one of the factors that prompted Evans to seek new ways of addressing the 
rapidly changing strategic landscape.60 While the Evans' '89 Statement was the first 
serious attempt to address this problem his most significant arguments were yet to come. 
The CSCA proposal for regional security dialogue and `common security' 
Just three months after the `89 Statement, Evans, in a speech on 22 March 1990 to a 
domestic audience, cautiously introduced some aspects of a common security 
philosophy and emphasised the importance of security dialogue for the region. The 
Minister began by saying that: 
It should not be assumed...that changes can be introduced at any comparable rate 
in...Northeast Asia [which had] more complex security relationships...lacks Europe's 
institutional framework...[and] has no real tradition of multilateral dialogue on security 
issues.61 
But Evans also suggested that, `the time may be approaching for a similar process to 
commence in the Asia region'62 Some four months later, on 19 July, when the Minister 
addressed another domestic audience he took the idea further, proposing a specific 
framework for the Asia -Pacific and giving it a name similar to the European institution, 
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): 
I don't think its too early...to be looking ahead to the kind of wholly new or 
institutional processes that might be capable of evolving in Asia just as in Europe, as a 
framework for addressing and resolving security problems. 
Why should there not be developed a similar institutional framework -a `CSCA' for 
addressing the apparently intractable security issues which exist in Asia ?63 
Evans made the same argument for a Conference for Security Cooperation Asia (CSCA) 
the next week to the gathering of regional foreign ministers at the 1990 ASEAN PMC 
and again in article in the International Herald Tribune on 27 July 1990.64 
GO Discussion with senior DFAT official, Hawaii, 1990. 
61 Gareth Evans, address to the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), 
Melbourne, 22 March 1990, p.13. 
62 Evans, address to the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), p.13. 
63 Gareth Evans, 'Australia's Asian Future', Monash University, Melbourne, 19 July 1990, p.10 -11. 
64 International Herald Tribune, 27 July 1990. 
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At the same ASEAN -PMC, the Canadian External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, had also 
argued that: `the time has come to develop institutions of [security] dialogue in the 
Pacific'.65 The Canadian approach, which focussed on the North Pacific, was likewise 
strongly influenced by European security thinking. `We might consider', Clark 
suggested, `a Pacific adaptation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe' 66 
Three months after the ASEAN -PMC and the International Herald Tribune article, on 
9 October 1990, Evans told an American audience at the University of Texas that there 
was a need for the Asia -Pacific to adopt a `common security approach' and a `sub - 
regional' approach to a `security dialogue'.67 He went on say that: 
While it is quite premature at this stage to contemplate any kind of specific new 
security architecture for Asia or the Asia Pacific, it may be that one day some kind of 
all embracing Conference on Security in Asia-built on some way on the still -evolving 
Helsinki CSCE model in Europe -will be seen as timely and appropriate. If it should 
be, it will be because a process of dialogue has begun to build confidence, and patterns 
of cooperation, around the Asia Pacific region.68 
The Minister added that in the move `towards a common security approach in the Asia - 
Pacific region the present framework of United States alliances in the region can and 
should remain, for the foreseeable as a solid base for that transition' .69 US decision 
makers were decidedly unimpressed with the Australian and Canadian suggestions and 
began to make their views public. 
Labor persists with security cooperation despite criticisms 
On 30 October 1990, just two weeks after Evans' address in Texas, US Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Richard Solomon, made the US 
position quite clear. Although he did not refer to Australia specifically, he revealed US 
doubts about `calls for a system of collective security in Asia...inspired by the European 
65 Joe Clark, `Canada and Asia Pacific in the 1990s', speech to the Victoria Chamber of Commerce, 
Victoria, BC, 17 July 1990, p.S. 
66 Clark, `Canada and Asia Pacific in the 1990s', p.8. 
67 Gareth Evans, `Alliances and Change in the US Relationship', University of Texas, 9 October 
1990, The Monthly Record, October 1990, p.697. 
68 Evans, `Alliances and Change in the US Relationship', p.697. 
69 Evans, `Alliances and Change in the US Relationship', p.697. 
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experience of a region -wide conference on security and cooperation'. 70 Solomon argued 
that: `the nature of the security challenges we anticipate in the years ahead do not lend 
themselves to region -wide solutions'.71 Solomon's opposition was also based on the 
failure of past multilateral institutions such as Cento and SEATO to deal with security 
problems. The US position would continue to be based on `forward deployed forces, 
overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements'.72 
Solomon's general criticisms were followed in the next month by a direct attack on 
Australia's specific proposal for a type of CSCA arrangement for the region. The US 
Secretary of State, James Baker, in a classified letter to Senator Evans on 19 November 
1990, expressed his concern about `the concept of a "regional security dialogue" or a 
Helsinki -type process for Asia'.73 Baker wrote that he had `serious doubts about whether 
such a dialogue or process is really in either of our interests'.74 `The current network of 
bilateral arrangements and agreements', he said, `has served both of us -and the 
region -extremely well, and we should think long and hard before casting aside a 
proven success'.75 From the viewpoint of the US Secretary of State, new economic 
structures such as APEC should be pursued, but 'the notion of a region -wide security 
dialogue is a different problem altogether'.76 The stated objection to a common security 
approach was that it `provided the wedge [the Soviets] need to achieve their Iong -held 
goal of naval arms control in the Pacific' .77 Baker's advised strongly against allowing 
the Soviets to set `the framework of the agenda for the security of Asia'.78 
Richard Solomon, later reiterated his criticism of Evans' approach saying that the 
region's problems were `addressed more appropriately through existing institutions or 
ad hoc coalitions of states rather than through a large and unwieldy region -wide 
70 Richard Solomon, `Asian Security in the 1990s: Integration in Economics; Diversity in Defence', 
University of California at San Diego, 30 October 1990, p.5. 
71 Solomon, `Asian Security in the 1990s', pp.5 -6. 
72 Solomon, `Asian Security in the 1990s', pp.7 -S. 
73 The AFR, 2 May 1990. The exchanged letters were leaked to the AFR and printed in full. 
74 The AFR, 2 May 1990. 
The AFR, 2 May 1990. 
76 The AFR, 2 May I990. 
77 The AFR, 2 May 1990. 
78 The AFR, 2 May 1990. 
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collective security forum' 29 The US ambassador to Australia, Melvin Sembler, argued 
against the need for any change in the existing framework of bilateral alliances with 
Japan and Australia. `If it ain't broke, don't fix it', he said.80 The Commander -in -Chief 
of US Pacific Command in Honolulu, Admiral Charles Larson, also ruled out region - 
wide security approaches.81 Again the US rejection was based on its perceptions of the 
Soviets' political intentions for the region and the capabilities of the Soviet Far East 
navy. According to Larson, `the Soviet military force in the Far East and Pacific region 
`is more capable today than it was four or five years ago' and it was attempting to 
expand its influence in Asia and the Pacific.82 From the Australian government's 
perspective these views betrayed a lack of understanding of the evolving military 
realities. But the government's advocacy of multilateral regional dialogue was under 
attack from within Australia as well. 
Domestic opposition 
The Liberal/National Party Opposition in Australia joined the US rejection of 
Australia's security plan. The Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Robert Hill, 
criticised the government's approach on a number of points. In Hong Kong, on 6 April 
1991, he argued that the plan was premature and unworkable.83 Lack of regional 
cohesion, evidenced by suspicions about `potentially militarily powerful countries such 
as Japan and China' were barriers to formal common- security arrangements, he said.84 
Even the Asia -Pacific's participation in wider global security was doubtful, according to 
Hill. 
In another speech in Washington DC, Hill endorsed the US approach of `cooperative 
vigilance' for the region. Although not denying the need for security dialogue within 
this structure he raised doubts that the ASEAN -PMC would be an appropriate forum: 
79 David Lague, `US Opposes Security Plan', Canberra Times, 8 April 1991. 
80 Tony Parkinson, `US Remains Firm on Pacific Policy', Australian, 25 April 1991. 
81 Mark Metherell, `US Admiral Warns of Soviet Threat', The Age, 14 May 1991. 
82 Metherell, `US Admiral Warns of Soviet Threat', The Age, 14 May 1991. 
83 Robert Hill, 'Security in the Asia -Pacific Region-Order or Disorder ?', address to International 
Democrat Union Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 6 April 1991; 
Craig Shehan, 'Opposition Rejects Asian Security Plan', Canberra Times, 8 April 1991. 
84 Hill, `Security in the Asia- Pacific Region-Order or Disorder ?', p.4. 
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General region -wide security discussions undoubtedly need to take place...but it is 
doubtful whether the expansion of the concerns of the existing PMC would fulfil this... 
it may be premature to turn PMC into a security conference addressing wider security 
issues. B5 
But perhaps the strongest argument made by Senator Hill was that the government's 
approach was `offensive' to the United States86 and undermined the existing alliance 
structures, which were the foundation of security in the region: 
Not only is this relegation of our major security partners offensive--and to call the 
alliance transitional undermines its importance-but Senator Evans proposition 
currently lacks foundation in reality. Australia's interests lie in a clearly defined defence 
alliance with more powerful states of shared values, particularly the ÚS.87 
Regional criticisms 
Regional governments did not support either the Australian or Canadian proposals. 
However, their reasons were different from those of the Americans and the opposition 
parties in Australia. Singapore's Foreign Minister, Wong Kan Seng, argued that `there 
has to be common ground before security issues can be discussed',B8 Ali Alitas, the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, said that `we have to be careful not to think that certain 
things that work in one region ought to be transplanted to another...we would be rather 
cautious in proceeding too fast to an overall security conference'.89 Japanese Prime 
Minister Kaifu, reportedly said that such ideas were `premature' 90 Overall, Australia's 
attempts to develop a cooperative basis for regional security were soundly criticised by 
the key international, regional and domestic players. 
85 Robert Hill, `Security in the Asia Pacific: Alliances and Dialogue, address to the International 
Democrat Union Standing Affairs, Washington, 29 July 1991, p.9. 
86 Mark Metherell, 'Lib Attacks Evans Plan', The Age, 30 April 1991. 
87 Mark Metherell, `Lib Attacks Evans Plan', The Age, 30 April 1991. 
88 'ASEAN Cool to Pacific Security Proposal', New Strait Times and Business Times, 8 October 
1990. 
89 'ASEAN Cool to Pacific Security Proposal', New Strait Times and Business Times, 8 October 
1990. 
90 The Toronto Star, 25 July 1990. Japanese foreign Minister Nakayama had a slightly different 
response saying that Tokyo was interested in new security frameworks and envisaged a larger 
grouping of states than that in the Canadian proposal. See Edith Terry, 'Canadian Proposal Pacific 
Security Rejected by Tokyo', Globe -Mail, 24 July 1990; Edith Terry, `Japan Cuts Loose from Old 
Isolation', Globe -Mail, 25 July 1990. 
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Security dialogue reworked 
Responding to this barrage of criticism Australia reworked rather than abandoned its 
argument for regional security. Evans, in an address to the influential Trilateral 
Commission in Tokyo, reiterated his previous argument that the CSCE process could 
not be recreated in the Asia- Pacific. However he continued to stress that although: 
Institutional processes cant be translated half a world way, that is not to say that the 
relevant habits of mind cannot be translated either....Greater degrees of transparency 
can be introduced into military arrangements, and confidence building measures like 
joint exercises can be devised 9t 
Moreover, Evans made the point that CSBMs could be adopted without 'stepping over 
the precipice of naval arms control or succumbing to any of the other horrors that policy 
makers in some high places keep worrying about' -a thinly veiled criticism of the US 
position at that time.92 
The following month Prime Minister Hawke acknowledged the criticisms of Australia's 
position, but argued that: 
We cannot translate the emerging European security architecture into our region. The 
mosaic of cultures, cleavages and conflicts in Asia is too complex for that. Rather... the 
shape of a regional security system will gradually emerge through an increasing pattern 
of bilateral and multilateral informal discussions...multilateral security dialogue...can 
best be done by building on existing multilateral regional forums. ASEAN meetings, 
including the post -ministerial conferences have recently begun to provide excellent 
opportunities for such discussion 93 
Like Evans, Hawke noted the different approach taken by the US and suggested that `the 
evolution of the US role in the region will need to reflect the development of the 
region's own ideas about security'.94 Notwithstanding all the criticisms the substance of 
Australia's policy changed very little. 
91 Gareth Evans, The Asia Pacific and Global Change', address to the Trilateral Commission, 
Tokyo, 20 April 1991, p.6. 
92 Evans, `The Asia Pacific and Global Change', p.6. 
93 Bob Hawke, `Australia's Security in Asia', address to the Asia- Australia Institute, University of 
New South Wales, 24 May 1991, p.10. 
94 Hawke, `Australia's Security in Asía', p.9. 
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Regional acceptance of security dialogue and Australia's continuing efforts 
Several developments took place in 1991 that indicated that the idea of cooperative 
security was beginning to gain support among regional governments. The annual 
ASEAN post -ministerial meeting (PMC) in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, was a 
significant milestone in the evolution of regional security thinking towards the kind of 
vision promoted by Australian officials. Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Taro 
Nakayama, cautiously proposed adopting the annual PMC meetings as a forum for 
security dialogue: 
If there is anything to add to the mechanisms and frameworks for cooperation in the 
three fields of economic cooperation, diplomacy and security, the first would be a 
forum for political dialogue where friendly countries in this region could engage in 
frank exchanges of opinion on matters of mutual interest.95 
Naturally, Australia supported the Japanese proposal, indeed Evans took the opportunity 
to again push Australia's views on regional security.96 He argued strongly for a variety 
of confidence building measures, giving credit to a number of regional activities already 
underway.97 He also suggested more specific measures including: incidents at sea 
agreements; greater transparency through exchange of data on military budgets, 
doctrines and future forward projections; observers at exercises and joint exercises; 
measures to prevent proliferation; security of sealanes and sealines of communications/ 
maritime surveillance; agreement on environmental security issues.98 
But the ASEAN ministers were far more cautious about the Japanese proposal. 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alitas noted that `we would perhaps prefer to move the 
way ASEAN used to move -don't institutionalise too quickly'.99 ASEAN ministers 
were reportedly fearful that the proposed security forum could dilute other issues, 
95 
`US Looks to New Ties With ASEAN Allies', Canberra Times, 24 July 1991. 
96 Gareth Evans, `6 plus 7 Session', the 24th ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 22 
July 1991, pp.1 -10. 
97 Evans referred to activities `such as the conferences and seminars hosted this year in Bali, Manila 
and Kuala Lumpur, with another soon in Bangkok...the workshop series on the South China Sea 
being sponsored by Indonesians...land] because of the level of representation present...this ASEAN 
PMC'. He suggested the latter should be extended to a `Post Ministerial conference retreat -a well 
established way of achieving frank and private exchanges between political leaders'. Evans, `6 plus 
7 Session', pp.8 -9. 
98 Gareth Evans, '6 plus.7 Session', the 24th ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 22 
July 1991, pp.1 -10. 
99 
'US Looks to New Ties With ASEAN Allies', Canberra Times, 24 July 1991. 
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including trade and investment. More fundamentally, the ASEAN countries had a 
broader understanding of security or what they called `comprehensive security'. As the 
Malaysian Foreign Minister Abudulla Badawi pointed out, for his ASEAN dialogue 
partners: 
Security has to be viewed in a comprehensive manner. We do not underestimate the 
importance of the military element of security. But, focusing only on the narrow aspects 
of security would distort national perceptions on relations between nations.1o0 
The approach, he said, `should be to find security by enhancing interdependence and 
confidence thorough economic cooperation and other regional endeavours, as well as 
through commitment to solve problems through peaceful means'.101 Nonetheless, the 
ASEAN ministers agreed to study the Japanese proposal. 
Meanwhile, as Cold War tensions continued to subside, US opposition to Australian 
proposals had reportedly become less strident. At the same PMC meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur in July 1991, that Evans had spoken at, the US Under Secretary of State, Robert 
Zoellick, said that the US and regional countries should develop closer relations. `This 
means adjusting alliances to new strategic realities and making our defence relationships 
more reciprocal so as to reflect the successes of our allies and friends', he said.10° The 
US, he concluded intended to `operate with you bilaterally and collectively'. 103 
Back in Australia, Evans continued to stress Australia's plans for regional security, with 
even more confidence following the 1991 ASEAN- PMC.104 He noted that: 
Suggestions that were not much more than a year ago perceived as radical, and even in 
some quarters as having the potential to undermine security to the extent that they cut 
across familiar bipolar ways of thinking, are now more likely to be regarded as boringly 
commonplace.105 
too Kavi Chongkittavorn, `ASEAN at Odds With Security Plan', The Nation, 24 July 1991. 
tot Chongkittavorn, `ASEAN at Odds With Security Plan', The Nation, 24 July 1991. 
102 David Lague, 'US Reverses Stance on Regional Security', The AFR, 23 July 1991. 
103 
`US Looks to New Ties with ASEAN Allies', Canberra Times, 24 July 1991. 
104 In August 1991, Evans said that regional powers should start exchanging information on military 
budgets, doctrines and plans. See David Lague, `Evans Calls for More Regional Alliances', The 
AFR, 1 August 1991. 
105 Gareth Evans, `Managing Australia's Asia Future', Asia -Australia Institute, University of New 
South Wales, 3 October 1991, The Monthly Record, October 1991, p.661. 
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Furthermore, he argued that some traditional approaches such as alliances based on 
security against others should be retained but supplemented with cooperative 
arrangements: 
It has come to be fully accepted that what I and others have talking about is not some 
dramatic overturning of existing security arrangements in the region -in particular the 
existing series of bilateral alliance relationships with the United states in the western 
pacific, with Japan and Australia as the northern and southern anchors respectively - 
but rather the supplementation of those relationships with additional layers and strands 
of cooperation, mutual assistance and ultimately mutual dependence. It is not a matter 
of cutting holes in any existing security net, but rather strengthening existing trends, 
weaving in additional threads and extending the net's coverage.1o6 
Evans by this time had further refined the security arguments for dialogue and 
confidence building: 
Dialogue is both process and outcome, facilitating progress and at the same time 
cementing it. Dialogue partners can exchange views on threat perceptions, for example, 
and in doing arrive at shared assessments which, optimally, reduce their sensed 
insecurity and check any trend to competitive arms acquisition. Dialogue in this way 
builds general confidence.107 
But the sophistication of this argument hardly impressed the US, which contrary to 
expectations, had reportedly once again rejected Australia's plans. Dr Richard Solomon, 
claimed during a visit to Canberra that US policy had been misinterpreted.108 He 
emphasised that the argument given by Mr. Baker in his Ietters to Senator Evans, that a 
CSCA was inappropriate for the region, remained. However, Baker had earlier made 
some concessions. In an article published in the prestigious Foreign Affairs journal he 
argued that security policy in the region could take on `a stronger multilateral 
component', but that this was in no sense an endorsement of institutionalised 
multilateral security dialogues. Rather, Baker was referring to ad hoc multilateral 
cooperation on specific security issues -like Cambodia or the North Korean nuclear 
issue.109 
106 Evans, `Managing Australia's Asia Future', p.661. 
107 Gareth Evans, `Managing Australia's Asia Future', p.661. 
108 David Lague, `US Says Defence Policy Unaltered', The AFR, 8 August 1991. 
109 See James A. Baker, `America in Asia', Foreign Affairs, Vol.70, No.5, 1991 -92, pp.38 -9. 
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The ASEANs endorse security dialogue (the 1992 ASEAN summit; the 1993 ASEAN - 
PMC; and the 1994 and 1995 ARFs) 
Six months after the Japanese Foreign Minister's proposal for security dialogue at the 
1991 ASEAN -PMC, the ASEAN heads of states agreed, despite their earlier reluctance, 
that, `ASEAN shall seek avenues to engage member states in new areas of cooperation 
in security matters'.110 It would also `intensify its external dialogues in political and 
security matters by using the ASEAN Post -Ministerial Conference (PMC)'.'" The next 
significant step was taken at the twenty -sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore 
on 23 -24 July 1993 when it was agreed that the security component of the PMC 
dialogue would be known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with eighteen 
members -the six ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, the 
Philippines and Brunei), their seven major trading partners (the United States, Japan, 
Canada, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the European Community), and the 
five `guests' and `observers' at the ASEAN meeting (Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and 
Pauper New Guinea).12 
The first ARF meeting, held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994, was a significant milestone in 
the evolution of regional security dialogue and one that Australia planned to build 
upon.113 Australia agreed with the Thai hosts and other regional states that a very 
modest agenda was prudent for the first meeting. As the Singaporean Defence Minister, 
Dr Yeo Ningi Hongi noted, it was `a significant achievement' that eighteen countries `at 
different levels of development and with different views on how to achieve regional 
stability and resolve security issues' can meet to discuss sensitive security matters.114 
Nonetheless, it was also the Australian view that it was necessary to set directions for 
future meetings. With that in mind Senator Evans insisted that a communiqué be issued 
that commemorated this `historic event' and suggested that an agreed agenda be 
110 Singapore Declaration of 1992, press release by ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, 
Singapore, 27 -28 January 1992, pp.1 -8. 
Singapore Declaration of 1992, pp.1 -8. 
112 Joint Communiqué of the Twenty -sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 23 -24 July 1993, 
Press Release, 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting/Post Ministerial Conferences, Singapore, 23 -28 
July 1993, para. 8. See also `Ministers Endorse Security Forum', Canberra Times, 24 July 1993; 
and Michael Vatikiotis, `Uncharted Waters', Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 August 1993, 
pp.10 -11. 
113 See `Chairman's Statement: The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 25 July 
1994, Bangkok', ASEAN Regional Forum, Press Release, Bangkok, 25 July 1994. 
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proposed that would focus on particular CSBMs for the region. These would relate to 
nuclear non -proliferation, peacekeeping cooperation, exchanges of non -classified 
military information, maritime issues, and preventive diplomacy. Many of these CSBMs 
were contained in a paper tabled by Australia at the meeting and indeed the same paper 
had been presented previously at ARF Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) held in May in 
Bangkok to prepare for the foreign ministers July meeting in Bangkok.115 
The Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation 
Australia's paper, The Australian Paper On Practical Proposals for Security 
Cooperation,tl6 set out a comprehensive set of measures for fostering regional 
cooperation (see Table 2.1 ). To accommodate differences in the region about the pace, 
priority and type of trust- building measures and institutions, Australia replaced its 
previous undifferentiated lists of cooperative measures and immediate time frames with 
a `graduated approach to trust- building' and `[n]o time frames'.117 As Table 2.1 
illustrates, Australia's practical proposals were graded into three categories and time 
frames. 
Even though these various proposals for CSBMs tabled at the May SOMt18 and the 
1994 ARF received little consideration at the time (the meetings were taken up with the 
114 
`The Janes Interview', Janes Defence Weekly, 19 February 1994, p.52. 
115 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, paper commissioned by the 1993 ASEAN PMC 
SOM and submitted to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) SOM, Bangkok, April 1994. For the 
public version of this set of proposals see Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper on 
Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific 
Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994. Australia's tabling The Australian Paper 
On Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation was ambitious under the circumstances. Prior to 
the ARF meeting, most of the regional states, and especially Thailand the host country, had seen 
the meeting primarily as an opportunity for former antagonists to get to know each other. One Thai 
official cautioned that ARF was `an essential step towards trust building and...far too important to 
be held as hostage to the controversy of the regional agenda'. See Asda Jayanama, Prospect of 
ASEAN Regional forum (ARF)', paper presented at the Second United Nations Disarmament 
Conference on Transparency in Armament, Regional Dialogue and Disarmament, Hiroshima, 14- 
17 May 1994, p_S. 
116 Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific Region. 
117 Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific Region, p.7. 
118 See CSCAP Pro -tem Committee, The Security of the Asia Pacific Region, Memorandum No.1, 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, April 1994; the Australian Department of 
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protocol and organisational aspects of the first ARF) the Australian proposals 
nevertheless influenced regional agendas. The ARF -SOMs, held by Brunei in May 
1995, adopted a similar approach1t9 and the next ARF meeting, in August 1995, issued a 
`Chairman's Statement' which included an agenda divided into three stages with 
different goals, i.e., confidence -building measures, preventive diplomacy and conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
Table 2.1 A graduated approach to trust -building measures for the next decade 
Category 1 
(a) Limited exchange of military information 
(b) A regional security studies centre 
(c) A maritime information database 
(d) Strategic planning exchanges 
(e) Observers at military exercises 
(f) Peacekeeping training 
Category 2 
(a) Maritime cooperation 
(b) A regional arms register 
(c) Notification of major military deployments 
(d) A multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents 
Category 3 
Consideration of more formalised trust- building measures; for example, collaborative environmental security 
arrangements, the establishment of zones of cooperation in contentious geographical areas, and regional maritime 
safety and surveillance cooperation agreements. 
Source: Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1994, p.13. 
The 1995 ARF Chairman's Statement pointed out that: 
The ARF process is now at Stage I, and shall continue to discuss means of imple- 
menting confidence building. Stage II, particularly where the subject matter overlap, 
can proceed in tandem with Stage L Discussions will continue regarding the 
incorporation of approaches to conflicts, as an eventual goal.12° 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific Region, paper commissioned by the 1993 ASEAN PMC SOM and submitted to 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) SOM, Bangkok, April 1994; Evans and Dibb, Australian 
Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region. 
t19 Discussions at the May SOM benefited not just from the Australian paper tabled the year before 
but also from three earlier inter -sessional meetings on CSBMs, held in Canberra, Seoul and Tokyo, 
and the formulation of a document called The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper. An 
important step taken in this paper was the definition and prioritisation of three 'baskets' of CSBMs 
for implementation in the immediate, short -term (the next 1 -2 years) and longer -term time frames. 
See The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, paper prepared by the ASEAN -SOMs, May 
1995. A public version is attached to `Chairman's Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF)', 1 August 1995, Bandar Seri Begawan. See also Ignatius Stephen, 'ARE Focus on 
Asian Security', Borneo Bulletin, 23 May 1995. 
120 
'Chairman's Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)', pp.3 -4. 
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Further refinements were made to support the development and implementation of 
proposals within the three stages. An Inter -Sessional Support Group (ISG) on 
confidence- building measures, co- chaired by Indonesia and Japan, was convened and 
Inter- sessional Meetings (ISMs) to discuss future cooperative activities were 
established. t 21 
Australia actively supported these moves towards what amounts to an impressive degree 
of institutionalisation at the working level and in the Senior Official Meetings and the 
Inter- Sessional Meetings. For example, in November 1994, Australia sponsored a 
seminar for officials and non -officials in Canberra that addressed measures for building 
confidence and trust.122 But even before this Australia supported developments for an 
institutionalised infrastructure to support the ARF at both the official and the non- 
governmental levels. t 23 
While Australia has made considerable efforts towards establishing security dialogue 
and an agenda for transparency and confidence -building measures, it nonetheless 
121 The first of the ISMs, co- chaired by Malaysia and Canada, examined peacekeeping operations. The 
second, co- chaired by Singapore and the US, addressed search and rescue cooperation and 
coordination. The ISGs and the ISMs meet between ARF -SOMs. It was hoped that these meetings 
together with the annual SOMs would become the most important mechanisms for the development 
and implementation of regional confidence- and security -building measures (CSBMs). See 
`Chairman's Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)', p.4. 
122 See Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific Region. 
123 In June 1991, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies had proposed that there 
be instituted a `senior officials meeting [SOM] made up of senior officials of the ASEAN states 
and the dialogue partners' to support the ASEAN PMC process (e.g., with respect to the 
preparation of agenda and meeting arrangements. See ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and 
International Studies, A Time For Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN 
Summit, 4 June 1991, p.5. The first of the PMC -SOMs was held in Singapore in May 1993, and 
involved extensive discussion of multilateral approaches to regional peace and security: for 
example, preventive diplomacy and conflict management; non -proliferation (both nuclear and non- 
nuclear); UN peacekeeping activities; the UN Conventional Arms Transfer Register; the extension 
of the Non -Proliferation Treaty (NPT); exchanges of information among defence planners; prior 
notification of military exercises; and the concepts of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The 1993 PMC - 
SOM agreed to undertake further research on: non -proliferation regimes and their application at the 
regional level; conflict prevention and management, including peacekeeping; possibilities for 
security cooperation in Northeast Asia; and confidence -building measures applicable to the region. 
See Chairman's Statement, ASEAN Post -Ministerial Conferences, Senior Officials Meeting, 
Singapore, 20-21 May 1993, paras. 8 and 10. For further discussion of the role of SOMs, see 
Nakayama, `Statement to the General Session of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference', pp.12- 
13; and Jusuf Wanandi, `Developments in the Asia -Pacific Region', paper prepared for a 
symposium, The Changing Asia - Pacific Scene in the 1990s: Security, Cooperation and 
Development, China Center for International Studies, Beijing, 10 -12 August 1991, p.27. - 
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considered ASEAN to be the key regional player in this process. Although Australia's 
initiative at the 1990 ASEAN PMC in Jakarta was an important impetus for the ARF,124 
as the above discussion shows, several factors, and in particular the role of the ASEAN 
countries, were central to its establishment.125 As the regional leader, the collective of 
ASEAN states had considerable influence over the agenda for security dialogue. 
Indeed, Labor's approach reflected some Asian perspectives on security. The language 
and to some extent the conceptualisation of cooperative measures was modified to 
reflect Asian conditions. As Evans points out in the introduction of The Australian 
Paper On Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation, '[t]he terminology differs from 
the traditional arms control language...the concept of trust -building rather than 
confidence -building is used to convey the idea of a less formal approach, built on a base 
of personal political contacts and relationships'.126 
Endorsement of the second -track process 
The emphasis on personal contact and informality was also reflected in the 
government's support for the second -track process. One purpose of such activities was 
to provide a forum for officials acting in a non -official capacity to become familiar with 
the security perceptions of regional counterparts and to informally explore possible 
solutions to various problems. Another purpose of the second -track was to support the 
established official infrastructure, such as the SOMs, ISGs and ISMs, with additional 
124 See Gareth Evans, `Australia and the Emerging Asia Pacific Community', the Edward `Weary' 
Dunlop Asialink Lecture, Melbourne, 14 October 1994, p.8. Here Evans claims that, `the 
development of the ARF is generally acknowledged to have begun with a proposal made at the 
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Jakarta in July 1990 by Australia (to some extent Canada)'. 
125 Among the factors that led to the establishment of the ARF were the following. First, there was 
pressure from the non -official organisation, ASEAN -ISIS, on the various ASEAN governments to 
establish such a regional security forum. Second, the ASEAN -PMC was the only sub- regional 
forum that had the potential to host a security dialogue and, as discussed earlier, it had agreed in 
1992 to include security discussions. The next step was to extend the forum to countries previously 
not directly part of ASEAN PMC, in particular Russia and China. Third, since ASEAN was keen 
for the regional security architecture to be shaped as much as possible to suit ASEAN interests, 
such as 'national resilience' and `regional resilience', it took the lead. Fourth, although the 
Australian and Canadian proposals for a CSCA type dialogue had been rejected earlier, both these 
states continued to add pressure for a regional dialogue forum of some kind, albeit in more subtle 
ways. Fifth, the position of other states was fortuitous. South Korea was supportive. Japan was 
supportive, although politically it could not he seen to be providing leadership for a security forum. 
The US was originally opposed to multilateral security dialogue, later supportive but not 
innovative; and China, while not strongly supportive, went along. 
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analyses, research and practical suggestions. Australia has been one of the most active 
participants in these activities and was instrumental in establishing the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia- Pacific (CSCAP) in 1993.127 
CSCAP has contributed to the ARF process in a number of ways. For example, the 
CSCAP Steering Committee submitted a comprehensive memorandum on security 
issues and CSBMs in the Asia- Pacific region to the ARF -SOMs in April 1994, prior to 
the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in July 1994.128 The Australian CSCAP Committee 
has been one of the energetic of the regional groups129 and co- chairs the Maritime 
Cooperation Working Group with Indonesia. In addition to the formalised second -track 
activities there are numerous centres and programs within Australia which foster 
regional security and cooperation.) °° 
Official explanations of the policy concepts 
The policy concepts that guided Labor's regional security policy evolved from within 
the context just discussed. According to the Foreign Minster, the key concept, was 
`cooperative security'. It was a multidimensional concept that encompassed other 
security concepts like `common security', `comprehensive security' and `collective 
security' .131 Evans explained that `common security' denotes a generally more 
126 Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific Region, p.4. 
127 See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, pp.30 -32. 
128 See CSCAP Pro -tem Committee, The Security of the Asia -Pacific Region, Memorandum No.1, 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia - Pacific, April 1994. 
129 See the AUS -CSCAP Newsletter, published by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the 
Australian National University. 
130 In addition to the `second track' activities there are centres and programs within Australia which 
study and foster regional security and closer regional interaction. Most are sponsored by academic 
institutions, private or semi- private security institutes and government departments, such as the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Some examples include: the Air Power Studies Centre; 
the Maritime Studies Program; the Joint Services Staff College; the Australian Defence Studies 
Centre at the Australian Defence Force Academy; the Australian Defence and Strategic Studies 
Centre; the Centre for the Study of Australian and Asian Relations at Griffith University; at the 
ANU, the Department of International Relations, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and the 
until recently the Peace Research Centre. These centres are just some of the many which conduct 
research, provide educational services and organise conferences and workshops on regional 
security and defence planning for Australian and regional participants. 
131 These concepts were discussed in numerous policy speeches and statements. See for example, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Speech Series, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, produced by the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra. 
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preventive, rather than a deterrent approach to security and applies mostly to inter -state 
rather than intra -state security and military measures.132 'Comprehensive security', is a 
more general approach which emphasises that security is `multidimensional in 
character', and is not only concerned with political and diplomatic disputes, but also 
with factors such as `economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, unregulated 
population flows, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism and human 
rights abuses'.133 And finally, `collective security' is the UN security community's 
collective response to threatened or actual aggression. Hence, as Evans put it, 
`cooperative security [is] a multidimensional concept [that goes] beyond traditional 
concerns with threats of an overly military nature'.t34 `Cooperative security suggests', 
he said, `consultation rather than confrontation; reassurance rather than deterrence; 
transparency rather than secrecy; and interdependence rather than unilateralism'.135 
Table 2.2 Cooperative security: matching responses to problems 
Problems 
Responses 
Emerging 
threats 
Disputes Armed 
conflicts 
Other major 
security crises 
Building peace 
international regimes 
In- country peace -building 
Pre -conflict 
Post -conflict 
Maintaining peace 
Preventive diplomacy 
Preventive deployment 
Restoring peace 
Peacemaking 
Peacekeeping 
Traditional 
Expanded 
Enforcing peace 
Sanctions 
Peace enforcement 
Cross -border aggression 
Support of peacekeeping 
Support of humanitarian objectives 
Source: Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1994, p.14. 
Evans also expounded on `cooperative security' as a policy concept for global security. 
Here he argued that it is associated with a wide range of strategies: from non -military 
132 See Gareth Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper delivered to Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Bonn, 
6 July 1994. 
133 Evans, 'Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.6 (since the title of the speech is the same as the book 
published by the Foreign Minister the term 'paper' will he added). 
134 Evans, 'Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.3. 
t35 Evans, 'Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.6. 
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peace building to peace enforcement using military means. These strategies are 
explained in a publication, Cooperating for Peace136 produced in 1993 by Evans and his 
department. The book was compiled as an Australian contribution to the debate 
generated by the United Nations publication in same year, An Agenda for Peace.137 The 
key strategies discussed in Cooperating for Peace include `peace building', `peace 
maintenance', `peace restoration' and `peace enforcement' (see Table 2.2). Although 
these strategies were elucidated with the aim of revitalising the UN, some of them were 
also germane to Australia's regional approach. For example, regional security policy 
included `preventive diplomacy' (which comes under the general category of `peace 
maintenance') and `peace building' which emphasised `international regimes' and 
dialogue. Some of these strategies were included in the Australian paper tabled at the 
first meeting of the ARF in Bangkok in 1994 and the subsequent 1995 ASEAN Concept 
Paper which set the ARF's agenda. 
However, Evans hesitated to apply some his arguments about `cooperative security', 
within the context of the UN, to the region.138 In particular, Evans was reluctant to 
extend `cooperative security' to the level of the individual, as opposed to the level of the 
state, as he had in the UN context. He had argued there that 'security...is as much about 
the protection of individuals as it is about the defence of territorial integrity of states',139 
`Human security' according to Evans is `prejudiced by major intra -state conflict as it is 
by inter -state conflict'.140 However, having raised a substantial challenge to traditional 
definitions of security, the Foreign Minister was reluctant to put his argument into 
practice in the regional context and continued to refer to `human security' in association 
with human rights rather than security. This suggested that Evans did not wish, for 
political reasons, to challenge regional views that human security was a state, not 
international, concern, despite his convictions about `cooperative security'. Nonetheless, 
136 Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen & 
Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1993. 
137 United Nations, Secretary General, An Agenda for Peace -Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking 
and Peacekeeping, United Nations, New York, June 1992. 
138 See Gareth Evans, `Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict', Foreign Policy, No.96, Fall 
1994, pp.3-20. 
139 Evans. `Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.7. 
140 Evans, 'Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.7. 
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his position leaves open the question of whether or not human security was an element 
in Australia's declaratory policy (see Chapter Six). 
`COOPERATIVE SECURITY': ITS LIMITATIONS, TENSIONS AND APPARENT 
CONTRADICTIONS 
The effort extended that Labor expended to argue the case for the security enhancing 
effects of `cooperative security' was unprecedented in Australia's security history. 
Indeed, as we have seen, the intellectual case continued to be made in the face of 
considerable political pressure from the US, regional governments and the Liberal/ 
National Party Opposition within Australia. Labor was committed to the view that 
`cooperative security' enhanced security. 
Nonetheless, Labor's exposition of `cooperative security' had its limitations, both 
intellectually and practically (the latter will be discussed in the next chapter). The first 
observation about `cooperative security' is that despite endorsing `comprehensive 
security', or the argument that security goes beyond military dimensions, most of the 
proposals for cooperation were of a military nature. This was evident as early as 1991, 
when at the annual ASEAN -PMC, Evans, although arguing for a broad concept of 
security, proposed measures which were all related to military problems.141 This was 
also evident in The Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security 
Cooperation142 that Australia tabled at the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in 1994. One 
repercussion was, as the next chapter shows, that the main actor in implementing 
`cooperative security' was the Australian Defence Force. 
A second observation is that comprehensive security, and its associated `web' of means, 
did not clearly explained why or how confidence- building in non -military matters or 
`small s' security actually built confidence in other military matters. For example, it is 
not clear how cooperative arrangements between Australia and Indonesia for monitoring 
illegal fishing and patrolling the Timor Gap boundaries acts to improve security 
141 Gareth Evans, '6 plus 7 Session, the 24th ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 22 
July 1991, pp.1 -10. 
142 Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific Region. - 
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relations overall: or at least it is yet to be demonstrated that there is a cause and effect 
from the local to the general. 
Third, even though `cooperative security' is focused largely on military issues it does 
not address some critical military developments in the region. Of all the destabilising 
developments in the region none was more potentially dangerous than the burgeoning 
arms modernisation programs in regional countries - particularly acquisitions of 
submarines and strike aircraft. In addition there were inadequate C3 measures to cope 
with a conflict that involved these capabilities. `Cooperative security' effectively by- 
passed any arms control or crisis management measures -the UN and regional arms 
registers being no exception.143 
Fourth, the relationship between `cooperative security' and traditional security 
arrangements in the region was not clearly explained. There was no explicit explanation 
why these different approaches, when applied concurrently, did not amount to a policy 
based on contradictions. For example, Evans argued that `cooperative security' was a 
supplement to existing `security against' strategies, such alliances. He claimed that a 
new approach to regional security: 
[Wlould see not the abandonment of traditional alliance relationships, but their 
supplementation by multilateral dialogue processes and the evolution of a real network 
of new bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements. 144 
However, if Australia saw its own alliance as a deterrent to would -be aggressors then for 
some that could appear to conflict with one of Evans arguments for 'cooperative 
security', namely that it stressed `reassurance rather than deterrence'. 
An argument can also be made that at times there is an apparent contradiction between 
the Foreign Minister's statements, which advocate `cooperative security', and those 
which endorse the balancing principles of a regional balance of power. For example, 
Evans argued that given that nature of the regional security environment that: 
143 Malcolm Chalmers, Confidence- Building in Southeast Asia, Bradford Arms Register Studies No.6, 
Westview Press, 1996 (especially The UN Register and Southeast Asia', pp.171- 221.); Ralph A. 
Cossa, Towards a Regional Arms Register in the Asia Pacific, Occasional Papers, Pacific Forum 
CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1995. 
144 Gareth Evans, `The Emerging Asia Pacific Community', speech to the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington, 6 October 1994, p.4. 
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We [should not] assume that cooperative approaches are the whole answer to regional 
security problems, or that we will ever be able to use them without at least a nod in the 
direction of traditional power balances. No one can sensibly deny the continued 
application of at least some traditional realpolitik considerations and the United States' 
role as a `balancing wheel' in the region is more or less universally accepted (albeit 
more often in private than in public) in this respect. And no one, least of all Australia, 
is about to tear up familiar bilateral alliances. t45 
On another occasion Evans argued that the Asia -Pacific is a region where `the idea of 
power- balance retains considerable resonance' and that: 
[T]here may be much to be said...for working over time to unite the lesser countries in 
the region- including those of South East Asia, Indochina and Australasia -into a 
more cohesive grouping of their own.146 
The argument here for `a more cohesive grouping of their own', could be suggestive of a 
preparatory stage for a balance of power arrangement. How that relates to his other 
argument that Australia and ASEAN countries should develop a 'security community' 
or a `community of shared security interests' is difficult to explain without suggesting 
there are contradictions. Overall, the question of how `cooperative security' was to 
operate in a region which, according to Evans, was characterised by states seeking to 
balance power was not explicitly addressed or intellectually justified in public 
statements. 
Fifth, as indicated above, Evans was also never clear about the nature of the suggested 
`cohesive grouping'. He often proposed that Australia and Southeast Asia should form 
some kind of regional security group: for example, `a cohesive grouping' of countries, a 
`security community' or a `community of shared security interests'. Yet the intellectual 
distinctions between these and other security arrangements, for example, an alliance or a 
Deutsch type security community, was never made clear. 
It is possible that at least some of the limitations of `cooperative security' can be 
explained by Labor's historical and political sensitivities about how best to enhance 
security in the region. The emphasis on military measures reflects Australia's historic 
concern about the military causes of insecurity. Hence the proposals for CBMs and 
145 Gareth Evans, `Australia's Role in East Asia's Future', speech to CEDA Asian Region 
International Association of Cooperating Organisations (ARIACO) Roundtable, Melbourne, 11 
September 1995, p.6. 
146 Gareth Evans, `Australia in East Asia and the Asia Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass', fourteenth 
Asia lecture to the Asia -Australia Institute, Sydney, 20 March 1995, p.7. 
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incidents at sea agreements and so on. Yet Labor's concern did not manifest itself in 
proposals for arms control measures which sought to limit and control the numbers and 
types of military platforms. Perhaps Labor's hesitation reflected domestic political 
interests: in the ADF, the right faction of the Labor government and perhaps the 
electorate. It certainly reflected the interests of regional states to continue substantial 
modernisation programs that often started from an antiquated baseline. 
Labor's vagueness about definitions, of `cooperative security', security groupings and 
the place of traditional arrangements for regional security, may well be explained by the 
real difficulty of making definitions clear. And, from a scholar' perspective, the 
apparent contradictions may be the result of shortcomings in IR theoretical explanations 
which adopt single and opposing frameworks, that is either realism or liberalism to 
explain security policies (see Chapters Five and Six). On the other hand, vagueness had 
a number of advantages. For example, a security community of any depth was in fact 
implausible among Southeast Asian states -in the present as it had been in the past -so 
it made little sense to push hard for ít.147 As for Evans' reference to alliances and 
regional balances of power, both arrangements could claim domestic support-the 
electorate in the case of the alliance and `China threat' proponents in the case of the 
regional power balancing. 
CONCLUSION 
Labor came into office in 1983 determined to overcome past difficulties among the 
party factions about security and foreign policy. With respect to regional security Labor 
pursued a policy which was based largely on cooperative principles across a range of 
issues in economics, politics and security. In the early period of Labor government, 
when Bill Hayden was the Foreign Minister, Australia's attempts to implement a 
regional security policy based on cooperation were not well received by regional 
countries or by the US. Australia's efforts to establish an open and cooperative 
economic approach for the region, however, gained the respect of many regional 
147 The ASEAN states retained security suspicions about each other and none were willing to 
contemplate a arrangement that looked like collective security. - 
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countries and provided the government with a degree of prestige and experience that 
helped its later efforts to pursue security cooperation. 
The government's efforts were also assisted by the security changes taking place in 
Europe, by proposals made by President Michael Gorbachev for a new security dialogue 
in Asia and by the final end of the Cold War. All these events provided a security 
environment, which was receptive to the `security with' approach so vigorously pursued 
by Hayden's successor, Senator Gareth Evans. 
Despite initial opposition to Australia's approach from regional countries, the US and 
the Opposition at home, the Labor government continued to be highly instrumental in 
setting the pace, intellectual framework and institutional basis for regional security 
cooperation. However, notwithstanding Labor's intellectual commitment to `security 
with', a number of the policy concepts had limitations and the policy appeared to 
contain tensions and contradictions. Nonetheless, under Labor, 'security with' other 
states was enthusiastically embraced. The intent was to establish cooperation as a 
regional norm, exercised via multilateralism and regional institutions. Labor believed 
that such approaches enhanced security and helped to engage Australia economically 
and politically in the region. But did Labor pursue practical cooperative activities with 
the same vigour it showed towards developing policy concepts? Did these policy 
concepts in fact guide practitioners; and what were their limitations? This is the subject 
of the next chapter. 
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LABOR'S `SECURITY WITH' POLICY: 
THE PRACTICE OF REGIONAL SECURITY 
[TJhe end of the Cold War is [directly associated] with the re- emergence of the 
notion of common security. This process can best be characterised as 
step -by -step building of military confidence between nations, achieving 
security with them not against them.1 
(The Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, 199 L) 
Only direct and personal contact, the sharing of experiences and perceptions 
can...prise open the doors of conservative military establishments... in the end, the trust 
and confidence that really matters is between defence organisations.2 
(The Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, 1995.) 
From the late 1980s onwards, Labor's Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, and his 
department, made significant steps towards a new regional security policy based on 
`cooperative security' and `security with' other states in Southeast Asia. Particularly 
strong efforts were put into establishing multilateral arrangements and especially a 
regional institution for security dialogue. Most of the other practical measures that 
supported `cooperative security' were, however, undertaken by the Department of 
Defence and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) -the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), 
the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Australian Army. 
Since in practice `security with' became strongly associated with defence cooperation 
this chapter describes in detail how this situation evolved. The first section reviews 
defence cooperation between Australia and regional countries prior to Labor's election 
in 1983. The second looks at the Department of Defence's general approach to regional 
cooperation under Labor and the third, fourth and fifth sections examines the particular 
practical measures that were implemented by the Department and the ADF with their 
Robert Ray, Opening Address to the Royal United Services Institute of Australia (RUSI) National 
Seminar, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 27 September 1991, p.2. 
2 Robert Ray, quoted in David Jenkins, `Defence Links Only So Strong: Expert', Sydney Morning 
Herald (SMH) 17 July 1995. Ray's successor (from the new Liberal/National Coalition 
government) Ian McLachlan, was no less enthusiastic about the value of military cooperation, 
saying that `...quite often the deepest point of international contact between nations is in the 
military'. See Florence Chong, `Defence Ties With Australia Move to a Deeper Level', Straits 
Times, Reuters News Service, 19 October 1996. 
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military counterparts in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia.3 The sixth section describes 
some of the problems that arose when the policy was applied -such as the absence of 
bilateral structures to coordinate cooperation and the shortcomings in defence directives 
and operational guidelines for practitioners -as well as some of the limitations that 
`security against' policies imposed on cooperative activities. And the final section 
describes some of the tensions within the policy and between it and Australia's other 
foreign policies, such as human rights. 
In brief I will show that the expansion and strength of defence cooperation between 
Australia and the armed forces of ASEAN during the 1990s were quite extraordinary. 
To convincingly argue this requires that the bilateral activities be analysed in as much 
detail as possible. The conclusion this leads to is that never before had Australia 
cooperated so closely with so many ASEAN countries. The number of ASEAN 
personnel being trained by the ADF increased considerably. For example at the 
beginning of 1990 there were no Indonesians being trained by the ADF and by 1996 -97 
there were 258. The number of exercises between all the military services increased 
dramatically (see Appendix 2). For example, whereas in the late 1980s there was one 
naval exercise series between the RAN and Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), by 
1996 -97 at least six series were underway. Perhaps most importantly, over the 1990s the 
exercises became more complex, in terms of planning, combat and operational skills, 
and thus the warfighting skills of all the parties involved were enhanced as a result of 
cooperating. For example in 1992, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) joined 
the USAF RAAF air defence exercise Pitch BIack as an observer and by 1996 the 
RSAF was participating in live- combat and war scenario routines that involved more 
than 50 aircraft in the air at any one time. By any measure this exercise was highly 
sophisticated and a significant advance on previous series. Furthermore, during the 
1990s, defence cooperation between Australia and ASEAN became more formalised 
and better coordinated with the introduction of new bilateral structures, policy 
directives, working groups and operational guidelines. Indeed, plans for defence 
cooperation between Australia and Indonesia were set in place for the next ten years and 
the Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) were given access to training facilities in 
3 Australia's defence cooperation with Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei is described in 
Appendix 3, since there is much less activity with these three countries. 
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Australia, in some case for up to twenty -five years. Furthermore, the main multilateral 
arrangement for defence cooperation, the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 
was considerably strengthened and a new naval `Fleet Concentration', called Kakadu, 
involving most of the ASEAN navies was started by the RAN. 
The second argument that results from this detailed analysis of defence cooperation is 
that it was guided by several objectives that arguably created tensions in the policy. 
Without doubt the main intention was to establish a policy of `security with' the region 
and to establish the norm of regional cooperation. The previous chapter showed how 
deeply committed Labor was to this approach to security. One of the most important 
measures adopted to build confidence and introduce transparency was security dialogue. 
But equally important were the numerous military exercises and training programs. 
These particular activities also served another objective, which was to develop 
interoperability between the ADF and the armed services of Indonesia, Singapore and 
Malaysia. The final objective driving defence cooperation was Australia's desire to 
shape the regional environment to mirror its security interests. In addition to the possible 
tensions that these different objectives created the policy was also constrained by the 
ADF's aim to enhance its `security against' policies through cooperation. For example, 
the ADF gathered intelligence on regional counterparts during cooperative activities 
and, moreover, did not share those military skills that provided advantages for the 
defence of Australia. For many ordinary Australians, however, the greatest tension in the 
policy was that its objective to improve the military skills of regional armies ran the risk 
of compromising Australia's human rights policy, for example in Indonesia. Finally, 
what this detailed analysis of the practice of `security with' shows is how, in most 
respects, it could be seen to conflict with the principles and practice of `security 
against' -defence of Australia and the Australia US alliance. 
REGIONAL SECURITY BEFORE LABOR 
In practice Labor's policy of `cooperative security' was different to the regional security 
policies of past Australian governments. Whereas Labor sought 'security with' the 
region, previous policies had been based on the perception that the region was a, if not 
the, major source of threat and therefore most cooperation had been with some countries 
against others. Australia had previously `cooperated' with several regional 
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governments or more precisely it had joined with the UK and the US governments 
which backed these regimes -to counter perceived regional threats and, as a result, it 
became involved in several Asian wars (see Chapter One).4 
Australia's embroilment in these conflicts had often begun with the provision of military 
aid, which started with training, materiel and advisers, and then grew to involve 
Australian combat troops and equipment. For example, in the case of Vietnam, 
Australia's assistance started with training and materiel, then progressed to sending 
thirty advisers in May 1962 (later seventy more advisers were dispatched). Finally, on 
29 April 1965, Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced that 1 Battalion Royal 
Australian Regiment (1 RAR), comprising some 800 combat and combat support troops, 
would be deployed to Vietnam. Additional Army deployments of some 8,000 troops, as 
well as naval and air deployments, were made until 1969.5 
Australian military aid was coordinated by the Department of Defence and in the early 
1960s a formal organisation, the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP), was established. 
The first arrangement under the DCP, which was announced by Defence Minister Paul 
Hasluck on 17 March 1964, provided assistance to the Malaysian government in its 
conflict, or Konfrontasi, with Indonesia.6 The main elements of the program were help 
4 See Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crisis and Commitments. The Politics and Diplomacy 
of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948 -1965, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards 
Sydney, in association with the Australian War Memorial, Sydney, 1992. Australia was also 
instrumental in developing other means to counter social and ideological threats. The Colombo 
Plan, for example, was instigated in 1950 to provide civil aid to de- colonising countries in 
Southeast Asia which were seen to be vulnerable to communist movements. Nonetheless, the 
purpose was to assist some states to resist others, particularly those with communist ideologies that 
had indigenous followings. 
5 See David M. Homer, Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War, Canberra Papers on 
Strategy and Defence No.40, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1986; Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, 
St Leonards Sydney, 1987; Ian McNeill, The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam, 1962- 
1972, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1984. 
6 On 21 February 1963, Indonesia announced it would adopt a policy of `confrontation' against the 
establishment of the post -colonial state of Malaysia, which had gained independence on 31 August 
1957, On 25 September 1963, Prime Minister Robert Menzies, announced to the Australian 
parliament that Australia `would add...military assistance to the efforts of Malaysia and the United 
Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia's territorial integrity and political independence'. See 
Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debate (CPD), House of Represen- 
tatives, Vol.40, 1963, pp.1338 -1339. The decision on 17 March 1964, upgraded the earlier level of 
assistance and is regarded as the beginning of the Defence Cooperation Program. See CPD, House 
of Representatives, Vol.4I, 1964, pp.522 -523. Konfrontasi came to an end in August 1966. See 
also David Homer, The Australian Army and Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia', 
Australian Outlook, Vol.43, No.1, 1989, pp.61 -76. 
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with training and materiel and `a secondment of a small number of officers and men of 
the Australia services'.7 Over the next two decades Australia initiated DCP arrange- 
ments with several other regional countries, for example Singapore, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and various South West Pacific states.8 Indonesia also 
received assistance under the DCP following the end of Konfrontasi in 1966 and the fall 
of President Sukarno, who had allegedly been supported by Indonesian communists. 
Australian defence cooperation at that time was guided by the view that assistance to 
particular regional states for development of their own `security against' strategies could 
be given in ways that benefited Australia's security and influence in the region. 
Collective military arrangements between Australia and several other states were 
another aspect of defence cooperation. Between 1954 and 1977 Australia was a member 
of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) which aimed to keep the US 
engaged in Asia and to counter the spread of communist insurgencies in the region. 
SEATO failed as an alliance strategy') A more enduring association aimed against 
others was the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The FPDA had been 
established in response to the British government's announcement in July 1967 that it 
would withdraw East of Suez (including Hong Kong in 1997). Several governments, 
namely the UK, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand, considered it prudent 
to establish a defence arrangement that could be used against Indonesia, should 
Indonesia threaten Malaysia as it had during Konfrontasi. The FPDA was signed in 
1971.10 
But around the same time, support for further collective defence cooperation 
arrangements aimed against others began to diminish. The Strategic Basis of Australian 
Defence Policy 1971, approved by the Defence Committee in March 1972, stated for the 
7 CPD, House of Representatives, Vol.41, 1964, pp.522 -523. 
8 Inspector- General's Division, Department of Defence, Defence Cooperation, Directorate of 
Publishing, Defence Centre, Canberra, 1995, Chapter 2, p.2. 
9 See Lezek Buszynki, S. E.A.T.O: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy, Singapore University Press, 
Singapore, 1983. The other members of SEATO were Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, the US, 
France, New Zealand, and Britain. 
to See Philip Methven, The Five Powers Defence Arrangements and Military Cooperation Among 
the ASEAN States: Incompatible Models for Security in Southeast Asia, Canberra Papers on 
Strategy and Defence No.92, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1992. 
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first time that any threat of overt military aggression by China into Southeast Asia or by 
Vietnam beyond Indochina was unlikely. As a result 'the likelihood of Australian 
combat involvement outside Australia' was `not great' and was receding and therefore 
`Australia must pursue her own security interests by her own efforts more than was 
necessary before'." Nonetheless, even if formal defence arrangements and participation 
in active combat against other states became less relevant for Australia's security in the 
minds of defence planners then, there was little evidence that they also endorsed the idea 
of `security with' others as the basis for Australia's regional security policy. This view 
of security continued in the Department of Defence for some time after Labor came to 
office. 
SECURITY WITH' UNDER LABOR 
When Labor came into office in 1983, defence planners were more concerned with 
putting in place a `security against' defence of Australia policy than examining the 
prospects for a new regional security policy. The view held by the Department of 
Defence was expressed succinctly in the 1987 White Paper: 
[T]he best contribution [Australia] can make to the continued stability of our region [is] 
an Australian defence force able to deal effectively with the most credible challenges to 
the nation's sovereignty. 12 
It was clear from the 1987 White Paper that Australia's defence cooperation with 
regional states was to continue within the policies developed during past decades. This 
state of affairs persisted for some years.13 Although in the latter half of the 1980s `the 
emphasis moved away from materiel aid to joint training and exercises to Southeast 
Asian countries',14 these changes were hardly reflections of a new orientation towards 
security in the region. Indeed, it was partly because the Defence Department's approach 
11 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 1971, Canberra, March 1971, 
pp.1, 57, 62. 
12 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1987, p.7. 
13 An indication of how little was happening in defence cooperation activities was that in I983 the 
RAN conducted one naval exercise with Indonesia and two with Malaysia and Singapore. The 
RAN did not conduct any formal exercises with Indonesia after 1983 until 1991. See Desmond 
Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement.' Australia's Asia -Pacific Security Policy in the 
1990s, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1996, pp.133 -142. 
14 Inspector -General's Division, Defence Cooperation, Chapter 2, pp.2 -5. 
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to regional policy had still not reflected the changes in the strategic environment, which 
followed the easing of Cold War tensions, that Gareth Evans, the Foreign Minister, 
began in late 1989 to introduce arguments and proposals for a new regional policy.15 
These efforts by Evans to establish a new policy were endorsed by Kim Beazley's 
successor as Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, although the latter received 
much less public attention.lb By the early 1990s, the Department of Defence was taking 
a much more vigorous approach to regional security. One of the first documents that 
addressed security in the region was Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s 
(ASP90).17 Until September 1992, ASP90, or rather a version of it, was a classified in- 
house document which argued that Australia should move beyond defence of Australia 
towards `promotion' of Australia's security interests in the region. As it stated: 
The strategy described in this document goes beyond the defence of the nation against 
direct attack to include promotion of our security interests. The term as used here 
encompasses the nation's defence goals, the principles and priorities for providing the 
means of achieving them, and the uses to which these defence capabilities should be 
put, both to defend and promote the nation's security interests.18 (Emphasis added.) 
According to Stewart Woodman, ASP90 marked the realisation by the Department of 
Defence that, apart from the `narrow confines of the direct defence of Australia': 
[A] no less important aspect of effective planning was a more proactive role aimed at 
promoting stability within Australia's immediate region and ensuring that the prospects 
of a military threat emerging in the future was even more remote.t9 
Another document to address regional security was the Strategic Review 1993 (SR93).2° 
It argued that: 
The challenge is to expand and accelerate our strategic engagement with the region as a 
major new emphasis in our defence posture, alongside our primary commitment to 
developing our self -reliant capacity for the defence of Australia.21 
15 Correspondence with DFAT official, 1990. 
16 As Ray pointed out, `engagement with the region has been given an enormous amount of attention 
both by myself and Foreign Minister Evans'. Robert Ray, `1994 Defence White Paper: National 
Security for the New', transcript of speech, 16 December 1994, p.5. 
17 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Department of Defence, 
Canberra, 1992. 
18 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, p.20. 
19 See Stewart Woodman, `Unravelling Australia's Strategic Dilemma', in Ian McLachlan et al, 
Australia's Strategic Dilemmas: Options for the Future, Australian Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1997, p.10. 
20 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, Defence Publications, Canberra, December 1993. 
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The Defence Department endorsed some of the Foreign Minister's initiatives for 
regional security and introduced some new policy concepts to guide defence 
cooperation. 
`Common security' and `strategic partnership' 
The Defence Minister, Senator Ray, like Foreign Minister Evans, endorsed the 
arguments for a policy concept of `common security'. He argued that: 
[T]he end of the Cold War is [directly associated] with the re- emergence of the notion 
of common security. This process can best be characterised as step -by -step building of 
military confidence between nation, achieving security with them not against them 22 
[Emphasis added.] 
Defence planners writing The Strategic Review 1993 applied this thinking to Australia's 
regional security policy proposing that: `[ilncreasingly', [Australia] will need to seek... 
security with Asia' 23 [Emphasis added.] 
Although emphasising the importance of cooperation, Ray, like Evans, did not 
underestimate the continuing need for military responses under some circumstances. 
Neither did he doubt the capacity of `common security' to encompass these traditional 
requirements: 
As my colleague Gareth Evans has pointed out, common security is not a policy for 
wimps. Nothing in the idea implies passivity or appeasement in the face of a security 
threat. It does not involve emasculating military forces, it is not about removing the 
capability to respond to direct threats.24 
Indeed, for Ray, military forces were central to `common security' and underpinned the 
very idea of `security with' others. In his view the military would provide the means for 
both defence self -help and regional cooperation. Australia's force structure for defence 
of Australia helped, it was argued, to engage Australia in the region. Military 
engagement and cooperation would consist of both traditional defence links, e.g., naval 
visits, personnel exchanges, high level military visits, combined exercises, in- country 
21 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, p.2 -9. 
22 Robert Ray, Opening Address to the Royal United Services Institute of Australia (RUST) National 
Seminar, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 27 September 1991, p.2. 
23 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, p.21. 
24 Robert Ray, Opening Address to the Royal United Services Institute of Australia (RUSI) National 
Seminar, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 27 September 1991, p.2. 
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training and formal ties (such as FPDA) and also `new forms of engagement'.25 New 
forms of engagement would seek a `more integrated approach to defence relationships' 
and they could include, in the first instance, collaborative industrial ventures, providing 
a defence industry support base for regional forces and also defence exports. 26 Over 
time, engagement could lead to deeper integration that `improve[d] the compatibility of 
Australian and regional forces and increase[d] the degree of interoperability with and 
between regional forces'.27 
Ray's argument, that strong military forces supported regional stability, was applied not 
just to Australia but to other Southeast Asian countries. According to the Minister, 
`[m]odernisations...will provide a basis for...nations to be self -reliant in their defence 
[and] this will assist regional security'.28 Moreover, it would be part of Australia's 
policy of security cooperation to assist the armed forces in the region to achieve this 
objective. According to Ray, Australia would `[contribute] to regional security by 
enhancing the capacity of regional countries to provide for their self- defence',29 
The most comprehensive official exposition of the Defence Department's objective to 
increase defence cooperation with regional countries was provided in The Strategic 
Review 1993.30 The key concept in the document, `strategic partnership', had several 
aims, including: 
`to enhance the capacity of our nearer region to exclude potentially hostile 
influences that could also threaten Australia's security' 
`to reduce the potential for misunderstanding and tension by promoting sound 
strategic assessment and force structuring processes through an increased security 
planning dialogue' 
25 Robert Ray, Opening Address to the 'Australia's Maritime Bridge into Asia' conference, Sydney, 
17 November 1993, p.4. 
26 Ray, Opening Address to the `Australia's Maritime Bridge into Asia' conference, p.4. 
27 Ray, Opening Address to the 'Australia's Maritime Bridge into Asia' conference, p.4. 
28 Ray, Opening Address to the `Australia's Maritime Bridge into Asia' conference, p.3. 
29 Robert Ray, keynote address to the RAAF air power conference `The War in the Air', Canberra, 29 
March 1994, p.2 
30 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993. To reinforce Australia's commitment to building 
regional confidence, several officials, responsible for the Strategic Review 1993, visited Southeast 
Asian governments to explain the contents of the paper. 
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`to assist the development of effective self -defence capabilities, including through 
cooperation in defence science and technology' 
`to move towards interoperability in key areas such as communications with the 
ASEAN nations' .31 
Another aim of `strategic partnership' was to move the defence relationship between 
Australia and many regional countries away from the tradition of aid/dependence 
towards partnership /equality, not least because some regional states, Iike Singapore, 
could now afford to pay a fee -for -service (see below).32 Clearly the Defence Department 
under Minister Ray had now developed an agenda for regional security policy. As the 
subsequent review of defence cooperation, undertaken by the Inspector General 
Division, stated: 
The Strategic Review 1993...emphasises that for the rest of the 1990s, enhancing the 
security of the region will become an increasingly prominent theme in defence 
policy.33 
And, indeed, significant developments were already taking place with each of 
Australia's major partners in Southeast Asia. 
DEFENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA 
Indonesia has been and continues to he Australia's most important Southeast Asian 
neighbour.34 During the 1990s, the relationship became much stronger than it had been 
in the past with defence cooperation being a major element.35 In the first place, contact 
between the two military communities increased substantially. Initially, the respective 
military chiefs led the way but soon links were established across the three services and 
at many levels -to the point that by 1993 Indonesians were being accommodated and 
trained at ILMAS Coonawarra in Darwin to be stewards for the Indonesian armed 
31 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, p.23. 
32 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, p.24. 
33 Inspector- General's Division, Defence Cooperation, Chapter 2, p.6. 
34 See the section in Chapter One which discusses inter alia the history of defence planners strategic 
assessments of Indonesia during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. 
35 For a discussion and rather critical view of the relationship see Bob Lowry, `Australia- Indonesia 
Security Cooperation: for Better or Worse', Working Paper No.299, Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, pp.1 -32. 
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forces_36 Second, the number of Indonesian personnel attending staff training programs 
in Australia and being trained in Indonesia by ADF staff increased dramatically. Third, 
both the number and sophistication of unit -level military training and exercises 
conducted by the ADF with the Indonesian services increased significantly. Fourth, the 
level of intelligence exchanges was upgraded and a wider range of topics was discussed. 
Fifth, formal structures were introduced to coordinate the wider military relationship 
and a comprehensive agenda for defence cooperation was developed. And finally, an 
historic Agreement on Maintaining Security signed in December 1995, indicating 'a 
fairly high level of intimacy and confidentiality',37 was concluded. Without doubt, in 
comparison to any previous period, cooperation increased and the defence relationship 
between the two countries during the 1990s was characterised by unprecedented 
closeness. 
The drive towards this situation had begun in the very late 1980s and at the most senior 
levels of government. On the Australian side the task of improving security relations 
between Australia and Indonesia at this time was pursued by key foreign affairs and 
defence officials. The Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, the Chief of the Defence Force 
(CDF), General Peter Gration, and his successors Admiral Alan Beaumont, and General 
John Baker were all strongly involved. On the Indonesian side, the main officials 
concerned were the Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and the Commander -in -Chief of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno. Evans, Gration, Alatas and Sutrisno 
were responsible for initiating a series of visits and talks in 1988 and 1989, which were 
aimed at overcoming the historic swings in the Indonesian- Australian security 
relationship38 and which over the preceding three years had been on a downward slide. 
36 Interview with ADF personnel, May 1997, Darwin, 
37 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991 quoted in David Goldsworthy, `An Overview', in 
John Ravenhill and James Cotton (eds), Seeking Asian Engagement. Australia in World Affairs 
1991 -95, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p.25. For an account of the steps in the 
negotiations which led to the agreement see Peter Hartcher, `How the Enemy Became an Ally', 
Australian Financial Review (AFR), 4 July 1996, p.1 and `the Indonesian Deal -an Act of Faith', 
AFR, 5 July 1996, p.26; also see Alan Dupont, `The Australia Indonesia Security Agreement', 
Australian Quarterly, Vol.68, No.2, winter, 1996, pp.49 -61. 
38 During Indonesia's attempts in the 1940s to remove the Dutch colonial administration Australia has 
supported the nationalist movements. But by 1963 the Menzies government had decided to 
purchase the long- range, strike bomber the F -111 because it could penetrate Indonesian air 
defences and strike key targets in Java. Moreover, according to cabinet documents, although the 
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There were a number of reasons for this. The Indonesian government had been highly 
irritated with Australia for `interfering' in their internal affairs, most notably with the 
publication of an article by the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper in 1986 that claimed 
members of President Suharto's family were involved in corrupt business practices.39 To 
the Indonesian government this public allegation was a particularly egregious insult.40 
Defence Minister General Benny Moerdani froze ministerial visits and Australia's long- 
standing `defence aid' program to Indonesia.41 At the beginning of 1988, Australia 
`called a formal halt'42 to the materiel -based projects conducted under the Defence 
Cooperation Program and in March 1988 the Australian parliament was informed by the 
Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, that defence `cooperative activities with Indonesia... 
[had] decline[d]'.43 The poor state of official defence relations was particularly 
unfortunate given a perception among quite a few Australians that Indonesia was a 
possible threat.44 Notwithstanding their qualms about the Indonesian regime's record of 
human rights abuse, Evans and Gration believed the security relationship had to be 
repaired. The relatively moderate Alatas and Sutrisno agreed. 
primary role of the F -111 was `the delivery of conventional weapons and reconnaissance, the 
aircraft should have the capability of delivering special stores (nuclear weapons).' See Cameron 
Stewart, `Fear of Indonesia Drove Liberals into F -111 deal', The Weekend Australian, 1 -2 January 
1994. 
39 David Jenkins, SMH, 10 April 1986. For an assessment of the Australian -Indonesian relationship 
at that time see the special issue of Australian Outlook, Vol.40, No.3, December 1986. 
40 In the author's interviews with Indonesian defence officials (serving and retired) and intellectuals 
in Jakarta during June 1997, the point which was constantly made was that the insult was not that 
the President was being accused of corruption since that was already been privately alleged within 
Indonesia but that it was made public and by a foreign journalist and such an event 'shamed' all 
Indonesians. 
41 Interview with General Benny Moerdani, June 1997, Jakarta. See also Patrick Walters, `Indonesian 
Forces Expand ADF Links', The Australian, 22 March 1994; 'Indonesian General's Visit to 
Improve Neighbour Relations', AFR, 10 July 1989. 
42 
`Australian Security Tied to Indonesia, Army Chief', Reuters News Service, 14 November 1988. 
43 
`Australia Plans to Expand Asian Defence Links' , Reuters News Service, 23 February 1988. 
44 Even during the new high in security relations between the two governments in the early 1990s the 
public remained sceptical. A paper analysing public opinion in the 1993 Australian Election Study 
concluded that '[t]he proportion of Australians who perceive Indonesia to be a threat is growing'. 
See Alison Cottrell and Toni Makkai, 'Australian Perceptions of Indonesia as a Threat', Asian 
Studies Review, Vol.19, No.2, November, 1995, pp.59 -71. See also Ian McAllister and Toni 
Makkai, `Changing Australian Opinion on Defence: Trends, Patterns, and Explanations', Small 
Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.2, No.3, 1991, pp.195 -235; S. Scherer, `The Tyranny of Cohabitation: 
Australian -Indonesia Relations', Australian Outlook, Vol.40, No.3, 1986, pp.148 -152; Ian 
McAllister and Toni Makkai, `Changing Australian Opinion on Defence Trends, Patterns, and 
Explanations', in Peter R. Young (ed.), Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War, Frank 
Cass, London, 1992. 
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In April 1988, Australian defence officials began a series of visits to Jakarta to seek to 
put the relationship on a better footing.45 This was followed in November by a meeting 
between General Gration and President Suharto and General Try Sutrisno. Gration 
proposed `new forms of cooperation' -ones, he said, that moved away from materiel - 
based activities towards the transfer skills and expertise and exercises, training and 
personnel exchanges.4ó Australian officials were so determined to establish the 
relationship on a cooperative basis that when the Indonesian military, without prior 
warning, closed the Lombok and Sunda Straits for military exercises their response was 
muted.47 Despite being concerned for a number of political, security and economic 
reasons, the government's views were calmly `delivered [in] a note' to the Indonesian 
government.48 General Gration's November visit went ahead and the new Foreign 
Minister, Gareth Evans, went to Indonesia to pay his respects to Ali AIatas who had just 
become the Indonesian Foreign Minister. All the meetings were positive and within 
three months both sides had made some important policy decisions about the future of 
the relationship. These were made public when Ali Alatas came to Canberra in February 
1989 to make the first visit by an Indonesian Foreign Minister for over three years.49 
Both sides agreed to a number of measures to improve the relationship, among them the 
establishment of the Australia Indonesia Ministerial Meetings to be held each year or 
more often if required.50 Evans and Alatas said that the recent rift in relations had been 
made all the more difficult to resolve because there had been no regular and formal 
consultations for over two decades.51 The discussions would be aimed in part at 
45 
`Australia- Indonesia Plan Better Defence Links', Reuters News Service, 18 April 1988. 
46 
'Australia- Indonesia Plan Better Defence Links', Reuters News Service, 18 April 1988. 
47 
`Australian Security Tied to Indonesia, Army Chief', Reuters News Service, 14 November 1988. 
48 
`Australian Security Tied to Indonesia, Army Chief', Reuters News Service, 14 November 1988. 
49 The Timor Gap Treaty, which was concluded on 1989, became an important arena for cooperation, 
notwithstanding some legal differences between the two sides. See Geoff Gardiner, The Security 
Treaty With Indonesia', Research and Analysis, Newsletter of the Directorate of Army Research 
and Analysis, No.6, April 1996, p.3. 
50 Mark Bruner, `Re- establish a Close Relationship', The Age, 4 March 1989. Other measures 
included the establishment of an Australia- Indonesia Institute that would administer a variety of 
cultural, scientific, and educational organisations. 
i1 In the early 1970s trade talks between Australia and Indonesia broke down and the two countries 
ceased regular discussions. 
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reducing misperceptions about `cultural differences',52 for example on human rights, as 
a basis for a stronger relationship. Many Australian observers, however, were suspicious 
that this approach downplayed human rights in order to improve the security 
relationship. Reducing misunderstandings was a central theme in subsequent talks 
between military leaders some five months later. 
This meeting in July 1989, was the first visit to Australia by the head of the Indonesian 
Armed Forces for almost two decades.53 The Commander -in -Chief of the Indonesian 
Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno, met with the Australian Defence Minister, Kim 
Beazley and CDF General Gration. According to General Gration, the first objective 
was `better consultation'.54 That is, he said, `[s]imply talking to each other so that there 
is less room for misunderstandings and we understand what they are doing and they 
understand what we are doing' S5 Both sides, it appeared, harboured misperceptions 
about each other's defence and security policies. 
Comments from a number of senior Indonesians suggested there were `misunder- 
standings' about Australia's defence policy. In May 1989, retired Indonesian Lt General 
Hasnan Habib had told a seminar in Canberra that Australia's `hawkish military posture 
is obviously out of place and may cause misgivings as to the real motivation and 
intentions of Australia'.56 Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had also commented that 
Australia could do more to explain its defence policy to Indonesia, saying that `I think 
Australia has tried to explain, but there is more room for further discussion and seminars 
to air each other's perceptions'.S7 A leading academic at Indonesia's Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies, Yusuf Wanandi, agreed and said that while Australia may 
have explained its defence policy to Jakarta, `the strategic, diplomatic and political 
52 Alatas said that as far as the Indonesian government was concerned, `what we ask is a greater 
sensitivity to the differences, a greater willingness to understand developments and policies H 
Indonesia in their own right, in our own culture'. See Louise Williams, `Visit Sets Scene for 
Jakarta Meetings', SMH, 27 February 1989. 
53 
`Indonesian General's Visit to Improve Neighbour Relations'; AFR, 10 July 1989; Andrew Fraser, 
`Defence Chief Calls for Closer Indonesian Ties', Canberra Times, 10 July 1989. 
54 Fraser, `Defence Chief Calls for Closer Indonesian Ties', Canberra Times, 10 July 1989. 
55 Fraser, `Defence Chief Calls for Closer Indonesian Ties', Canberra Times, 10 July 1989. 
56 Lt. General (ret.) A. Hasnan Habib, `Australia -Indonesia Relations: Politico- Defense Dimension', 
paper presented to the Fifth Australia -Indonesia Conference, the Australian National University, 
Canberra, 25 -27 May 1989, pp.11 -12. Later published in Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson (eds), 
Strange Neighbours, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1991, pp.161 -182 and p.I68 for quote. 
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objectives have not been explained'.58 And finally, a senior analyst at the Indonesian 
Institute for Sciences in Jakarta said that Australia's posture `could be interpreted as 
provocative and offensive...and might be perceived as a threat to Australia's 
neighbours' .59 
These comments were dismissed by some Australian defence officials60 and scholars as 
unrepresentative of mainstream Indonesian views on Australia's defence policy. 
However this dismissal missed several points.61 The first was that the Indonesians have 
a broader notion of security and some actions by Australia seemed threatening to it. 
Even if the particular views expressed above were not widespread among the Indonesian 
military elite, many of them still worried that human rights groups within Australia 
might undermine the Indonesian government's ability to maintain internal cohesion. 
Second, there were also concerns among some Indonesians that if the Australian 
government could not control these domestic groups and the anti -Indonesian press 
reports then by the same logic it might not be able to check public opinion that was 
concerned that Indonesia was a security threat (see fn 44). While senior Indonesian 
officials knew that most of their counterparts in the ADF were not concerned about 
Indonesia in this way62 they also knew that Australia was a democracy that had to 
respond to the electorate's views. Third, for many Indonesians, there was a link between 
Australia's values and the defence policy it pursued. As Peter Hastings argued: 
[TJhe feeling that Australians are fundamentally racist about Indonesia, believing it to 
be a potential threat, and that its `aggressive' defence build up is the result of fear...is 
more widely spread in the Indonesian establishment than [Australians) commonly 
believe 63 
57 Fraser, `Defence Chief Calls for Closer Indonesian Ties', Canberra Times, 10 July 1989. 
58 Roy Eccleston, `Indonesia in a Flap Over Bob's Hawks...', The Australian, 30 May 1989. 
59 See Pauline Kerr, `Despite War Toys, We're Not Seen as Militaristic', AFR, 24 August 1989. 
60 Roy Eccleston, 'Beazley Rejects "Hawks" Accusation', The Australian, 30 May 1989. 
61 Interviews with General Hasnan Habib (ret.), General Moerdani (ret.), Rear Admiral Sunardi, First 
Admiral Yuswaji, Jakarta, June 1997. 
62 For example, on his visit to Indonesia in November 1988, General Gration had said that 'Australia 
does not regard Indonesia as a threat'. See 'Australian Security Tied to Indonesia, Army Chief', 
Reuters News Service, 14 November 1988. Some in the ADF, however, were not so sanguine 
about Indonesia. The Australian Army Chief, General Laurie O'Donnell, said around the time of 
Sutrisno's visit in 1989 that Australia would not stand by if there was conflict between Indonesia 
and PNG. See `Indonesian General's Visit to Improve Neighbour Relations', AFR, 10 July 1989. 
63 Peter Hastings, 'A Boom in Ties with Jakarta', SMH, 26 June 1989. 
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Fourth, again as Peter Hastings argued, many Indonesians could not accept the strategic 
logic expressed in the 1986 Dibb Report that Indonesia was the area `from or through' 
which a threat may come.ó4 `From' Indonesia `evokes an unacceptable image of a 
belligerent Indonesia which is contrary to Indonesia's self image' .65 For some 
Indonesians to agree, as Hasnan Habib did later, that Australia's defence posture was 
appropriate given its geography, did not mean that they had no concerns that Australia 
might be a potential threat to Indonesia. Moreover, for Australia to assume that its 
actions and rhetoric were non -threatening underestimated the culture within ABRI, 
which was deeply suspicious about any internal or external security matter. For all these 
reasons, Australia needed to adopt an approach that reassured the Indonesians. Finally, 
from an entirely different angle, many ordinary Australians with the views above needed 
to be reassured that their own government's security policy would not undermine the 
human rights of ordinary Indonesians. 
In a joint statement following General Sutrisno's visit to Australia in July 1989, he and 
General Gration addressed some of these security concerns. They determined to improve 
relations through defence activities, such as senior level military visits, military 
exercises, staff college exchanges and defence industry contacts.66 Following the visit by 
General Sutrisno, further visits and discussions took place between ministers and senior 
officials. If some of these early and subsequent cooperative measures for improving 
security relations between the two countries were aimed at `simply talking' to reduce 
tensions caused by various cultural and security misperceptions then many of the later 
measures pursued in the 1990s went well beyond this goal. The two areas where close 
cooperation developed, were in individual staff training programs and unit level training 
and exercises. The measure of that closeness was the extensive assistance that the ADF 
gave to ABRI for development of combat and operational skills.67 
64 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, a report to the Minister for Defence, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986, p.48. 
65 Hastings, 'A Boom in Ties with Jakarta', SMH, 26 June 1989. According to Lt. General Hasnan 
Habib, this account in the Dibb report also insulted Indonesian mythology that described the waters 
around Indonesia and Australia as ruled by the peaceful and caring sea goddess. Interview, Jakarta, 
June 1997. 
66 
`Australia, Indonesia Agree to Strengthen Defence Links', Xinhua News Agency Bulletin, Reuters 
News Service, 15 July 1989. 
67 Interview with ADF personnel, Canberra, November 1998. 
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Individual personnel training programs 
The number of Indonesian personnel trained in Australia and in Indonesia by the ADF 
increased significantly during the 1990s.6ß Whereas in 1988 -89 there were no 
Indonesian military personnel being trained in Australia,69 by 1996 -97 there were 147.70 
In 1991 -92 there were no Indonesian personnel being trained in Indonesia by the ADF71 
but by 1996 -97 there were 111,72 making a total of 258 Indonesians trained by the ADF 
in that year. ADF personnel also attended Indonesian staff colleges and participated in 
civilian based language training. 
During this period Australia had become the most important foreign country supplying 
military training to the Indonesian armed forces.73 It had replaced the United States, 
68 At a more general level Australia is seen as the biggest single destination for Indonesians seeking 
education overseas. See Glenda Korporall, 'A Testing Time for Friends', SMH, 22 July 1995. 
69 Senate Hansard, Question No.1695, IO October 1994, p.I386. 
70 The Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia 
and ASEAN: Managing Change, Parliamentary Paper No.54 of 1998, March 1998, p.194. In 
1989/90 there were five Indonesian personnel being trained by the ADF (Senate Hansard, 
Question No.I695, 10 October 1994, p.1386); and by 1993 /94 there were 120 (Senate Hansard, 
Question No.1752, 31 January 1995, p. 166). According to Patrick Walters the figure was higher, 
amounting to more than 300 in 1994. See Walters. 'Indonesian Forces Expand ADF Links', The 
Australian, 22 March 1994. In March 1994, a senior delegation of army officers, reportedly the 
most senior concerned with training Indonesian personnel ever to visit Australia, toured training 
establishments around the country. In the same year the Australian Defence Minister, Senator 
Robert Ray, proposed that Australia should offer the 'full gamut of training' to Indonesians (Ray 
Offers to Boost Indon. Military Aid', The Age, 3 August 1994). Indonesians were trained at ADF 
establishments such as Staff College LIMAS Penguin, HMAS Cerberus, 1{MAS Creswell, 
Command & Staff College Queenscliff, Cunungra Land Warfare Centre, School of Artillery 
Manly, School of Army Aviation Oakey, School of Infantry Singleton, Army TAFE Bonegilla, 
Special Air Services Regiment Swanbourne, Staff College RAAF Fairbairn, RAAF Wagga Wagga, 
RAAF Sale and at educational institutions such as the Australian Defence Force Academy, Joint 
Services Staff College, Peacekeeping School RAAF Williamtown, Language School RAAF 
Williams, ADF Warfare Centre WilIiamtown. See Senate Hansard, Question No.1752, 31 January 
1995, p.166. 
71 Senate Hansard, Question No.1626, 19 September 1994, p.958. 
72 Department of Defence, International Policy Division, submission 55 to the Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade enquiry into matters relating to East Timor, 31 March 1999, annex A. In 
1992/93 there were 56 Indonesian personnel being trained by the ADF in Indonesia (Senate 
Hansard, Question No.1626, 19 September 1994, p.958); in 1993 /94 there 143 (Senate Hansard, 
Question No.I626, 19 September 1994, p.958); in 1994 -95 there were 140 (Jenkins, `Australia's 
Helping Hand in Indonesia's Military Muscle', SMH, 4 December 1995); and in 1995 -96 the 
number had risen to some 240 (Tim Huxley, 'Pointers: Defence Links With Indonesia Growing', 
Janes Defence Weekly, p.10, Reuters News Service, 1 February 1997). The type of instruction 
covered such topics as electronic warfare, flight safety and infantry instructional techniques 
(Huxley, 'Pointers: Defence Links With Indonesia Growing', p.10). Australia also helped with 
Nomad aircraft maintenance, survey and mapping. In 1994 for example, there were some four ADF 
personnel assisting the Indonesians with these projects. 
73 David Jenkins, 'Australia's Helping Hand in Indonesia's Military Muscle', SMH, 4 December 
1995. 
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which under pressure from Congress had canceled the International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) program in June 1992.74 Indeed, if one of the objectives of 
Australian defence officials was to reduce misperceptions by exposing Indonesians to 
Australian military thinking through training programs then it was also the case that one 
of the Indonesians' aims was to fill the gap left by the cancellation of US military aid. 
Unit level training and exercises 
An even stronger indication of the Labor government's intent to implement a policy of 
cooperation with Indonesia was the ADF's assistance to ABRI with unit training and 
exercises. Unit training involves the three armed services -the Army, Navy and Air 
Force-of both countries. As a consequence of unit training provided by the ADF, the 
Indonesia armed forces were able to improve combat and operational skills. 
Navy to Navy cooperation 
Navy -to -Navy activities such as ship visits75 and exercises increased in frequency during 
the I99Os and the relationship between the RAN and the TNI -AL, the Indonesian Navy, 
became one of the `closest' among the three forces.76 In 1990, there were no scheduled 
naval exercises but by 1996 -97 two series, the Ausina and New Horizon /Cakrawala 
Barn, were taking place regularly. Each series involved several separate exercises; for 
example in 1994, three Ausina Passexs and two Ausina Patrolexs (the latter was later 
renamed Cassowary) took place. The first series involves major fleet unit combined 
passage exercises and smaller scale passexs while the second involves patrol boats and 
P3C maritime surveillance aircraft. By 1993, these patrol and communications exercises 
had reached strong Ievels of cooperation: for example, in Ausina `93 Australian 
personnel flew with Indonesian personnel on their Navy Searchmaster (Nomad) aircraft 
74 Jenkins, `Australia's Helping Hand in Indonesia's Military Muscle', SMH, 4 December 1995. The 
US House of Representatives voted in June 1992 to cut $2 million military aid after Indonesian 
troops were involved in the November 1991 massacre of East Timorese in Dili. 
75 In July 1989, some five RAN ships visited Indonesia (Hastings, 'A Boom in Ties with Jakarta', 
SMH, 26 June 1989); during 1993 -94 there were between 16 to 20 RAN visits to Indonesia (Peter 
Fray, `Comrades in Arms', The Bulletin, 5 April 1994, p.18). In October 1993, a training cruise by 
Indonesian warships to Sydney took place and young Indonesian officers participated in shore 
training programs. By 1996, in the month of July, seven RAN vessels made port visits to Indonesia 
(Walters, `Indonesia to Stage Huge Exercise in South China Sea'). 
76 Patrick Walters, `Indonesia to Stage Huge Exercise in South China Sea', The Weekend Australian, 
24 -25 August 1996. 
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and Indonesian personnel had flown on Australian P3C Orion aircraft during 
surveillance operations in the Timor Gap.77 The other series, New Horizon, which 
usually takes place biennially, is a major combined exercise and bigger than the Ausina 
series. The New Horizon VII, held near Darwin in 1993, was the largest held to that 
point and involved eight RAN ships, RAAF aircraft, six Indonesian ships and a Nomad. 
In subsequent New Horizon/Cakrawala Baru exercises Indonesian officers and sailors 
routinely came aboard Australian navy ships and, according to Navy personnel, by then 
`the level of comfort' between Australian and Indonesian officers and sailors was very 
strong.7$ 
A major step taken by the RAN in 1993 was organising the first `multilateral exercise', 
or rather what was called Fleet Concentration Kakadu, in Darwin harbour. The aim of 
the Kakadu series, according to the RAN, is to bring regional navies together with the 
objective to `enhance stability and security through graduated ship work -up programs 
designed to improve preparedness and interoperability'.79 The Indonesian Navy and 
other regional navies from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, New Zealand, Hong Kong 
were invited. On this occasion the Indonesians sent observers but at the second Kakadu, 
held in 1995, the Indonesian Navy participated in the harbour phase of the Fleet 
Concentration but not the sea phase. The planning and evaluation (or `wash -up') 
procedures of Kakadu are multilateral and the sea phase routines are bilateral.89 Kakadu 
Two involved a harbour phase, which included landing drills and tactical planning, and 
a ten -day sea phase, which involved maneuvers to simulate a conflict. B7 Some twenty - 
four warships and 5,000 personnel participated from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Hong Kong. Naval observers from the Philippines 
also attended. There was also an air component that consisted of Australian F /A -18s, F- 
77 Gary Waters, `Regional Air Power Cooperation -an RAAF Perspective', in Gary Waters and 
Mark Lax (ed.), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, Air Powers Studies Centre, Canberra, 
1994, p.185; Desmond Ball, `The Political- Security Dimension of Australia and the Asia - Pacific 
Region', The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol.XXII, No.3, 1994, pp.227 -246. 
78 Interview with RAN officer, Darwin, May 1997, 
79 Jack McCaffrie, `Regional Cooperation -a RAN Perspective', in Gary Waters and Mark Lax 
(eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, Air Powers Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994, p.141. 
so Interview with RAN officer, Darwin, May 1997. 
81 David Nason, 'Wargames Hone Skills', The Australian, 10 March 1995. 
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Ills, P3Cs and helicopters and other strike aircraft came from Singapore and 
Malaysia.82 
Apart from increasing in frequency and closeness, exercises with the Indonesian Navy 
are also growing in complexity and the planning for them is becoming more 
sophisticated.83 As one Australian defence source pointed out, the relationship is 
showing `real sign[s] of maturity'.S4 Now, he said, `you can argue tooth and nail with 
your Indonesian planners about the detail of the exercise'.85 An indication of the 
growing sophistication is that interoperability between the two navies across a range of 
combat skills is increasing.86 As the Defence Annual Report for 1996 -97 stated: 
New Horizon VIII- 96...enhanced mutual cooperation and improved interoperability 
between Australian and Indonesian maritime and air forces in anti -air warfare, EOD, 
and MCM.87 
According to a senior RAN officer involved in developing plans for cooperation with 
TNI -AL, the RAN has been key' to development of the Indonesian Navy's operational 
and combat skills.88 
Two events in the last few years suggest that the Indonesian Navy is gaining confidence 
in its operational and combat abilities. The first, in March 1992, involved 8 -9 ships 
from the Indonesian Navy which sought to prevent an aging Portuguese car ferry 
carrying protesters from entering Indonesian waters near East Timor.89 The passengers, 
82 Nason, Wargames Hone Skills', The Australian, 10 March 1995. Another Kakadu was held in 
1997. 
83 In 1996, the exercise New Horizon. VIII/Cakrawala Baru, four RAN ships, a RAAF P3C Orion 
(flying for the first time to Juanda naval airbase in Surabaya) and RAN clearance divers 
participated. RAN and Indonesian naval staff had previously `sat down together to plan the 
exercise in minute detail'. See Patrick Walters, `Indonesia to Stage Huge Exercise in South China 
Sea', The Weekend Australian, 24 -25 August, 1996. 
84 Walters, `Indonesia to Stage Huge Exercise in South China Sea', The Weekend Australian, 24-25 
August, 1996. 
s5 Walters, `Indonesia to Stage Huge Exercise in South China Sea', The Weekend Australian, 24 -25 
August, 1996. 
86 Interview with senior RAN officer, Canberra, November 1998. 
87 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1997, p.77. 
88 Interview, senior ADF officer (ret.) Canberra, November 1998. 
89 Chips MacKinolty and Mark Metherell, `Warships Ready for East Timor Blockade', The Age, 10 
March 1992; Moses Manoharan, `Indonesian Navy Flexes Muscle Over East Timor', Reuters 
News Service, 12 March 1992. 
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Australians, Portuguese and other nationalities, were planning to land and place wreaths 
at the Dili cemetery to commemorate the killing of East Timorese in November 1991 by 
Indonesian troops and thereby focus international attention on the event. The Indonesian 
Navy flotilla included Van Speijk frigates recently acquired from the Netherlands and 
reportedly fitted with `state of the art electronic surveillance equipment'.90 According to 
one report it was `one of the largest exercises since {Indonesia's] confrontation with 
Malaysia in the 1960s'.91 
The second time the Indonesian Navy demonstrated its strength was in September 1996. 
Then the Navy held its biggest combined exercise in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands in 
the South China Sea.92 Some 20,000 armed forces and police personnel took part and 
most of ABRI's primary weapon systems, including 54 F -16s, F -5 and Hawk 100/200 
fighters, and some twenty -seven ships were involved.93 Previous tri- service exercises 
had been held on Java but this exercise was seen as a test of Indonesia's logistical 
capabilities for defence of maritime waters and island territory.94 According to some 
commentators, the exercise was intended to show China that Indonesia would defend its 
claims to the gas fields around the Natuna Islands.95 A week after the exercise the Navy 
Chief, Vice Admiral Kushariardi, announced plans to increase patrols and deploy more 
corvettes and missile patrol boats in the area.46 
Army to Army cooperation 
At beginning of 1990 there was virtually no contact between the Australian Army and 
the Indonesian Army (TM -AD). It was often suggested that language differences 
90 Manoharan, 'Indonesian Navy Flexes Muscle Over East Timor', Reuters News Service, 12 March 
1992. 
91 MacKinolty and MethereIl, `Warships Ready for East Timor Blockade', The Age, 10 March 1992. 
92 Tim Huxley, 'Indonesian Armed Forces Face up to New Threats', Janes Intelligence Review, 
pp.36--42, Reuters News Service, 1 January 1997. 
93 Huxley, 'Indonesian Armed Forces Face up to New Threats', pp.36 -42. 
94 Australian, Malaysian, Singaporean, Thai, Chinese and Japanese observers were invited. The 
Chinese and Japanese declined the invitation. See Walters, 'Indonesia to Stage Huge Exercise in 
South China Sea', The Weekend Australian, 24 -25 August 1996. Interview ADF personnel, 
Jakarta, June 1997. 
95 Huxley, 'Indonesian Armed Forces Face up to New Threats', pp.36 -42. 
96 S.N. Vasuki, `Indonesian Navy Step Up Patrols of Natuna Islands', Business Times (Southeast 
Asia), Reuters News Service, 21 September 1996. 
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prevented interaction between the two ground forces.97 It was also the case that there 
had been reservations on the Australian side about training TNI -AD troops who might 
be involved in human rights abuses within Indonesia. Nevertheless, by 1993 such 
concerns no longer hindered the Australian Army's defence cooperation. 
Army parachute exercises were an important area of army defence cooperation. In 1994, 
following the release of the 1994 White Paper, CDF Beaumont, said that Australian 
troops were to train and exercise more often with Indonesian paratroops.98 According to 
the CDF, paratroop dropping was a fundamental military skill, and the training would 
build up understanding between the two forces.99. 
97 In June 1993, CDF Beaumont said that the next forward is to see if we can get some army -to -army 
exercises [between Australia and Indonesia]. That is proving more difficult, principally because of 
the language problems'. See Martin Daly, `RAAF to "Attack" Indonesia', The Age, 9 October 
1993. To address this issue the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant -General John Grey 
introduced a policy in April I993 aimed at improving the language skills of army officers. It stated 
that from 1 January 2001 `officers with a regional language skill will be preferred for promotion to 
Lieutenant Colonel. Those without the necessary aptitude to attain language proficiency will be 
encouraged to undertake complementary studies in Asian culture'. Quoted in Colonel Brian Hewitt, 
`The Australian Army and Regional Cooperation-Security Through Partnership', in Waters and 
Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.90. 
98 Geoffrey Barker, 'White Paper Maneuvers Fail to Address Human Rights Abuse', AFR, 12 
December 1994. 
99 Barker, `White Paper Maneuvers Fail to Address Human Rights Abuse', AFR, 12 December 1994. 
In November I994, a platoon from the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), flew to 
Malarg, East Java, to take part in the first ever combined airborne exercise with an Indonesian 
parachute unit, the Battalion 502 of the green beret Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) (see David 
Jenkins, `Australia's Helping Hand in Indonesia's Military Muscle', SMH, 4 December 1995. 
According to Jenkins, the Battalion 502 was the same unit which, twenty years ago, been involved 
in the invasion East Timor). On 6 March 1995, Indonesian troops arrived in Australia to participate 
in exercise Canopy Swift, prior to their participation in Kangaroo '95. Some 50 Indonesian 
paratroops from the Army Strategic Reserve joined Australian paratroops from the 3RAR in a 
training exercise at Shoalwater Bay in Queensland for two weeks. The exercise included the 
RAAF's long -range F -111 fighter- bombers in supporting air strikes. See Jenkins, `Australia's 
Helping Hand in Indonesia's Military Muscle', SMH, 4 December 1995; David Lague, `Timor 
Question Clouds Exercise With Indonesia', SMH, 6 March 1995. In August, when Kangaroo '95 
was being conducted, some I60 Indonesian paratroops and two Hercules transport aircraft 
participated (David Lague, `New Top Gun Wants to be Neighbourly', SMH, 13 July, 1995). The 
paratroopers joined 3RAR in a combined parachute jump drop on Wyndham (Jenkins, `Australia's 
Helping Hand in Indonesia's Military Muscle', SMH, 4 December 1995). Some useful background 
to Indonesian participation in Kangaroo `95 is the following: Indonesia was briefed on Kangaroo 
`89 during General Sutrisno's visit in July 1989; Indonesian observers were invited to Kangaroo 
`92; Indonesia was invited to join in the planning of Kangaroo `95 exercise and participated for the 
first time. See above sources plus David Lague, `Forces Chief Denies Indonesian Press Story', 
SMH, 23 September 1995. 
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Special forces cooperation 
The Australian Army's Special Air Service (SAS) developed strong links with its 
Indonesian equivalent, Kopassus.too In May /June 1993, a unit of some twenty -nine SAS 
troops went to Bandung, Java, where a Kopassus regional HQ is situated.101 In the past 
individuals had visited Bandung but this was the first time a unit had been sent.102 In the 
same month, some thirty Kopassus troops, visited SAS Headquarters at Swanbourne, in 
Perth Western Australia. According to defence sources, the objectives of special forces 
exchanges in 1993 were familiarisation and cross -training. The Indonesians participated 
in small arms range practice, communications, water, rappelling out of helicopters and 
rope work and medical training.103 In March /April 1994, in another troop exchange, 
counter hijack training took place. The special forces exercises are called Night 
Mongoose, Night Komodo and Kookaburra. 
Training between SAS and Kopassus continued during 1995 -96.104 The level of training 
reached during this period is difficult to assess given the sensitivity of special forces 
too Cooperation between the SAS and Kopassus was a sensitive domestic issue because Kopassus was 
connected with human rights abuses in Indonesia. See Barker, `White Paper Manoeuvers Fail to 
Address Human Rights Abuses', AFR, 12 December 1994; Harold Crouch, Defence Aid Should 
be Defence Aid', The Canberra Times, 4 August 1994. For a brief history and description of 
Kopassus see Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards 
Sydney, 1996, pp.85 -89. The Department of Foreign Affairs initially objected to the suggestion 
that exchanges between the units should take place on these grounds but was later persuaded that 
the training routines would concentrate on anti -terrorist training which was legitimated by 
Australian and Indonesian support for international agreements against terrorism. The argument 
made by the Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, was that 'we don't train anyone specifically in the 
skills that are involved in being deployed for internal rather than external purposes'. See Ian 
McPhedran, `Views of Arms Trade Differ', The Canberra Times, 5 September, 1994. Ray's view 
was arguably supported by the fact that the special forces of any country are divided into different 
specialised units: for example within Kopassus there are units for counter -terrorism, counter urban 
guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, amphibious operations and fighting in built -up areas. See 
'Indonesia to Expand Special Forces', Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, November- December 
1996, p.38; David Jenkins, `SAS Dares but do we Win ?', SMH, 15 July, 1993. 
tot 'Australia, Indonesia Swap Elite Troops', Reuters News Service, 23 June 1993. Kopassus is 
divided into three groups each of about 1,000 personnel and based at Serang (West Java), Bandung 
(West Java) and Solo (Central Java). Two more groups were formed in 1996, one of which will be 
based in Jakarta. See 'Indonesia to Expand Special Forces', Asia -Pacific Defence Reporter, 
November- December 1996, p.38; Jenkins, 'SAS Dares but do we Win ?', .SMH, 15 July, 1993. 
102 
`Australia, Indonesia Swap Elite Troops', Reuters News Service, 23 June 1993. 
103 Jenkins, 'SAS Dares but do we Win ?', SMH, IS July, 1993. 
too Exchanges between the two special forces continued until June 1998 when an SAS visit to 
Indonesia was deferred. Special forces exercises were again deferred in November 1998. 
According to news reports, Defence sources in Canberra acknowledged that the decision had been 
motivated by concern over 'political risks' of being seen to be too close to Kopassus. See Don 
Greenlees, 'Army Abandons War Games', The Australian, 29 October 1998; Robert Garran, 
'Moore Denies War Games Cancelled', The Australian, 30 October 1998. 
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training. On the one hand, the official account in the Defence Annual report for 1995 -96 
is quite vague simply stating that, for example, the `outcome' of the 1996 Night 
Komodo was: 
[A)n increased awareness of the level of SF capabilities and individual skills., gained 
through individual and low level collective tasks across a range of Special Forces skills 
conducted with the Indonesian Kopassus.1a5 
On the other hand, according to a senior ADF officer, SAS -Kopassus training `at times 
has exceeded the usually accepted limits' but that `more than that I will not say'.106 
Air Force to Air Force cooperation 
At the beginning of 1990 there was no formal contact between the RAAF and TNI -AU, 
the Indonesian Air Force.107 A few months later, however, Australia and Indonesia 
agreed that the RAAF would begin visits to Indonesia for airman -to- airman talks when 
F /A -18 aircraft were transiting to or from FPDA exercises.'" By November 1991, 
RAAF aircraft were landing in Indonesia on return from Butterworth and the FPDA and 
Churinga exercises.10° 
The two air forces also began airlift and drop training exercises in 1991.110 Before long 
there were rotating visits between Australia and Indonesia on an annual basis."' 
105 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1996, p.96. 
106 Interview with senior ADF officer, Canberra, November 1998. 
107 Apart from the preference of the RAAF to exercise with the more sophisticated USAF, there may 
have been some sensitivity that AustraIia's long -range fighter -bombers, the F -111 aircraft, had 
been ordered from the US in 1963 with Indonesian targets in mind. See fn 38. 
108 'Agreement with Indonesia on Closer Defence Links', The Age, 6 April 1990; `Australia Stepping 
up Defence Links with Indonesia', Reuters News Service, 5 April 1990. 
109 Interview with ADF personnel, Darwin, May 1997; `Australia Links with Indonesia', The Age, 18 
November 1991. 
t0 
`Military Take Part in Exercises in Australia', Radio Australia, Melboume, 1100gmt, 13 October 
1995. 
L t 1 Chris Spence, 'No.86 Wing and the Air Training Process', in Keith Brent (ed.) Regional Air Power 
Workshop RAAF Richmond, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1996, p.71. During Rajawali 
Ausindo `94, the main series for air lift exercises, RAAF C -130s and a platoon from 3rd Battalion 
worked with TNI -AU to provide tactical air transport training (Waters, `Regional Air Power 
Cooperation -an RAAF Perspective', in Wafers and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop 
Darwin, p.185). In October 1995, an Indonesian C -I30 transport plane and 55 air and ground crew 
arrived at Richmond in Australia for air transport training exercise. According the Defence Annual 
Report for FY1995 -1996, the Rajawali Ausindino for that period consisted of `tactical air transport 
operations [which led] to an increase in interoperability between Australian and Indonesian air 
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Maritime air surveillance exercises involving RAAF P3Cs and TNI -AU Nomads 
became another important arena for cooperation.112 By November 1993, air defence 
exercises were taking place between the RAAF and TNI -AU, showing that a wider 
range of operational activity and greater complexity in exercises was developing.t13 
According to the CDF, Admiral Alan Beaumont, these exercises were 'a major step 
forward' in cooperation.' 14 Moreover, there were plans for more air defence cooperation 
with Indonesia. According to Flight Lt Pulford of the RAAF's No.3 Squadron, we are 
planning to do more with the Indonesians under the framework of the security co- 
operation agreement. We have...been given the heads -up that we should prepare for 
upcoming exercises'.115 Apart from expanding the new Elang Ausindo series that was 
already underway, there were plans for another air defence series, the Albatross 
Ausindo, to begin in 1997.116 
Intelligence exchanges 
Australia and Indonesia have long -established intelligence exchanges. Liaison between 
the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Indonesian State Intelligence 
transport forces'. A similar exercise was held at Kalijati air base in west Java in October 1996 
(Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.104). 
112 During Ausina '93 Indonesians flew in RAAF P3Cs and RAAF personnel flew in Indonesian 
Nomads for the first time. Ausina '94 involved closer cooperation with crews planning and 
debriefing the activities together and developing common procedures and exchanging information. 
During New Horizon `94, RAAF PC3s, F /A -18s and F -111s exercised in combined maritime 
training with Indonesian maritime forces. (Waters, `Regional Air Power Cooperation-an RAAF 
Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.185). In July 
1996, P3Cs visited Indonesia to take part in New Horizon and to give briefings at Surabaya on 
Java, and Hasunadan Air Force Base on Sulawesie (Joris Janssen Lok, `Military Exercises & 
Training - Missions and Capabilities Grow', Jane's Defence Weekly, p.12, Reuters News Service, 
1 July 1996). 
113 In the November 1993 Elang Ausindo series the RAAF's prime tactical fighters the F /A -18s and 
the Indonesian's F -5s flew together for the first time in a combined air defence exercise held in 
Medan, Sumatra (Waters, `Regional Air Power Cooperation -an RAAF Perspective', in Waters 
and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.185). 
114 Daly, `RAAF to "Attack" Indonesia', The Age, 9 October 1993. 
115 Janssen Lok, `Military Exercises & Training -Pitch Black Sheds Light on Australian Live Flying 
Exercises', Jane's Defence Weekly, p.16, Reuters News Service, 1 July 1996. 
116 Interview with RAAF officer, Darwin, May 1997. Air exercises will be helped by the additional 
twenty retired RAAF Nomads purchased by the Indonesian Air Force from the RAAF. Delivery of 
the aircraft took place during January June 1997. Interview with RAAF officer, Darwin, May 
1997; 'Edi Dismisses Doubts on Sukhoi Jet Fighter', Jakarta Post, Reuters News Service, 9 
August 1997. 
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Coordinating Board (BAKIN) formally began in 1971.117 By 1974, there had been five 
rounds of regular meetings -an average of two each year (this was changed to annual 
meetings after 1974). At the March 1974 meeting the discussion covered such subjects 
as China's international posture, ASEAN, Asian collective security, Papua New Guinea 
and international terrorism.118 In 1974, a Foreign Affairs officer was appointed to the 
Jakarta embassy as a National Intelligence Committee (MC) Liaison officer to BAKIN 
to ensure continuity to the relationship119 and in 1977 an ASIS Liaison Officer was 
appointed to BAKIN.120 By the 1976 meeting, the closeness of the intelligence 
relationship was indicated by the statement from the head of the Defence Department's 
Joint Intelligence Organisation, Gordon Jockel: 
The intelligence relations with Indonesia were extremely valuable and important to 
Australia. They were the closest intelligence relations Australia had in South -East Asia. 
Australia's intelligence relations with Indonesia could be used as a precedent for the 
development of intelligence cooperation with other South -East Asian countries, but 
Australia's intelligence contacts with Indonesia would remain by far the most 
important.121 
The warmth of the relationship is all the more remarkable given that the statement was 
made just a year after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. 
During the 1990s several new elements were added, not just to the ASIS -BAKIN 
connection but also to the wider intelligence relationship between Australia and 
Indonesia. In the first place, Prime Minister Bob Hawke announced on 24 May 1991 
that increased exchanges of intelligence between Australia and other regional countries 
would assist confidence building in the region_122 In the early 1990s talks between 
BAKIN and its Australian equivalents concluded that the quality of intelligence 
117 See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement; Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties 
That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries, Allen & Unwin, Boston, 
1985, p.172. Apparently ASIS had conducted covert operations in Jakarta at Ieast since 1954. 
118 Department of Defence, Joint Intelligence Organisation and National Intelligence Committee, 
Fourth Annual Report 1974, Canberra, November 1974, p.25. Confidential. 
119 Department of Defence, Joint Intelligence Organisation and National Intelligence Committee, 
Fourth Annual Report 1974, Canberra, November 1974, p.25. Confidential. 
120 See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p.65; Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, p.172. 
121 Brian Toohey and Marion Wilkinson, The Book of Leaks, Angus & Robertson, North Ryde, 1987, 
p.193. 
122 R.J. Hawke, `Australia's Security in Asia', Asia -Australia Institute, Sydney, 24 May 1991, p.11. 
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exchanges would be up- graded.123 Second, the signing of the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 
provided an opportunity for the two countries to share information about prospective 
maritime threats in that area.'24 Third, following in -house discussions about the role of 
the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), CDF General Baker announced on 22 
May 1997 that Australia would provide the Indonesian government with information 
from JORN.125 General Baker said that it was part of a `joint surveillance' operation that 
the two countries were undertaking.126 It was suggested that much of the information 
would focus on illegal fishing and piracy rather than military activities. Fourth, in 1996 
exchanges of information were potentially facilitated by a secure communications link 
between NORCOM, Australian Maritime HQ in Sydney, and the Indonesian naval 
command in Surabaya and ABRI HQ in Jakarta.127 
Strategic planning 
Australia provides important advice to Indonesia about strategic planning, particularly 
the processes and procedures required to establish Indonesia's strategic requirements 
123 Interviews with senior officials from foreign affairs and trade, defence and intelligence 
organisations, Canberra, November 1998. 
124 Gardiner, `The Security Treaty With Indonesia', p.3. Also see Commonwealth of Australia, Senate 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, `Consideration of Budget Estimates' 
(Proof Copy), Proof Committee Hansard, 8 June 1999, p.191. 
125 The Australian, Reuters News Service, 22 May 1997; For a general discussion of Indonesia's 
surveillance capabilities see Bob Lowry, 'Surveillance Remains a Problem for Indonesia', Asia 
Pacific Defence Reporter, September October 1996, pp.8 -9. 
126 The Australian, Reuters News Service, 22 May 1997; Liam Fitzpatrick, `Radar Deal Boosts Ties 
With Indonesia', South China Morning Post, Reuters News Service, 24 May 1996. 
127 Don Chalmers, `Regional Engagement in Practice: Implementing Policy -a View from the Field', 
in Jack McCaffrie and Dick Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, Australian 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996, p.70; Stuart Harris, 
`Regional Security Dimensions', paper presented to the joint Northern Territory /CSIS Seminar on 
Progress and Challenges of the Indonesian Northern Territory MoU and the Australian Indonesian 
Development Area (AIDA), Jakarta, 3 April 1997; interview with RAN officer (ret.), Darwin, May 
1997. During proceedings at the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 
in June 1999, Air Vice Marshall Nicholson, made the following statement about the history and 
current status of the communications links between Australia and Indonesia: 'It began with as a 
commercial grade secure link between maritime headquarters and the headquarters of Eastern Fleet 
Surabaya. That was successfully operated for a couple of years. It was then extended to operate 
between Headquarters, Northern Command and the headquarters of KODAM 9, the 9t5 military 
region, based in Denpasar, Bali. The intention was to extend it between Headquarters ADF, here in 
Canberra, and MABES TNI-MABES just means headquarters. I am not sure that that last link has 
actually been put in place. The other two links are used occasionally, infrequently. It is an off -the- 
shelf, commercial crytographic set to enable security telephone and secure fax, using the normal 
telephone system'. See Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, 
'Consideration of Budget Estimates', p.196. - 
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and acquisition programs.128 For example, the Australian Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation (DSTO) undertook, at the request of the Indonesian 
government, a project to establish the logistical capabilities for defending island 
territory, in this case the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea.129 An important aspect 
of this project is wargames to establish how best to sustain a force in such environments. 
In these ways Australia has become an important source for intellectual advice on 
defence planning to Indonesia. 
Defence Industry, science and technology cooperation 
Little in the way of defence industry cooperation took place during the early -mid 1990s 
between Australia and Indonesia. Several issues continued to overwhelm the prospects 
for cooperation in this area, even though it was proposed in most regional agendas. For 
example, discussion about exports of the Steyr rifle to ABRI raised, once again, 
concerns in some quarters that such arms sales could undermine Australia's foreign 
policy and human rights principles. Nonetheless, some progress has been made and in 
June 1996 Australia and Indonesia signed an agreement to increase collaboration within 
the aviation industry.130 
By 1995 -96 more than twenty research and training collaborative activities were 
underway or planned with Indonesia.131 Oversight of these programs is provided by the 
newly established Australian -Indonesian Defence Coordination Committee and in 
particular its Defence Science and Technology Working Group (see below). 
Collaborative activities between DSTO and its equivalents in Indonesia include research 
on high frequency propagation and synthetic aperture radar and composite repair of 
metallic aircraft structures.132 
128 Interview with ADF personnel, Jakarta, June I997. 
129 Interview with ADF personnel, Jakarta, June 1997. Also see Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Legislation Committee, `Consideration of Budget Estimates', p.191. 
130 Greg Earl, `Air Deals With Indonesia', AFR, 1 July 1996. 
131 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995-1996, p.169. 
132 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.169. During proceedings at the 
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee in June 1999, it was claimed by 
a member of that committee, Senator Hogg, that the current areas of cooperation [between 
Australia and Indonesia] are stated to include integrated communications technologies, chemical 
analysis and detection, GPS accuracy HF propagation and aircraft investigation techniques'. Hogg 
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Outcomes 
From the Labor government's perspective, Indonesia was the most important regional 
country for Australia. As Admiral Alan Beaumont said when he was CDF, `more than 
any other regional nation, a sound strategic relationship with Indonesia is of greatest 
importance for AustraIia's security'.133 And indeed a sound strategic relationship was 
achieved. In part this was due to the personal friendships which were developed between 
key political and defence individuals; for example between Generals Gration and 
Sutrisno, between General Baker and Admiral Beaumont and their equivalents in ABRI, 
between Foreign Ministers Evans and Alatas and between Prime Ministers Hawke and 
Keating and President Suharto. These friendships helped to resolve several potential 
political problems: for example when a diplomatic row looked imminent following the 
nomination in 1995 of a new Indonesian ambassador in Australia who had supported the 
1991 Dili massacre in East Timor;134 and when Australia nominated an ambassador for 
Jakarta who had been critical of the Indonesian regime.'35 
The sound strategic relationship was also the result of defence cooperation between the 
military establishments that had enhanced trust and confidence and had also helped to 
ameliorate potential political tensions. Some indication of this occurred in August 1995, 
when demonstrators in Australia burned the Indonesian flag in protest about the 50th 
anniversary of Jakarta's occupation of East Timor. Given ABRI's dual political and 
security role (dwi fungsi) it was not surprising that ABRI officials were highly offended. 
ABRI's chief spokesman, Brigadier -General Suwarno Adiwijoyo, made it clear that he 
deplored the act. However, he also warned against tit- for -tat responses which had been 
characteristic of both sides in the past, saying that `[i]f [Indonesia does] similar 
things -burning their flags -we'll be the one who losses' [sic].136 This reaction 
noted that we are engaged in cooperation in areas of communications, electronic warfare and 
information technology'. The Defence Department representatives at the Committee asked that 
their reply to these observations be presented as a written statement. See Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, `Consideration of Budget Estimates', pp.195 -196. 
133 A.L Beaumont, `Regional Security in the Asia- Pacific Towards 2001: a Military Perspective', 
Royal United Services Institute of Australia 1994 National Seminar, Australian Defence Force 
Academy, Canberra, 23 September 1994, p.5. 
134 See Korporall, `A Testing Time for Friends', SMH, 22 July 1995. The Indonesian military 
confirmed that they would attend Kangaroo '95 despite the row. 
135 David Lague, 'Harsh Critic of Soeharto Our New Man in Jakarta', SMH, 13 June 1996. 
[36 Greg Earl, `Jakarta Military Douse the Flag- Burning Flames', AFR, 23 August 1995. 
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contrasted with calls from other officials within Indonesia to sever the relationship. The 
Australian Defence Minister, Robert Ray, like the Indonesian military, was also highly 
critical of the incident and suggested that `the [Australian] government long -term will 
have to look at outlawing this, making it illegal to burn another country's flag'.137 The 
incident took place while Indonesian and Australian military forces were participating in 
Kangaroo `95 for the first time and presumably both militaries considered this exercise 
and the continuation of other defence cooperation activities to be more important than 
reacting adversely to the flag burning incident. 
The contribution that defence cooperation had made to the improvement in the security 
relationship was stressed by Australian officials. For example, the CDF, Admiral 
Beaumont, said in 1993 that exercises were an important part of long -term relationships 
in the region and provided a basis for rebuilding relationships that might be damaged by 
diplomatic problems.138 The Defence Minister Senator Ray told the Indonesian press 
that more military exercises would reduce misunderstandings and increase friendship,139 
And defence staff in the Australian embassy in Jakarta confirmed that the Indonesian- 
Australian relationship was expanding and maturing and that `at the centre of the 
relationship is an understanding on both sides that it is through mutual contact and 
cooperative activities that the relationship is developed'.140 Quite clearly, by this time 
the tensions between the policies for defence cooperation and human rights had been 
successfully disregarded by defence officials. 
From the Indonesian perspective not only was the relationship much stronger but as a 
result of defence cooperation the combat and operational competency of all three 
services was enhanced. As an Indonesian navy spokesman said, the main purpose of 
exercises between Australia and Indonesia was to increase combat capabilities of both 
navies and forge closer friendship and cooperation.141 
137 Greg Earl, `Flag -Burning Ban Threat as Protests Anger Indonesia', AFR, 18 August 1995. 
138 Daly, `RAAF to "Attack" Indonesia', The Age, 9 October 1993. 
139 
`Australia Might Sell Weapons to Indonesia', Reuters News Service, 5 August 1994. 
140 Department of Defence, Jakarta Defence Staff, 1993 Annual Survey -The Defence Relationship, 
2 April 1994, p.1. Confidential. 
141 
`Indonesia and Australia Stage Naval Exercise', Reuters News Service, 9 August 1994. The 
argument that defence cooperation makes a significant contribution to the relationship continued to 
be made by the Liberal Defence Minister, Ian McLachlan. McLachlan also claimed that the 
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DEFENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND SINGAPORE 
Under Labor, defence cooperation between Australia and Singapore expanded 
significantly. Some cooperative measures grew out of the existing multilateral 
structure-the FPDA -while others were the result of new bilateral arrangements. 
Several of the new arrangements were based on novel contracts permitting the 
Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) to train, exercise and store equipment at Australian 
military facilities for periods up to twenty -five years. 
The FPDA has been the linchpin for defence cooperation between Singapore and 
Australia for over two and a half decades.142 Defence cooperation through FPDA had 
been regular but uneventful for most of the 1970s and 1980s. After the publication of 
the 1987 White Paper, which set down directions for establishing the defence of 
Australia, the Defence Minister Kim Beazley claimed that Australia would continue to 
focus its contribution to regional security through the FPDA. The focus of FPDA, he 
said, would be to `help...develop [regional countries'] military capabilities'.143 However, 
few changes were made to the FPDA during the late 1980s. When, in the early 1990s, 
the Australian government began to stress that regional cooperation would be the basis 
of regional security policy, the FPDA became an obvious site for expanding cooperation 
between Australia and its partners. This coincided with Singapore's interest in 
expanding the FPDA in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
In September 1994, when Singapore hosted the biennial meeting for FPDA defence 
ministers,144 the respective ministers agreed with the two proposals suggested by the 
Minister for Defence, Dr Lee Boon Yang. The first was that the existing organisational 
structure should be modified to `strengthen decision -making processes';145 and the 
second was that it was necessary to `further raise the level of sophistication of FPDA 
defence links between the two countries had contributed to the relatively peaceful resolution of the 
political crisis which had followed President Suharto's resignation in May 1998. See Robert 
Garran. `Jakarta Military Salute', The Australian, 5 August 1998. 
142 See the earlier discussion in this chapter about the formation of the FPDA. 
143 Kim Beazley, `Alumni International Singapore: Australian Perspectives on Regional Secur 
Issues', compendium of speeches 1985 -1989, p.177. 
144 The Chiefs of Staff meet every year and the Defence Ministers meet every three years. 
145 
`FPDA Defence Ministers' Conference', 20 September 1994, transcript issued by the Department 
of Defence, Canberra, p.3. 
Y 
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exercises and to increase the efficiency of the integrated air defence system'.146 As a 
result the two previous councils were replaced with a single one which allowed for 
greater integration between the air, land and sea components of FPDA.1g7 The two main 
FPDA exercises -the LADS ADEX (or Integrated Air Defence System Air Defence 
Exercise)148 involving the five air forces, and the exercise Starfish involving the five 
navies149 -continued during 1995 and 1996. In 1997, a third exercise, Flying Fish, was 
introduced, the first time combined naval and air exercises were performed_150 It was 
held off Malaysia's Tioman Island in the South China Sea and was the biggest FPDA 
exercise ever conducted.151 And for the first time both the Maritime Component 
Commander and the Air Component Commander participated, showing the successful 
integration of maritime and air commands.152 According to the Malaysian Defence 
Minister, Datuk Syed Hamid Albar, it was an `historical incident' .153 'Interoperahility', 
he said, is `the key factor that will ensure effectiveness of the countries in the new 
146 
'FPDA Defence Ministers' Conference', p.3. 
147 According to the Singaporean Defence Minister, 'Under the revised structure, a new consultative 
council to be called the FPDA consultative council (FCC) will replace the existing joint 
consultative council (JCC) and the air defence council (ADC).' See, `FPDA Defence Ministers' 
Conference', p.3. 
148 The Integrated Air Defence System has its headquarters at Butterworth in Malaysia. The 
commander is traditionally a two -star RAAF officer. Under Labor the RAAF replaced a squadron 
of Mirage fighters stationed at Butterworth with rotational visits of F -111 and F /A -18 aircraft. P3C 
Orion surveillance aircraft operate from Butterworth throughout the year under the Gateway 
Operation, which conducts `surveillance patrols of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean'. See 
Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.103. 
149 The Starfish series started in 1980. Since then more exercise segments have been added: for 
example, in 1989 surface -to -air training was introduced to the traditional surface and sub- surface 
routines and during Starfish `95 conventional and nuclear submarines exercised. See Department of 
Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.65; and `FPDA Exercise to Have Surface -to -Air 
Combat Training', Business Times (Singapore), 1 July 1989. According to Captain Jack MaCaffrie, 
Director General of the RAN's Maritime Studies Program `[tike Starfish series has become bigger 
and more complex over the years'. See McCaffrie, 'Regional Cooperation --a RAN Perspective', 
in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.101. 
150 Thomas Lee, `Biggest -Ever Five -Power Exercise Starts', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 15 
April 1997. 
151 The exercise involved 39 warships, including an aircraft carrier and two submarines, 160 aircraft 
and 12,000 personnel. Bill Tarrant, `Five Powers Affirm US Security Presence in Asia', Reuters 
News Service, 15 April 1997. 
152 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.76. 
153 Leslie Andres, `First FPDA Joint Naval, Air Exercise', New Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 
1 April 1997. See also Ian Stewart, 'Ministers Reaffirm Future of Five Power Defence Pact', South 
China Sea Post, Reuters News Service, 16 April 1997; Tarrant, `Five Powers Affirm US Security 
Presence in Asia', Reuters News Service, 15 April 1997. 
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security environment of the region'.154 Moreover, the Malaysian Defence Minister 
flagged further changes involving the armies of FPDA members saying that that `in 
future we will have to see if there is a need to get the army involved'.155 Without doubt 
the FPDA grew in sophistication during the 1990s, in terms of the nature of the 
exercises and the arrangements for tactical command and decision- making.156 Apart 
from deepening and widening their cooperative activities through the FPDA, Australia 
and Singapore also introduced several new exercises and arrangements. 
Individual training 
The number of Singaporean personnel training in Australian increased during the 1990s. 
Most of this was conducted through the DCP and the average annual number is about 
100.157 Australia also provides in- country training to Singaporean personnel. 
Unit level cooperation 
The three services in both countries increased the number and sophistication of bilateral 
exercises during the 1990s. Interoperability expanded and the Singaporean Armed 
Forces gained enormous operational and combat benefits from the assistance given by 
the ADF and from the arrangements for elements of the Singaporean Army and Air 
Force to train in Australia. 
Navy to Navy cooperation 
The RAN now conducts more exercise series with the Republic of Singapore Navy 
(RSN), than any other of the ASEAN navies.158 Whereas in the late 1980s the main 
154 Tarrant, `Five Powers Affirm US Security Presence in Asia', Reuters News Service, 15 April 1997. 
155 Andres, `First FPDA Joint Naval, Air Exercise', New Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 1 April 
1997. The FPDA army element started in 1981, initially being hosted alternatively by Australia and 
New Zealand but later by Malaysia and Singapore. Suman Warrior is the major land exercise. The 
seventh of the series was held in Queensland in October 1996 and involved 40 Singaporeans -part 
of total of 300 troops from FPDA countries. See Leong Chan Teik, `Dr Tony Tan on 7 -day Visit to 
Australia', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 18 October 1996. 
156 In addition to agreeing to upgrade the FPDA in these ways, some members also pressed for an 
expansion of the geographic area covered by the Agreement. Malaysia has suggested that Sabah 
and Sarawak should be included and that as a consequence Brunei could become a member. In 
March 1990, Brunei attended a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the FPDA countries as an 
observer. For Australia's cautious response to this suggestion see Ball and Kerr, Presumptive 
Engagement, pp.96 -97. 
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series was Tasman Sea, a combined maritime operations in a multi- threat environment, 
in the 1990s there are at least six series. These include: 
the Harpoona series, starting in 1992, and described as a `war at sea exercise'.159 
the ASWEX series, starting in 1993, and aimed at ASW procedures and tactics. 160 
the Axoloty series, starting in 1993, and aimed at RAN/RSN interoperability in 
diving and explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine countermeasures (MCM) 
operations.161 
the Singaroo series, starting in 1996, and aimed at interoperability in combined 
maritime procedures and tactics. 162 
the Hunter series, starting in 1996, and aimed at MCM interoperability between 
RAN and RSN. 163 
In addition to expanding the number and sophistication of bilateral exercises the RAN 
invited the Singaporean Navy and Air Force to the multilateral Kakadu series in 1993 
and 1995.164 (See above for a description of the aims of this series.) The Tricrab series, 
sponsored by the USN, and aimed at MCM and EOD, now involves both the RAN and 
RSN.165 
Through these activities the RAN has made an important contribution to the 
development of the RSN's operational and combat skills. As Rear Admiral Don 
Chalmers, then Maritime Commander Australia, points out, the RAN and particular 
individuals have made important contributions to the RSN: 
157 Conversation with Singaporean Defence Adviser, Canberra, 5 August 1999. 
158 This does not include those exercises conducted under FPDA. 
159 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p.139. 
160 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p.140. 
161 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.75. 
162 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.75. 
163 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.77. 
164 Tim Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', Jane's Intelligence Review, p.9, Reuters 
News Service, 1 January 1997. 
165 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.79. 
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Our [RAN] participation in exercises in their [RSN] tactical trainer and the fine work 
that Commander Ted Walsh has undertaken in the damage control and firefighting 
areas has been and will continue to be important.166 
And, as Chalmers also predicted, the RSN, in exercises with the RAN, will seek to 
`move onto the next level of complexity'.167 One recent indication that this is well 
underway is that there is now a `formal set of Standard Operation Procedures' which 
was ratified during Singaroo '96 and then signed in Singapore by the Maritime 
Commander Australia and Fleet Commander RSN prior to Singaroo `97'.168 As the 
Defence Annual Report for 1995 -96 repeatedly states, exercises between the two navies 
now demonstrate `improved interoperability'.169 
Air Force to Air Force cooperation 
Air exercises between the RAAF and Republic of Singapore Air force (RSAF) grew in 
sophistication during the 1990s. This occurred in the already established Churinga series 
under FPDA170 and in the two new series: the Nulla Nulla air defence missile exercise 
starting in 1989 and the exercise Western Reward beginning in 1992.171 
But the most significant development in the RSAF's combat and operational skills air 
exercises occurred as a result of Singapore's involvement, beginning in 1992, in the 
Pitch Black series which Australia conducts regularly with the USAF.172 The exercises 
grew in sophistication and the RSAF steadily increased its participation in combat 
166 Chalmers, `Regional Engagement in Practice', in McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and 
Regional Engagement, p.71. 
167 Chalmers, `Regional Engagement in Practice', in McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and 
Regional Engagement, p.72. 
168 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.78. see also Huxley, `Australia 
Looking North for Security', p.9. 
169 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.66. See also Huxley, 'Australia 
Looking North for Security', p.9. 
170 The FPDA now involves deployments of F-11 Is, F /A -18s, C -130s and B -707 tankers to Singapore 
and Malaysia for over four weeks. 
171 Western Reward 1992 involved some 125 Singaporean personnel and some 14 aircraft: eight F -5 
interceptors, four F -16 fighters, one E2C early warning aircraft and one C -130 air -to -air refueling 
tanker. See 'Singapore, Australia Air Forces Start Exercise', Reuters News Service, 5 October 
1992. 
172 Waters, `Regional Air Power Cooperation an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax Ceds), 
Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.182. 
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scenarios.173 By 1996, Pitch Black had become `Australia's largest air defence 
exercise"74 and there was growing interoperability between the three air forces.175 The 
purpose of the exercise is to test Australia's northern air defences and it was reportedly: 
The first exercise involving airborne early warning aircraft on both sides and [tested] 
Australia's long term strategy of introducing airborne early warning and control (AEW 
&C) aircraft into its air defence system.176 
The wargames were designed to give aircrews `realistic air combat experience in a 
joint/combined training environment'.177 At times there were more than fifty aircraft in 
the air together and the forces took part in 'comprehensive air defence battle with 
missions flown day and night'.178 Clearly, such exercises are designed to increase the 
combat capabilities of all participants. As Flight Lt Liam Pulford from the RAAF 
pointed out, `on the first day of the war scenario' all available assets [were] used 
including dropping live weapons on Delamere tactical air weapons range'.179 According 
to RAAF officers, the Singaporean pilots were `ecstatic' with the level of the combat 
activities undertaken during the exercise.'" 
Other areas of cooperation between the two air forces are either underway or being 
discussed. In 1994, Canberra agreed to the RSAF conducting remotely piloted vehicle 
173 The 1994 Pitch Black series involved RAAF F -111s, F /A -18s, a C -130 and a B -707; USMC AV- 
8s, F /A -18s and EA -6Bs; and RSAF F -16s, F -5s and E -2Cs. See Waters, `Regional Air Power 
Cooperation -an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop 
Darwin, p.182. The 1995 Pitch Black exercise was subsumed into Kangaroo 1995. See Department 
of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.104. Singapore participated in the Kangaroo `95 
(ibid., p.125.). 
174 USCINCPAC, Asia Pacific Defence Forum, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, pp.41 -45. 
175 Pitch Black 1996 involved some 400 SAF personnel and Rapier and I -Hawk SAMs. See Huxley, 
`Australia Looking North for Security', p.9. 
176 Janssen Lok, `Military Exercise & Training -Pitch Black Sheds Light on Australian Live Flying 
Exercises', p.16. 
177 USCINCPAC, Asia Pacific Defence Forum, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, pp.41 -45. 
178 USCINCPAC, Asia Pacific Defence Forum, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, pp.41 -45. 
179 Janssen Lok, 'Military Exercise & Training -Pitch Black Sheds Light on Australian Live Flying 
Exercises', p.16. 
185 Interview with RAAF officers, Darwin, May 1997. 
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(RPV) training in Australia.181 And in October 1996, during Dr Tony Tan's visit to 
Canberra, the two countries signed a memoranda for air -to -air refueling exercises.182 
Army to Army cooperation 
Apart from the FPDA series of Army to Army exercises (namely, the brigade level 
command post exercise Suman Warrior) several new exercises were introduced during 
the 1990s. One was the Flaming Arrow series, which started in 1992, and is held in 
Singapore and aims to improve interoperability between infantry units of the Australian 
and Singaporean armies.183 And the other is the Matilda series, which started in 1991, 
and is a triennial company level exercise held in Singapore aimed at interoperability 
between ADF and SAF. 
Special Forces cooperation 
The SAS and the SAF Special Forces (SOF) have been participating in bilateral 
exercises annually since 1993.184 The main series is called Night Lion. 
Singaporean deployments in Australia 
During the 1990s Australia became the most important training location for the 
Singaporean Armed Forces.185 The two countries agreed upon several arrangements. In 
1992, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) provided for deployments of the 
Republic of Singaporean Air Force (RSAF) to Australia for up to ten months.t86 RSAF 
units were deployed at RAAF bases at Darwin and Tindal in the Northern Territory, at 
181 
I82 
183 
184 
155 
Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', p.9. 
Florence Chong, Defence Ties With Australia Move to a Deeper Level', Straits Times, Reuters 
News Service, 19 October 1996. 
Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.100. According Singaporean report 
the 1997 Flaming Arrow series was held at the SAFTI live -firing area in Pasir Laba in Singapore. It 
was the fifth in the annual series and involved 110 Australian soldiers from the Rifle Company, 
Butterworth (RCB) and 400 Singaporean troops from 1 SIR. According to a MINDEF press 
release on 18 March 1997, Flaming Arrow 'is an opportunity to develop interoperability between 
Australia and Singapore through an exchange of knowledge of each forces' tactics and operational 
staff procedures'. Media Releases, MINDEF Internet Webservice, 
www.mindef. go v. sgimidpa/media.htm. 
Correspondence with the Singaporean Defence Adviser, Canberra, 2 August 1999. 
Singaporean personnel are also trained in Taiwan, Brunei, United States, France, Israel, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Israel and Bangladesh. 
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Amberley in Queensland, at Williamtown in Victoria and at Richmond in New South 
Wales. Arrangements were also made for the RSAF to use the Delamere electronic 
warfare range in Northern Territory and the Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA) in 
Queensland.' " 
Apart from air force training in Australia, the Singaporean Army has also significantly 
increased other training in Australia. The main site where this takes place is the 
SWBTA, a largely forested terrain twice the size of Singapore. The two main exercises 
conducted there, the Wallaby and Wallaroo exercises, are held annually and focus on 
armoured, combined -arms and joint service operations. At the October 3/96 Wallaby 
exercise some 3,900 SAF personnel and 150 armoured vehicles were involved.188 RSAF 
A-4s, F -5s, C -130s and Super Pumas supported army units.t89 A major storage facility 
for SAF equipment (e.g., armoured vehicles) in SWBTA was opened at the 
Rockhampton airport in December 1995.190 
Apart from arrangements for short term deployments of the Singaporean military to 
Australia, other agreements were signed which allowed the Singaporean Armed Forces 
to establish several `semi- permanent' facilities for training in Australia. The first of 
these, established by a MoU in 1993, was set up at Pearce Air Base in Western 
Australia, just north, of Perth. Pearce became the site for the relocation of Singapore's 
Air Force's Flying Training Schoo1.191 The MoU is for fifteen years in the first instance 
with an option to renew for another ten years.192 The first sixteen aircraft and 150 
186 Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', p.9. 
187 Waters, 
`Regional Air Power Cooperation -an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), 
Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.182. The RSAF started training at SWBTA in October 
1993. 
188 See Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', p.9; Leong Chan Teik, `Dr Tony Tan on 7 -day 
Visit to AustraIia', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 18 October 1996; Liam Fitzpatrick, 
`Attacks Against Singaporean Troops Add Fuel to Racism Row', South China Post, Reuters News 
Service, 31 October 1996. 
189 See Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', p.9; Leong Chan Teik, `Dr Tony Tan on 7 -day 
Visit to Australia', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 18 October 1996; Fitzpatrick, `Attacks 
Against Singaporean Troops Add Fuel to Racism Row', South China Post, Reuters News Service, 
31 October 1996. According to news reports the number of Singaporeans at SWBTA was around 
1,000. See Fitzpatrick article above. 
190 Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', p.9. 
191 Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', p.9. 
192 Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', p.9. 
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personnel arrived in late 1993 with further arrivals bringing the number to thirty aircraft 
and 400 personnel, including dependents.193 
Provision for a second `semi -permanent' facility at the Australian Army's Aviation Base 
at Oakey, was signed in October 1996.194 This arrangement will extend until 2012 and 
involves up to twelve Super Puma helicopters and about 250 Singaporean personnel and 
their dependents.195 According to the Department of Defence `[t]he squadron's main 
role is maintaining flying skills and operational capabilities'. 196 
Two other training facilities for the SAF are under discussion. In March 1995, talks 
began about basing the Singapore Air Force jet trainer squadron at Amberley in 
Queensland. Some twenty A -4 Super Skyhawk aircraft and up to 280 support personnel 
and their families would be involved. Eventually this project would involve some 700 
Singaporean nationals. Amberley however was ruled out following an environmental 
study that predicted unacceptable levels of noise.197 Discussions about a new site for the 
project continue.198 The other facility being discussed is reportedly a new training area, 
193 Waters, `Regional Air Power Cooperation -an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), 
Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.182. 
194 Department of Defence, `Singapore Helicopter Training in Queensland', Media Release, Office of 
the Minister for Defence, 21 October 1996. 
195 Department of Defence, `Singapore Helicopter Training in Queensland', Media Release, Office of 
the Minister for Defence, 21 October 1996. See also `Australia and Singapore Likely to Further 
Strengthen Defence Ties', Defence News Release, Defence Public Relations 24/95, 30 March 
1995. See also Cameron Stewart, `Singapore Requests Base for Troops', Australian, 31 March 
1995; and David Lague, `Singaporean Deal May Reap Millions', SMH, 19 April 1995. Leong 
Chan Teik, `SAF Keen on More Areas for Training in Australia', Straits Times, Reuters News 
Service, 25 October 1996. 
196 Department of Defence, 'Singapore Helicopter Training in Queensland', Media Release, Office of 
the Minister for Defence, 21 October 1996. According to the press release `Singapore is expected 
to pay $30 to $35 million for the construction of dedicated facilities'. According to newspaper 
reports some $5 million a year in maintenance and $10 million in annual wages will benefit local 
communities. See Roy Eccleston, `Racism Claims Touch Off Concerns for Foreigners' Helicopter 
Base', The Australian, 31 October 1996. 
197 Charles Miranda, Secret Air Base Search: Foreign Jets Seek Australian Home', The Daily 
Telegraph, 7 February 1997. 
198 See Miranda, `Secret Air Base Search. Foreign Jets Seek Australian Home', Daily Telegraph, 7 
February 1997. In April 1998, the South Australian premier, John Olsen suggested that the RSAF 
may conduct jet- training at Woomera. See `Singapore Air Force Invited to Woomera', The 
Canberra Times, 16 April 1998. 
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three times the size of Singapore, which Singapore would help the Australian Defence 
Department to develop.199 A final decision had not been taken in the period under study. 
Australian training facilities are invaluable to the Singaporean Armed Forces for 
developing combat skills. An indication of the value attached to these arrangements is 
that in June 1995, CDF Admiral Alan Beaumont, became the first Australian to receive 
Singapore's highest military award.20° It signaled Singapore's acknowledgment of 
Beaumont's `outstanding service in promoting defence relations between Australia and 
Singapore' and his `personal commitment and enthusiastic support [which] greatly 
eased the move of the Republic of Singapore Air Force's Flying Training School to 
Pearce Air Base in Western Australia'.22201 In February 1995, CDF Beaumont also 
supported an agreement to allow SAF army training at the Shoalwater Bay Training in 
Queensland.202 
Intelligence exchanges 
Australia and Singapore have long standing intelligence links. In April 1965, ASIS 
established formal liaison arrangements with the Singapore Special Branch. Later in 
1970, when the Security and Intelligence Division (SID) of the Ministry of Defence was 
established to concentrate on external intelligence, ASIS helped the new organisation by 
bringing two research officers in Australia and training them in such areas as carding, 
filing, and registry work.203 Apparently, the level of standard of intelligence exchanged 
during this period was not high quality but some useful contacts were nonetheless 
established. ASIS also exchanged intelligence with the Internal Security Division (ISD), 
including information about international terrorism. During the 1990s the quality of 
intelligence exchanges between the two countries was apparently increased, though the 
nature of the material is difficult to assess given the extreme secrecy surrounding this 
199 Leong Chan Teik, 'SAF Keen on More Areas for Training in Australia', Straits Times, Reuters 
News Service, 25 October 1996; `Singapore to Boost Defence Ties -Paper', Reuters News Service, 
12 September 1995. 
200 'Aussie Awarded Top Military Honour', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 28 June 1995. 
201 
`Aussie Awarded Top Military Honour', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 28 June 1995. 
202 
`Aussie Awarded Top Military Honour', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 28 June 1995. 
203 See Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind and especially p.172. 
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area.204 The general intelligence relationship, however, had periods of tension. In early 
1996, for example, Australian defence and intelligence officials claimed that, following 
an unspecified 'incident', Canberra became alarmed over apparent Singaporean efforts 
to collect intelligence on Australian defence capabilities.205 
Strategic planning 
Australia does not provide any assistance to Singapore in strategic planning. According 
to official sources the high level courses that SAF personnel attend in Australia have 
generic strategic subjects as part of the curriculum but there is no dedicated training.206 
Defence industry, science and technology cooperation 
Little in the way of defence industry cooperation developed during the 1990s between 
Australia and Singapore. One project, the Nulka, a missile decoy system, is being seen 
as a test case207 for the future cooperation.208 Australia does provide industry support for 
Singaporean military aircraft and armoured vehicles located in Western Australia and 
Queensland respectívely.209 
In the areas of science and technology, the DSTO worked with Singapore on 'F404 
aircraft engine performance modeling' 21° Under a MoU for Collaboration in Defence 
Science and Technology potential areas for additional cooperation include ship 
survivability and shock testing, land operations technology, and integrated 
communications.211 Overall, there is little evidence of much activity in these areas. 
204 Interviews with senior officials from Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence and intelligence 
organisations, Canberra, November 1998. 
205 Huxley, `Australia Looking North for Security', p.9. 
206 Correspondence with Singaporean Defence Adviser, Canberra, 2 August 1999. 
207 For such issues as security concerns and intellectual property. 
208 Wylie, `Regional Engagement and Defence Cooperation -the Thrust into Asia', in MaCaffrie and 
Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, p.79. 
209 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, pp.142. See also Wylie, 'Regional 
Engagement and Defence Cooperation -the Thrust into Asia', in MaCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), 
The Navy and Regional Engagement, p.79. 
210 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.169. 
211 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.100. 
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Outcomes 
Singapore, perhaps more than any other country in the region, has mixed motives for 
defence cooperation with Australia. On the one hand, Singapore unequivocally 
advocates security cooperation as a means for underwriting a stable region. On the other 
hand, Singapore's political and geo- strategic vulnerability ensures that any opportunity 
to advance operational and combat skills through training and exercises and use of 
Australian facilities will be pursued vigorously. From Australia's perspective, given the 
growing technological sophistication of Singapore's armed forces, there is an increasing 
affinity between the two countries as exercise partners and the relationship is mutually 
beneficial. For example, Singapore's AEW &C capabilities have helped Australia to 
develop these skills at a time when Australia lacks a similar capability. 
Moreover, apart from developing combat skills through cooperation with Australia, 
Singapore's military and political elite also consider Australia's alliance with the United 
States another attraction for defence cooperation arrangements. As indicated above, the 
RSAF now participates in the highly sophisticated Pitch Black air exercise series, 
involving the USAF and RAAF. But equally importantly the connection between 
Australia's membership both the FPDA and the alliance is seen to be a valuable 
deterrent from the Singaporean perspective. As Lee Hsien Loong, the Second Minister 
for Defence, said some time ago: 
[T]he core of FPDA [is] political and psychological deterrence...the very presence of 
forces belonging to an FPDA -e.g., Australian aircraft squadron --must raise the 
possibility of a response from that partner...land] some sort of reaction from the 
partner's allies, linked to it through other alliances.212 
The degree to which Australia's security cooperation with Singapore, especially in the 
heady days of the early 1990s, took account of these various motives for defence 
cooperation is arguable. What is clear is that both parties' operational and combat skills 
are undoubtedly stronger as a consequence of defence cooperation. 
212 Lee Hsien Loong (Second Minister for Defence), The FPDA and Regional Security', Air Defence 
Seminar, Singapore, 29 November 1989, p.11. 
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DEFENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN AND MALAYSIA 
The defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia, like the one between 
Australia and Singapore, largely revolved around the FPDA during the 1970s and for 
most of the 1980s.213 And, as also occurred with Singapore, during the early 1990s the 
FPDA became the site of increased cooperation between Australia and Malaysia. 
However, with the exception of extra special forces exercises, there were very few new 
exercises introduced.214 Individual training and study visits on the other hand did 
expand. 
Individual training and study visits 
During the 1990s the number of Malaysian personnel visiting Australia for study and 
training went from 114 in 1993 -94 to 138 in 1996 -97.215 These visits took place under 
the DCP and personnel were located at a wide range of military establishments.216 
Australians were hosted at Malaysian military establishments: for example, RAN 
officers served at Lumut Naval Base.217 In addition Australia provided short, in- country 
training programs to Malaysian personnel.218 
213 As discussed in Chapter One, Australia has had a long defence relationship with Malaysia, going 
back to the 1950s and Konfrontasi. 
214 Malaysia like Singapore and Indonesia participated in Kangaroo `95 for the first time. 
215 The Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia 
and ASEAN: Managing Change, p.194. 
216 For example; the RAN hosted personnel at HMAS Albatross, Cerberus, Creswell, Penguin, and 
other establishments; the Army hosted personnel at Faìrbaìrn, Richmond, Bandiana and other 
establishments; and the RAAF hosted personnel at Richmond, Amberley and other establishments. 
In addition educational organisations such as Australian Defence Force Academy, the Australian 
College of Defence and Strategic Studies, the Australian Defence Warfare Centre, the Joint 
Services College and RAN Maritime Studies Centre also hosted personnel. 
217 For example, in 1997 there were some 16 Australian personnel in Malaysia for this purpose. 
Interviews with defence personnel, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997. 
218 For example, in 1993/94 there were some 439 Malaysian personnel trained by the ADF in 
Malaysia Senate Hansard, Question No.1830, 31 January 1995, p.178. The establishments where 
this training took place included the Malaysian Command & Staff College and the instruction was 
conducted by among others the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, the Maritime Studies 
Program and the Air Powers Study Centre. One such in- country program which started in 1992, 
involved Australian personnel from the RAN Maritime Studies Program and the RAAF Air Powers 
Studies Centre who presented a two week module to the Armed Forces College and lectures to 
officers at the Staff College and Royal Malaysian Naval Base at Lumut. The arrangement, which 
came under the auspices of the 1992 Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program (see below), was 
aimed at giving `students a good understanding of the principles underpinning the use of maritime 
and air power in peace and war so that those principles can be applied in a Malaysian context'. See 
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Unit training 
As indicated above, much of the expansion in unit training took place as a result of the 
improvements in the FPDA series (which have already been discussed). Given the less 
sophisticated nature of Malaysia's air and naval capabilities, relative to that of the other 
FPDA partners, it is likely that cooperation with Malaysia will be less advanced than it 
is between the others. Nonetheless, the RAN in particular has provided important 
assistance with operational and combat skills.219 
Navy to Navy cooperation 
Apart from the naval components within FPDA there appears to be no new bilateral 
naval exercises introduced during the early 199Os. Lumutex, a formalised passage 
exercise and harbour training is one of the few bilateral exercises outside of the 
FPDA 220 Ship visits took place regularly and more often; for example, RAN ship visits 
went from eight to twenty -three in 1993 -94.221 The RAN also invited the Royal 
Malaysian Navy (RMN) to the multilateral Kakadu Fleet Concentration series (see 
above). 
Air Force to Air Force cooperation 
Again, cooperation between the RAAF and the RMAF (Royal Malaysia Air Force) was 
under the auspices of FPDA.222 For example, No.36 Squadron and AMTDU (Air 
Movements Training and Development Unit) participated with RMAF C -130 for tactical 
McCaffrie, `Regional Cooperation', in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop 
Darwin, p.137. 
219 According to a senior RAN officer, 'Australia may have been too generous' with its assistance. 
Interview, Canberra, November 1998. 
220 McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, Annex, p.57. 
221 Fray, 'Comrades in Arms', The Bulletin, 5 April 1994, p.18. 
222 The small permanent detachment at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth has six 
permanent staff who organise operations from Malaysia. One aircraft and its crew rotate through 
Butterworth on deployment from Edinburgh, usually every three weeks. Maintenance crews rotate 
six -weekly. Janssen Lok, 'Military Exercise and Training - Missions and Capabilities Grow', p.12. 
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operations and airdrop training at Richmond, Australia.223 The RAAF also conducts 
navigator training for the RMAF.224 
Army to Army cooperation 
Traditionally, Army to Army exercises have been an important area of cooperation 
between the two countries, originating during the Emergency in the 1950s and 
Konfrontasi during the 1960s.225 A long- standing Army to Army exercise, the 
Haringaroo series, involving the Australian Rifle Company based in Butterworth, had 
several elements added to it in the 1990s.226 And, the battalion level exercise, Southern 
Tiger, was started in 1992. 
Special forces 
Special forces exercises between the two militaries were taking place in the 1980s under 
the Pernburn Rusa series. During the 1990s special forces exercises were formally 
increased. The 1990 Night Tiger series was followed by Tiger Moon in 1993 (which 
focused on `war roles' for special forces) and Day Tiger in 1994.227 In October 1996, 
Malaysian special forces visited Australia for Kokoa Tiger. According to the Defence 
Annual Report for 1995 -96, the `outcome' of the exercise was `an increased awareness 
of commando capabilities'.228 
Intelligence exchanges 
Intelligence links between Australia and Malaysia are long- standing. In 1964, ASIS 
established formal liaison arrangements with both the Malaysian Special Branch (MSB) 
223 Chris Spence, 'No.86 Wing and the Air Training Process', in Keith Brent (ed.) Regional Air Power 
Workshop RAAF Richmond, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1996, p.71. 
224 Waters, `Regional Air Power Cooperation -an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), 
Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.183. 
225 Hewitt, `The Australian Army and Regional Cooperation-Security Through Partnership', in 
Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.84. 
226 Hewitt, `The Australian Army and Regional Cooperation', in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air 
Power Workshop Darwin, p.84. 
227 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, pp.133 -142. 
228 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.100. If this is correct then 
Australian -Malaysian special forces cooperation is close since many 'commando' activities are 
restricted. 
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of the Malaysian Police and the Malaysian External Intelligence Organisation 
(MEIO).229 Intelligence exchanges between ASIS and the MSB were originally 
concerned with the internal issue of communist insurgency, especially since Australia 
supported Malaysia during Konfrontasi with Indonesia. ASIS also assisted MSB, with, 
for example, a number of technical operations. Initial cooperation between ASIS and 
MEIO was limited (due to a number of organizational and political issues) but after 
1972 it apparently improved. During the 1990s, as was the case with Indonesia and 
Singapore, the quality of intelligence exchanges was apparently enhanced, though 
exactly in what ways is difficult to know.230 As with Singapore, there have been 
tensions in the general intelligence relationship. On one occasion in 1995 Australia was 
the alleged offender in an `incident' that reportedly involved `bugging' of the Malaysian 
embassy in Canberra.231 
Strategic planning 
The ADF has provided extensive assistance to the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces with 
the development of its doctrine and strategic plans for the defence of Malaysia. 
According to some sources, notwithstanding each country's different defence 
requirements, there is a remarkable similarity in the wording of Australian and 
Malaysian doctrinal documents.232 
Defence industry and science and technology cooperation 
For much of the first half of the 1990s, Australia and Malaysia were involved in 
extensive negotiations about a joint development plan for a patrol boat program.233 
Indeed, as Bob Wylie observed, there was such an extraordinary amount of momentum 
that the project appeared to be the `touchstone of the overaII relationship between the 
229 Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, p.172. 
230 Interviews with senior officials from Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence and intelligence 
organisations, Canberra, November 1998. 
231 
'Evans Says Espionage Reports Damaged Interests', FBIS- EAS -95 -107 Daily Report, 1 June 1995, 
http://wnc.fedworld.gov. 
232 Interviews with defence personnel, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997. 
233 Desmond Ball, `The Joint Patrol Vessel (WV): A Regional Concept for Regional Cooperation', 
Working Paper No.303, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1996, pp.1 -14. - 
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two countries'.234 At the end of Labor's time in office the arrangement had not been 
finalised but in October 1997, it was terminated when the Malaysians announced that a 
German tender had won the contract.235 
With regard to science and technology cooperation, some collaborative projects had 
been established between the two countries by 1995 -96. Under the Malaysian- Australia 
Joint Defence Program (see below) signed in 1992 and its associated Defence Science 
and Industry Working Group, the DSTO and the Malaysian Defence Science and 
Technology Centre instituted collaborative research into military vehicle instrumen- 
tation and food science.236 In addition several visits between the organisations took 
place. 
Outcomes 
The overall defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia is the longest and, 
some would argue, the closest of all regional relationships.237 Nonetheless, there are 
long- standing and current political sensitivities, a number of which came to the surface 
during Labor's time in office.238 The most protracted issues between the two countries 
arose because of differences about regional economic arrangements. It was in this 
context that Prime Minister Paul Keating commented about Dr Mahathir's refusal to 
attend the APEC Summit in Seattle in 1993, saying that: 
234 Wylie, `Regional Engagement and Defence Cooperation-the Thrust into Asia', in MaCaffrie and 
Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, p.79. 
235 Don Greenlees, 'Malaysia Sinks Our $2bn Ship Contract', The Australian, 10 October, 1997; 
Carolyn Jones, Rachel Hawes and Dennis Shanahan, `Coalition Blames Keating, Hanson for Loss 
of $2bn Ship Deal', The Weekend Australian, 11 -12 October 1997. 
236 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.169. 
237 The reasons usually given are Australia's assistance to Malaysia in the 1950s and 1960s, especially 
during Konfronatsia, and the closeness of the two navies. Apart from attending the same Royal 
Navy training institutions as RAN personnel, the Chief of the RMN until the late 1960s was a high - 
ranking RAN officer. 
238 For a analysis of the various tensions between the two countries during Prime Minister Mahathir's 
time in office see David Camroux, "Looking East "...and Inwards: Internal Factors in Malaysian 
Foreign Relations During the Mahathir Era, 1984 -1994', Australia Asia Paper No.72, Centre for 
the Study of Australia Asia Relations, Griffith University, Queensland, 1994. See especially pp.39- 
53. 
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I couldn't care less, frankly, whether he comes or not...APEC is bigger than all of us- 
Australia, the US and Dr Mahathir and any other recalcitrants.239 
The new bilateral dispute was particularly vicious.240 It prompted an unusual visit by an 
18- member Australian delegation of mostly ADF personnel to Malaysia some two 
weeks after Mr Keating's comment. The team spent a period of over two weeks trying to 
find common ground and ways of resuming normal relations. For many observers it was 
this visit and the intervention by the Australian Defence Minister Robert Ray that finally 
brought the incident to an end, rather than diplomatic ties or negotiations.241 
Notwithstanding the historic relationship and the demonstrated strength of defence ties, 
cooperation between Malaysia and Australia requires continuing sensitivity. As one 
senior Australian defence official points out: 
[W]ith Malaysia, perhaps more than with any other country in the region, it is important 
that we come quickly to understand their culture and how even the smallest indiscretion 
on our part can affect the relationship.242 
For all the sensitivities between the two countries, defence cooperation flourished 
during Labor's time in office, and the Malaysian Armed Forces gained considerable 
combat and operational skills through this cooperation with the ADF. 
STRUCTURES, PRACTICAL DIRECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR 
COOPERATION 
When Labor's Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, began in earnest to establish a new 
regional security policy in 1989 -90 there were few structures, practical directives or 
operational guidelines to support the policy. Officials in the Department of Defence and 
military practitioners were often confronted with policy concepts and proposals, such as 
`cooperative security' and `confidence building', and `transparency' without knowing 
exactly what that meant in practice.243 Military practitioners found the existing 
239 Quoted in Camroux, "`Looking East "...and Inwards', p.44, and originally quoted in AFR, 23 
February 1993. 
240 See Camroux, "'Looking East "...and Inwards', pp.44 -47. 
241 Interview with ADF officer, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997. 
242 Chalmers, `Regional Engagement in Practice', in McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and 
Regional Engagement, p.72. 
243 Interview with ADF officer, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997. 
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operational guidance was often inappropriate for the new policy.244 Some of the 
guidance was derived from outdated arrangements such as SEATO; some from the 
FPDA, which did not allow the guidelines to be applied to third parties (e.g., Indonesia) 
and focused on air defence more than maritime operations; and some was designed for 
activities with formal allies, like the US and the UK, and was not to be used for 
interaction with non -NATO militaries.245 Overall, much of the operational guidance 
appeared suited to previous periods, when `cooperation' was directed against other 
states, rather than the present situation, which stressed `cooperation with' others. 
Until the late 1980s Australia had few compelling reasons to revise this situation. The 
force structures and doctrines of most regional states were designed for internal use and 
were usually underdeveloped with respect to operational cooperation with other 
countries. However, as regional states began military modernisation programs246 and 
Australia moved in the I990s to a regional policy based on cooperative rather than 
competitive activities the existing structures and directives became inappropriate for the 
task ahead. 
The near absence of suitable formal defence cooperation directives led to several 
developments. Some practitioners embraced the new policy with enthusiasm, took the 
initiative and developed measures that they saw as being good cooperative practice. The 
SAS, for example, were instrumental in establishing cooperative measures with 
Kopassus. Some senior members of the SAS well before this had supported the idea that 
cooperation with Kopassus was an important objective. Colonel Chris Roberts, for 
example, when Commanding Officer of the SAS in the early 1980s, had argued that 
exchanges and contact between the two groups would enhance security.247 Kopassus 
was the most important security and political group within ABRI and, many argued, 
within Indonesia.248 For many, like Colonel Roberts, unless the military elite in 
244 Interview with RAN officer, Kuala Lumpur, June 1996. 
245 Interview with ADF officer, Canberra, May 1997. 
246 Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, `The Military Build -up in the Asia -Pacific Region: Scope, 
Causes and Implications for Security, Working Paper No.264, Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1992, pp.1-14; Desmond Ball, `Arms and 
Influence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia -Pacific Region', International Security, Vol.18, No.3, 
1993 -94, pp.78 -112. 
247 Interviews with ADF officer, May 1997, Darwin. 
248 Interview with ADF officer, Darwin, May 1997. 
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Indonesia was known, understood and encouraged to participate, then Australia was 
unlikely to develop a sound strategic relationship with Indonesia. Previous attempts by 
the SAS to establish closer contact had been unsuccessful, Iargely because of political 
opposition within Australia to cooperation because of alleged involvement of Kopassus 
in serious human rights abuses in Indonesia. When the Labor government began to 
promote a policy of security cooperation, the SAS took the opportunity to follow - 
through on earlier efforts. 
In 1992, a new position of army defence attaché was established in the defence section 
of the Australian embassy in Jakarta. Colonel Jim Molan, an Indonesian speaking 
infantry officer, was appointed and given a broad directive from Army Chief of Staff, 
General John Gray, to establish better army to army relations at a pace comfortable to 
both sides.249 On arrival in Jakarta, Colonel Molan developed several strong personal 
contacts with senior Kopassus officers250 that set the tone and pace of the relationship. 
After several rounds of negotiation exchange visits were agreed on, and in May and 
June of 1993 the first visits took place (see above). 
In the absence of detailed official guidance, particular individuals were able to influence 
the development and pace of cooperative activities. The visits were also to demonstrate 
how essential personal relationships were to be in this process. By 1993, the pace of the 
relationship was progressing so quickly that Defence staff at the Australian embassy in 
Jakarta believed the resources to plan, coordinate and implement cooperative measures 
were beginning to be strained.251 Likewise, on the Indonesian side it was reported that 
the `desire to expand the nature and scope of cooperative activities tested their ability to 
plan and coordinate their participation in them'.252 The advice of the Defence staff in 
Jakarta to the Defence Department was that `greater efficiency in planning and 
coordination can be had by adopting more formal procedures'.253 
249 Interview with ADF officer, Canberra, April, 19 
250 Interview with ADF officer, Canberra, April, 19 
251 Department of Defence, Jakarta Defence Staff, 
2 April 1994, p.1. Confidential. 
252 Department of Defence, Jakarta Defence Staff, 
2 April 1994, p.I. Confidential. 
253 Department of Defence, Jakarta Defence Staff, 
2 April 1994, p.1. Confidential. 
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If the absence of clear practical directives sometimes advanced cooperation at other 
times it appeared to work against it. One example of this was the Australian Singapore 
arrangement for servicing the RSAF Machetti training aircraft that were based at Pearce. 
The two parties had agreed that an Australian company would provide repair facilities to 
the SAF, However, the Singaporeans appointed a Singaporean company with a shop - 
front in Australia and shipped the parts back to Singapore for maintenance.254 Although 
the event suggested that Australia was commercially naive, it also underlined how 
unguided enthusiasm for cooperation could go astray if the practical directives were 
inadequate. 
If some practitioners were keen to develop cooperative measures then others were, for a 
variety of reasons, content to go slow and not press for precise directives. For example, 
the RAAF was the last to develop cooperative arrangements with the Indonesian Air 
Force. Many senior RAAF officers were 'operators' who were more interested in 
spending their limited budgets on exercises with the USAF-the RAAF's most 
sophisticated and technologically advanced exercise partner -than on activities with 
Iess sophisticated regional air forces. The initial advances that the RAAF made towards 
cooperation with Indonesia were due not to any conviction that cooperation would 
benefit the RAAF's operational skills, but rather that it was politically useful and 
certainly the wish of their political masters. Much of this cooperation was due to just a 
few senior and well -placed RAAF advocates of the idea, such as Air Vice Marshall 
Nicholson when he was the Commanding Officer (CO) of NORCOM during the early 
1990s.255 
For other practitioners the undeveloped nature of practical directives caused confusion 
and frustration. In 1991, the absence of new Navy directives meant that the RAN spent 
more hours in the Southern Ocean than it did in the sea air gap or cooperating with 
regional navies. In 1992, the Navy's port visit schedule was in disarray and the 
254 Interviews with ADF officers, Darwin, May June 1997. 
255 The CO was particularly interested in developing better security relations with Indonesia, spoke 
Indonesian, traveled to the country and established personal friendships with Indonesia officials 
and in this way helped to get the RAAF involved in cooperating with the Indonesian air force. 
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objectives and guidelines for such visits, apart from the undefined policy goal of 
`cooperation', were far from clear.256 As one naval officer argued: 
The RAN has become a key instrument in the practical implementation of the 
government's policy of regional engagement...[y]et RAN cooperation with regional 
navies has often been ad hoc, poorly focused and sometimes even half hearted.257 
Some practitioners were frustrated because, they argued, lack of precise directives and 
operational guidelines could undermine Australia's own security. According to one 
naval officer: 
Substantial technological, operational and training 'edges' are essential in achieving the 
RAN's prime directive of maintaining `defence of Australia' capabilities. In particular, 
capability margins in the entire array of targeting technologies, combat C5, EW, ASW, 
and MCM must not be compromised by engagement in CNAs [cooperative naval 
activities]. Combat orientated cooperation should only be tailored to specific mission 
areas with particular countries who have a demonstrable need for it, or where a direct 
long -term benefit to Australia exists.258 
The arguments made by these practitioners were supported by the general conclusion of 
an official review of the Defence Cooperation Program, which stated that the rationale 
for some objectives in the DCP, even those in the key defence document the Strategic 
Review 1993 (see above), were not readily apparent. As the review of the DCP argued: 
Much of the Defence Cooperation sub -Programs range of activities reflects a 
commonsense approach to achieving objectives that are in broad agreement with policy 
guidance. However, the rationale for these activities and the relevance of the strategies 
being followed is not always obvious. Indeed there is some inconsistency in the 
development of objectives for Defence Cooperation. There is room for clarification and 
restatement of the underlying framework for cooperative defence activities.259 
It became more and more obvious that implementing Labor's cooperative regional 
security policy would require considerably more attention. 
256 Interview with RAN officer (ret.), Kuala Lumpur, June 1997. 
257 Alan Hinge, 'Cooperative Naval Activities: Drawing the Lines', Journal of Australian Naval 
Institute, November 1994 /January 1995, p.17. 
258 Inspector- General's Division, Defence Cooperation, Chapter 3, p.2. 
259 Inspector- General's Division, Defence Cooperation, Chapter 3, p.2. 
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New structures, practical directives, and operational guidelines 
To overcome the problems above, several new structures and directives were developed 
with Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia during the 1990s. Some pertained to the FPDA, 
as discussed earlier, but most addressed the bilateral relationships. 
Indonesia 
As discussed above, by 1993 the Defence staff at the Australian embassy in Jakarta was 
now concerned about the rapid pace and ad hoc nature of bilateral defence activities. To 
address these kinds of problems, several new structures were put in place over the next 
few years. These included committees for formulating and coordinating the policy; five 
working groups to oversee implementation (1995); a ministerial task force (1996); and a 
`Future Directions Plan' (1996). 
1. The Ministerial Task Group (MTG) 
As a result of the MTG there are now annual meetings between the two Defence 
Ministers on a broad range of security issues. The MTG is seen as one of the measures 
that gives substance to the 1995 Agreement Between the Government of Australia and 
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Maintaining Security.260 
2. The Australian -Indonesian Defence Policy Committee (AIDPC) 
The AIDPC (originally called the Bilateral Defence Discussions) is co- chaired by the 
Australian Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the Indonesian equivalent KASUM 
ABRI. The AIDPC brings together defence personnel from both countries `to consider 
the development of the relationship'. 261 
260 For a copy of the agreement see Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, Appendix 5, pp.143- 
144. 
261 Inspector -General's Division, Defence Cooperation, pp. 4-14. 
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3. The Australia- Indonesia Defence Coordinating Committee (IADCC) 
The AIDPC also sponsors the IADCC which `acts as the executive committee (at one - 
star level) to the AIDCP with responsibility for coordination, directing and imple- 
menting all aspects of the relationship'. 262 
4. The Australia - Indonesia Secretariat (AIDSEC) 
The Australia- Indonesia Secretariat (AIDSEC) is situated in the Directorate of 
Indonesian Regional Cooperation (DIRC) in the Strategic and International Policy 
Division. Among its responsibilities is the coordination of the following five working 
groups that are responsible for the key parts of the defence relationship. 
5. The five working groups (and their respective areas of responsibility) 
i) Operations and exercises 
ii) Education, training, exchanges and attachments 
iii) Logistics 
iv) Communications, electronics warfare and information technology 
v) Science and technology 
The members of the working groups on the Australian side are civilians and defence 
officials (e.g., SIP officials and three of the defence attaches in Jakarta are members of 
working groups 1, 2, and 3 while the head of the defence section in Jakarta, a Brigadier, 
sits on the AIDCC). On the Indonesian side only military officials from KASUM ABRI 
participate (there are no civilians in KUSUM ABRI).263 
6. The `Future Directions Plan' 
A significant achievement for the defence cooperation relationship between both sides 
occurred in 1996 when a `Future Directions Plan' ,264 was signed by the Chief of Staff of 
KASUM ABRI and the Vice -Chief of the ADF.265 This document, which establishes the 
262 Inspector -General's Division, Defence Cooperation, pp. 4 -14. 
263 Interview with ADF officer, Jakarta, June 1997. 
264 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.142. 
265 This paper then informs the CDF Operations Directorate (CDFOD) -see below. 
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future directions of the total defence relationship until 2005, is the most detailed, 
structured and far- reaching that Australia has with any country in the region.266 
Apparently it is now seen as a model not just for Australia's military relationships with 
other regional countries but also one that regional states are keen to implement among 
themselves, with some adaptation of course. 
Singapore 
The FPDA provides a structure, objectives and guidelines for cooperation between 
Australia and Singapore. In addition to FPDA, several new bilateral structures were 
agreed upon during the 1990s. 
The Joint Australia- Singapore Coordination Group (JASINCG) 
Established in 1992, the JASINCG provides a bilateral framework for coordinating 
cooperative activities. According to the Defence Department, "`Defence Cooperation" is 
becoming a relatively small element of broader activities' between the two countries and 
increasingly Singapore undertakes fee - for -service arrangements for military training in 
Australia. 
In January 1996, the Prime Minister Paul Keating agreed to an arrangement, titled the 
Singapore -Australia New Partnership, for closer political, security, economic and 
cultural cooperation.267 In October 1996, a `treaty -level agreement' covering the conduct 
of bilateral activities was signed with Singapore.268 
Malaysia 
As with Singapore, the FPDA provides a structure for coordinating Australia -Malaysia 
defence cooperation. During the 1990s several other structures were implemented which 
addressed the bilateral relationship. 
266 Interview with ADF officer, Jakarta, June 1997. 
267 Paul Keating, `Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism', Singapore, 17 January 1996, pp.1 -19. 
268 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.142. 
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The Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program ( MAJDP) 
Established on 17 February 1992, the MAJDP provides a framework for `all bilateral 
cooperative defence activities conducted between Malaysia and Australia'.269 The 
oversight of policy and management of the MAJDP is exercised by the MAJDP Review 
Committee. This committee is supported by three sub -committees whose tasks are to: 
review ongoing projects; as required to issue directives relative to ongoing projects; to 
assess and, as appropriate, endorse new project proposals; and to report to the MAJDP 
Review committee.270 The responsible parties on the policy side in Malaysia are the 
Under Secretary Policy, in the Ministry of Defence and in Australia, the Assistant 
Secretary Asia Branch, International Policy Division (on behalf of the Deputy Secretary 
Strategic and Intelligence). Implementation is under the direction of Headquarters 
Malaysian Armed Forces Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations and Training) who is 
assisted by an Australian officer.271 According to one ADF officer, `this program...is 
designed to ensure that our Defence Cooperation proceeds within the bounds of 
mutually agreed priorities' .272 Additional agreements were formulated during 1996 -97. 
For example, in February 1997, a `treaty level agreement' covering the conduct of 
bilateral activities was signed with Malaysia.273 Also in 1997 a handbook for 
implementing the Administrative Arrangement of Joint Logistics Support between the 
Department of Defence, Australia and the Ministry of Defence Malaysia was 
published.274 This arrangement `increased the potential for greater interoperability and 
compatibility of logistics systems and procedures between the two countries'.275 
Operational guidelines 
The inadequate operational guidelines for directing regional cooperation were also 
addressed by the Defence Department and the ADF and with some success The existing 
269 Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program, 17 February 1992. 
270 Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program, 17 February 1992, Annex A (no page numbers 
provided on original document). 
271 Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program, 17 February 1992 (no page numbers). 
272 Hewitt, `The Australian Army and Regional Cooperation', in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air 
Power Workshop Darwin, p.84. 
273 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.142. 
274 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.77. 
275 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.77. 
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operational guidelines, which were generally unhelpful for the new regional policy, had 
been listed in what was called the Overseas Activities List. In 1995 -96 this list was 
replaced with a new document -the Chief of Defence Force Overseas Activities 
Directive (COAD) -which attempted to provide more detail about the nature of 
cooperative activities to be conducted.276 By 1996, the Defence Department claimed that 
in that year 
Overseas guidance was developed and issues setting out regional engagement 
objectives and Ievels of interoperability to be established with each of our regional 
neighbours and alliance partners [were addressed].277 
Subsequently, further improvements were made to the COAD and it was renamed the 
Defence International Engagement Policy (DIEP).278 
However, the formulation of practical measures to support a policy of `cooperative 
security' continued to chaIIenge officials in Defence. In the first place, as a senior 
defence official recently pointed out, the Department is still trying to `match activities to 
the "outputs" stated in the Department's corporate plan'.279 In other words, it is often 
difficult to formulate and implement measures that achieve the official expected policy 
outcome. In the second place, decisions are often made on the basis of what was done 
last year rather than on an analytical assessment of their effect on the security 
relationship; or decisions are made to implement new measures without detailed 
analysis of their possible effects on the relationship. And, finally, the guidelines rarely 
set explicit priorities that are set down in formal documents. Apparently, priorities can 
be arbitrary and informal. As a recently retired senior officer from the ADF commented, 
although improvements have been made, there is still some way to go with the 
development of satisfactory operational guidelines.28° 
Australia has also been active in setting some general guidelines for multilateral 
cooperative operations. The RAN, for example, was instrumental in establishing the 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) in 1988, which now takes place every two 
276 Interview with senior ADF officer, Canberra, December 1998. 
277 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, pp.64 -65. 
278 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, December 1998. 
279 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, December 1998. 
280 Interview with senior ADF officer, Canberra, December 1998 - 
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years.28t The WPNS has produced a Maritime Information Exchange Directory, a 
WPNS Tactical Signals Handbook, a WPNS Replenishment at Sea Handbook and is 
planning a for Command Post Exercise (CPX) to assist development of a common 
doctrine and publications.282 Other forums where Australia has been instrumental in 
setting guidelines are the CSCAP Maritime Working Group that in 1997 produced a 
publication, Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation,283 and the series of Sea 
Lanes of Communications conferences.284 And finally, the RAN has been the main 
instigator, originally in 1993 through the then Maritime Commander Rear Admiral 
Robert Walls, of the multilateral Kakadu Fleet Concentrations (see above). 
Overall, during the 1990s, the Department of Defence and the ADF made significant 
efforts to address the problems in applying the Labor's government's regional security 
policy that was based on the principle of `security with' other states. The new structures, 
directives and operational guidelines that were introduced certainly helped to advance 
this enterprise. 
OLD AND NEW TENSIONS IN THE POLICY 
Despite the attempts to improve the coordination and conduct of regional security 
policy, several tensions remain. The first concerns the degree and nature of cooperation 
between the ADF and the other armed forces in the region. Notwithstanding the 
emphasis on `security with' states in the region, the ADF, like other regional military 
establishments, does not share certain operational and combat skills with its regional 
neighbours. This is because, the ADF aims to have a military advantage over others. The 
RAN's Allan Hinge states emphatically that the Navy's `capability margins...must not 
281 See Sam Bateman, `Prospects for Naval Cooperation', in Jack McCaffrie and Alan Hinge (eds), 
Seapower in the Next Century, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force 
Academy, Canberra 1997, pp.203 -204. 
282 See Bateman, `Prospects for Naval Cooperation', in McCaffrie and Hinge (eds), Seapower in the 
Next Century, pp.203 -204. Bateman suggests the WPNS is `limited by its "first- track" nature and 
the inherent conservatism of naval forces'. 
283 Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation, CSCAP Memorandum No.4, Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 1997, pp.1 -12. Commodore Sam Bateman (RAN ret.) is the co- 
chair of the Maritime Working Group (with an Indonesian Navy rear admiral) and was a key figure 
in formulating the guidelines. 
284 See Bateman, `Prospects for Naval Cooperation', in McCaffrie and Hinge (eds), Seapower in the 
Next Century, pp.203 -205. 
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be compromised by CNAs [cooperative naval activítiesj'.285 Some important tactical 
procedures, for example, anti -submarine warfare (ASW) and mine counter measures 
(MCM) are shared with others but only those parts which do not jeopardise Australia's 
advantages for conducting defence of Australia.286 According to Hinge, among the 
activities that should not be compromised in any way during cooperative naval activities 
are targeting technologies, combat C3, and electronic warfare (EW).287 Similarly, the 
SAS does not share some categories of training: for example, intelligence gathering, 
which could reveal methods.288 The ADF, like the other military establishments in the 
region, also carefully guard the levels of combat readiness and preparedness of their 
military forces 289 According to many practitioners, all the armed forces in the region 
accept this situation as a given and do not see it as any obstacle to cooperation. As one 
naval officer put it: 
We know how to do business together without expecting a complete osmosis of 
minutiae, and we accept in a pragmatic sense, without too much suspicion, that each is 
keeping its own secrets.290 
Nonetheless, according to some sources, in reality the situation is often more complex 
and there have been a number of instances when the ADF has `given too much away' in 
the course of defence cooperation with regional countries.291 
Underpinning this issue is the question of criteria for judging what is a cooperative and 
what is a competitive activity. Although some activities may be clear -cut others are not. 
For example, it is not necessarily self- evident that, on the one hand, training in basic 
skills such as damage control at sea292 is a cooperative measure which unequivocally 
does not undermine Australia's security, while on the other hand, target training is an 
activity which does. It is also not clear that the intellectual assistance which Australia 
285 Hinge, `Cooperative Naval Activities', p.21. 
286 Interview RAN officer, Darwin, May 1997. 
287 Hinge, `Cooperative Naval Activities', p.21. 
288 Interview with former SAS officer, Canberra, July 1997. 
289 Interview Army officer, Jakarta, June 1997. 
290 David Shackleton, `Naval Cooperation: Present Trends and Future Directions', in McCaffrie and 
Sherwood, The Navy and Regional Engagement, pp.49 -59. 
291 Interview with senior ADF officer, Canberra, November 1998. 
292 The RAN has assisted the Singapore Navy for example to train for damage control while under 
attack at sea. Interviews with RAN officers, Canberra, May 1997 and November 1998. 
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provides, for example with development of doctrine and force structures, is simply and 
only a cooperative measure without detrimental strategic implications for AustraIia.293 If 
claims by senior defence officials294 that these issues are not difficult to resolve in 
practice are to be accepted, then the criteria on which such decisions are made should be 
publicly available and explained. 
The second tension within the policy is that the ADF, like the other armed forces in the 
region, uses cooperative activities to gather intelligence. As one senior ADF officer 
stated, `cooperative activities enhance opportunities for intelligence gathering'.295 And 
moreover, he claimed that 'this is widely understood' among cooperative partners and 
there is an unwritten understanding that it `is done discreetly'. Although such statements 
are no doubt a good description of the situation, they are undermined to some extent by 
the strong reprimand issued by the ADF to the Singaporean Air Force in 1996 when the 
latter collected intelligence while flying (presumably indiscreetly) in Australian air 
space.296 
The third problem with the policy is that there appears to be some confusion about its 
means and ends. Certainly the major objective is to establish cooperation as a `norm' for 
security practice in the region, on the grounds that cooperation enhances security. But 
many of the measures adopted by the ADF enhance the combat and operational skills of 
the armed forces in region. Although this may well build trust and transparency between 
Australia and other countries it also strengthens the warfighting capabilities of the 
armed forces in the region. This may at some point in the future undermine Australia's 
own security if currently friendly relationships deteriorate radically. Assisting the armed 
forces in the region in this way is supported by the ADF on the grounds that strong 
military forces help to make the region secure and may well insulate Australia from 
possible threats (see above). Another reason cooperation is pursued is to increase the 
levels of interoperability between the ADF and other regional forces. Again, although 
this may well build trust it may also support collective defence arrangements, or 
293 Australia assists most regional militaries with defence planning. Indeed, in many instances the 
doctrine of regional countries is taken verbatim from Australian documents. Interviews with ADF 
officers, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997. 
294 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, September 1998. 
295 Interview with retired senior ADF officer, Canberra, November 1998. 
296 Interviews with senior ADF officers, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, June 1997. 
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strategies for `security against' others and therefore does not necessarily support the 
`security with' objective of the policy. Another purpose of defence cooperation is to 
establish Australia's `access and influence' in the region.297 This objective was evident 
in speeches made by the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley in late 1988,298 in the 
ministerial statement made by the Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in 1989,299 in the 
Defence Department's document Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP90) 
published in 1992,300 and in the recent views of Defence officials.301 The general goal of 
cooperation in these statements is to `shape' the regional strategic environment to 
Australia's interests. Some officials have even gone so far as to claim that the purpose is 
`power projection', or as a senior ADF officer stated, `it's Australia's own Monroe 
Doctrine'.302 It is clear from these statements that there are several answers to the 
question `cooperation for what ?'. As the review of the Defence Cooperation Program 
concluded: 
[T]he rationale for [defence cooperation] and the relevance of the strategies being 
followed is not always obvious. Indeed there is some inconsistency in the development 
of objectives for Defence Cooperation. There is room for clarification and restatement 
of the underlying framework for cooperative defence activities.303 
The different objectives behind cooperation raise questions about what type of security 
framework is being pursued by Australia (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
297 Interviews with senior ADF officers, Canberra, November and December 1998. 
298 In December 1988, Beazley stressed that, `security policy is not simply about direct military 
threats, but the ability to manage strategic developments in a way that reinforces our favourable 
strategic outlook' . See Kim Beazley, `Australian Defence Policy', in Desmond Ball (ed.), Australia 
and the World: Prologue and Prospects, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.69, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990, p.348. 
299 In December 1989, Evans emphasised that, `we have the capacity to creatively set the regional 
agenda, defining issues in terms that suit our interests and in a way that leads, hopefully, to action 
in directions that profit Australia'. See Gareth Evans, Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial 
Statement, Management Information Processing, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
December 1989, p.41. 
300 In ASP90, it was stated that, `because we need to shape our own security environment, there are 
fundamental national security reasons for our playing an active and constructive role on regional 
strategic issues'. See Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, p.43. 
301 In interviews with senior Defence Department officials it was stated that a major rationale for 
defence cooperation was to `shape' the regional environment to `mirror' Australia' s view of 
regional security. Interviews, Canberra, November and December 1998. 
302 Interviews with senior ADF officers, Canberra, November and December 1998. 
303 Inspector -General's Division, Defence Cooperation, Chapter 3, p.2. 
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In addition to the tensions, which are inherent in the policy, there are others that 
ironically, have developed as a result of the new arrangements to enhance and 
coordinate cooperation. First, Australian training contracts with Singapore to host 
personnel and equipment from the Singaporean Armed Forces could undermine 
Australia's own political neutrality and indeed security, if Singapore became involved in 
a crisis with some other regional countries. Second, in the same way, Australia' s 
commitment to the restructured FPDA and its increased focus on operations in the South 
China Sea304 may involve the ADF in a conflict that is not in Australia's interest.305 
Third, although the new committees and working groups have greatly improved policy 
coordination and, in the case of Indonesia, formalised an agenda for defence cooperation 
for at least the next ten years, they have also produced some new issues. The 
Indonesians involved in these new arrangements are from KUSUM ABRI, which is the 
equivalent to the Australian Department of Defence, but which is staffed only by 
military personnel. The latter, it is claimed, are very uncomfortable with the presence of 
Australian civilians from the Department of Defence in the various committees and 
working groups.306 Another example of new tensions, according to some Australian 
defence officials, is that the new structures have hindered rather helped cooperation 
because now the procedures have become `overly bureaucratic' and 'produce more 
minutes and fewer measures' .3°7 
Apart from these issues there are continuing in -house problems within the Department 
of Defence about the coordination of cooperative arrangements. For example, as one 
senior naval officer points out, '[t]here is still room for better liaison between Navy 
Office, Headquarters ADF (HGADF), International Policy (IP) division and DFAT in 
considering policy initiatives which advance our wider interests' .308 
Finally, despite the various justifications given by Defence that the military skills 
provided by defence cooperation do not necessarily undermine the human rights of some 
304 Interview with recently retired senior ADF officer, Canberra, December I998. 
305 See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, pp.94 -97. 
306 Interview ADF officer, Jakarta, June 1997. 
307 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, November 1998. 
308 Shackleton, `Naval Cooperation', in McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional 
Engagement, p.53. 
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domestic groups in ASEAN countries, it remains the case that many ordinary 
Indonesians continue to be seriously threatened by elements within TNI. 
CONCLUSION 
Labor's regional security policy was not only based on strong policy concepts that 
supported cooperation but also on a remarkable degree of practical cooperation. As the 
CDF General Baker, said in 1995, Australia was leading the way in regional defence 
cooperation.309 By that time, Australia was conducting more exercises with ASEAN 
militaries than ever before and more than each ASEAN country conducted with each 
other,310 These exercises were aimed at building confidence and trust with others. As 
CDF Baker said in September 1996, `there is no better demonstration of trust than to 
invite countries in the region to our country for training and exercises'.3t1 The ADF also 
helped the other armed forces in the region to develop operational and combat 
capabilities and interoperability with Australian forces. These activities were further 
supported by the development of several structures aimed at coordinating security 
cooperation and new practical directives and operational guidelines. Notwithstanding 
several flaws in Australia's policy and some confusion about its ends and means it was 
nonetheless guided by the sentiment expressed by the Defence Minister, Senator Ray 
that: 
Only direct and personal contact, the sharing of experiences and perceptions can...prise 
open the doors of conservative military establishments...in the end, the trust and 
confidence that really matters is between defence organisations.312 
In practice, Labor developed a regional security policy which went well beyond any 
previous efforts to cooperate with the armed forces in the region and was firmly based 
on the view that `security with' other regional states enhanced Australia's security. This 
of course contrasted with the principles and practice which guided Australia's `security 
against' policies - defence of Australia and the Australia -US alliance. 
309 David Lague, `New Top Gun Wants to be Neighbourly', SMH, 13 July 1995. 
310 See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p.64. 
311 Felix Soh, `Joint Training "Boosts Regional Security "', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 12 
September 1995. 
312 Jenkins, `Defence Links Only so Strong: Expert', SMH, 17 July 1995. 
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PART II 
THREE THEORETICAL LITERATURES 
FOR EXPLANATION 
Chapter Four 
REA LIST AND LIBERAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY 
Structural realists are pessimists about the prospects for international cooperation; 
they believe that competition...is the normal state of affairs) 
(Charles L. Glaser, Realist Theorist.) 
The heart of liberalism is cooperation.2 
(David Long, Liberal Theorist.) 
This second part of the thesis examines the theories in the International Relations 
literature that seek to explain security. The two main traditions of international security 
studies - liberalism and realism -will be explored. The first section in the chapter will 
discuss the worldview of realists and liberals by examining their respective views about 
human nature, the state and the international system. The second will examine the 
security assumptions of realists with the help of three questions: what is the object of 
security; what is security being sought from; and by what means. The third section will 
examine the security assumptions of liberals using the same three questions. 
I argue several points. The two traditions are based on different assumptions about 
security. Despite these differences all variants of realism classical realism, neorealism/ 
structural realism and its sub -variants of offensive and defensive realism share some 
security assumptions with the variants of liberalism republican, commercial and 
institutional liberalism. But the differences between realists and liberals have significant 
implications for security policy. Moreover, any policy that incorporates both realist and 
liberal strategies could, from the perspective of either realism or liberalism on its own, 
be seen to be contradictory. 
Charles L. Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self -HeIp', International Security, Vol.19, 
No.3, 1994 -95, p.122. 
David Long, 'The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory: A Case for CIosure', 
Millennium, Vol.24, No.3, 1995, p.493. 
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REALIST AND LIBERAL WORLDVIEWS 
Two traditions of thought -realism and liberalism have dominated the literature in 
international relations since the discipline was first established in the inter -war years. 
Some scholars may want to qualify this generalisation3 but most will still agree that it is 
appropriate to talk about a liberal or realist worldview. Realists tend to have a 
pessimistic view of the world,4 the reasons for which, they claim, are readily observable 
in the empirical world. For Hans Morgenthau, the pre -eminent `classical realist', the 
reason is man, or rather human nature.5 For Kenneth Waltz, the acclaimed father of 
`structural or neorealism', it is the anarchic nature, or the lack of a centralised authority, 
in the international system of states.6 For Stephen Walt, a `defensive realist', it is the 
anarchic system and the nature of particular kinds of states (those which threaten others 
with offensive military power and demonstrable aggressive intentions) which are the 
problem.? Most realist scholars will agree that ultimately the reason for their pessimism 
is that states compete, be it for power, survival or position in the international system 
3 For example, some post - modernist scholars may claim that the dominance of the two traditions has 
been detrimental to the discipline since realism and many liberalisms have flawed epistemological 
and ontological foundations. For an evaluation of the post -positivist debate see John A. Vasquez, 
'The Post- Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations After 
Enlightenment's Fall', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory Today, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp.215 -240. See in addition, Richard K. Ashley, `The Poverty of 
Neorealism', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Craies, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1986, pp.255 -300; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security 
Studies: Concepts and Cases, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997. 
4 According to K.J. Holsti, 'many of the theoretical arguments about the fundamental contours of our 
discipline are really debates about optimism and pessimism, our very general outlooks towards the 
world in which we live'. Quoted in Robert Jervis, 'Realism in the Study of World Politics', 
International Organization, Vol.52, No.4, 1998, p.974. According to Robert Gilpin, `realism is 
founded on a pessimism regarding moral progress and human possibilities'. See Gilpin, `The 
Richness of the Condition of Political Realism', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its 
Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p.304. 
5 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, McGraw -Hill Publishing Company, New York, 6th ed. 1985. 
5 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison -Wesley, Reading Mass, 1979; Man the 
State and War, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959; 'Reflections on Theory of 
International Politics: A Response to My Critics', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics; 
'The Stability of the Bipolar World', Daedalus, Vol.93, No.3, 1964, pp.881 -909. 
See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 
1987. 
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and this can undermine their security.8 For example, Morgenthau's oft quoted dictum 
and self -acclaimed theory is that: 
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate 
aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.9 
Furthermore, this competitive behaviour is recurrent, fixed, timeless, and universal. The 
only change that is possible is a re- ordering of states in the international pecking order, 
according to who has more or less power. For the realist Robert Gilpin, `the nature of 
international relations has not changed fundamentally over the millennia'.l0 
The liberal's worldview 
Liberals are cautiously optimistic about the nature of humans, the state and the 
international system. In general liberals agree with the worldview of the liberal political 
philosopher John Locke, whose writing informs the American Declaration of 
Independence of 1776. According to Locke: 
fAllI men are created equal, in that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable rights, that among them are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.tt 
As this assumption implies, liberals are more confident than many realists that life isn't 
always brutish and short. In addition, many liberals are guardedly optimistic about 
human nature, if only because humans possess the faculty of reason. Immanuel Kant 
argues that 'the...prospects of perpetual peace' rest not so much on a continuous high 
s 
9 
l0 
u 
Most realists also agree that the state is the most important actor in international politics; that it is a 
sovereign unit and a rational actor; and that external factors are more important than domestic 
factors for explaining the security behaviour of states. For discussion about the assumptions of 
realists see Robert O. Keohane, `Theory of World Politics', pp.163 -169; and Gilpin, `The 
Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', pp.304 -305, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its 
Critics. For a useful collection of realist views see special issues of Security Studies, winter 1995 
and Spring 1996. 
Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6`s ed. p.31. 
Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1981, p.211. 
See Torbjorn L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester and New York, 1992, p.I33. 
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standard of ethical behaviour but on the human faculty of reason, or as he puts it, even 
on `devils, so long as they possess understanding'.12 
It is the human capacity to reason and recognise an inevitable trend towards positive 
social evolution which gives rise to the variants of liberalism labeled `cognitive 
liberalism' and `sociological liberalism'. i3 The first of these has spawned a large 
literature on whether reason, learning and knowledge can affect and even change the 
interests, values and policies of states.14 The second variant has fostered another modern 
literature on the impact of social interaction, international communications, 
transnational actors, cultural patterns and globalism on states» Both these variants 
suggest that states can interact positively and that other actors are important in 
international politics. 
12 
13 
14 
Quoted in Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Charles W. Kegley Jr 
(ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, St. 
Martin's Press, New York, 1995, p.97. 
Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, `Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, 
Divergent Strands', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory, p.129 -133. 
There was of course an earlier literature on this variant of liberalism. For example, see John Stuart 
Mill, On Liberty, Crofts, New York, 1947; and John Hobson, Imperialism: a Study, George Allen 
& Unwin, London, 1938. For examples of the later literature see, Peter Haas (ed.), 'Knowledge, 
Power and International Policy Coordination', special issue of International Organization, Vol.46, 
No.1, 1992, pp.1 -390; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in 
International Relations, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990; Immanuel Adler, 
`Cognitive Evolution: a Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and their 
Progress', in Adler and Beverley Crawford (eds), Progress in Postwar International Relations, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, pp.43 -88; Martha Finnemore, `International 
Organisations as Teachers of Norms; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization and Science Policy', Vol.47, No.4, 1993, pp.565 -591; Jack Levy, `Learning in 
Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, Vol.48, No.2, 
1994, pp.279 -312; Dan Reiter, Crucible of Belief : Learning, Alliances and World Views, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1996. 
The most prominent scholar in the early literature was Karl Deutsch. See Deutsch, Nationalism and 
Social Communication, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 1953; Deutsch et al, The Integration of 
Political Communities, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1964. Later examples include John Mueller, 
Retreat From Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War, Basic Books, New York, 1989; Arthur 
R. Stein, `Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation', in Philip 
Tetlock et al (eds), Behaviour, Society and International Conflict, Vol.3, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1993. On transnational actors see Joseph Nye Jr and Robert Keohane, Transnational 
Relations and World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1972; 
Matthew Evangelista, `The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic 
Structures and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union', International Organization, 
Vol.49, No.1, 1995, pp.1-38; Stanley Hoffman, `The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism', Foreign 
Policy, No.98, Spring, 1995, pp.159 -177; Jef Huysmans, `Post -Cold War Implosion and 
Globalisation: Liberalism Running Past Itself', Millennium, Vol.24, No.3, 1995, pp.471 -487. - 
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Indeed, the distinguishing feature of the liberals' worldview is their cautious optimism 
that states will cooperate. For liberals cooperation can take place across a range of issues 
and involve a variety of actors including states. Immanuel Kant, who is best known for 
another variant of liberalism called `republican liberalism', suggests that certain types of 
states are more likely to cooperate than others. Republican liberalism proposes that 
states, which adhere to certain governing principles such as democracy, are inclined to 
be peaceful towards other Iike- minded states. As Michael Doyle argues, democratic 
states will be `indeed peaceful' towards other liberal states.16 Republican liberals are 
also optimistic that these like -minded states will cooperate to form `zones of peace'» 
Scholars from another variant of liberalism, `commercial liberalism', are also optimistic 
that the prospects for peace can be improved as a consequence of trading and economic 
activities between states.18 The nineteenth- century liberal, Richard Cobden, argued that 
free trade would `promote cooperation and friendship among nations, paving the way to 
peaceful relations'.19 Another variant of liberalism, `liberal institutionalism', which has 
its roots in functional, neofunctional integration and interdependence theories, is 
particularly optimistic that states can cooperate rather than pursue competitive 
strategies.20 These liberals propose that international institutions and regimes can 
16 Michael W. Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in 
International Relations Theory, pp.83 -106. Doyle emphasises that Kant's argument rests on the 
'three "definitive articles" as each necessary conditions and only together a sufficient condition for 
establishing a pacific union' (see p.101). This issue is discussed further below. 
L7 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, pp.83 -106. 
18 F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967; 
Norman McCord (ed.), Free Trade: Theory and Practice From Adam Smith to Keynes, David & 
Charles, Newton Abbot, 1970. For more discussion and further references see below. 
19 James L. Richardson, `Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present', Working Paper No.1995/10, 
Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1995, p.13 (reprinted in the European Journal of International 
Relations, Vo1.3, No.1, 1997, pp.5 -33.) 
20 For functionalist international theory, see David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, Quadrangle 
Press, Chicago, 1943 and 1966; Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation- State: Functionalism and 
International Organization, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964. On interdependence theory 
see, Edward S. Morse, `The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernisation, Interdependence 
and Externalisation', World Politics, Vol.22, No.3, pp.371 -392, 1970; Richard N. Cooper, 
'Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policies in the 1970s', World Politics, No.24, No.2, 1972, 
pp.158 -181; John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an 
Institutional Form, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993. See below for discussion and 
more references. - 
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establish expectations of behaviour, norms, rules and procedures which can guide inter- 
state transactions in a variety of issue areas. 
Liberals' differences with realists and each other 
If the liberals have a more optimistic worldview about the nature of man, states and the 
international system than do the realists then it is also the case that what often 
distinguishes them from realists is also the cause of tensions among liberals. With 
regard to cooperation, liberals differ with realists not just about the prospects for 
cooperation among states but also about the nature of cooperation (see below). Liberals 
also disagree with each other about cooperation. For some liberals cooperation is 
concerned with common interests and for others it is concerned with collective self - 
interests. As David Long points out, `there is a tension in liberalism between individual 
interests and the common good'.21 From Long's perspective, 'without the notion of the 
common good the defence of individual or group interests is not recognisably liberal'.22 
For liberals like Long, cooperation based on an aggregation of individual interests does 
not reveal the common interest and thus does not fit his definition of liberalism. 
Another cause of disagreement among liberals but not realists concerns the actors in 
international relations. Unlike realists, liberals accept that there are other key actors in 
international politics besides the state,23 but they disagree among themselves about 
which actors - individuals, society or the state -are the most important. Those scholars 
who privilege the individual consider that those who don't, for instance those who focus 
on the state, are not fulfilling the liberal project of greater freedom for individuals in 
society. David Long argues that there is `a significant narrowing of the liberal tradition' 
by the so- called `Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory'24 and its 
neoliberal institutionalist scholars. These scholars, Long argues, have `emasculated 
liberalism'. They have, he insists: 
21 David Long, The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory: A Case for Closure', 
Millennium, Vol.24, No.3, 1995, p.497. 
22 Long, The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', p.497. 
23 The seventeenth century philosopher and laissez -faire liberal, John Locke, is hostile to the absolute 
state but regards the state as such as being necessary for protecting property and for private groups 
to operate. Zacher and Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in 
International Relations Theory, p.11 1. 
24 Long, 'The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', pp.489-505. 
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[Shorn it of] its normative concerns with the liberty and well -being of the individual 
[by] focusing on economic variables, using utilitarian discourses and theories of liberal 
economics, and making states the agents in international relations.25 
While he accepts that other early liberal theorists and practitioners, like Immanuel Kant 
and Woodrow Wilson, had a `degree of statism' in their writings, Long argues other 
liberals, like the functionalist, David Mitrany, did not take the state as the given actor. 
Mitrany, Long argues, discussed the `sort of institutionalist form that might be required, 
if individual and group interests cannot be represented by national territorial states'.26 
Many liberals appear to be sensitive in principle to Long's objections and few would 
disagree with Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew that, `all [the] strands of liberal 
international theory are ultimately about enhancing the security, prosperity, and human 
rights of individuals'. 27 There is however, a tendency among many liberals to collapse 
the interests of individuals with the state. For liberals like Long, `state -persons' misses 
the point of liberalism. 
Long also argues that liberals who focus strongly on the economic variant are dubious 
members of the liberal camp. For many liberals the commercial variant of liberal 
economic theory is the heartland of liberalism and its distinguishing feature vis a vis 
realism. Although realism does not neglect economic issues, the discussion is state - 
centric and confined to concerns about mercantilism, economic -power politics and the 
importance of economic wealth for military power.28 The scope and purpose of liberal 
economic theory are by contrast much more varied. But even so, for liberals like Long, 
the focus on commercial liberalism has resulted in excesses, such as imperialism, and 
neglect of the bigger liberal project, which is anti- privilege and emancipatory. As Long 
argues, `economic factors are only a part of liberalism, indeed arguably a subsidiary 
part, subordinate to individual liberty and well- being'.29 
25 Long, `The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', p.496. 
26 Long, `The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', p.500. 
27 Zacher and Matthew, `Liberal International Theory', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in 
International Relations Theory, p.137. 
28 For a useful overview of the realist approach see Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack (eds), Asia - 
Pacific Security: the Economics - Politics Nexus, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1997. See 
also Richard K. Betts, `Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the 
Cold War', International Security, Vol.18, No.3. 1993 -94, pp.34 -77, See below for more 
references. 
29 Long, The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', p.495. 
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Another matter which concerns liberals and not realists and which creates tensions 
among liberals is the role of `society' in international relations. The term society is used 
to refer to both material and ideational factors such as institutions, regimes, international 
Iaw, and norms which involve cooperation. Realists view liberal claims about regimes 
with deep scepticism, seeing them simply as examples of states seeking power and 
pursuing self- interests. Realists often explain the participation of hegemonic states or 
strong states in multilateral institutions and norm -creation in these terms.30 Liberals by 
contrast tend to support institutions, regimes and norms as means for facilitating 
security, preventing market failure, preserving the rule of law, and expanding welfare 
internationalism, for example. But Long argues that liberals should only defend those 
institutions, both domestic and international, which `improve the conditions for the 
individual or social group'.31 He sees neoliberal institutionalists, a la the Harvard 
School, as defenders of institutions not because they improve the conditions of people 
but because they `address the situations of the agents [i.e., states] in the international 
system'.32 
A final difference between liberals and realists, although not a cause of great tension 
among liberals, is the role of power. Most realists, as we have seen, make power the 
central focus of their inquiry. Liberals generally eschew power politics, but power is 
also central to their investigation. Laissez -faire liberals worried about the power of the 
state upon individuals. Conservative liberals in eighteenth -century Europe worried about 
the power of the masses vis a vis the state. Rarely though do liberals consider the 
conditions when the use of power may be required. As we will see below, republican 
liberals are some of the few liberals who explicitly consider the use of military power, 
not just to protect their democratic values and interests but also to advance them 
abroad.33 Other variants of liberalism, however, do not directly address situations when 
the use of power may be required even as a measure of last resort. This difference 
30 For discussion relating hegemonic stability theory to security issues see Gilpin, War and Change in 
World Politics. 
31 Long, `The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', p.495. 
32 Long, `The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', p.495. 
33 See Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in 
International Relations Theory, pp.83 -106. 
169 
Realist and Liberal Assumptions About Security 
between liberals and realists has implications for how each tradition approaches security 
and the following questions: security of what, from what and particularly, how. 
REALISTS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY 
It is clear from the worldview of realists that the state is the referent object of security: 
in other words the answer to the question `security of what' is `the nation state' .34 And, 
if Morgenthau claims that `international politics...is a struggle for power'35 and that 
`armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making 
for the political power of a nation',36 then logically this suggests that the main threat to 
the power of the state is another state's military might. How and by what means states 
address the struggle for power is, from Morgenthau's perspective, quite complex and it 
is possible to find at least two answers in his writing. 
Two readings of Morgenthau's means to achieving security 
One reading of Morgenthau is his argument that the state's security is best achieved 
within a balance of power in the international arena: 
[Iinternational peace and order are a function of the balance of power-that is, of an 
approximately equal distribution of power among several nations or combinations of 
nations, preventing any one of them from gaining the upper hand over the others.37 
Morgenthau's assumption that `an approximately equal distribution of power among 
several nations' is the most satisfactory way to balance power is an important classical 
realist position. So too is his assumption that `[ a]lliances are a necessary function of the 
balance of power operating within a multiple -state system'.38 However, given the ever 
present struggle for power among states, alliances are not permanent arrangements for 
3a Realists usually assume that the nation state is a unified nation, at least with respect to secur 
35 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., p.31. 
36 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., p.33. 
37 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., pp.388 -389. 
38 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., p.201. Morgenthau argues that 
`Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve 
their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power 
the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. 
When they make the first choice, they embark upon an armament race. When they choose the 
second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances' (see p.201). 
ry 
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enhancing security. According to Morgenthau, `alliances are typically of temporary 
duration and most prevalent in wartime'.39 
Morgenthau is adamant that security is not achieved through cooperation between states. 
International institutions and even international law are, he thinks, weak means to 
achieving security, for at least two reasons. The existence of the state depends on the 
principle of sovereignty (by which he means the accepted political fact that the nation is 
the supreme law maker and giver and that this provides it with an `impenetrability', vis 
a vis any other law maker, which it will not compromise).40 The second reason is that as 
a consequence of sovereignty there is a decentralised international environment. For 
these reasons `collective security', the institutional means to achieving security provided 
originally by the League of Nations and later the United Nations, is a weak means of 
achieving security. This reading of Morgenthau, which stresses the competitive nature 
of states and their `desire to maximise power',41 provides a common understanding of 
the security assumptions underpinning classical realism. 
But while common, this view misses some of the finer points about Morgenthau's 
position. Morgenthau's argument is in fact more nuanced and qualified than is often 
recognised. Morgenthau's conception of power is complex. Power is derived from 
`elements of national power', that is, it is nationally based, and multidimensional 
(political, economic and military). Importantly, as Mastanduno et al argue, `the state's 
external power position cannot be divorced from its internal situation and capabilities'. 42 
Furthermore, a state's power is never static and is always relative, especially to another 
nation's national power. Morgenthau explicitly warns against errors when evaluating 
national power and lists three common mistakes: `not correlating the power of one 
nation against another...not correlating actual power at one time to possible power at 
some future time...and not correlating one power factor to others of the same nation'.43 
When discussing this final error he warns against `militarism', or `the conception that 
39 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, fifth edition, 
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1973, p.185. 
40 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., pp.328 -346. 
41 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., p.228. 
42 Michael Mastanduno, David Lake and G. John Ikenberry, `Toward a Realist Theory of the State', 
International Studies Quarterly, No.33, 1989, p.460. 
43 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., p.174. 
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the power of a nation consists primarily, if not exclusively, of its military strength, 
conceived especially in quantitative terms'.44 Morgenthau also distinguishes between 
types of power -between for example, legitimate and illegitimate power. 
Morgenthau's underlying acknowledgment of the destructiveness of unrestrained 
illegitimate power leads him to establish conditions for the proper workings of the 
balance of power. For Morgenthau: 
[T]he equilibrium...the dynamics of the arrangement are embedded in a moral 
framework without which, in the long run, it cannot operate.45 [Emphasis added.] 
This is an important argument in Morgenthau's work because it indicates that, despite 
his claim that nations' `desire to maximise power is universal',46 he explicitly acknow- 
ledges that his main arrangement for achieving security requires a moral undertaking for 
it to operate. From that it can be argued that the moral framework which Morgenthau 
invokes to ensure an equilibrium also indicates that he implicitly assumes that states will 
engage in passive cooperation out of self- interest. This second reading of the security 
assumptions of classical realism has both similarities and differences with neorealism. 
Assumptions about security in neorealism or structural realism 
Much of the `new' realist, or neorealist, literature written over the last two decades 
endorses the classical realist view that the state is the object of security and that military 
threats are the main source of insecurity. Neorealism also adopts Morgenthau's extreme 
pessimism about inter -state relations, though the reasons for this are different. As 
discussed earlier, neorealists or structural realists understand international relations from 
a structural perspective. This structure, or system, is amoral, ahistoric and apolitical and 
most importantly it is anarchic or without government. Indeed, for structural theorists or 
neorealists, 'anarchy is...the single most important character underlying international 
44 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., p.174. 
45 Morgenthau and Thompson. Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., pp.388 -389. 
46 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., p.228. 
172 
Realist and Liberal Assumptions About Security 
relations' .47 This external condition or structure of anarchy determines state behaviour 
with dire consequences for all. 
The original and best known structural realist is Kenneth Waltz.48 Another con- 
temporary neorealist scholar is John Mearsheimer.49 Excerpts from a number of their 
works will illustrate neorealist beliefs about the most effective means of achieving 
security. The most important neorealist assumption is that the condition of anarchy 
encourages competition and discourages cooperation. Mearsheimer claims that 
`international relations is...a state of relentless security competition'. 50 According to 
Waltz, in such an anarchic system 'states...must rely on the means they can generate and 
the arrangements they can make for themselves'.51 Waltz calls this self -help and claims 
that `self -help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order'.52 'In any self - 
help system', he says, `units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their 
behaviour'.53 As a result `threats or seeming threats to...security abound...[r]elations 
remain tense: the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile'.54 Mearsheimer shares 
Waltz' view that anarchy requires states to seek self -help for security. For Mearsheimer 
each state living under anarchy faces the ever- present possibility that another state will 
use force to harm or conquer ít'.55 Hence: 
47 Helen Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique', in 
David A Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1993, p.140. 
48 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison -Wesley, Reading Mass, 1979; Man the State and 
War; `Reflections on Theory of International Politics', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its 
Critics; 'The Stability of the Bipolar World', pp.881 -909. 
49 John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International 
Security, Vol.15, No.1, 1990, pp.5 -56; `The False Promise of International Institutions', 
International Security, Vol.19, No.3, 1994 -95, pp.5 -49. 
50 Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', p.10. 
51 Kenneth Waltz, `Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its 
Critics, p.108. 
52 Waltz, 'Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power', in. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, 
p.108. 
53 Waltz, `Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power', in. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, 
p.102. 
54 Kenneth Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb 
(eds), The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, 
p.43. 
55 Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future', p.12. 
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[E]ach state must guarantee its own survival since no other actor will provide its 
security. All other states are potential threats, and no international institution is capable 
of enforcing order or punishing powerful aggressors.56 
Given this assumption and Mearsheimer's view that `[o]ffensive military action is 
always a threat to all states in the system'57 the most important dimension of self -help is 
the military aspect. And given the competitive nature of the international context and the 
dynamic of relative gains, states will, if they can, seek to be stronger in military means 
than their competitors. 
The structure of anarchy also conditions states to balance power as a means to achieving 
security. Waltz and Mearsheimer both argue that of the two principal arrangements of 
power, multipolarity and bipolarity, the latter is `more peaceful'.58 Mearsheimer 
considers hegemony as `a third possible distribution' of power but argues that it is rarely 
achieved because `threatened states have strong incentives to band together to thwart an 
aspiring hegemon'.59 
Alliance formation, a key means for obtaining security in neorealism, is considered to be 
a dimension of power balancing in the international system. As Charles Glaser argues, 
alliances are a form of competition, and balancing in the form of an alliance `is probably 
the most prominent and widely accepted prediction of structural realism'.60 Since 
Mearsheimer assumes that `anarchy guarantees that security will often be scarce'61 the 
prospects of alliances continuing when security is plentiful is of course not addressed. 
Hence, the conditions under which alliances operate are confined just to balancing and 
56 Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future', p.12. 
57 Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future', p.12. 
58 Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future', p.13. Mearsheimer argues there are three main reasons why a 
bipolar system is more peaceful: `the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities 
for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily 
averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculation of relative power 
and of opponents' resolve are fewer and less likely' (see p.14). See also Waltz, `The Stability of 
the Bipolar World', pp.881 -909; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 8. For other 
works on bipolarity and multipolaríty see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, `Chain Gangs 
and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization, 
Vol.44, No.2, 1990, pp.137 -168; Richard N. Rosecrance, `Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the 
Future', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.10, No.3, September 1,966, pp.314 -327. 
59 Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future', fn 15, p.13. 
60 Glaser, Realists as Optimists', fn 4, p.124. 
61 Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future' , p.45. 
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therefore both the classical and neorealist explanations of alliance formation are narrow 
and undeveloped. 
The neorealist assumption that competition is the normal state of affairs62 implies that 
states will not, or are most unlikely to, cooperate to enhance security. Waltz argues that 
`the condition of insecurity-at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other's future 
intentions and actions -works against their cooperation'. 63 The self -help systems, he 
says, `make the cooperation of parties difficult...Rules, institutions, and patterns of 
cooperation...are all limited in extent and modified from what they might otherwise 
be'.64 A useful summary of the standard neorealist view about cooperation is given by 
Charles Glaser: 
[C]ooperation is difficult because states are sensitive to how it affects their current and 
future relative capabilities; moreover, cooperation is often impossible because states 
Lind military advantages to be especially valuable and thus compete to acquire them. 
Making matters still worse, falling behind in this competition can carry extremely high 
costs: it invites war and, in the worst case, a major power can lose its sovereignty.65 
The assumption about the dire effects of anarchy upon cooperation between states has 
become the hallmark of neorealism and is the standard structural realist argument. There 
is a vast North American literature focused on the concepts of `relative and absolute 
gains' which neorealists claim underpin their argument about cooperation.66 The 
impetus for much of this literature is the neorealists' debate with their critics the 
neoliberal institutionalists. 
62 See Glaser, `Realists as Optimists', pp.50 -90. 
63 Waltz, `Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, 
pp.101 -102. 
64 Waltz, `Reflections of Theory of International Politics', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its 
Critics, p.336. 
65 Glaser, `Realists as Optimists', p.129. 
66 The crux of the argument about relative gains is explained by Joseph Grieco: `[Sltates seek to 
prevent increases in others' relative capabilities...states always assess their performances in any 
relationship in terms of the performance of others...[that is] states are positional not atomistic...state 
positionality may constrain the willingness of states to cooperate. See Joseph M. Grieco, `Anarchy 
and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', in Kegley 
(ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theories, p.161. For additional works on the 
relative and absolute gains see: Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984; Robert Axelrod, The 
Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, 1984; Robert Powell, `Anarchy in 
International Relations Theory: the Neorealist Neoliberal Debate', International Organization, 
Vol.48, No.2, 1994, pp.313 -344; Kenneth A. Oye (ed.) Cooperation Under Anarchy, Princeton 
University Press, 1986; Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism. 
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The neorealists' debate with neoliberal institutionalists about cooperation 
and competition 
At the centre of this debate is the disagreement between neorealists and neoliberal 
institutionalists about the meaning of anarchy and its consequences for cooperation 
between states. This issue of course has implications for the means to achieving 
security. Neoliberal institutionalists, like Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod,67 
probably have fewer differences with neorealists than many other liberals (see 
discussion above for the liberal David Long's criticism of the neoliberal 
institutionalists). Keohane and Axelrod agree with the neorealists that the state is the 
object of security, that anarchy characterises the international system and determines 
state behaviour and that states are unitary -rational actors. Nonetheless, they disagree 
with the neorealists' argument that the logic of anarchy is that states seek relative gains. 
Grieco argues that neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists have different meanings for 
anarchy.68 For both the neoliberals, and the neorealists, anarchy means `the lack of a 
common government in world politics' .69 But for the neoliberals, the major effect of 
anarchy is that individuals or states believe there is no agency that can enforce rules. 
Anarchy therefore `means that states may wish to cooperate, but aware that cheating is 
both possible and profitable, lack a central agency to enforce promises'.75 The neoliberal 
institutionalists' response is that the problem of cheating can be largely overcome by 
regimes and institutions which can establish rules, norms, principles and procedures.7i 
As has already been discussed, for neorealists, anarchy means more than the absence of 
central agency to enforce promises. It means that `states recognise that...there is no 
overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to 
destroy or enslave them' ?2 According to Kenneth Waltz, under anarchy, wars can occur 
67 Keohane, After Hegemony; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New 
York, 1984. 
68 Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation', p.160. 
69 Grieco, `Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation', p.161. 
7u Grieco, `Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation', p.160. 
71 According to Stephen Krasner, `international regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and 
decision -making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue -area'. See 
Krasner, `Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in 
Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Organization, special edition on `International Regimes', 
Vol.36, No.2, 1982, p.185. 
72 Grieco, `Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation', p.160. 
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`because there is nothing to prevent them' and therefore `in international politics force 
serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one'.73 
The debate now seems to have reached a stalemate over the meaning and implications of 
anarchy and relative and absolute gains for states' security.74 As Robert Powell points 
out the debate is narrow and `suffer[s] from internal weaknesses and limitations',75 
Powell concludes that where the debate does contribute is to highlight the importance 
of: 
[T]he absence of central authority, the potential for joint or cooperative gains, the 
distributional conflict these potential gains engender and the roles of coercion and 
institutions in realizing and allocating these joint gains.76 
These and other points raised by Powell suggest some directions for research on 
cooperation, which is a crucial concept in the literature, but one needing much more 
elaboration.77 
Realists' `passive' cooperation 
The debate between the neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists about cooperation 
implies that realists assume that virtually no form of cooperation is possible or 
meaningful for security. Yet, clearly realists assume that there is active cooperation 
between states in an alliance, albeit against other states and temporarily. It is not clear 
why, if cooperation is possible in an alliance, it should not be possible outside an 
alliance framework. Moreover, as noted above, classical realists implicitly introduce 
73 Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p.232. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.113. 
74 See for example, Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics', International Organization, VoI.46, No.2, 1992, pp.391 -425. 
75 Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory: the Neorealist -Neoliberal Debate', 
International Organization, Vol.48, No.2, 1994, pp.313 -344. 
76 Powell, `Anarchy in International Relations Theory', p.344. 
77 That agenda might also include the fundamental question about why cooperation in security 
matters actually enhances security. As Robert Jervis points out, `nonrealists have been slow to 
develop and test arguments about the conditions they consider conducive to peace'. Another 
important issue which Jervis raises is that we know very little about `the psychological processes of 
attitude change' which, for example, explain the transition from antagonist relations to security 
communities where war is rejected, as it is currently between the major developed states. See 
Jervis, `Realism in the Study of World Politics', pp.985 -987. Also See James Macintosh, 
`Confidence- and Security- Building Measures: A Skeptical Look', Working Paper, No.85, Peace 
Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990, pp.1 -32; Desmond Ball and 
Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia -Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s, 
Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1996, pp.91 -92. 
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'passive' cooperation into their arguments. The way Morgenthau addresses the puzzle of 
stability and peace in a world where states eternally and universally seek to maximise 
power is to argue that the equilibrium arises because balancing behaviour takes place 'in 
a moral framework'. It would appear that Morgenthau accepts that without this passive 
form of cooperation, power balancing `cannot operate' .78 
A similar argument can be made about neorealists who 'smuggle in' the logic of 
cooperation as a 'circuit breaker' to counter the potentially destructive logic of relative 
gains. Grieco argues that, 'survival is [the] core interest' of states'.79 Seeking survival 
has a different security logic to that of pursuing relative gains. In this era of weapons of 
mass destruction the logic of survival directs states away from constantly and 
universally seeking relative gains. The curious point is that in this context both logics, 
relative gains and survival, come from the same structure, that is anarchy. So that even 
within the terms of neorealism, anarchy has two logics and the latter, survival, supports 
a form of passive cooperation -for example, not to undertake certain activities, such as 
pursuing relative gains in destablising weapons. 
Thus, both classical realism and structural realism introduce additional explanations to 
account for the fact that the pursuit of military gains in an anarchic world does not lead 
to perpetual conflict. Acceptance that cooperation of one type or another exists in the 
international system is actually essential if realist theory is to explain why the majority 
of states, which the theory says are locked in permanent military competition, have 
peaceful relations with each other most of the time.80 Nonetheless, both main variants of 
realism continue to evince profound scepticism about inter -state cooperation. 
Developments in realism 
Over the last decade, however, realist thinking has undergone several developments, 
which have major implications for security theory and policy. According to Stephen 
Walt, '[t]he most interesting conceptual development within the realist paradigm has 
78 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., pp.388 -389. 
79 Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation', p.161. 
80 Some periods of history which are generally well explained by realism have involved passive 
cooperation. For example, during the cold war the US and Soviet agreed to a range of measures, 
such as the ABM Treaty, which supported the current military balance of power. 
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been the emerging split between the "defensive" and "offensive" realist strands of 
thought'.S1 The worldview of offensive realism is based on several assumptions, some 
of which were discussed above. Offensive realism assumes that international anarchy is 
generally Hobbesian and security is scarce. Offensive realists, like Mearsheimer,82 argue 
that anarchy forces great powers to compete and he predicts that in the future Europe 
will once again be the site of intense competition.83 Offensive realists assume that `to 
understand why a state is behaving in a particular way...one should examine its relative 
capabilities and its external environment'.84 
Defensive realism retains many of the standard structural realist assumptions above but 
claims that different implications can be drawn from them.85 Defensive realists assume 
that anarchy is the condition of the international system but that, in contrast to offensive 
realism `that security is often plentiful rather than scare'.86 Defensive realists, like 
Stephen Van Evera,87 George Quester88 and Jack Synder89, for example, assume that 
states have `little intrinsic interest in military conquest and...that the costs of expansion 
generally outweigh the benefits'.49 The view that international anarchy can also mean 
that `security is often plentiful rather than scarce' is partly derived from defensive 
realists' concept of the `security dilemma' .91 
81 Stephen M. Walt, `International Relations: One World, Many Theories', Foreign Policy, Spring 
1998, p.37. 
82 Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future', pp.5 -56. 
S3 See also Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise Again', 
International Security, Vol.17, No.4, 1993, pp.5 -51. 
64 Gideon Rose, 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', review article, World 
Politics, Vol.51, No.1, 1998, pp.144 -172. 
85 For a constructivist critique of structural realism which makes a similar point see also Wendt, 
'Anarchy is What States Make of It', pp.391 -425. 
86 Rose, 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', pp.144 -172. 
Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War', 
International Security, Vol.9, No.1, 1984, pp.58 -107. Also see Van Evera, Causes of War, Vol.1, 
The Structure of Power and the Roots of War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca New York, 
forthcoming 1999 (see Sean M. Lynn- Jones, `Realism and America's Rise', review essay, 
International Security, Vol.23, No.2, 1998, In 3, p.157). 
88 George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, Wiley, New York, 1977, 
89 Jack Synder, The Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Cornell 
University Press, 1991. 
vo Walt, 'International Relations', p.37. 
91 Charles L. Glaser, 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', World Politics, Vol.50, No.1, October 1997, 
pp.171 -201. According to Glaser, the offense -defence distinction and the associated concept of 
87 
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The concept of the security dilemma was formulated succinctly by Robert Jervis back in 
the mid-1970s.92 Jervis describes the security dilemma as a situation in which `the 
means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others'.93 
Other defensive realists make the same argument, saying that states are purely `security 
seekers' who try only to be secure but their actions fuel competition which can decrease 
security.94 Jervis has also claimed that the magnitude and nature of the security dilemma 
depended on two variables: the offense -defense balance and the offensive -defense 
differentiation.95 As Charles GIaser points out: 
As a result, the security dilemma can vary over space and time...there can be significant 
variation in the attractiveness of cooperative and competitive means, the prospects for 
achieving a high level of security, and the probability of war 96 
This argument, stressing `significant variation' in the security dilemma, helps to explain 
why defensive realists have a more benign view of international anarchy than do 
offensive realists who, as Glaser points out, do not focus on the security dilemma and 
anticipate `a consistently more competitive and dangerous world'.92 
Glaser, whose work builds on the original article by Jervis,98 concludes that many of the 
issues which Jervis raised back in late 1970s remain unresolved and are the basis of the 
current debate among offensive and defensive realists. For example, following along the 
the `security dilemma' have had a significant impact on international relations theory and security 
policy. See pp.172 -73 for a list of the literature which, Glaser claims, draws on this thinking. 
92 Robert Jervis, `Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, Vol.30, No.2, January 
1976, pp.167 -214. Glaser suggests that lilt is surprising that Jervis's analysis is often not 
considered part of the structural- realist family, since his discussion of the security dilemma rests 
on the same fundamental assumptions as does structural realism -that states seek security and live 
under the condition of international anarchy'. See Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited', 
p.188. An important earlier discussion of the security dilemma is found in John H. Hertz, `Idealist 
Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', World Politics, Vol.2, No.2, January 1950, pp.157- 
180. 
93 Jervis, `Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', p.169. 
94 Glaser, `The Security Dilemma Revisited', p.172. 
95 Glaser, `The Security Dilemma Revisited', p.171. 
96 Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited', p.171. 
97 Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited', p.172. 
98 Glaser argues that in addition to the two variables which Jervis emphasises, there are two others 
which influence the magnitude of the security dilemma: namely, `the extent of the adversary's 
greed (that is, motives beyond security) and of the adversary's unit -level knowledge of the state's 
motives'. See Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited', p.174. 
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lines of John Mearsheimer's arguments,99 the most recent work by offensive realists, 
such as Randell Schweller,100 Eric Labs,101 and Fareed Zakaria,l02 argues that because of 
anarchy `no state can ever be sure when a truly revisionist power might emerge'.103 This 
is a critical issue for defensive realists since, as Glaser states, `whether a theory posits 
only security seekers or instead posits some greedy states is a pivotal choice'.104 The 
choice is difficult because there can be great uncertainty about the goals of states. 
Hence a number of scholars belonging to a strand of neorealism labelled `motivational 
realism', have examined the role of uncertainty in the offense -defense distinction. 
Andrew Kydd argues that `[u]ncertainty over state motivation is an essential element of 
any structural realist explanation of conflict' .305 He suggests that a security- seeking state 
may experience two types of uncertainty: uncertainty about current motivation of other 
states and uncertainty about the future motivation of other states.106 Offensive realists, 
like Mearsheimer, of course argue that states can never be certain either now or in the 
future that other states will not attack them. From this perspective, states' motivations 
are unknowable. Even some defensive realists argue that states that are security seekers 
now could possibly become greedy revisionist states in the future. As Jervis puts it: 
No matter how much decisionmakers are committed to the status quo, they cannot bind 
themselves and their successors to the same path. Minds can he changed, new leaders 
can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise. 107 
In response to these kinds of arguments Schweller has claimed that status quo states will 
always be able to signal their motivations.108 Glaser is more cautious and argues that the 
99 Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future', pp.5 -56; `The False Promise of International Institutions', 
pp.5 -49. 
too Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealim's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma ?', Security Studies, 
Vo1.5, No.3, 1996, pp.90 -121. 
tot Eric J. Labs, `Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims', Security 
Studies, Vol.6, No.2, 1998, pp.I57 -182. 
102 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton N.J., 1998. 
103 Walt, `International Relations', p.37. 
104 Glaser, 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', p.174. 
105 Andrew Kydd, 'Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other', 
Security Studies, Vol.7, No.1, 1997, pp.114 -155. 
06 Kydd, 'Sheep in Sheep's Clothing',pp.I16 -117. 
107 Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', p.168. 
108 Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias', pp.90 -121; Kydd, 'Sheep in Sheep's Clothing', p.116. 
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offense -defense distinction sometimes provides opportunities for states to send 
reassuring signals to each other, but that they do not always do so.109 Kydd, like 
Schweller, argues that uncertainty about motivations can `usually be overcome', not just 
because of the offense -defense distinction as Schweller suggests, but also because there 
are other avenues that states can convey their motivations.110 In particular Kydd argues 
that `the transparency of the democratic process facilitates cooperation' in this way.111 
The real problem, Kydd suggests, is not the difficulties that security -seeking states may 
have with signalling their status quo intent, but rather aggressive, expansionist or greedy 
states. These kinds of arguments add important qualifications to realist thinking and 
could have implications for defence planners. 
Stephen Brook's work re- examining realist views of state behaviour112 claims that 
`realism does not have a unified set of assumptions about state behaviour'.113 
Neorealists, he claims, 'view...the international system as a relentless competition for 
security'. In contrast, `postclassical realists', like himself, are `agnostic regarding 
security competition in the international system'. Like other defensive realists, Brooks 
assumes that there is considerable variation in the nature of security and competition 
under anarchy. This is because postclassical realists include factors other than 
capabilities. As Brooks argues: 
[T]he strength of security pressures fluctuates according to a variety of material factors 
besides the distribution of capabilities, namely technology, geography, and inter- 
national economic pressures. 114 
In other words, Brooks acknowledges that security conditions vacillate and depend on 
other material factors than system -level capabilities. As a result he can avoid the 
neorealist assumption, which Mearsheimer makes, that the pursuit of security involves a 
relentless competition and requires worst -case forecasts about state behaviour.115 
109 Glaser, `Realists as Optimists', pp.50 -90. 
11° Kydd, `Sheep in Sheep's Clothing', p.117. 
1 t 1 Kydd, `Sheep in Sheep's Clothing', p.153. 
112 Stephen M. Brooks, `Dueling Realisms', International Organization, Vol.51, No.3, Summer, 1997, 
pp.445 -477. 
113 Brooks, `Dueling Realisms', p.473. 
114 Brooks, `Dueling Realisms', p.472. 
115 See Rose, `Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', pp.144 -172. 
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Brooks argues that there is an important intellectual distinction between neorealism and 
his notion of postclassical realism. Neorealists assume that `the mere possibility of 
conflict' conditions decision making whereas postclassical realists assume it is the 
probability of conflict' that does [emphasis added].116 These different assumptions have 
both theoretical and practical implications for security, among other issues. At the 
theoretical level, Brooks argues that the `worst- case /possibilistic assumptions and not 
the condition of anarchy performs the bulk of the explanatory work in the Waltzian 
neorealist framework'.117 This suggests that realists may be pessimistic regardless of the 
context. At the practical level, the `worst- case /possibilistic assumptions' leads decision 
makers towards worst -case planning. The less dire `probability of conflict' assumption 
suggests that security is more plentiful and it provides a broader range of options for 
defence planners to choose from.118 
Defensive realists also canvass more varied approaches to military action. Offensive 
realists `believe offensive military action often contributes to security'.119 Defensive 
realists by contrast consider that acting, and being prepared to act, pre -emptively is 
provocatively risky and only justifiable under certain conditions: that is, when there is a 
rising power which is thought likely to become aggressive in the future and when the 
`prevailing modes of warfare favour the offensive'.120 As Brooks argues, `defensive 
realists have a much more conditional view than aggressive realists as to whether 
offensive action enhances security'.121 Offensive realists are also inclined towards the 
view that expansionism is a major aspect of the security behaviour of states and even 
that security requires expansionism.122 Defensive realists by contrast emphasise that 
security relations are part of a more complex security dilemma. As Jervis points out, 
116 Brooks, `Dueling Realisms', p.472. 
117 Brooks, Dueling Realisms', p.449. 
118 For example, postclassical realists might suggest that defence planners should plan force structures 
and strategies that deal with the most likely security situations (e.g., ranging from no threats, to low 
threats to intense threats) and should focus on surveillance and intelligence to provide warning - 
time for preparation, rather than have large standing military forces. 
119 Brooks, `Dueling Realisms', p.457. 
120 Rose, `Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', p.50. 
121 Brooks, `Dueling Realisms', p.458. 
122 Jervis, `Realism in the Study of World PoIitics', p.986. 
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`disagreement over the prevalence of expansionism' is one of the major issues between 
`offensive' and `defensive' realism.123 
The realist notions of the balance of power and alliances have also been examined from 
a defensive realist perspective.'24 Stephen Walt re- examines and modifies the common 
realist argument that power and capabilities explain why states balance and bandwagon 
and argues that: 
Although power is an important part of the equation, it is not the only one. It is more 
accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the 
greatestthreat.125 
States are motivated to balance in response to a perceived threat126 or, as Walt says, 
`states which are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against 
them'.127 His argument suggests that the `balance of power' argument is an insufficient 
explanation for state behaviour and should be supplemented with calculations about the 
`balance of threat'. These calculations are based on such factors as a state's `aggregate 
power' but also `geographic proximity, offensive power and aggression intentions' .128 
Walt's analysis has important policy implications. As Michael Mastanduno points out: 
In a world in which balancing behaviour is the norm and balancing is a response to 
threat, it is often rational for states to pursue policies that signal restraint and 
reassurance.129 
As Walt recommends, `foreign and defence policies that minimise the threat one poses 
to others make the most sense in such a world'.130 He also argues that `the precise level 
of US power is probably less important than the way in which it is used; and the 
domestic situation of the United States may he more important than anything else',131 
Although Walt's work adds to realist thinking, his argument about alliances, like that of 
123 Jervis, `Realism in the Study of World Politics', fn 34, p.982. 
124 Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 
125 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p.21. 
126 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p.21. 
127 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p.25. 
128 Walt, in particular pp.21 -49 and the Conclusion. 
129 Michael Mastanduno, `Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist theories and US Grand Strategy 
after the Cold War', International Security, Vol.21, No.4, 1997, p.59. 
130 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p.27. 
131 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.282 -284. 
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other realists, implies that alliances will disintegrate in a non -threatening strategic 
environment. Yet alliances have flourished in the post -Cold War period in Asia Pacific 
and Western Europe where threats are generally low or negligible and despite the fact 
that their original rationale has disappeared. 
To sum up, the developments in realism have important theoretical and policy 
implications. In the first place, the worldview of defensive realism continues to assume 
international anarchy, but also assumes that the nature and extent of competition is not 
as dire as offensive realists say it is. Importantly, defensive realists explicitly assume 
that under certain conditions cooperation between states enhances security. This is 
different from the implicit assumption about cooperation made by early neorealists like 
Waltz (see above). In the second place, although defensive realists continue to assume 
that the object of security is the nation state and security is sought from military threats, 
the means they prescribe to enhance security are more varied than those envisaged by 
either classical or standard structural realists. In particular, the means involve 
cooperative measures to stabilise the offense defense balance through arms control 
measures. As Kydd argues, arms control should `play an important role in establishing 
cooperation by reducing the severity of the security dilemma and shifting the world 
towards to a defense -dominated status'.132 The military means to achieving security, 
from a defensive realist's perspective, are also more varied. As discussed above, defence 
planners have other options other than preparations for worst -cases. Defensive realism 
can also mean that defence planning is more complex. Finally, defensive realists 
consider domestic factors as an important part of explaining state behaviour. 
However, some of the modifications to realism made by defensive realism need further 
clarification. Several examples illustrate the point. The nature and extent of cooperation 
is unclear. Glaser defines cooperation as `coordinated policies designed to avoid arms 
races' 133 but he does not envisage institutional cooperation and in fact considers his 
notion of `contingent realism' as a challenge to neoinstitutionalists.134 Kydd endorses 
arms control measures but he is vague about implementation -only suggesting that 
132 Kydd, `Sheep in Sheep's Clothing', p.I20. 
133 Glaser, `Realists as Optimists', p.123. 
134 Glaser, `Realists as Optimists', p.125. 
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multilateral treaties could be usefu1.135 These defensive realists discuss cooperation in 
functional terms, not as a norm. There is no evidence that ideational factors, as opposed 
to material factors such a offensive /defensive capabilities, are considered as means to 
enhancing security. As Robert Jervis argues, `realism cannot explain deeper forms of 
cooperation'.136 Furthermore, in defensive realism there is no discussion about the 
balance between cooperative measures and self -help. And, with respect to the latter, 
there is little indication of how different assumptions underpinning self -help (e.g., 
Brook's possibility /worse -case versus the probability assumptions) can be translated 
into doctrine, strategy, force structure and defence planning concepts. Finally, with 
regard to alliances, there is little discussion about the continuation of alliances under any 
other conditions than the very few which realists stipulate i.e., as responses to power or 
threat balancing. Defensive realism has added refinements to realist thinking but it needs 
to go further, and, for example, explore the nature of cooperation which underpins it. 
Summary 
In sum, this examination of the realist literature suggests that several points can be made 
about its underlying security assumptions. The two main variants of realism classical 
and neorealism- assume that states compete to be secure and that cooperation is either 
too difficult or dangerous. Both variants hold pessimistic worldviews and dispositions. 
The state is the referent object of security and self -help, alliances and balance of power 
arrangements are the prescribed means for achieving security. In both cases the latter 
may involve a degree of passive cooperation despite realists' arguments to the contrary. 
Recent realist writings, especially those stressing the offensive defensive division, have 
refined realist thinking about competition and cooperation, the reasons for alliances, the 
underlying assumptions for self -help and the relevance of domestic factors for 
understanding security. But clarification is still needed in a number of areas, particularly 
the nature, extent and purpose of cooperation. 
In conclusion, realism remains the major tradition in international relations for 
explaining both the continuing focus on state competition and the pessimistic view that 
135 Kydd, `Sheep in Sheep's Clothing', p.120. 
136 Jervis, `Realism in the Study of World Politics', p.985. 
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security relationships between states is often one of 'tragedy' .137 The liberal tradition is 
by contrast based on a more positive set of assumptions about relations between states. 
LIBERALS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY 
As discussed earlier, the woridview that underpins the liberal tradition is more 
optimistic than that of the realist tradition. All liberals assume that cooperation between 
states is possible and beneficial for security. Liberals also differ among themselves on a 
range of issues. Their differences have some interesting implications for the answers 
that they give to the questions `security of what, from what and by what means'? 
Republican liberalism 
Republican liberals, such as Immanuel Kant and his modern successor Michael Doyle, 
are interested in the connection between particular types of states and security. Michael 
Doyle's thesis that democratic states tend not to go to war with each other bolsters long - 
held liberal arguments about the positive relationship between peace and democracy. 
Doyle's research is more rigorous and better empirically based than earlier work on the 
subject and is distinct from the more philosophical lines of reasoning, such as Kant's.138 
Indeed, Doyle's finding and other work claiming the practical absence of war among 
democracies is, according to Jack Levy, `as close as anything we have to an empirical 
law in international relations'.139 The revival of the general argument about peace, 
democracy and capitalism has certainly been the cause of much excitement in the liberal 
camp and, according to Zacher and Matthews, the relevant studies since the early 1980s 
`have breathed more life into liberal international theory than any body of scholarly 
137 James Kurth, `Inside the Cave: the Banality of I.R. Studies', The National Interest, No.53, Fall 
1998, pp.29 -40. 
138 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, pp.83 -106. Doyle refers to some earlier scholars who addressed empirically the 
tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, see note 3 on p.88. 
139 Jack S. Levy, `The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence', in Philip Tetlock et al 
(eds), Behaviour, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol.1, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.270. Bruce 
Russett also claims that the democratic peace proposition is `one of the strongest nontrivial or 
nontautological generalisations that can be made about international relations'. See Russett, 
Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA, 1990, p.123. Also see Bruce Russett (ed.), Grasping the Democratic 
Peace: Principles for a Post -Cold War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993. 
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writings'.140 Although many scholars support the correlation between democracies and 
peace (despite some contention over the meaning of democracy and peace) there is less 
agreement about the causal explanations.141 
The democratic peace argument raises questions about the meaning of state -to -state 
security: between Iiberal states within the zone of peace; between liberal and nonliberal 
states (the latter being outside of the zone of peace); between nonliberal states; and the 
transition of nonliberal states to liberal status.142 The different security situations that the 
democratic peace argument encompasses may suggest that there are several answers to 
the questions `security from what and how'? 
According to Doyle, Kant's theory of perpetual peace depends upon the combination of 
three `definitive articles': namely, a domestic republican constitution, which guarantees 
restraint; international law, which garners respect; and cosmopolitan law, which 
signifies the spirit of commercialism and adds material incentives (e.g., wealth) to moral 
commitments. It is important to note that Doyle also adopts the same argument when he 
states that: 
[Nlo single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient, but 
together (and only together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities 
and economies with sustained liberal peace.143 
If these are the requirements for liberal states to function with each other in perpetual 
peace then there is still the question of how liberal states relate to other states which do 
not adhere to these principles, that is nonliberal states. 
Security between Iiberal and nonliberal states is apparently much more tenuous. Liberal 
states are not necessarily less aggressive than nonliberal ones. Michael Doyle argues (as 
did Kant) that while liberal republicanism challenges many aspects of realism insofar as 
it assumes that `liberal states are different' because `[t'hey are indeed peaceful' he 
too Zacher and Matthew, `Liberal International Theory', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in 
International Relations Theory, p.123. 
141 For a current review and extensive bibliography of the literature on the democratic peace see Steve 
Chan, 'In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise', Mershon International Studies 
Review, Vol.41, supplement I, May 1997, pp.57 -91. 
142 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, `Democratisation and War', Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.3, 
May -June 1995, pp.79 -97. 
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stresses that `they are also prone to make war' .144 Doyle argues that 11]iberal states, as 
Kant argued they would, have created a separate peace. They also, as he feared they 
might, have discovered reasons for aggression'.145 In effect, Doyle argues that, `in their 
relations with nonliberal states, liberaI states have not escaped from the insecurity 
caused by anarchy in the world political system as a whole' .146 If this is the case then 
liberal states will seek `security against' nonliberal states using traditional realist means. 
Moreover, liberal states can be threats to nonliberal states. As Doyle points out: 
[T]he very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and 
shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states 
establish grounds for additional conflicts in relations between liberal and nonliberal 
societies.147 
If Doyle's argument describes the basis of the liberal republican approach to security 
then clearly this does not eschew the use of force as a means for achieving security. 
That some liberals are prepared to use force, not just to protect themselves but to further 
their own values and interests, comes as no surprise to some scholars. E.H. Carr's 
critique of liberalism, or what he called utopianism, makes this very point.L48 Carr 
argued that: 
[Title bankruptcy of utopianism resides not [only] in its failure to live up to its 
principles, but in the exposure of its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested 
standard for the conduct of international affairs.149 
Carr argued that utopians were likely to present or `cloak' their interests as `a universal 
interest for the purpose of imposing it upon the whole world'.150 To demonstrated his 
point Can recounts Woodrow Wilson's assurance to the world after the American 
143 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, p.100. 
144 Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, pp.83 -84. 
145 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, pp.83 -84. 
146 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, p.100. 
147 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, p.100. 
148 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919 -1939, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 2nd ed., 
1974. 
149 Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p.88. 
150 Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p.78. 
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bombardment of Vera Cruz in 1914, that `the United States has gone down to Mexico to 
serve mankind'.151 Carr's argument that utopians usually fail to expose their standards 
for conduct, for example the use of force, may apply to many liberalisms but not to 
republican liberalism, which is quite open about the role of force. 
Apart from indicating the role of force in liberalism, liberal republicanism also informs 
liberal thinking about security in two other ways. The first is that, if liberal republicans 
see republicanism as a goal for the domestic realm and the international system, then in 
Doyle's interpretation of Kant's international Iiberalism, peace among all states does not 
require a world state or state of nations. Sovereignty remains in -tact in the international 
system, and this is not necessarily a bad thing. For Doyle (and he says, Kant), 'national 
sovereignty precludes reliable subservience to a state of nations: [and] a world state 
destroys the civic freedom on which the development of human capacities rests'.152 And 
second, Doyle also points out that in Kant's liberal republicanism, the pacific union 
between liberal states is not necessarily a formal institutionalised one.153 Doyle supports 
his claim with the observation that, `liberal states have behaved for the past almost 200 
years as if such a Kantian pacific union and treaty of perpetual peace had been 
signed'.154 He suggests that Kant may have had in mind something less formal such as 
`a mutual nonaggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement, and the 
cosmopolitan law'.155 That security can be enhanced without institutional forms is an 
interesting argument for liberal institutionalists to consider (see below). 
Several observations about liberal assumptions of security follow from examining 
liberal republicanism. Among the most important are that: security of the state is central; 
liberal states are peaceful among themselves under certain conditions i.e., under Kant's 
three principles; liberal states justify the use of force against nonliberal states for 
151 Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p.78. 
152 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, p.95. Doyle's paraphrasing from Kant, The Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose, p.50. 
153 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, p.95 -96. 
154 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, p.96. see note 10. 
155 Doyle, `Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, p.96. 
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protecting and extending their values; sovereignty is valued and a world state is not 
recommended; and formal institutionalised security arrangements are not necessary to 
ensure peace. The underlying assumption is that under certain conditions states will 
cooperate with each other. Another variant of liberalism, commercial liberalism, puts 
more emphasis on Kant's cosmopolitanism, or commercial spirit, as a basis for peace. 
Commercial liberalism 
There are a number of strands of commercial liberalism which, while concerned 
primarily with trade and commercial relations between nations, have implications for 
security. At the centre of most arguments for economic liberalism is the claim that 
commerce, trade and economic interactions in general have pacific consequences for 
security relations between nations. Commercial liberals are less concerned about issues 
of sovereignty, power and anarchy than some of their political sisters. Indeed, it claimed 
by such liberals that: 
[T]he key to world order is less the balance of military power than it is the form of 
economic exchange and balance of fiscal power, for the latter operate at the 
superstructural level to shape the former.156 
Like other liberals, commercial liberals assume states are rational actors and concerned 
with interests. Some earlier commercial liberals even argued that there existed a 
`harmony of interests' among nations. But there are also differences among commercial 
liberals, about other such issues as the role of the state and institutions in commercial 
and peaceful activities. 
In what might be called the Cobden strand of commercial liberalism, after the nineteenth 
century economic philosopher Richard Cobden, security is a consequence of the state 
taking a particular role. In the first place, governments should be constrained and 
contact between nations should be unrestricted. As Cobden puts it, for `as little 
intercourse as possible between governments [and] as much connection between nations 
156 Charles W. Jr, Kegley, `The Problematic Future Peace: Arms and Commerce as Contributing 
Factors'., in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theories, p.248. 
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of the world'.157 According to F.H. Hinsley, such nineteenth century Iiberals were of the 
view that: 
[W]hen international relations became relations between nations of peoples -war 
which was materially profitless and absurd and morally wrong, would be replaced by 
free and peaceful economic competition and such sources of dispute as still remained 
would easily be settled by judicial procedure.158 
Governments were seen to be the problem for several reasons. At the international level 
they often pursued balance of power interests, which the liberal John Bright referred to 
as the `foul idol' and condemned for the 'recorded...sufferings which [it] has 
entailed',159 And at home, governments often imposed barriers to commerce and trade, 
usually to accommodate vested interests. Another view held by these early economic 
liberals was that `the use of force...had no role in bringing about a liberal world 
order'.160 Instead a natural order, peoples' rationality, economic incentives and judicial 
procedure would overcome most of the obstacles to security. 
In a similar vein the liberal philosopher Jeremy Bentham emphasised utilitarian liberal 
values and economic processes as the basis for international peace. Bentham is 
accredited with adding two important concepts, economic utility and the harmony of 
interests, to the liberals' conceptual roll -call of equality, rationality, liberty and 
property.161 Bentham, like the political economist Adam Smith, saw a connection 
between self -interest and the good society. On Bentham's calculation, if each person 
individually pursued their self -interest in happiness, by `maximising pleasure and 
minimising pain', then when aggregated, this would be to the good of society. This 
rather mechanistic process was driven by self- interest: not by moral principles or lofty 
views about the nature of people, although it was assumed that people did seek 
happiness. When applied to commerce, which unlike politics was a private activity, a 
natural equilibrium would operate, which, if governments kept their distance, would 
have the consequence of ameliorating conflict, or so the argument went. 
157 Cited in R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems and World Order, Frances Pinter, London, 
1986, p.201. 
158 Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p.I1I. 
159 Cited in McKinlay and Little, Global Problems and World Order, p.176. 
160 McKinlay and Little, Global Problems and World Order, p.176. 
161 Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, p.134. 
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World War I challenged the early liberal emphasis on the pacific consequences of 
commerce on nations, when European states engaged in a long and savage war despite 
high levels of commercial interdependence. The rise of fascist and communist 
governments, it was argued, were also a threat to peace since they rejected the liberal 
precepts of rationality, individual self- interest in commercial contacts and the free 
market. Or, if governments did allow such elements to develop then they would 
participate as state units in the market and use their wealth to accumulate power to 
threaten the very existence of liberal states. The Iatter prediction was made by 
mercantilist economic thinkers who, like political realists, argued that national economic 
wealth (plenty, as some put it), power and war were closely connected. In any event, 
confidence faded in the Bentham, Cobden, Bright strand of commercial liberalism, so- 
called laissez -faire liberalism, and as a result modifications and additions were made to 
the commercial liberals' argument. 
One of the major modifications made by early twentieth century commercial liberals 
concerned the nature and role of the state. Now states were seen as being more benign 
than the early commercial liberals had portrayed them and capable of contributing 
positively to commerce and peace. More attention was given to the particular nature of 
the state, to state -to -state cooperation, and to intervention, or, as some would prefer to 
say, facilitation by the state and other institutions in economic issues. J.A. Hobsoni62 
and Norman Ange1P63 were two early twentieth century commercial liberals who argued 
for democratic states, interstate cooperation, economic interdependencies between 
states, and free trade, not least because it created interdependencies that reduced the 
incentives for war. 
Later in the century, and particularly after the Second World War, commercial liberals 
endorsed liberal economic institutions that had the effect of supporting the security of 
the state. The operation of the Bretton Woods system, the GATT, the IMF, and the 
World Bank were seen to indirectly benefit state security: for example, through 
provision of economic /political welfare that gave citizens a stake in the system and, as a 
consequence, enhanced internal security. Support for inter -state economic cooperation 
162 Hobson, Imperialism: A Study. 
163 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, G.P. Putnam, London, 1912. 
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also enhanced the state's external security relations because, it was thought, there would 
be powerful economic incentives for preventing or resolving conflict. 
The contemporary international relations literature on commercial liberalism pursues 
both old and new themes. There is renewed interest in the assumption that economic 
interdependence reduces the prospects for conflict.164 But, as Susan McMillan concludes 
from her review of theoretical propositions and twenty empirical case studies, 
`interdependence, conflict and the relationship between them are more complex than has 
generally been assumed'. 165 Her work shows that more research is needed to `explain 
how both the costs and benefits of interdependence are related to international 
conflict' ,166 
Overall, several points can be made about the connections between security and 
economics discussed by commercial liberals. All agree that commerce and peace are 
positively correlated. Not all agree on how this comes about. For nineteenth century 
liberals peace was more likely to take place if the state had minimal involvement, indeed 
states were often seen as the cause of conflict especially those which sought 
unrestrained political power and balance of power arrangements. Later liberals were 
more sympathetic to the state and encouraged them to support economic 
interdependencies, cooperation add institutions to manage economic relationships. 
164 See for example, David A. Baldwin, `Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', 
International Organization, Vol.34, 1980, pp.471 -505; Arthur R. Stein, `Governments, Economic 
Interdependence, and International Cooperation', in Philip Tetlock et al (eds), Behaviour, Society 
and International Conflict, Vol.3, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993; Dale C. Copeland, 
`Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations', International Security, 
Vol.20, No.4, 1996, pp.5 -41; Paul A. Papayoanou, `Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance 
of Power', International Security, Vo1.20, No.4, 1996, pp.42 -76; Beverley Crawford, `The New 
Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence, Millennium, Vol.23, No.1, 
1994, pp.25 -55; Stuart Harris, `The Economic Aspects of Security in the Asia- Pacific Region', in 
Desmond Ball (ed.), The Transformation of Security in the Asia -Pacific Region, Frank Cass, 
Portland Oregan, 1996, pp.32 -51. For a brief account of several current research agendas in 
economics and security see Michael Mastanduno, `Economics in Statecraft and Scholarship', 
International Organization, Vol.52, No.4, 1998, pp.825 -854. For earlier views on the relationship 
between trade and peace see Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, Basic Books, New 
York, 1986; Barry Buzan, `Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the 
Liberal Case', International Organization, Vol.38, No.4, Autumn 1984, pp.597 -624; Betts, 
`Wealth, Power and Instability', pp.34 -77. 
165 Susan M. McMillan, 'Interdependence and Conflict', Mershon International Studies Review, 
Vol.41, supplement 1, May 1997, p.56. 
166 McMillan, 'Interdependence and Conflict', p.56. McMillan argues that Liberalism has emphasised 
the benefits of interdependence and realism has emphasised the costs, but neither theoretical 
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Commercial liberals stress the costs, both economic and social, of conflict and support 
other liberal arguments about the obsolescence of war in the modern period. Institutions 
not weapons are the preferred means for preventing conflict. Commercial liberals are 
also confident that the security of individuals within states is enhanced by improving 
economic conditions and that this reduces the prospects of domestic issues becoming the 
cause of conflict between states. These liberals seem to be less concerned about the 
negative effects of international liberal economics on liberal values at the domestic 
level. Material values precede the social and political values of other liberals or rather 
they provide the base on which other liberal values develop. 
Liberal institutionalism 
The neoliberal institutionalists' argument that cooperation is central to security was 
discussed earlier. But their particular argument about cooperation is a relatively recent 
one that belongs to a wider and older genre called liberal institutionalism. The main 
theories that comprise liberal institutionalism, at least since the early 1940s, are 
functionalism,167 neofunctionalism,168 integrationism,169 transnationalísm,170 complex 
interdependence,171 and regime theory.172 As Robert Cox points out, these theories: 
[C]entred attention on multilateralism, endeavouring to discern in it the emergence of 
institutions that would transform world order by progressively bringing the state system 
within some form of authoritative regulation. 73 
framework had developed an argument that explains how both the costs and the benefits of 
interdependence are related to international conflict', p.56. 
167 See for example, David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization, London, 1943. 
168 See for example, E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Haas, Beyond the Nation State, Functionalism 
and International Organization, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964. 
169 See for example, Karl W. Deutsch et al, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, 1957; Nationalism 
and Social Communication. 
170 See for example, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1972. 
171 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr, Power and Interdependence, Little, Brown, Boston, 1977. 
172 Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca New York, 
1983; Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1986; Keohane, After Hegemony. 
173 Robert Cox, 'Multilateralism and World Order', Review of International Studies, Vol.18, No.2, 
1992, p.169. 
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The concept of multilateralism is clearly integral to liberal institutionalism but it appears 
to have several meanings. Liberals such as John Ruggie argue multilateralism is an 
institutional form distinctive from other organisational forms, 
[W]hat is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national 
policies in groups of three or more states, which is something that other organisational 
forms also do, but that it does so on the basis of certain principles or ordering relations 
among those states.174 
The principles to which Ruggie refers add a qualitative dimension to multilateralism and 
focus on three properties: indivisibility, generalised principles of conduct, and diffuse 
reciprocity.175 Hence, Ruggie argues ` multilateralism is a highly demanding institutional 
form'.176 He critically notes that many other liberals, including the neoliberal 
institutionalists, are not so demanding and they endorse the argument that multi - 
lateralism is mostly concerned with the coordination of national policies. 
Liberal institutionalism, or at least its integrationist dimension, also differs from 
neoliberal institutionalism in that it leaves open the prospect that the state as an 
institution will be superseded. The integrationist theorist, Karl Deutsch, for example, 
held out the hope that `nationalism and...the growth of nations may recede into its 
proper historical perspective'.177 Neoliberal institutionalists, by contrast, assume that the 
state is the central actor and will remain so. Deutsch also argued that sociological 
factors, such as cross -national communications and cultural networks, would help to 
ameliorate the divisions between states and result in what he called `pluralistic security 
communities'. Indeed, Deutsch considered the North Atlantic area exemplified this 
development.178 Deutsch's view of security communities differs from the more recent 
174 John Gerard Ruggie, ' Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', in John Gerard Ruggie 
(ed.), Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Fonn, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1993, p.7. 
t75 Ruggie, ` Multilateralism', in Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters, pp.3 -47. According to James 
Caporaso, `indivisability can be thought of as scope (both geographic and functional)... Generalised 
principles of conduct usually come in the form of norms exhorting general if not universal modes 
of relating to other states...Diffuse reciprocity [emphasises] that actors expect to benefit in the long 
run and over many issues, rather than every time on every issue'. See James A. Caporaso, 
`International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations', in Ruggie (ed.), 
Multilateralism Matters, pp.53 -54. 
176 Ruggie, ` Multilateralism', Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters., p.12. 
177 Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p.166. 
178 Karl W. Deutsch, Tides Among Nations, The Free Press, New York, 1979. Also see other 
references to Deutsch in fns 15 and 169. 
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views about the nature of security communities, such as those proposed by Barry Buzan, 
which do not necessarily imply that there is social integration but still suggest that 
conflict is highly unlikely.179 
Underpinning liberal institutionalism is the assumption that norms, habits, values, 
expectations and beliefs are important dimensions of the international system and 
provide a basis for cooperation. Along with rules, laws, and regulations these elements 
form what many liberals refer to as `international society'. Liberals assume that 
increasing interdependence between groups and states will consolidate and expand 
shared values. Some liberals extend the argument to claim that `global citizenship' and 
cosmopolitan values are increasing.18o 
The emphasis which liberal institutionalism places on norms, values, institutions and 
society has been the inspiration for further investigation by constructivist scholars. 
Though not necessarily liberal in other senses these scholars have sought to explicate the 
role of non -material factors, like ideas and norms, in determining state behaviour. Ted 
Hopf, for example, argues that a constructivist approach can show how social practices 
and norms construct the identities and interests of states and how, in the case of 
democratic states, these intersubjective meanings help to explain the liberal peace.181 
Liberal institutionalism provides a number of different answers to the question of 
`security of what'? The main division are between those institutionalists who claim that 
individuals and groups are the proper referent objects of security and those who suggest 
that it is the state (the latter claim the state provides for the security of individuals and 
groups). Liberals who focus on individuals claim that institutions, such as human rights 
179 Barry Buzan, who cannot be called a liberal, makes a similar argument to Deutsch and claims that 
security communities exist when `disputes among all members are resolved to such an extent that 
none fears, or prepares for either assault or military attack by any of the others'. However, Buzan 
doesn't address the relationship between security communities and the state and just makes the 
statement that '[bleyond security community lies regional integration, which ends anarchy and 
therefore moves the regional issues from the national and international to the domestic realm'. See 
Barry Buzan, People, Stares and Fear, second edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991, 
pp.218 -219. 
180 James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1990, 
181 Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', International 
Security, Vol.23, Vol.1, 1998, pp.191 -192. See also Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 
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regimes, are required to protect individuals from repressive states. Other liberals focus 
on institutions, or regimes, which facilitate state -to -state cooperation. It appears that 
liberal institutionalists agree that institutions based on shared expectations and values 
are central to cooperation and security, but they are concerned with different referent 
objects and causes of insecurity. 
Liberals and military issues 
Although many liberals are concerned with establishing the conditions for peace, few 
address situations where liberal approaches have been tried but failed, or cannot be 
applied in the first instance. They also have little to say about what might constitute 
military policies during periods of peace; for realists these issues are central. 
Nonetheless, there is a liberal military security literature that provides further insights 
into liberals' security assumptions. 
First, for many liberals the nuclear age and the fact of mutual assured destruction 
capabilities in the hands of the major powers had shown that security is interdependent. 
What is needed, according to these liberals is a policy of `common security'. The 
argument is clearly expressed in the 1982 Palme Commission, which stated that:182 
States can no longer seek security at each other's expense; it can be attained only 
through cooperative undertakings...A doctrine of common security must replace the 
present expedient of deterrence through armaments. [Emphasis in orìgìnal.)183 
The critical point made by the Commission was that security must be achieved `not 
against the adversary but together with him'.184 For many Iiberals, this means that the 
crux of common security is that military technology and particularly nuclear, chemical 
and biological technologies have made states interdependent or dependent on each other 
for security -and therefore cooperative approaches are essential. 
1996 and Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998. 
182 Olaf Palme, chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 
Common Security: a Programme for Disarmament, Pan Books, London, L982, pp.58 -59. 
183 Palme, Common Security, pp.58 -59. 
184 Palme, Common Security, p.xiii. 
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Second, for many liberals security involves much more than military security for 
defence of the state. These liberals assume that security is comprehensive and support 
the argument in the 1980 Brandt Report that: 
An important task of constructive international policy will have to consist in providing 
a new, more comprehensive understanding of `security' which would be less restricted 
to the purely military aspects. In the global context true security cannot be achieved by 
a mounting up of weapons defence in the narrow sense-but only by providing basic 
conditions for peaceful relations between nations and solving not only the military but 
also the non -military problems which threaten them t85 
Those liberals who claim that solutions to economic problems are a key to resolving 
security problems especially endorse this assumption that security is more 
comprehensive.186 For these liberals `a direct Iink is drawn between security and 
prosperity so that the promotion of economic development becomes indistinguishable 
from the promotion of common security'.187 Many liberals claim that in addition to 
economic security, comprehensive security involves a broader conception of `human 
security' which includes freedom from repression, hunger and disease.188 
Third, for many of these Iiberals the individual is the referent object of security. Security 
must be comprehensive because the individual is subjected not only to military and 
economic threats but other types of threats as well. Hence for Ken Booth, `security 
means absence of threats'.189 He argues that the purpose of security is the liberal project 
of emancipation of the individual because `emancipation, not power or order, produces 
security'. By emancipation Booth means `the freeing of people (as individuals and 
185 Willy Brandt, chairman of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 
North- South: A Programme for Survival, Pan Books, London, 1980, p.214. 
186 Some of these liberals argue that individual security also requires that governments do not privilege 
military technology and military power because this causes economic and social insecurities. 
Privileging the military security of the states undermines the welfare of the individual and society 
and moreover such preparations may not even enhance a state's security. On the latter point some 
liberals, like Robert Johansen, argue that the realist's maxim, 'if you want peace prepare for war' is 
difficult to substantiate historically and that in the light of such uncertainty it should be discarded 
in favour of the argument that `if you want peace, prepare institutions to keep peace'. See Robert 
Johansen, `Swords into Plowshares: Can Fewer Arms Yield More Security', in Kegley, 
Controversies in International Relations Theories, p.253. 
187 McKinlay and Little, Global Problems and World Order, p.199. 
188 See Ramesh Thakur, 'From National Security to Human Security', in Stuart Harris and Andrew 
Mack (eds), Asia Pacific Security: the Economics -Politics Nexus, Allen Sr. Unwin, St Leonards 
Sydney, 1997, pp.52 -80. 
189 Ken Booth, `Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, Vol.17, No.4, 1991, 
p.319. 
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groups) from...physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they 
would freely choose to do'.190 For Booth `individual human beings are the ultimate 
referent'.191 This is because states, although `important features of world politics' are 
`unreliable, illogical and too diverse in their character to use as the primary referent 
Objects',192 
Several observations follow from the liberal concern with military issues. First, the 
object of security is the individual. Second, security is sought from a variety of threats 
and the hence the means for achieving security are also varied. The basic argument is 
that security is best achieved through cooperative rather than competitive means. The 
notion of `cooperative security' captures the liberal policy approach. Insofar as this 
concerns state -to -state security, from the liberal institutionalists' viewpoint, this of 
course involves multilateralism, institutions and regimes. For other liberals, formal 
institutions may not always be appropriate or possible and cooperation takes place in a 
variety of ways, through for example, dialogue, military or non -military means and 
along bilateral and multilateral lines. Republican liberals are some of the few liberals 
who leave open the option of the use of force to protect and further their liberal values. 
A final observation is that although liberals have traditionally supported peaceful means 
for achieving security and have criticised military intervention, those (at least in the 
West) most concerned about human security and gross violations of human rights have 
in the 1990s increasingly supported so- called humanitarian intervention i.e., the forcible 
intrusion into the internal affairs of other sovereign states in order to save individuals 
from repression, often by their own governments. Liberals have supported such 
interventions even when, as in the case of Kosovo, they were clearly in contravention of 
traditional international law. 
Overall, liberal scholars, unlike their realist counterparts, do not articulate detailed and 
comprehensive security strategies to support their various positions. The realists 
dominate the discussion about security and particularly the means to achieving it. 
190 Booth, `Security and Emancipation', p.319. 
191 Booth, `Security and Emancipation', p.319. 
192 Booth, `Security and Emancipation', p.320. 
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Although the divisions between the two main traditions may be fewer than is commonly 
recognised much is justifiably made of the differences between them. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the security assumptions underpinning the two main traditions of 
international relations, liberalism and realism. It argued that there are variants within 
these traditions which provide different understandings of security. In some instances 
these differences indicate that there are similarities between the two traditions. For 
example, all the variants of realism make the state the object of security and likewise 
some variants of liberalism. Similarly, all realisms consider that the main threat to 
security is the military power of other states and so do some liberalisms. However, 
despite these and other similarities there are considerable differences. 
The main differences concern firstly their worldviews, with realists having more 
pessimistic dispositions and liberals more optimistic attitudes. Realists are pessimistic 
about the prospects of cooperation between states; liberals are cautiously optimistic. 
With regard to security assumptions, realism assumes that the state is the object of 
security while the variants of liberalism assume there are different objects of security, 
though overall the emphasis is on individuals rather than states. Since liberalism 
identifies different objects of security then, as would be expected, the threats its 
proponents perceive to security also vary. For example, individuals can be made 
insecure by the state, economic deprivation, and by threats to their human potential, the 
absence of which Booth calls emancipation. Realism assumes the main threat to security 
is competition between states, especially with regard to military power. Finally, the 
means to achieve security envisaged by each tradition vary from each other and between 
the different variants of realism and liberalism. Realists endorse competitive strategies 
involving self -help, alliances, and balance of power arrangements while liberals support 
cooperative arrangements involving institutions, regimes and multilateralism and 
military measures such as transparency and confidence building. 
The different security assumptions of each tradition have important implications for 
policy. While liberals and realists share a number of assumptions about security, in one 
important area their assumptions are antithetical. Liberals believe that cooperation 
enhances peace and military competition undermines it; realists believe that cooperation 
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is not only extraordinarily difficult but in some cases may undermine deterrence. 
Realists believe in pursuing policies of `peace through strength' rather than peace 
through cooperation. They seek security against other states not with them. Clearly these 
liberal and realist policy approaches are antithetical, if not contradictory. Because 
Australia's security policy embraces both -liberal and realist policies- ` security with' as 
well as `security against' it would be seem to follow that its overall policy is 
contradictory as well. This raises the question of whether or not there is an international 
relations literature that could explain this apparent contradiction. The next chapter will 
further examine the literature with this objective in mind. 
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LIBERAL -REALIST ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY 
[Tjhe two- schools analysis is not adequate....the more it is made the basis for a 
general international theory the more untrue it seems to be. t 
(Martin Wight, Political Theorist.) 
The element of international society is real, but the elements of a state of war 
and of transnational loyalties and divisions are real also, to reify the first element, 
or to speak as if it annulled the second and third, is an illusion. Z 
(Hedley Bull, Political Theorist.) 
Eclecticism may not be the route to theoretical precision, 
but sometimes it is the only route available.-: 
(Robert Gilpin, Political Theorist.) 
If, as the previous chapter has argued, the two main traditions in international relations 
(IR), realism and liberalism, are based on contradictory assumptions about security this 
in turn suggests that if a policy was claimed to be based realist and liberal assumptions it 
would also be contradictory. From this it would seem to follow that if Australia's 
security policy can be shown to be based on both liberal and realist assumptions, then it 
too must be contradictory. Yet, as we have seen, policy makers reject this claim. 
This chapter will continue to examine the IR literature for other possible theoretical 
explanations, and in particular one that may explain the assumptions behind Australia's 
security policy. The first section of the chapter will review the recent literature, which 
followed the end of the Cold War and which calls for an assessment of the roles and the 
relationship between the two traditions of liberalism and realism. The second will 
examine three antecedents to this literature, namely the Grotian school, the neoliberal 
institutionalists and that of the `new security' group of scholars. The third section will 
investigate these last three literatures, in terms of its worldviews and the assumptions 
3 
Martin Wight, International Theory: the Three Traditions (eds), Gabriel Wight and Brian Porter, 
Leicester University Press/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1991, pp.266 -267. 
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Macmillan, London, 
1977, p.51. 
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton N.J., 1987, p.25. 
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about security which are prompted by the three questions posed earlier, `security of 
what, from what and by what means'? 
I argue several points in this chapter. First, that the IR literature does in fact include 
scholarship that embraces more than one theory to explain the relations between states 
and that this Iiterature provides some foundations for explaining security relations. 
Second, that the three schools of thought -the Grotians, the neoliberal institutionalists 
and the `new security' school -are the most useful in this respect. More importantly, the 
assumption they all share is that anarchy and society co -exist in the international system 
and that both are important for explaining security. Anarchy and society are concepts 
that are based respectively on realist and liberal assumptions about security. Third, that 
from the worldviews and security assumptions of the three schools it is possible to 
construct an analytical framework, which could be called a liberal realist framework, 
and which can be used to examine the security policies of states. Finally, from the 
perspective of a single theory explanation the liberal realist framework is one that 
incorporates contradiction and paradox. This `paradoxical' approach distinguishes the 
liberal realist perspective from the other two traditions: from realism which privileges 
the state, anarchy, competition, power -politics, relative gains, self -interest; and from 
Iiberalism which privileges the individual, society, cooperation; and common interests. I 
suggest that the liberal realist framework provides another approach for explaining 
Australia's security policy. 
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE IR LITERATURE 
The `first great debate' in the discipline of international relations, back in the 1920s, 
highlighted the divisions between realism and idealism. Consequently much of the IR 
literature thereafter focused on the differences between liberals and realists and on 
single frameworks either realism or liberalism to explain states' behaviour. Security 
relations were dominated by realist explanations. Recently, however, scholars have 
started to re- assess both the relationship between liberalism and realism and single 
theory explanations. 
This current re- assessment of the two traditions has come from several directions. One 
argument claims that the collapse of the Cold War was a turning point in international 
relations and confirmation that `the dominant realist framework...may have become 
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inadequate to account for current realities'. According to some scholars, the time had 
come for a new approach that was rigorous, coherent and idealist not least because many 
realist tenets are being undermined by `a revolution [of democracy]' which is `sweeping 
the world' .5 This idealist framework is, according to Stanley Kober, one which 
understands the `the harsh realities of power'.6 Indeed, the problem in the past has been 
that realists have `oversimplified the concept of power' .7 
From another direction there is the more cautious argument that although the post -Cold 
War period is different from previous eras it is also characterised by uncertainty and 
complexity and therefore `it may be premature to judge whether realism's paradigmatic 
axioms no longer fit's Charles Kegley, suggests that scholars should search for `a theory 
that integrates the most relevant features of both traditions' or, he suggests, `an 
altogether different theoretical framework which transcends them'.9 A number of 
scholars, addressing the first of these tasks, now claim that the two traditions can indeed 
be `melded', can be seen as `hybrids', or `fusions', `that realism and liberalism can be 
synthesised', that `realists and liberals need each other'.10 The implicit assumption held 
by many of these scholars is that liberalism remains the more important tradition) t 
A third argument, often made from a modified realist position, suggests that a synthesis 
of the two traditions is less useful than an approach that involves both traditions, 
separately and equally. From this perspective the post Cold War realities show that the 
tenets of realism remain relevant, but need to be supplemented, for example, with liberal 
and other insights. Fred Riggs, for example, argues that the state -centric focus of realism 
4 Charles W. Kegley Jr, The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the 
New International Realities', International Studies Quarterly, No.37, June 1993, p.133. 
5 Stanley Kober, 'Idealpolitik', Foreign Policy, No.79, Summer 1990, p.9. 
6 Kober, 'Idealpolitik', p.16. 
7 Kober, ' Idealpolitik', p.16. 
5 Kegley, `The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies ?, p.133. 
9 Charles W. Kegley Jr, `The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An 
Introduction', in Charles W. Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theories, St 
Martin's Press, New York, p.17. 
10 Most of these terms are excerpts from the authors in Kegley's edited volume above, Controversies 
in International Relations Theories. 
1 See for example, Kober, `Idealpolitik', pp.3 -24. 
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needs to include the growing problem of `inter -nationality warfare'.12 Riggs proposes a 
`new brand of realism', one which would combine `both realist and idealist points of 
view': a realist view to address the problems of violence, power and external factors and 
an idealist view to address the internal political /economic and institutional factors.13 In 
Rigg's `new realism', realism and idealism are not conflicting theories, rather they are 
`essentially complementary' since both are needed to make sense of a `complex reality'. 
A fourth line of argument is that international relations, and the location of liberalism 
and realism within it, is best addressed by bringing in other paradigms.l4 Michael Banks 
discusses international relations with the help of three paradigms, realism, pluralism and 
structuralism.15 Michael Donelan suggests international relations theory consists of five 
'strands': natural law, realism, fideism, rationalism and hístoricism.16 Terry Nardin and 
David Mapel suggest that the history of international relations shows twelve ethical 
traditions.l" One effect of introducing these additional paradigms is that the distinctions 
between realism and liberalism are often blurred and the relationship is changed. 
A fifth set of arguments comes from scholars who have reassessed the roles and the 
relationship between liberalism and realism from a critical perspective. David Long's 
argument, which has already been mentioned, is that the neoliberal institutionalists have 
accommodated realist tenets, to the point, he claims, that they have `shorn [liberalism] 
of its normative concerns with the liberty and well -being of the individual'.18 Then there 
are some post -modernists and critical theorists who argue that realism and many 
12 Fred W. Riggs, `Thoughts About Neoidealism vs Realism: Reflections on Charles Kegley's ISA 
Presidential Address, March 25, 1993', International Studies Notes, Vol.19, No.1, 1994, pp.1 -6; 
Fred W. Riggs, `International Relations as a Prismatic System', in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba 
(eds), The International System: Theoretical Essays, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961, 
pp.144 -181; see also Charles W. Kegley, `Redirecting Realism: a Rejoinder to Riggs', 
International Studies Notes, Vol.19, No.1, 1994, pp.7 -9 
13 Riggs, 
`Thoughts About Neoidealism vs Realism', pp.1 -6. 
14 , For a short discussion about the taxonomy of classical traditions in IR literature see Ian Clark, 
`Traditions of Thought and Classical Theories of International Relations', in Ian Clark and Iver B. 
Neumann (eds), Classical Theories of International Relations, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 
1996, pp.3 -4. 
15 Michael Banks, `The Evolution of International Relations Theory', in Michael Banks (ed.), 
Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations, Brighton, 1986, pp.3 -21. 
16 Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Thought, Oxford, 1990. 
17 Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds), Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992. 
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liberalisms share several characteristics including: flawed epistemological and 
ontological foundations and methodologies. These theorists claim that in most instances 
both traditions incorrectly assume that it is possible to make a clear distinction between 
the subject and object, both privilege the state, and both embrace positivism.19 But not 
all critical theorists are so dismissive of the two traditions. Andrew Linklater, for 
example, argues that `a critical theory of international relations ought to preserve the 
main strengths of the realists and rationalist traditions'.20 
This current re- assessment of the relationship between the liberal and realist traditions 
has some precedents in the international relations literature. Some established sub- 
disciplines of international relations, such as peace research, implicitly assume that the 
liberal notion of cooperation between states is possible in security matters. However, 
this assumption is often derived from game theoretic /psychological assumptions about 
cooperation rather than from IR traditions or theories. And finally, other disciplines, for 
example history, either ignore the traditions or dismiss their antithetical positions. For 
example, Christopher Hill argues that changes in ideas and policies: 
[Ulsually involves the overlapping of competing paradigms, either as one set of 
assumptions is gradually superseded by another, or as separate issue -areas are governed 
by distinct, even contradictory principles.21 
In addition to these precedents there are at least two well -established schools of 
international relations that also acknowledge relationships between the two traditions. 
1s 
19 
David Long, The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory: A Case for Closure', 
Millennium, Vol.24, No.3, 1995, p.496. 
For an evaluation of the post -positivist debate see John A. Vasquez, `The Post -Positivist Debate: 
Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations After Enlightenment's Fall', in Ken 
Booth and Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1995, pp.215 -240. Also see in the same volume Ken Booth, `Dare Not to Know: International 
Relations Versus the Future' See in addition Richard K. Ashley, `The Poverty of Neorealism', in 
Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neo realism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, 
pp.255 -300; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and 
Cases, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997; David Campbell, Writing Security: 
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Minnesota University Press, 
Minneapolis, 1998. 
20 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism, London 1990, p.32. 
21 Christopher Hill, `1939: The Origins of Liberalism Realism', Review of International Studies, 
No.15, 1989, p.325. 
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The Grotian school 
Scholars from the Grotian and neoliberal institutionalist schools argue that single 
framework explanations are unsatisfactory.22 The Grotian scholar Martin Wight claims 
that one of his two `conscious aims' is to show that: 
[Tihe two -schools analysis is not adequate...the more it is made the basis for a general 
international theory the more untrue it seems to be.23 
Moreover, Wight argues `the greatest political writers in international theory almost all 
straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions' .24 
This Grotian literature suggests that international relations are better explained if several 
frameworks are used. Wight finds it useful to adopt `three traditions of international 
theory': realist, rationalist and revolutionist, which represent Machiavellian, Grotian and 
Kantian thinking.25 Even so, he remains wary of such classifications, warning that, `the 
purpose of building pigeon -holes is to reassure oneself that the raw material does not fit 
into them' (emphasis in the original).26 He counsels that his three traditions: 
[A]re not like three railroad tracks running parallel into infinity. They are not 
philosophically constant and pure like three stately, tranquil and independent 
streams....They are streams, with eddies and cross -currents, sometimes interlacing and 
never for long confined to their own river bed. They both influence and cross -fertilise 
one another, and they change, although without...losing their inner identity.27 
Thus when Wight discusses the importance of the three traditions for understanding 
diplomacy and foreign policy, he concludes that: 
22 The Grotion school is also known as the English school and apart from Martin Wight and Hedley 
Bull, whose work will be discussed here, the other main members included C.A.W. Manning, John 
Vincent, Adam Watson, Gerrit Gong and James Mayall. See the bibliography for publication 
details of the last five scholars. 
23 Wight, International Theory: the Three Traditions (eds), Gabriel Wight and Porter, pp.266 -267. 
Wight's second aim is to demonstrate that 'there is very little, if anything, new in political theory, 
that the great moral debates of the past are in essence our debates', see p.268. 
24 Wight, International Theory, p.259. 
25 Wight's three traditions, realist, rationalist and revolutionist, represent his three ways of thinking 
about the components of international relations: international anarchy (the multiplicity of sovereign 
states acknowledging no political superior); habitual solidarity (expressed in the institutions of 
diplomacy, international legal rules, commerce) and moral solidarity (the communion deeper than 
politics and economics, expressed in such phrases as the society of states', the 'family of nations', 
'world public opinion'. See Martin Wight, An Anatomy of International Thought', Review of 
International Studies, No.13, 1987, p.221 and pp.221 -227. 
26 Wight, International Theory, p.260. 
27 Wight, International Theory, p.260. 
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[T]he Grotian and Kantian dove -tail in their idealism and their theory of history, 
whereas the Grotian and Machiavellian share a certain realism. The Machiavellian and 
Kantian agree on the origin of politics, on (the absence of) international society, and on 
the criteria for international morality. Broadly, the Grotian and Kantian approximate 
over ideals, the Kantian and Machiavellian over methods.28 
Wight's approach, according to Claire Cutler, `emerges from an inability to embrace any 
one single formulation'.29 As Wight states above, this is his `conscious aim'. 
Nonetheless, Wight does identify most closely with his middle `stream', the rationalist 
tradition, based on the works of the seventeenth century Dutch jurist, Grotius. The main 
rationalist argument is that international relations takes place within a `society of states'. 
Indeed, for Wight the most fundamental question you can ask in international relations 
theory is, What is international society ?'.30 In a Grotian society the essential actors are 
states, but individuals and non -state actors are also important.31 Wight's society is 
characterised by constitutionalism and moderation: constitutionalism is apparent in the 
moral and legal limits on the exercise of power32 and moderation is evident the choice 
of a middle way, or a via media, between the two extremes of realism and revolution, 
between Machiavelli and Kant.33 International society, according to Wight, is: 
Manifest in the diplomatic system; in the conscious maintenance of the balance of 
power to preserve the independence of the member communities; in the regular 
operations of international law...in economic, social and technical interdependence and 
the functional international institutions established to...regulate it.34 
According to Cutler, in Wight's society these common practices are maintained through 
positive institutions and practices and not through the `transcendent principles of natural 
law' argued for by Grotius.35 Clearly then the Grotian society assumes cooperation 
28 Wight, International Theory, p.162. 
29 A. Claire Cutler, -The Grotian Tradition" in International Relations', Review of International 
Studies, Vol.17, No.1, 1991, p.52. 
30 Wight International Theory, p.30. 
31 Martin Wight, `Western Values', in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966, p.101. 
32 Wight, `Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, pp.104 -105. 
33 Wight International Theory, pp.158 -163. 
34 Wight, `Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, pp.96 -97. 
35 Cutler, -The Grotian Tradition" in International Relations', p.53. If Cutler is right that institutions 
and social practices are important in Wight's society then whether these processes had an effect on 
the institution and on state interests is unclear. It is also not clear if the actions /processes that are 
conducted, in themselves, constitute part of the identity and interests of these states, as construe- 
tivist scholars suggest. 
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between states. Equally important, the Grotian society assumes that anarchy continues to 
be present in the international context and to co -exist with society. Grotians are most 
concerned therefore that `the problematic [is] the phenomenon of war and conditions of 
peace and order...reflecting the belief that war is inevitable'.36 
Hedley Bull was strongly influenced by Martin Wight and is a well -known member of 
the Grotian school. As R.J. Vincent, points out, Bull: 
[Ilnterposed the idea of international society between, on the one hand, the Hobbesian 
rejection of the possibility of a society of states (because states existed together in a 
state of nature which was a state of war) and, on the other hand, the Kantian view of a 
cosmopolitan or world society of individuals (which was, at the same time, a more 
fundamental fact than international society, and a productive fiction foretelling the end 
of mere inter -state society) 37 
CIearly then for Bull, like Wight, there is a `society of states'. According to Bull: 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive of themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relationship with 
one another, and share in the working of common institutions38 
Bull's society is state -centric, that is it is defined by the common interests and values of 
states, expressed in formal treaties and customary law rather than in state norms based 
on natural law or the norms of individuals and non -state actors, as Grotius had 
suggested. Thus Bull's society is limited, to the formal relations between states. 
Bull, like Wight, also acknowledges the co- existence of society with anarchy. As Bull 
cautiously argues: 
The element of international society is real, but the elements of a state of war and of 
transnational loyalties and divisions are real also, to reify the first element, or to speak 
as if it annulled the second and third, is an illusion.39. 
For Bull then, international society, the state of war, transnational loyalties and divisions 
all co- exist. It is not surprising that the title of Bull's most famous book is The 
36 Cutler, "'The Grotian Tradition" in International Relations', p.50. 
37 R. J. Vincent, `Hedley Bull and Order in International Politics', Millennium: Journal of 
International Politics, Vol.17, No.2, 1988, p.195. 
38 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.13. 
39 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.51, -- 
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Anarchical Society40 and that, as Stanley Hoffmann, points out, it `showed that anarchy 
was compatible with society'.41 
Again like Wight, Bull assumes that, because anarchy is constantly present within the 
international context, the problem of war between states, the conditions of peace, and in 
particular, international order, were absolutely critical components. Whereas Wight asks 
`what is international society', for Bull the central issue for international relations is 
`that of identifying and strengthening the foundations of order' .42 `Order', he says, `is 
part of the historical record of international relations...modern states have formed...not 
only a system of states but also an international society'.43 Various institutions are 
necessary to maintain order: in particular international law and the balance of power. 
The latter is seen by Bull to be quite precarious but the best arrangement under some 
circumstances. Overall, although Bull and Wight emphasise different issues, their 
arguments provide explanations that take account of the co- existence of anarchy and 
society and of competition and cooperation between states. Their arguments also 
demonstrate that single frameworks are inadequate for explanation. 
Neoliberal institutionalists 
A second school of thought that also acknowledges the co- existence of anarchy and 
society and refers to more than one theory to explain international relations is that of 
neoliberal institutionalism. Scholars of this school regard both realism and liberalism as 
complementary and provide an analysis of international relations which, they claim, 
integrates them. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye analyse the liberal concept of 
economic interdependence from a realist `power- orientated' perspective and with the 
insights of bargaining theory 44 According to Keohane and Nye, their analysis `linked 
40 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 1977. 
41 Stanley Hoffmann, 'Hedley Bull and His Contribution to International Relations', International 
Affairs, Vol.62, No.1, 1986, pp.179 -I95. Hoffmann follows this statement with a question, `but 
how much society...is likely to flourish in an anarchical society' ?' 
42 Hedley Bull, `The Twenty Years' Crisis Thirty years On', International Journal, Vol.24, No.4, 
Autumn, I969, p.637. 
43 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.24. 
44 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr, Power and Interdependence, Little Brown, Boston, 
1977. 
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realist and neorealist analysis to concerns of liberals with interdependence'.45 As they 
say, `rather than viewing realist theory as an alternative to liberal "interdependence 
theory" we regarded the two as necessary complements to one another'.46 The authors 
claim that an analysis of power and interdependence shows that: 
[T]he key point [is] not that interdependence made power obsolete -far from it -but 
that patterns of interdependence and patterns of potential power resources in a given 
issue -area are closely related- indeed two sides of a single coin. Thus we sought not 
merely to place realist and liberal perspectives side by side, but to link them together in 
an integrated analysis.47 
The authors also argue that the liberal concept of regimes provides the `governing 
arrangement' for relationships of interdependence and that a proper understanding of the 
nature of regimes, their formation, change and maintenance, requires an integrated 
approach of realist's focus on power and the theory of bargaining.48 
Keohane and Nye argue this integrated approach is `analytically justified'. They claim 
that realism and liberalism share some common assumptions about the state's political 
action: 
[R]ealism and liberalism both have their roots in a utilitarian view of the world, in 
which individual actors pursue their own interests by responding to incentives. Both 
doctrines view politics as a process of political and economic exchange, characterised 
by bargaining. Broadly speaking, both realism and liberalism are consistent with the 
assumption that most state behaviour can be interpreted as rational, or at least 
intelligent, activity. Realism and liberalism are therefore not two incommensurable 
paradigms with different conceptions of the nature of political action.49 
For, Keohane and Nye, although there are distinct differences between the two 
traditions, for example regarding the nature of the international environment and the 
goals of actors, this does not preclude common intellectual processes and state actions 
based on rationality. 
45 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.728. 
46 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.728. 
47 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.730. For a critique of Keohane and 
Nye's understanding of power, see Richard Little, `The Growing Relevance of Pluralism', in Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysìa Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.80 -83. 
48 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', pp.740 -745. 
49 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', pp.728 -729. 
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Further analytical justification for an integrated approach is provided by Keohane's and 
Nye's examination of liberal notions of process and realist notions of structure when 
examining economic interdependence. Indeed, the authors argue that `adding the process 
Ievel to the concept of structure in defining international systems enriches our ability to 
theorise'.50 This is because the emphasis: 
(OM process as well as (rather than instead of) structure moves us towards a synthesis 
of, rather than a radical disjunction between, realism and liberalism. Neorealism is 
appropriate at the structural level of systemic theory; liberalism is most fruitful at the 
process level. We aspire to combine them into a system -level theory that incorporates 
process as well as structure.51 
It is important to note that, although Keohane and Nye stress that 'neorealism is 
appropriate at the structural level' and `liberalism is most fruitful at the process level', 
their understanding of the type of anarchy which exists at this structural level allows for 
cooperation between states. As shown in the previous chapter, this is a major point of 
difference between the neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists and the latter believe 
that norms, regimes and institutions are important: the former see them as 
epiphenomonal. In other words, neoliberals assume there is society, as well as anarchy. 
Interestingly, the focus on process, which Keohane and Nye pursue to investigate the 
practice of interdependence, led them towards the study of domestic and internal factors, 
particularly those that initiated and maintained the processes.52 In his more recent 
writing Keohane appears to point to the effects of institutions and regimes on state 
interests and thus not only underscores the direction of the connections between 
systemic and domestic factors but also shows the effects of society on the latter.53 
It seems that from the neoliberal institutionalists' perspective, analysis of international 
relations requires a 'synthesis...rather than a radical disjunction between realism and 
50 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.747 
51 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.747. 
52 As Helen Milner, another neoliberal institutionalist scholar, points out, the neorealist notion of 
structure notwithstanding, analysis of the domestic realm is significant for understanding 
international relations. Milner also argues that a proper analysis of the international system 
combines anarchy and interdependence. See Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in International 
Relations Theory: a Critique', Review of International Studies, Vol.17, No.1, 1991, pp.67 -85. 
53 Robert O. Keohane, 'Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War', in David 
A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, 
pp.269 -338. 
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liberalism'.54 Keohane and Nye's study of a key liberal tenet -interdependence using 
realists' tools, provides a strong analytical framework, perhaps one that is stronger than 
a single theory under most circumstances. 
'New security' school 
Although less developed than the two schools discussed, there is a third group of 
scholars who assume that anarchy and society co- exist. This literature, which for 
convenience will be called the new security' school,S5 developed during the mid -1980s 
when the first signs of the end of the Cold War were evident.56 The main assumption 
underpinning this work is that, `anarchy does not preclude security'.57 As Ken Booth, 
argues: 
We can predictably expect to live in an anarchical world, but "anarchy" need not have 
the pessimistic connotations it invariably does have.5t 
New security, he argues, is 'both...realistic and utopian' and `sophisticated and 
strategically literate'.59 Empirical evidence for this argument is found, it is claimed, in 
the development of `security communities'. Booth argues that security communities do 
not change the anarchical character of the international system but `confront the analysis 
and prognosis of pessimistic Hobbesian realism'.60 
54 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.747. 
55 This label is derived from another term used frequently in a book edited by Ken Booth and 
published in 1991, namely `new thinking about security'. Several contributing authors, particularly 
Booth and Barry Buzan, can be taken as representatives of this school. See Ken Booth (ed.), New 
Thinking About Strategy and International Security, HarperCollins Academic, London, 1991. 
56 Another strand of literature, which developed later, was centred around the debate between those 
scholars who argued for traditional definitions of security and those who proposed that security 
should be conceptualised broadly. See for example, Sean M. Lynn- Jones, `International Security 
Studies', International Studies Notes, Vol.16, No.3, 1992, pp.53 -63; Stephen M. Walt, The 
Renaissance of Security Studies', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.35, No.2, 1991, pp.221- 
239; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security', Foreign Affairs, Vol.68, No.2, 1989, 
pp.162 -177; Edward A. Kolodziej, Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, 1992, pp.421 -438. 
57 Booth, War, Security and Strategy', Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International 
Security, p.337. 
58 Booth, `War, Security and Strategy', Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International 
Security, p.337. 
59 Booth, War, Security and Strategy', Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International 
Security, p.28. 
60 Booth, `War, Security and Strategy', Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International 
Security, p.337. 
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Another scholar who could be included in this latter school is Barry Buzan 61 Buzan, 
rather like the neoliberal institutionalists, examines the `interplay between anarchy and 
interdependence' and argues that it is `the major framework within which thinking about 
international security has to take place'.62 Buzan claims that: 
The prospects for international security have to be located within the complex dialectic 
that results from the dividing tendencies or anarchy interacting with the binding ones of 
interdependence.63 
This argument and others indicate that Buzan endorses both anarchy and society. Buzan 
argues that `security communities' are `micro- demonstrations of what mature anarchy 
looks like' and indicative of the fact that some useful `norms are emerging as major 
elements of international society'.64 In this case it is the norm that `amongst major 
powers...wars...are no longer a desirable or fruitful way of settling differences'. 65 
Buzan's argument about `security communities' and `mature anarchy' rests on the 
assumption that there is an international context which consists of both anarchy and 
society -a society which, as he indicates, involves positive norms of behaviour based on 
cooperation between states. 
In a later work Buzan makes an implicit argument that is very similar to one explicitly 
made here, namely that `the logic of structural realism [shows J how international society 
can emerge as a natural product of the logic of anarchy' .C6 Hence although the purpose 
of Buzan's argument in this case is to show how international society can evolve from 
anarchy, his analysis indicates the co- existence of each is an important characteristic of 
the international context. 
61 Buzan claims he is a realist but his arguments go well beyond traditional realism. For Buzan's 
defence of his realist position see Buzan, `The Timeless Wisdom of Realism ?', in Smith, Booth 
and Zalewski (eds), International Theory. 
62 Barry Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible ?', in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy 
and International Security, pp.43 -44. 
63 Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible ?', in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, p.44 
64 Buzan, `Is International Security Possible ?', in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, p.50. 
65 Buzan, 
`Is International Security Possible ?', in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, p.50. 
66 Barry Buzan, `From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime 
Theory Meet the English School', International Organization, Vol.47, No.3, 1993, p.327. 
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Muthiah Alagappa also argues against single theory explanations saying that `the reality 
of international politics is complex and changing [and]...No single existing theory can 
adequately capture and generalise about all of reality'.67 For Alagappa, `the realist 
paradigm provides a good starting point for analysis' because some of the core 
assumptions, such as that `anarchy is the ordering principle', are highly relevant.6g But, 
he says that, in crucial ways, analysis and explanation [of realism] must be modified by 
insights provided by other theories'.69 In an edited volume on contemporary Asian 
security practices Alagappa concludes that `[i]nternational politics in Asia is now 
characterised not only by competition and conflict but also by cooperation and 
interdependence' .70 
This examination of the works of these three schools- Grotian, neoliberal institution- 
alism and the `new security' school -affirms two arguments: that explaining security 
often requires reference to more than one tradition; and that international security 
relations involve the co- existence of anarchy and society and competition and 
cooperation. These three literatures share enough in common to be described generically 
as a liberal realist perspective. The notion of international society is based on liberal 
assumptions about cooperation. Grotians conceptualise society in terms of liberal 
notions of constitutionalism and international law, Neoliberal institutionalists see it in 
terms of liberal notions of norms, rules and governing arrangements like regimes and 
institutions. And the new security school consider that society is found in `security 
communities' and `mature anarchy'. In all these cases the idea of society assumes that 
there will be cooperation between states.71 
The notion of anarchy, which all three schools share, is based on realist assumptions. 
Grotians conceptualise anarchy as a situation where there is always potential for warfare 
67 Muthiah Alagappa, `Rethinking Security. A Critical Review and Appraisal of the Debate', in 
Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford 
University Press, California, 1998, p.61. 
68 Alagappa, `Rethinking Security', Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice, p.62. 
69 Alagappa, `Rethinking Security', Alagappa (ed.), Asian. Security Practice, p.62. 
70 Alagappa, `Asian Practice of Security', in Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice, p.660. 
71 As Ian Clark argues, in the Grotian society, 'cooperation...is manifested in the institutions of 
international society such as diplomacy and international law'. See Clark, `Traditions of Thought 
and Classical Theories of International Relations', in Clark and Neumann (eds), Classical Theories 
of International Relations, p.5. 
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and where order is problematic. Neoliberal institutionalists see anarchy present in the 
dynamic of absolute gains and the use of power. And, the `new security' thinkers 
assume that the continuing need for military force confirms the presence of anarchy. In 
all cases the idea of anarchy assumes that there will be competition between states. The 
next step in the argument is to establish the extent to which, in addition to these views, 
these scholars have developed a broader worldview which may help to reveal their 
assumptions about security. 
THE LIBERAL -REALIST WORLDVIEW 
From the literature discussed so far, it seems that a liberal -realist worldview has several 
characteristics. The first two have already been made above but are reiterated for the 
sake of completeness. 
Complexity. The first assumption is that international relations, and any analysis of 
them, is too complex to explain from a single perspective. Martin Wight, according 
to Hedley Bull, was attracted to the Grotian tradition because it `was better able to 
accommodate complexity because it was itself a compromise that made concessions 
to both the Machiavellians and the Kantian points of view'.72 
The assumption of the co- existence of anarchy and society. The second charac- 
teristic, indeed the defining feature of a liberal -realist worldview is the argument by 
Grotian, neoliberal institutionalist and `new security thinking' scholars that the 
international environment is characterised by anarchy as well as society. This is a 
different view from that held by realists and liberals who tend to privilege either 
anarchy or society. 
Power /competition and common interests /cooperation. As a consequence of anarchy 
and society, a third characteristic of a liberal -realist worldview is that the use of 
power and competition co -exist with cooperation and common interests. Even E.H. 
Can, famous for being a realist, argued that both power and utopian thinking were 
necessary in international politics and in this way he too adopts a liberal -realist 
72 Hedley Bull, `Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations', in Wight, International 
Theory, p.xiv. 
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position.73 His critique of utopianism was based largely on his argument that 
utopianism failed, especially during the interwar period, because it did not take 
account of power. Moreover, Can argued that even utopians, ignorantly or 
knowingly, incorporated power into their practices. Like Can, a number of 
neoliberal institutionalists make the study of power a central focus of their analysis. 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, provide a qualified but firm endorsement of the 
centrality of power in international relations. To exchange realism, they say: 
[F]or an equally simple view -for instance, that military force is obsolete and 
economic interdependence benign -would condemn one to equally grave, though 
different errors.74 
Nonetheless, Keohane and Nye remain cautious about the resort to military power 
on the grounds that, `the use of force has become increasingly costly'.75 They also 
argue that `that military power dominates economic power' and disagree with those 
commercial liberals who claim that strong economic interdependence impedes 
war.76 But again they emphasise the risks of using military power. 77 
As mentioned above Keohane and Nye also point out that power and inter- 
dependence are connected. As neoliberal institutionalists, their key point was that: 
[N]ot that interdependence made power obsolete -far from it -but that patterns of 
interdependence and patterns of potential power in a given issue area are closely 
related -- indeed two sides of a single coin.78 
Indeed, they say `interdependence would not necessarily lead to cooperation...or that 
its consequences would automatically be benign' .79 In summary, their position in 
their major work, Power and Interdependence, was that: 
73 Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, p.95 -I45. 
74 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p.5. 
75 They suggest four conditions which explain why this has come to be: `risks of nuclear escalation; 
resistance by people in poor or weak countries; uncertain and possibly negative effects on the 
achievement of economic goals; and domestic opinion opposed to the costs of human costs of the 
use of force'. They conclude that such conditions have `erode[d] the hierarchy based on military 
power'. See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p.228. 
76 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p.16 -17. 
77 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p.16 -17. 
78 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.730. According to the authors, their 
widely discussed concept of `complex interdependence' was liberal one: but it was a hypothesis, an 
ideal type which contrasted with an ideal type of realism, and was not intended as an accurate 
description of world politics, see p.737. 
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We were cognisant of the realities of power, but did not regard military force as the 
chief source of power, nor did we regard security and relative position as the overriding 
goals of states.8° 
That liberal realists are serious about `the realities of power' is further shown by the 
fact that some neoliberal institutionalist scholars argue that power is not constrained 
to the international domain. Helen Milner argues that power is a feature, not just of 
interdependence between states and a common feature of international politics but 
also, of domestic politics. That power politics characterises both realms is for Milner 
an indication that the two realms cannot be easily separated -an argument many 
neorealist scholars would reject.81 As Milner puts it, `politics domestically and 
internationally is about balancing power' .82 
Barry Buzan goes even further. He argues that there is no reason `why the logic of 
power, self- interest and conflict cannot run in other sectors, nor indeed why the state 
should be seen as exclusively political',83 Buzan finds the `multi- sectoral part of the 
realist tradition represented by Can has more to offer to the future than that 
represented by either Morgenthau or Waltz'.84 Thus for Buzan, realism's privileging 
of `the military/political sector as opposed to the economic, societal or environ- 
mental ones' does not capture essence of international relations.85 In effect Buzan's 
and Milner's arguments extend realist tenets into sectors traditionally seen as liberal 
territory. 
But, while power is fundamental to number of relationships and entities, from the 
perspective of the liberal realist framework, it is usually exercised within limits. As 
Wight argues, in a Grotian society there are `moral and legal limits on the exercise 
79 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.730. 
80 Keohane and Nye, `Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.733. 
81 As Milner argues, `the radical separation between domestic and international politics [which 
neorealists have invokedl' is an oversimplification. See Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in 
International Relations Theory', p.85. 
82 Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory', p.80. 
83 Buzan, The Timeless Wisdom of Realism ?', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond, p.52. 
84 Buzan, The Timeless Wisdom of Realism ?', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond, p.52. 
85 Buzan, The Timeless Wisdom of Realism ?', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond, p.52. - 
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of power' provided, he says, by constitutionalism.86 Power in a liberal -realist 
framework is considered a factor rather than the factor which explains the way states 
behave: that is, while examining power is necessary it is not sufficient to explain 
how states behave. 
Mixed -motives. A fourth characteristic of a liberal -realist worldview which can be 
implied or derived from the assumption that anarchy and society co -exist is that 
states may have a number of motives. As some as security scholars, like Thomas 
Schelling, have argued the relations between states is often characterised by 
`strategic interdependence' and that as a result of this they exhibit `mixed - 
motives'.87 Neoliberal institutionalists, like Helen Milner, have made this 
observation that states having mixed- motives, a core element in theorising about 
economic interdependence.88 
Shifting interests. If the international context shifts between degrees of anarchy and 
society, then this suggests that a fifth characteristic of a liberal -realist worldview is 
that state interests also shift. While anarchy ensures that security achieved via 
military means is a major interest, so too is the expansion of society needed to 
ameliorate anarchy. For example, for Grotians, writing during the Cold War, the 
maintenance of sovereignty, through international law and diplomacy and the 
balance of power, was an important interest (not least for the perpetuation of 
society). By the time neoliberal institutionalists were publishing their theories, 
sovereignty appeared to be less threatened and thus relatively less important. It was 
evident to the neoliberal institutionalists that `dense' economic transnational 
processes were taking place across state borders and hence they stressed that state 
interests were concerned with liberal economic reform, via cooperation, regimes and 
institutions. These neoliberal scholars considered regimes in terms of mutual self - 
interest, and win -win outcomes. It appears that for liberal -realists, what constitutes 
self -interest and the way it is constituted is far more problematic than it is for strict 
86 Wight, 'Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, pp.104 -105. 
ß7 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963. 
es See Milner, `The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory', pp.82 -85. 
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realists and liberals.89 As Keohane argues, `the notion of self -interest is so elastic 
[that] we have to examine what the premise means rather than simply taking it for 
granted'.90 As other scholars, from the constructivist school, have argued, the extent 
to which international and domestic processes constitute the identities of actors and 
influence self -interests, rather than interests being determined just by structures, 
remains unclear in much of the literature.91 
Material and ideational factors. The sixth characteristic of the liberal -realist 
worldview is that both material and ideational factors are important for under- 
standing world politics. As Hedley Bull argues with regard to sovereignty: `[t]he 
sovereignty of states, both internal and external, may be said to exist at a normative 
and a factual level'.92 Liberal -realists emphasise that it is not just material elements, 
like military capabilities and trade, which help to determine and explain state 
behaviour but also shared norms. As Bull's definition of international society 
indicates `common values', `a common set of rules', and `common interests' are all 
critica193 Muthiah Alagappa is emphatic that `ideational factors together with 
material ones determine social reality'94 
Moderation. The seventh assumption of a liberal -realist worldview is that, in 
general, it is necessary to achieve a degree of balance between contending theories. 
The Grotian theorists adopt a middle way or `golden mean' between extremes of 
89 Many strict realists assume the prime, constant and universal interest of states is power maximising 
and relative gains in military capabilities. Many strict liberals assume a prime, constant and 
universal 'harmony of interests' among states, at least in some issues like commerce, or at some 
point in time. 
90 Robert O. Keohane, `Empathy and International Relations', in Jane J. Mansbridge (ed.) Beyond 
Self -Interest, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, p.227. 
91 See Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996. Katzenstein, examines the social, as 
opposed to material, construction of national security. He acknowledges that '[s]cholars [in the 
Grotian tradition] have not focused very explicitly on how norms construct states with specific 
identities and interests. But sociological imagery is strong in their work; it is not a great leap from 
arguing that adherence to norms is a condition of participation in a society to arguing that states are 
constructed, partly or substantially by these norms.' See p.15 and chapter on `Norms, Identity and 
Culture in National Security'. Also see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International 
Society, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996. 
92 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.8. See fn above. See also Alexander Wendt, `Anarchy is What 
States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, Vol.46, 
No.2, 1992, pp.391 -425. 
93 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.13. 
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Machiavelli and Kant or between the realist and revolutionist traditions and they 
support the rule -of -law. The neoliberal institutionalists steer a way between realism 
and liberalism and support a range of social arrangements, ranging from informal 
`expectations of behaviour' to formal rules, which are administrated by regimes and 
institutions. The implication is that practitioners should be encouraged to `balance' 
competing interests and in security areas, to cooperate within `margins of safety' 
(see later reference to Tit for Tat strategies). 
Apparent contradictions and paradoxes. Finally, if the liberal -realist worldview 
involves anarchy and society, then from the perspective of single theory proponents, 
it must also be seen as embodying contradiction and paradox. Indeed, many of the 
ideas and terms used by the scholars grouped as liberal -realists seem to 
acknowledge that there are `apparent' contradictions between the two points of view 
they embrace: for example, there are many references to notions such as `via 
medias', `middle ways', `golden means', `straddling', `faltering between', 
`synthesising' and 'integrating'.95 All these terms point to a worldview which takes 
account of apparent contradictions and paradoxes. In essence it is a worldview 
which, as Wight suggested (see above), straddles the frontiers of different theories 
and entities: for example, between realism and liberalism; anarchy and society; 
competition and cooperation; enmity and amity; pessimism and optimism, rational 
interests and passions,96 interdependence and sovereignty; uncertainty and certainty; 
and unpredictability and predictability.97 
94 Alagappa, 'Asian Practice of Security', in Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice, p.655. 
95 The first four terms are used by Wight and the last two by Keohane and Nye. "Faltering between' 
is used by Andrew Wyatt -Walter who considers, inter alia, the `complex view of human nature' 
held by Adam Smith (usually seen as a 'commercial liberal') to explain that in fact Smith `falters 
between realism and liberalism' and provides 'a bridge between economic liberalism and the realist 
and mercantilist traditions of thought'. See Andrew Wyatt-Walter, `Adam Smith and the Liberal 
Tradition', Review of International Studies, Vol.22, No.1, January 1996, p.17, 
96 As Wyatt -Smith's study of Adam Smith work shows, `citizens have passions as well as economic 
interests'. See Wyatt -Walter, `Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition', p.17. This was an argument 
underlying Adam Smith's claim that 'neither democracy nor commerce might ensure peace'. 
97 The liberal -realist perspective seems to reflect Jung's view of `the paradoxical soul of man': 'But 
things that fall hopelessly apart in theory lie close together without contradiction in the paradoxical 
soul of man'. See Carl Gustav Jung, Freud and Psychoanalysis, CW 4, p.756. 
222 
Liberal - Realist Assumptions About Security 
LIBERAL -REALIST SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS 
What then are the implications of the broad liberal- realist worldview for security? In 
particular, what might be the answers to the questions: security of what, from what, and 
by what means? Although it is being argued here that there is a Iiberal- realist 
worldview, scholars in the three schools have not explicitly examined the answers to 
these questions. Providing these answers is one the tasks of this thesis. 
Security of what? 
All the liberal- realist scholars discussed so far appear to assume the state is 
conditionally the primary object of security.98 Several points need to be made about the 
conditionality of the state in liberal -realist thinking. First, most scholars assume that the 
purpose and justification of the state as a political unit is grounded in individuals, and 
that its duty is to represent the collective of individuals within its frontiers. Bull argues 
that: 
[Title ultimate units of the great society of all mankind are not states (or nations, tribes, 
empires, classes or parties), hut individual human beings which are permanent and 
indestructible in a sense which groupings of them of this or that sort, are not. This is the 
moment of international relations, but the question of world order arises whatever the 
political and social structure of the globe.99 
Martin Wight, has a similar view and approvingly quotes Westlake's argument that, in 
the society of states `states are its immediate, men its ultimate members. The duties and 
rights of states are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them'.100 And, as 
Cutler points out, Wight `subject[s] the primacy of the state to the moral and legal 
restraints embodied in international society' .an 
For the neoliberal institutionalists, states are the key elements in regimes, but neoliberal 
institutionalists' understanding of the relationship between the state and the individual 
citizen is often unclear. According to Cutler, regime theorists like Puchala and Hopkins 
98 Barry Buzan, it is argued by some, has recently moved from emphasising the state to stressing 
society as the object of security. See Bill McSweeny, `Identity and Security: Buzan and the 
Copenhagen School', Review of International Studies, Vol.22, No.1, 1996, pp.81 -93. 
99 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.22. 
too Quoted in Wight, 'Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, 
p.102. 
tot Cutler, The Grotian Tradition in International Relations', p.53. 
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note that `individuals as bureaucratic units are often the real players in regime creation 
and maintenance'.102 Nonetheless, Cutler argues that regime theorists, `do not suggest 
that subnational units or individuals are recognised as having any special status or 
holding any special rights in international relations.103 But other regime scholars seem to 
support the view that individuals provide the ultimate purpose of states and regimes. 
Keohane, for example, makes the general argument that, `the analysis of social 
reality...begins with individuals as the relevant actors' and it `seeks to understand how 
organisations composed of aggregations of individuals interact' .104 From these accounts 
of both the Grotian and neoliberal instutionalists scholars it seems clear that from a 
liberal -realist perspective, the primacy of the security of the state, particularly from 
external anarchy, is not perceived as being, in principle, at odds with the security of the 
individuals within it.1o5 Although the assumption of an identity of interest between state 
and citizen assumes that states are in some sense answerable to their citizens, which is 
often not the case. 
Although most of these scholars see states as representing individuals few of then have 
explored the consequences of taking the individual as the equal referent object of 
security. Bull, for one, seems to side step the implications of referring to the individual. 
He is in fact unconvinced that individuals should be entitled to address their insecurity 
through claims for `human rights'. Bull believes that the pursuit of human rights -the 
security of the individual -vis a vis the state is dangerous because it risks subverting the 
state. He argues that: 
[Clarried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under 
international law is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organised 
as society -of states.to6 
102 Cutler, `The Grotian Tradition in International Relations', p.61. 
103 Cutler, `The Grotian Tradition in International Relations', p.61. 
104 Robert O. Keohane, 'International Liberalism Reconsidered', in John Dunn (ed.), The Economic 
Limits of Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.172. 
105 The argument here is not that strict realists and certainty not strict liberals do not consider the 
individual. Rather it is that the realist starts with the state and goes backward to the individual 
while the liberal starts with the individual and ends with the state. The liberal -realist tries to 
balance the interests of the individual and the state and is influenced by the context rather than 
universal principles. 
106 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.152. 
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Bull seems to assume that the security of individuals is best assured by maintaining the 
society of states. 
Wight is more receptive than Bull to a conception of international law that recognises 
individuals and non -state actors.107 But he too still seems to see individual human 
security best achieved in the society of states. Having made the state the referent object 
of security on the grounds that it represents the individuals within, many of these 
scholars fail to address the question of states that are illegitimate in the eyes of their 
citizens. That is, they fail to address those situations when states do not merely fail to 
protect their citizens, but may actively oppress them. 
Muthiah Alagappa, a third wave liberal realist, grapples with this issue. He argues 
that the `political community - presently the nation -state is the primary security 
referent',108 but that any conceptualisation of security, in Asia at least, has to take 
account of the `problematic nature of the state and the presence of other security 
referents, some of which may compete with the existing state',109 Overall then, the 
liberal realist literature suggests that the state is the referent object, conditional upon it 
performing the task that legitimises it, namely protection of the individuals within. 
Security from what? 
The liberal realist approach to security is state -centric in that it assumes the most 
serious threat to the state is from external military violence. The first wave of liberal 
realists were most concerned about the risks of conventional and nuclear conflict, 
particularly in Europe. However, the third wave of liberal realist security scholars, 
writing in the 1990s, assume that the threat of war, at least between major powers, is 
decreasingly probable. In other words, that society not anarchy is the dominant 
characteristic between the major powers. This latter view has several implications for 
liberal realist assumptions about security. 
[07 
108 
109 
Wight, `Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, p.102. 
Alagappa, `Conceptualising Security. Hierarchy and Conceptual Traveling', in Alagappa (ed.), 
Asian Security Practice, p.679. 
Alagappa, `Conceptualising Security. Hierarchy and Conceptual Traveling', in Alagappa (ed.), 
Asian Security Practice, p.681. 
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The first is that the most devastating but yet the most remote threat to the state's 
survival, nuclear war, still has to be addressed. That is, unless nuclear weapons are 
eliminated, nuclear deterrence must still be supported. The second implication is that, 
although external military violence and the use of military force remains the key threat 
to the state, other threats to the survival of the state may be more probable. Fred Riggs 
points to the internal domain of states, where there is organised armed violence between 
the state and its citizens and between groups of citizens within the same state 
boundaries. "° Other scholars point to additional causes of conflict. For Buzan the 
state's survival is not just concerned with power politics, self -interest and conflict in the 
military/political sectors outside and inside the state but also in the economic, social and 
environmental sectors."' Nonetheless, like many scholars making this argument, Buzan 
does not make it clear whether or not insecurity in such `sectors' is indeed a potential 
cause of military conflict between or within states, or whether it is another type of 
insecurity which could threaten the state, or whether it is both. For example, is economic 
insecurity a cause of military conflict or is it a another type of threat to the survival of 
the state or both? Buzan's argument requires further conceptualisation of the notion of 
threat. 
Another third wave liberal -realist, Muthiah Alagappa, has made some progress in this 
respect. He too argues that security goes `beyond the concern with international military 
threat to the political survival of the state' .112 He also suggests that the content of 
political survival should be `deepened and broadened' to accommodate `contested and 
multiple referents and a broad range of values, threats and coping strategies, and must 
110 
111 
112 
Riggs, `Thoughts About Neoìdealism vs Realism', pp.1 -6. Also see Buzan, People, States and 
Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 2nd edition, 1991; and Alagappa, Asian Security 
Practice. 
Buzan, `The Timeless Wisdom of Realism ?', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), International 
Theory' Positivism and Beyond; Buzan, People, States and Fear; Buzan, `Is International Security 
Possible ?', in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security; `New Patterns 
of Global Security in the Twenty -first Century', International Affairs, Vol.63, No.3, 1991, pp.431- 
451; Buzan, 'From International System to International Society', pp.327 -352. 
Alagappa, 'Conceptualising Security. Hierarchy and Conceptual Traveling', in Alagappa (ed.), 
Asian Security Practice, p.677. For Alagappa, security is concerned with the core value of political 
survival, comprehensively defined, of the community [n addition, Alagappa, argues that although 
`political survival constitutes the nucleus', conceptions of security `must also accommodate serious 
challenges to the well -being of the community' (p.697). 
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include both the internal and international levels'.113 Importantly, Alagappa attempts to 
establish some criteria for judging `threats' to the political survival of the community. 
He argues that if any factor, for example an `ideational challenge',114 is considered by 
the `authoritative decision makers' of the community to be a value that is vital to the 
survival of the community and, in addition, an `urgent' challenge to its survival, then 
this is what constitutes a threat to security.115 
Although this argument clarifies what can be considered a threat it too has problems, 
which the author acknowledges in part.116 Unless the notion of a threat can be defined 
without reference to what is deemed to be an urgent and vital value to the survival of the 
community by those in charge then it is a relative and circular definition. By this 
account, if the authoritative decision makers considered health to be a vital value for the 
survival of the community, and it was being challenged urgently (by, say, an AIDS 
epidemic), then this would constitute a security threat. Furthermore, if health/AIDS is a 
security threat then the means to achieve it, e.g., safe -sex and/or sexual abstinence, are 
also a security matter. Intellectually this seems unsatisfactory. Hence this charac- 
terisation of `threat' might be improved not just by moving away from relative 
definitions but also by considering the practical measures for addressing security 
problems. It appears from this discussion that third wave liberal- realists have `deepened 
and broadened' the notion of threat but have yet to give convincing reasons for its new 
boundaries. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily weaken their status as Iiberal- realists 
since they still give priority to the state and to external and internal political violence, 
whereas many others who seek to re- conceptualise security do not (see fn 56). 
The means to achieving security? 
If for liberal -realists the external context is one of anarchy and society, of enmity and 
amity, then logically the security of the state must involve both military and non -military 
113 Alagappa, `Conceptualising Security. Hierarchy and Conceptual Traveling', in Alagappa (ed.), 
Asian Security Practice, p.683. 
114 Alagappa, `Conceptualising Security. Hierarchy and Conceptual Traveling', in Alagappa (ed.), 
Asian Security Practice, pp.684 -685. 
115 Alagappa, `Conceptualising Security. Hierarchy and Conceptual Traveling', in Alagappa (ed.), 
Asian Security Practice, pp.690 -691. 
116 Alagappa, 
`Conceptualising Security. Hierarchy and Conceptual Traveling', in Alagappa (ed.), 
Asian Security Practice, pp.690 -693. 
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measures. Wight argues that in an international society of states `the distribution of 
power is the central preoccupation...but it is not possible to say that concern for the 
social and moral order are excluded' )17 As a first wave scholar writing when military 
threats were not only the most devastating but also perceived to be the most likely threat 
to the survival of the state the measures which Wight stresses are, the distribution of 
power or the balance of power among the major states and self- defence. But he also 
emphasises that diplomacy and international Iaw and norms are equally important. 
Balance of power 
With respect to the balance of power, Wight argues that it is an arrangement which is 
embedded in a society where `the majority of states can agree on a broad comparative 
estimate of international power, and can co- operate in a common policy to maintain 
it'.118 In this version of balance of power the highly competitive aspects of `offensive 
realism' are modified because the arrangement is embedded not just in anarchy but, 
more importantly, explicitly in society. Wight's balance of power expressly requires 
cooperation and a distribution of power which appears to resemble a concert of power. 
HedIey Bull, contends that the balance of power is a term we cannot do without, but that 
power balancing in practice is far from being an inevitable tendency among states, as 
many realists would maintain.19 Bull indicates that balance of power arrangements may 
be conditional rather then inevitable and he is cautious about their security enhancing 
effects. He, like Stanley Hoffmann,120 argues that in a context that consists of bipolarity, 
nuclear weapons and economic interdependence, attempts to balance power are of 
dubious value and are of little use to states which are not great powers.121 
In general the third wave security scholars do not have developed views on balance of 
power arrangements, or for that matter alliances. Barry Buzan seems to take a fait 
117 Wight, `Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, p.103. 
118 Wight, 
`Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, p.103. 
119 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp.101 -126. Bull adopts Vattel's definition that a balance of power 
is `a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay 
down the law' (p.101). 
120 Stanley Hoffmann argues that `the balance of power is not a relevant mechanism in the new arenas 
of world politics'. See Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, Mc Graw -Hill, New York, 1978, 
pp.168 -177. 
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accompli attitude to the balance of power. He makes the observation that the 'anarchic 
structure can only be maintained by a balance of power' and that `the two are effectively 
opposite sides of the same coin'.122 His view that `the balance of power will by 
definition last as long as the international anarchy' suggests that power balancing is 
inevitable and in this respect is different from Bull's.123 However, Buzan thinks that the 
type of polarity is important and that whether or not the international system is bipolar 
or multipolar affects important strategic issues like deterrence, alliances, and arms 
control.124 
It would seem that, given the liberal -realist assumption that anarchy and society 
constitutes the international environment, an argument can be made that prescriptions 
for a balance of power arrangement would depend on the conditions at the time. In such 
a context evidence of overt aggression could be the only motive for establishing a 
balance of power arrangement. If a state seeks more military power than others because 
it is fearful of attack but this fear is misplaced then the best response from other states is 
give reassurance that that fear is unwarranted. Reassurance could be given via political 
and military means, such as common security approaches, particularly transparency and 
confidence building. If on the other hand a state seeks military power because it has 
aggressive intentions, manifest as offensive doctrine, declarations, and military 
capabilities and general mobilisation, then this state is not insecure and will not respond 
to reassurance measures. In this case it may be necessary to balance the power of the 
would -be aggressor with power. For liberal -realists the balance of power is a 
conditional arrangement. As Bull argues it is not an inevitable tendency.125 
Alliances 
Balance of power arrangements may sometimes involve alliances. However Wight, 
unlike the realists, emphasised the varied forms and utility of these arrangements. 
According to Wight: 
121 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp.101 -126. 
122 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.165. 
123 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.165. 
124 Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp.165 -166. 
125 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.112. 
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Alliances are as various as friendships in their character, their purpose, their occasion, 
their duration, the relative position of those who make them. The oldest classification is 
into equal and unequal, according to the relative status and power of the allies. They 
can be wartime or peacetime, offensive or defensive, political or economic, permanent 
or temporary, bilateral or multilateral.126 
Clearly, Wight's notion of alliances is not necessarily linked to balance of power 
arrangements. However, like many other scholars, including Bull, he did not fully 
develop his idea of alliances as means to achieving security. 
As indicated above third wave scholars have little to say about alliances. For Buzan, the 
establishment of an alliance policy is usually part of the balance of power. Given his 
views above about the inevitability of balance of power arrangements under anarchy its 
likely that he sees alliances in the same way. However, the concern he has about 
alliances is that they are `more in line with the national security strategy of increasing 
strength and reducing vulnerability than they are with an international strategy aimed at 
reducing threats' .127 For liberal -realists then it is likely that alliances, like balance of 
power arrangements, are measures to be taken under specific conditions.128 But 
importantly, as Wight indicates, the uses of alliances extend well beyond security 
guarantees. 
Self -help 
Apart from conditional support for balance of power and alliance arrangements as 
means to achieving security, liberal -realists support self- defence and the use force, 
though again there are several qualifications. Wight argues that: 
[I]nternational society has a right of self- defence and of coercion. If its common 
standards are challenged, they may be defended and reimposed by force; and if the 
distribution of power is threatened it may be restored by force.129 
Furthermore, with respect to self- defence he suggests that: 
126 Martin Wight, 'Alliances', in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbrand (eds), Martin Wight: Power 
Politics, Leicester University Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p.122. 
127 Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp.336 -337. 
128 This contrasts to the approach in realism, or at least offensive realism, which considers balance of 
power and alliances as the prime and perhaps only measures for ensuring security: since anarchy is 
the constant and dominant condition which always requires some form of power balancing 
approach For the realist the costs of attempting to balance of power and establishing alliances 
appear to be less than the costs of anarchy. 
129 Wight, 'Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, p.104. 
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[T]he exercise of this self -defence and coercion is most fully justified when it is 
undertaken by the members of international society collectively, or by a majority of 
them, or by any one of them with the authorisation of the others.13o 
Wight's emphasis on self- defence is a major theme of third wave security scholars from 
the `new security' school. For some, like Ken Booth, self -defence is seen as an element 
of `common security'. In this context, self- defence can provide reassurance that pre- 
emptive offensive strategies will not be undertaken and that uncertainty, arising from the 
difficulty of knowing if weapons and platforms are `offensive' and `defensive', is 
reduced. As Buzan argues, common security: 
[S]eeks to combine the self -reliance, self -preservation imperatives of anarchy with the 
idea that the only rational approach to security under contemporary political, military, 
economic and environmental conditions is through the logic of interdependence....Its 
advocates are realist in that they accept the need to work within the existing anarchic 
political framework, and the idealist in that they see plenty of room for improving 
international security within the limits set by the prevailing conditions in the system.131 
Self- defence within common security contrasts with those realist -only approaches that 
purposely or inadvertently make states insecure.132 
Collective security 
Collective security is another approach to security conditionally supported by liberal - 
realists. Wight makes it clear in the quote above that the use of force is `most fully 
justified when it is undertaken by members of international society collectively'. Wight 
locates collective security as a means to achieving security within a discussion about 
power and considers it to be the `institutionalisation of the balance of power'.133 As he 
argues, with respect to the League of Nations, `the possibility of collective security 
constantly came back to the balance of power on which the League was based.' 134 It is 
likely that for liberal -realists the idea that threats are indivisible to a collective of states, 
that an attack on one is an attack on all and calls for a collective response, is only 
130 Wight, `Western Values', in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, p.104 -105. 
131 Buzan, `Is International Security Possible ?', in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, p.44. 
132 Deliberately by declarations, force structures and deployments which support `peace through 
strength' strategies: i.e., offensive strategies to attack pre- emptively and/or attack home territory. 
And inadvertently, either as a consequence of seeking relative strength and creating a security 
dilemma, or as a result of unintended escalation during a crisis. 
133 Wight, International Theory, p.277. 
134 Wight, 
`Alliances', in Bull and Holbrand (eds), Martin Wight: Power Politics, p.209. 
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plausible under clear cut empirical conditions (as was the case in the Gulf War). The 
cost and benefit analysis is too difficult to make in advance and in the abstract to 
unconditionally endorse collective security.135 
Security regimes, security communities, multilateralism, security cooperation 
Apart from the competitive and military means discussed above the other critical means 
involved in a liberal realist approach to security are those based on cooperation with 
other states. The aim behind these means is to further develop elements of society. 
Buzan argues that such arrangements as, `cooperative regimes', can indeed, `form new 
perceptions of the national security problems'.136 Security regimes take account of the 
interdependence between states and aim to provide a governing arrangement which is 
based on norms and rules -which will hopefully increase the prospects of society and 
thereby decrease anarchy. The 1970 -80s security regime literature originally focused on 
the interdependencies which made nuclear deterrence possible and on the development 
of common rules and conventions which would potentially improved stability.137 
Scholars applied these regime principles to analyse a range of practical arrangements for 
improving security:138 such as the Conference on Security and Confidence in Europe 
(CSCE), Anti -Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Non -Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Incidents at Sea Arrangements (INCSEAs), 
and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
Some of the principles underpinning regimes, such as norms, underpin another liberal 
realist approach to security, that of `security communities' among states. Barry Buzan, 
135 According to John Ruggie `what is distinctive about a collective -security scheme is that it 
comprises, as Sir Arthur Slater put it a half -century ago, a permanent potential alliance "against the 
unknown enemy" -and he should have added, in behalf of the unknown victim.' See, John Gerard 
Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, Columbia 
University Press, 1993, p.11. Liberal realists are reluctant to commit themselves in advance to 
such abstractions as `a permanent potential alliance' against an unknown enemy and victim. 
136 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.380. 
137 See for example, Joseph S. Nye, `Nuclear Learning and US Soviet Security Regimes', 
International Organization, Vol.41, No.3, 1987, pp.371 -402. 
138 See for example, Manfred Zurn, `Preventing War in Europe Through Confidence- and Security - 
Building Measures ?', in Volker Rittberger (ed.), International Regimes in East -West Politics, 
Pinter, London, 1990, pp.117 -150; Harald Muller, `The Internationalization of Principles, Norms 
and Rules by Governments: the Case of Security Regimes', in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime 
Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, pp.361 -388. 
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uses this term to refer to groups of states where there is `a norm that wars between them 
are no longer a desirable or fruitful way of settling differences'. 139 The United States 
and Canada, the Nordic countries, the European Community, and, with qualifications, 
ASEAN, are given as examples. 
MultilateraIism is of course inherent to regimes and institutions. Grotian scholars, like 
Bull, tended to consider states as the prime institution needed for international order but 
he clearly endorsed international institutions like international law.140 Other types of 
multilateral institutions, like the UN and the International Monetary Fund are discussed 
by the Grotian scholars in a fairly an agnostic way, though they were critical of the UN's 
role in collective security.141 The important point that Bull stresses in these discussions 
about institutions is that they provide not just an organisational and administrative 
machinery but `a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common 
goals',142 This view, underpins the neoliberal institutionalists argument that institutions 
are `persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe 
behaviour' and facilitate cooperation.143 In effect the liberal- realists support both the 
machinery and the norm of multilateralism, though they do not go as far as the liberal 
scholar John Ruggie (see the previous chapter). 
Cooperation is without doubt an important aspect of the liberal -realist approach, though 
the mechanisms underpinning it are not well explored by most scholars. One group of 
scholars, located among the regime theorists, who do examine the process of 
cooperation are the game theorists. An important concept in the game theory literature is 
`reciprocity' and it is the central feature of the strategy Tit for Tat in the game Prisoner's 
Dilemma.144 Work done by Robert Axelrod on Tit for Tat shows, according to Charles 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
Buzan, `Is International Security Possible ?', in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, pSO. Buzan also refers to `security complexes' which are regional security 
sub -systems where there are `patterns of amity/enmity that are substantially confined within some 
particular geographic area'. See Buzan, People, States and Fear, Chapter 5 and p.190. 'Security 
communities' suggest groups of states where amity more than enmity is evident. 
Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp.71 -74. 
Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.146. 
Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.74. 
Robert O. Keohane, `Multilateralism: an Agenda for Research', International Journal, Vol.XLV, 
No.4, Autumn, 1990, p.732. 
See among his extensive work on this subject, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 
Basic Books, New York, 1984. 
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Lipson, that if the time horizon is long enough, then the best strategy for individual 
actors is some initial generosity (that is, cooperating unilaterally on the first move), 
followed by tough -minded reciprocity' or retaliating each time the other player 
defects.145 Axelrod and Keohane argue that: 
[T]his argument suggests that governments may have incentives to practice reciprocity 
in a variety of situations that are characterised by mixtures of conflicting and comple- 
mentary interests.146 
A major benefit of Tit for Tat strategy is that it allows for cooperation to take place 
within `margins of safety': that is, without a state becoming vulnerable. It appears to be 
a classic liberal -realist approach in that it involves both cooperation and coercion. 
Cooperation and competition 
The liberal- realist means to achieving security obviously involves both competition and 
cooperation and this is seen to enhance security. As Muthiah Alagappa argues: 
Competition, cooperation and community building are relevant in the pursuit of 
security. Cooperative strategies can be useful in mitigating the international security 
dilemma under certain conditions and possibly even overcoming it, leading to the 
formation of pluralistic security communities... 
But self -help is not unimportant. Often a combination of approaches and instruments 
will have to be deployed.147 
The key to understanding the means to achieving security in liberalism -realism is, as 
Alagappa argues, `a combination of approaches and instruments'. 
Finally, although the emphasis in this discussion has been on both the competitive and 
cooperative military aspects of security, a liberal -realist framework incorporates non- 
military measures which support and expand society. Regimes, both globally and 
regionally, have already been mentioned and so has norms and multilateralism, but 
equally important is international law and diplomacy. 
145 Charles Lipson, International Cooperation, in Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p.65. 
146 Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, `Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy', in Baldwin, 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p.104. 
147 Alagappa, `Rethinking Security. A Critical Review and Appraisal of the Debate', in Alagappa 
(ed.), Asian Security Practice, p.64. 
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CONCLUSION 
What then does a liberal- realist analytical framework contribute to efforts to explain the 
security assumptions underpinning state security policy? What has it achieved that the 
other approaches have not and where are the gaps and tensions? (See Table 5.1.) To 
reiterate an earlier point, the literature examined in the last chapter showed that 
assumptions about security are derived from two different, single theories - realism and 
liberalism. The dominant explanation of security is based on realist assumptions -a 
single perspective, albeit with variants. On the rarer occasions that security explanations 
are based on liberal assumptions it is, again, from that single perspective. But since each 
theory is based on different approaches to security this means that an explanation that 
involves both theories would be contradictory from the perspective of either theory. 
It is argued that the literature examined in this chapter suggests an approach that 
incorporates both theories. and is not necessarily contradictory. The assumptions about 
security that underpin this literature have not previously been investigated, or at least not 
from the perspective of the three questions which are used in this thesis to explore 
realist and liberal assumptions. It is also a literature whose assumptions have not been 
previously examined in a systematic way and organised into a framework that could be 
used to analyse security policies. The liberal- realist framework, which is constructed for 
this purpose, provides a different approach to explaining security. Although it appears to 
be paradoxical from a single theory perspective it overcomes the narrowness and 
presumably the inadequacies of single theory explanations. 
The liberal -realist perspective is based on two concepts -anarchy and society-and 
both are needed to explain the international context in which states operate. Anarchy 
and society are the key concepts in realism and liberalism respectively. In this context 
the state is the primary object of security, but it is assumed that it provides for the 
security of individuals. Indeed, the society of states is seen as the best arrangement for 
the security of individuals. Thus the liberal- realist perspective privileges both the state 
and the individual, though, as discussed above, not without some difficulty. Most 
Grotian first wave scholars assumed the ideal state was a one based on Western notions 
of statehood that represented the interests of, and was based on, the consent of 
individual citizens. Although the state and individuals are both to be protected, the first 
wave scholars did not examine the security of individuals from the state, only from 
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Table 5.1 Explanatory literatures simplified 
WORLD 
VIEW 
REALISM 
Anarchy 
International politics is a 
struggle for power 
Constant competition 
between states 
Relative gains 
Pessimism 
* Defensive realists have 
more modified 
worldviews 
SECURITY OF The state and territory 
SECURITY FROM Military threats to the state 
MEANS FOR ACHIEVING 
SECURITY 
Military means 
Self -help 
Balance of power 
Alliances 
LIBERALISM 
Society 
Cooperation is possible 
between states 
Interdependence 
Prospects for progress 
Optimism 
Individuals, society, state 
Depends on the variant of 
liberalism 
Threats to the safety and 
welfare of individuals from 
the state; economic well 
being of the state 
Mostly non -military means 
Development of society 
Diplomacy 
International iaw 
Institutions 
Multilateralfsm 
Regimes 
CBMs 
Economic regimes 
Economic 
interdependence 
Republican liberals 
consider the use of force 
THE LIBERAL- REALIST 
FRAMEWORK 
Anarchy and society 
Competition and 
cooperation 
Enmity and amity 
Power and 
interdependence 
Optimism and pessimism 
via medias, straddling, 
middle ways 
The state and individuals 
Military threats to the 
state; political violence 
towards individuals within 
the state; non -military 
threats to the state 
Military and non -military 
means 
Competition and 
cooperation 
Self -help 
Conditional balance of 
power arrangements and 
alliances 
Institutions 
Regimes 
Multilateral arrangements 
CBMs 
Diplomacy 
International law 
external threats. Most of these scholars were uncritical of the sovereign state as a unit 
within the international context and its internal relation with individuals- indeed they 
seemed to have assumed a unitary and liberal nation state. Nonetheless, even though 
they failed to examine the security of individuals within the state, the important relation 
between the state and individual was acknowledged. 
The third wave, or the `new security' scholars, took a more critical view of the state and 
examined its internal dynamics: in particular, those situations where organised violence 
between the state and its citizens and between groups of citizens within the state 
occurred. Many took the view that more people are killed by their own governments 
than by wars between states. In comparison to single theory explanations the liberal - 
realist framework emphasises that both the state and individuals are the referent security 
objects, notwithstanding the difficulties above. 
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The focus on two referent objects means that threats are more varied. The first wave 
scholars looked mostly at the international political/military dimensions of state security 
and the second and third wave scholars extended the idea of anarchy to other sectors, for 
example, to security issues in the domestic realm, economic relations and the 
environment. Notwithstanding, these forays into other sectors, the main threats were 
seen to arise from the effects of anarchy on the one hand, military competition and the 
threat or the use of force between states; and on the other hand, violent competition and 
the organised use of force within the state, either by the state or between groups within 
the state. The liberal realist framework adds to the analysis of security issues by 
focusing on the threat or use of force from both external and internal sources. 
The means proposed by a liberal realist framework include military and non -military 
means and involve competitive and cooperative measures. Thus the means involve both 
realist and liberal strategies. The objective, survival of the state through management of 
anarchy and building society, often means that `contradictory' strategies are advocated. 
To summarise the means advocated by Liberal realists. The first wave of Grotian 
scholars stressed societal norms, rules, international law, institutions and diplomacy as 
well as the use of force for self- defence and conditional balance (equilibrium) of power 
arrangements. The second wave of neoliberal institutionalists examined the conditions 
under which cooperation, as a means of building society, was possible and the extent to 
which power was involved. They found webs of interdependency between states, which 
involved both power politics and cooperation. They argued that the security of states 
was improved through building regimes of rules and norms and institutions, to 
ameliorate the effects of anarchy. Cooperation could be facilitated, they said, by 
reward/punishment Tit for Tat strategies -a classic liberal realist strategy mixing both 
cooperation and coercion. The third wave of liberal realists advocated both competitive 
and cooperative means to achieving security. On the one hand, self -help strategies which 
did not undermine the security of non - threatening others and, on the other hand, 
cooperative security measures, such as CBMs and transparency. Liberal realist means 
can be distinguished from other strictly liberal or realist prescriptions by the fact that 
they could be combined, that no one approach was privileged, but is determined by the 
context. The ongoing intention being to build societal elements, albeit within margins of 
safety, to counter anarchy. 
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To summarise the main points about the liberal -realist perspective: 
it assumes an international context of anarchy and society 
the state is the object of security, but, since this is conditional on its relation with 
individuals within it means that both the state and the individual are the objects of 
security 
the state and individuals within seek security primarily, though not exclusively, from 
the effects of anarchy, and particularly from the use of force by other states and by 
the state against its citizens 
the state's survival depends on managing the effects of anarchy and sustaining the 
ameliorating effects of society on it 
the means to achieving security involve both competition and cooperation. On the 
one hand, self -help, alliances, the use of force, balancing power and on the other 
hand, cooperative measures, norms, multilateralism, and institutions. These means 
are often applied concurrently 
the liberal -realist perspective appears to be paradoxical from a single framework 
perspective 
this apparent paradoxical approach distinguishes the liberal -realist perspective from 
the other two traditions: from realism which privileges the state, anarchy, 
competition, power -politics, relative gains, self -interest; and from liberalism which 
privileges the individual, society, cooperation; and common interests 
this approach is an advance on single theory explanations but has yet to be applied 
empirically 
In conclusion, the liberal -realist perspective makes a substantial contribution towards 
the meaning of security. Notwithstanding the flaws in the framework,148 it will, I hope, 
provide another option for explaining the security assumptions that underpin Australia's 
security policy. 
148 The liberal--realist perspective needs to further develop the intellectual justification for some of its 
assumptions. For example, the relation between the state and individuals needs to be developed to 
show the theoretical justification for why states and individuals are equal as referents of security. 
And, if this is the case, why threats seem to be limited to those that concern violence. After all, 
some argue that, `security threats' to the survival of the state and individuals involve such issues as 
environmental degradation and AIDS. 
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Chapter Six 
EXPLAINING LABOR'S SECURITY POLICY IN THEORETICAL TERMS: 
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
[Tlhe greatest political writers in international theory almost 
all straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions.). 
(Martin Wight, Political Theorist, 1965.) 
You are always trying to sandwich yourself between the lessons of the past, which 
shows the world is a very dangerous place and you need a lot of armed forces to keep 
yourself safe, and hopes for the future that you might be able to construct an 
international order in which armed force isn't necessary.2 
(Hugh White, Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence, 
Department of Defence, February 1999.) 
Two main arguments have been made in Parts One and Two of this thesis. First, that 
under Labor Australia adopted a security policy which was based on principles of, on 
the one hand, `security against' and competition, and on the other hand, `security with' 
and cooperation. And second, that a review of the IR security literature suggests that 
there are three different theoretical literatures - realism, liberalism and the liberal realist 
perspective -for explaining the security assumptions of the policy. 
This third part of the thesis examines which of the three can best explain Australia's 
security policy. It consists of two chapters. This chapter examines the documentary and 
empirical evidence discussed in Part One. The next chapter canvasses the non - 
documentary evidence obtained directly from policy makers through interviews and a 
questionnaire. 
In brief, I will argue in this chapter that neither liberalism nor realism alone cannot 
explain Australia's overall security policy. Australia's mainly, but not exclusively, 
realist policy of defence of Australia and the alliance, is juxtaposed with the liberal 
realist policy of regional cooperation with its strong emphasis on liberalism. The 
2 
Martin Wight, International Theory: the Three Traditions (eds), Gabriella Wight and Brain Porter, 
Leicester University Press/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991, p.259. 
Quoted in Geoffrey Barker, `Smoke Horizon', The Australian Financial Review Magazine, 
February edition, 1997, p.26. 
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liberal realist framework that incorporates both realism and liberalism best explains 
Labor's overall security policy. 
EXPLAINING AUSTRALIA'S `SECURITY AGAINST' POLICY: DEFENCE OF 
AUSTRALIA 
As Chapter One has shown, several points can be made about the defence of Australia 
policy under Labor. First, that security policy should concern the military defence of 
territory and its people (as was the assumption, shown in Chapters Two and Three, that 
regional cooperation enhanced security).3 Second, in keeping with the strategic outlook 
since the mid- 1970s, that it was highly unlikely that there would be direct threats to the 
survival of Australia over the next 10 -15 years. And third, that there were strategic 
`uncertainties' within the Southeast Asian region -which constituted Australia's zone 
of direct military interest -and beyond. As Paul Dibb noted, `the idea of "threat" is no 
longer a useful construct' for defence planning and the task now was `planning under 
uncertainty' 4 
Concern about uncertainty appeared to increase dramatically during Labor's time in 
office. The judgment in the 1986 Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper was that 
current uncertainties justified defence preparedness for low and escalated low -level 
conflict. But when the next White Paper was published five years later in 1994, defence 
planners warned that `new uncertainties' had developed after the end of the Cold War 
and that `the relative peace in Asia may not last' .5 As a consequence, defence planning 
was now be guided by the prospect of `short- warning' conflict. 
Realist theory explains much of the Australian strategic outlook during the Labor 
period. The assumption that security is state centric and concerns the defence of territory 
via military means is mainstream realist. However, many other assumptions are better 
3 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1987, p.vii; The mission statement of the Department of Defence is to To 
promote the security of Australia, and to protect its people and interests', see Department of 
Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1997, p.3. 
4 Paul Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, p.l. 
5 Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Australian Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1994, p.4 and p.7. 
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explained by looking at the variants of realism, particularly defensive and offensive 
realism. Indeed, it is argued here that the assumptions underpinning the strategic outlook 
in the 1986 Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper derive from a defensive realist 
perspective. With the publication of the 1994 White Paper, however, the security 
assumptions can be better explained from the viewpoints of defensive plus offensive 
realism. 
The assumptions behind the strategic outlook in the Dibb Report are similar to those of 
defensive realists. The view of defensive realists is that `security is plentiful' whereas 
offensive realists claim `security is scarce'. Offensive realists, such as Mearsheimer, 
claim that `international relations is...a state of relentless security competition'.6 They 
would be wary of judgements in the Dibb Report such as, `Australia is one of the most 
secure countries in the world'? and `any tendency to prepare for unrealistically high 
levels of threat should be resisted'.8 Offensive realists would also be suspicious about 
the judgments in the 1987 White Paper, which although less optimistic than the Dibb 
Report, also did not envisage any potential direct threat in the next ten years. Like the 
Dibb Report, the 1987 White Paper was concerned about low -level and particularly 
escalated low -level conflict rather than anticipating that there would be high levels of 
conflict in the future. Australian defence policy in these two earlier documents is not 
based on the assumption that regional states were relentlessly seeking relative gains in 
military capabilities and constantly trying to maximise power -as offensive /neorealists 
and classical realists respectively would suggest. Neither is the policy based on the 
offensive realists' assumptions that `offensive military action often contributes to 
security' and that expansionism is a major aspect of the security behaviour of states.9 If 
Australian defence planners had held that assumption then declaratory policy would 
have anticipated much more than low -level conflict; the force structure most likely 
would have had many more offensive capabilities; and action policy, in terms of 
6 John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions', International Security, 
Vol.19, No.3, 1994 -95, p.10. 
7 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, report to the minister for defence by Mr 
Paul Dibb, Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1986, p.I. 
8 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.6. 
9 See Chapter Four. 
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exercises, would not have been based on the reactive and defensive exercise plans that 
the ADF practiced during the regular Kangaroo series. 
The notion of uncertainty in the strategic outlook of Dibb Report and the 1987 White 
Paper is also best understood from the perspective of defensive realism, which assumes 
that there are many different levels of uncertainty that have to be assessed and that 
defence policy should respond to the situation, rather than always anticipate a bleak 
future, as offensive realists tend to do. 
The strategic outlook in the 1994 White Paper reflected defensive realist plus some 
offensive realist assumptions. Paul Dibb argued that, `the reasons for...strategic caution 
if not pessimism' concern `important new uncertainties' about `changing relations 
among the major powers and the development of...a new strategic balance' in the post - 
Cold War period.') Another cause for `new uncertainties' was the `expanding military 
capabilities throughout Asia'." The Paper noted that the `nature and scale of forces that 
could be brought to bear against Australia...will steadily increase over the next fifteen 
years'12 and it stressed that Australia's planning `focuses on capabilities rather than 
threats' (underlined in the original).13 As Dibb points out, `the most striking aspect of 
this White Paper...is its hard -edged realist treatment of the long -range strategic outlook 
from an Australian perspective'. 14 
This newly pessimistic strategic outlook reflects some of the concerns of offensive 
realism. First `changing relationships among the major powers'15 were noted. This 
implied greater uncertainty than in the simpler Cold War bipolar structure. As noted 
earlier, the offensive realists Waltz and Mearsheimer both argue that bipolarity is `more 
peaceful' than multipolarity.16 Second, the narrow focus on `capabilities rather than 
10 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.12. 
Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.11. 
12 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.11. 
13 Department of Defence, Defending Australia', p.22. 
14 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.12. 
15 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.7 -8, p.22. 
16 John Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International 
Security, Vol.15, No.1, 1990, p.13. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, The Stability of the Bipolar 
World', Daedalus, Vol.93, No.3, 1964, pp.881 -909; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics, chapter 8. 
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threats' in the 1994 White Paper can be understood in the light of the offensive realists' 
assumption that competition in the system is a given and that military capabilities and 
associated relative gains are the greatest threat to security. This focus on military 
capabilities can also be understood from a classical realist perspective if we note 
Morgenthau's argument that `armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most 
important material factor making for the political power of a nation'.17 
The emphasis given to military capabilities in the 1994 White Paper was alarmist in 
most respects.I8 Military modernisation does not necessarily imply hostile intent. 
Discussions of military capability alone are insufficient and need to be coupled with 
analysis of other factors such as logistics and training since problems in these areas can 
constrain the external use of power.19 Australia also endorsed modernisation as a way of 
regional states making themselves more secure (see Chapter Three). 
Despite the increasing military capabilities in the region and the judgment in the 1994 
White Paper that the `nature and scale of forces that could be brought to bear against 
Australia...will steadily increase over the next fifteen years'2° another judgement was 
that the survival of Australia was not threatened. Whereas offensive realists assume that 
`survival is [the] core interest' of states',21 Australian defence policy, by contrast, had 
for some time been more concerned with a much less dire problem than survival. As the 
17 
18 
Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, McGraw -Hill Publishing Company, New York, 6th ed. 1985, p.33. As indicated in 
Chapter Four, Morgenthau's view of power can also be seen to be more complex than the above 
quote suggests. In this reading he considers power to be multidimensional and warns against 
having a `militaristic' conception of power which is narrow or 'consists primarily, if not 
exclusively of...mìlitary strength, conceived especially in quantitative terms' (p.174). 
For several considered and more positive views of the strategic environment in East Asia see Stuart 
Harris and Gary Klintworth (eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the 
Asia - Pacific, St Martin's Press, Melbourne, 1995; Harry Harding, `Cooperative Security in the 
Asia -Pacific Region', in Jaime Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 
21st Century, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1994, pp.417 -446; Robert S. Ross, `The 
Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty -first Century', International Security, Vol.23, 
No.4, 1999, pp.81 -118. 
19 Interestingly, Indonesia was not seen as a threat because these factors and domestic issues were 
factored into the analysis and other factors, such as its rapidly growing economy, a developing 
military, and the fact that it was Australia's nearest neighbour (another key neorealist tenet), were 
given less attention (pp.86 -88). But China, which arguably had more domestic constraints than 
Indonesia and was more distant, was viewed with much more caution. See Department of Defence, 
Defending Australia, pp.7 -11. 
20 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.11. 
21 Joseph M. Grieco, `Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism', in Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theories, p.160. 
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1987 White Paper had made clear it was that some regional state could `demonstrate 
Australia's vulnerability and...force political concessions over some disputed issue'.22 
This position supports Dibb's argument that Australian planning should be guided by 
credible threats and not the most extreme and implausible threats -such as the offensive 
realists' fear about state survival. 
These judgements show that the nature and level of uncertainty in the 1994 White Paper 
can also be explained in defensive realist terms. Furthermore, although there is no 
detailed evidence that the `new uncertainties' described in the 1994 White Paper derived 
from the kinds of calculations which defensive realists make about the offense defense 
balance and the offense defense differentia1,23 it was stated that, `while the military 
capabilities are expanding no country is currently acquiring the range and scale of forces 
necessary for...[major conflict]'.24 
Overall, the discussion above shows that the strategic outlook in the 1994 White Paper 
can be explained in terms of the variables stressed by both defensive and offensive 
realists. As shown in Chapter One, the strategic outlook of the last two years of Labor 
government had become even more pessimistic about the possible outcome of these 
new uncertainties'. 
Defence doctrine 
Australia's notion of self -reliance is based on self -help, which is a core neorealist 
assumption about the way that states seek security in the international context. Waltz' 
assumption that for states ''[t]o achieve their objectives and maintain their security 
[they]...must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make 
22 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.24. 
23 Defensive realism assumes that security contexts vary and that there will be different levels of 
uncertainty and threats and for this reason may help to explain the new uncertainties'. The concept 
that supports the defensive realist's assumption about differences in security contexts is the 
'security dilemma'. The two factors that explain why there are variations in the nature and 
magnitude of the security dilemma across time and space are first, the offense -defense balance and 
the offense -defense differential. On the basis of calculations based on these variables defensive 
realists anticipate that there will be different security situations. 
24 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.23. 
245 
The Documentary Evidence 
for themselves'25 is similar to the assumption underpinning Australian self- reliance 
policy. As Dibb argues: 
[T]he first priority of Australian defence policy...is to have forces which are capable, 
without help from the combat forces of other countries, of resisting any attack which 
could realistically be mounted against Australia.26 
The Dibb Report argued strongly that, `independence and self -reliance should be a 
central theme in our national defence effort'27 because, `ft]he exercise of authority over 
our land territory, territorial sea and airspace is fundamental to our sovereignty and 
security'.28 But despite this apparent statement of principle, defence planners also 
believed that self -help was necessary because the alliance with the US explicitly did not 
assure combat assistance if Australia were attacked, unless US interests were involved. 
Self -reliance in the Dibb Report was so clearly focused on self -help and independence 
that the US military establishment became concerned that Australia might not provide 
political and military support for US policy. It was not until the Labor government had 
unequivocally stipulated in the 1987 White Paper and AUSMIN meetings that 
Australia's notion of self -help was compatible with support for the US that the 
Americans were reassured.29 
There were other modifications to the doctrine of self -help that made it into a more 
pragmatic policy. Australia's self -help strategy continued to depend on US technology 
to establish elements of the force structure, for intelligence assessments of the region 
and particularly for strategic `warning -time'. In the highly unlikely event of there being 
threats to Australia's survival Australian defence planners continued to hope that the 
existence of the alliance with the US and the presence of joint facilities would convince 
the US that their interests were indeed at stake. Moreover as Dibb put it, `there are clear 
limits to our defence capacity'.30 In later formulations of self -reliance -in the 1994 
White Paper and during 1995 -96- self -help was further modified. By then defence 
planners expected that the end of the Cold War and the `new uncertainties' in the region 
25 Kenneth Waltz, 'Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism 
and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p.108. 
26 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.13. 
27 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.44. 
28 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.3. 
29 See Chapter One. 
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might require more military operations with the US in areas beyond Australia's direct 
zone of military interests but which affected the security of Australia's region. 
Nonetheless, the aim throughout was self -help for most contingencies which is both a 
defensive and offensive realist assumption about the means for achieving security. 
Strategy 
As argued in Chapter One, there are two main dimensions to Australia's defence 
strategy: one is defensive, involving military action close to Australia in the sea -air gap 
and on Australian territory (this could involve counter -offensive strikes in the sea -air 
gap); and the other is offensive, involving military action some distance from Australia 
(either for offensive or counter -offensive attacks on land or maritime bases). 
The Dibb Report supported a strategy of `denial', which was strongly defensive since it 
sought simply to repel attacks and gave little support to the option of striking foreign 
targets. Although the 1987 White Paper gave more emphasis to this option, it was still 
mainly defensive. In terms of practice, for example, the major Kangaroo exercise series 
was focused on near defence. However, by the time the 1994 White paper was published 
there was a further strengthening of the option for distant operations and for Australia 
`taking the initiative'. This indicates that at the very least some changes in rhetoric had 
occurred. In addition, plans were in process to replace the reactive and defensive 
Kangaroo series with a more pro- active series called Crocodile, which would involve an 
offshore task -force exercise with US forces. 
Although these developments seem to be moving Australia towards a more offensive 
strategy, they are not incompatible with the defensive approach as well. Defensive 
realists assume that a defensive strategy is the most stable arrangement if other states are 
security seekers; but if they are `greedy'31 states then it may be necessary to adopt an 
offensive strategy. Offensive realists, by contrast, assume that greedy states are the rule 
rather than the exception and thus `believe offensive military action often contributes to 
security'.32 
30 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.3. 
31 The term `greedy' is used by defensive realists and is discussed in Chapter Four. 
32 Stephen M. Brooks, `Dueling Realisms', International Organisation, Vol.51, No.3, 1997, p.457. 
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Force structure 
The force structure developed for self -reliance can also be explained in terms of realism 
and the offensive /defensive distinction. The original formulation of self -reliance in the 
Dibb Report and 1987 White Paper incorporated a force structure which included both 
defensive and offensive capabilities: the latter consisted of F -ills (with in -flight 
refueling) and FA -18s. The Dibb Report however, was more clearly based on defensive 
realist assumptions insofar as it put limits on the offensive elements. It proposed that the 
F -llls should undergo only minimal upgrades, which therefore de- emphasised the 
option of land attacks, and that their place in the force structure be reviewed later. In 
Dibb's view the aircraft were only included in the force structure because they were 
already in it, not because they should be there or were needed.33 Indeed, a major 
criticism of the Dibb Report was that it did not call for a force structure with sufficient 
strike power. The 1987 White Paper retained the F -11 l s as an integral part of the force 
structure. Nonetheless, overall the force structure remained defensive and in particular it 
eschewed capabilities that could be used for invading or holding territory. 
Throughout Labor's time in office defence planners insisted that the ADF should retain 
a `technological edge' and subsequently an `information edge' over other regional 
militaries. This is consistent with the offensive /neorealist assumption that states seek 
relative gains, particularly in military capabilities. However, the desired `technological 
edge' was not specifically focused on offensive capabilities and was not concerned with 
advantages in capabilities to invade and hold territory. Therefore, the sought -after gains 
can also be understood from a defensive realist perspective. 
Defence planning concepts 
Despite the attention given to the idea of `warning -time' in the Dibb Report the 
arguments associated with it were always controversial within defence planning circles 
in Australia.34 Interpreting the arguments about `warning -time' from a theoretical 
33 See Chapter One. 
34 See Chapter One. As Desmond Ball, for example, points out, historically the `warning -time' prior 
to major conflict has been too short for adequate military preparation. Ball refers to a 1975 study 
entitled An Analysis of Warning Periods Associated with Major Conflict produced by the Central 
Studies Establishment in the Department of Defence which concluded that most of the 23 major 
conflicts examined had Defence Preparation Times' considerably less than one year and only one 
had over two years. See Desmond Ball, `Analysis and Australian Defence Decision Making', 
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perspective is difficult and perhaps the best that can be done is to reflect upon the broad 
assumptions about security that may underpin the idea. Warning -time' in the Dibb 
Report seems to be based on assumptions similar to those of defensive and motivational 
realists (see Chapter Four) who assume that, at least in the present context, security is 
plentiful rather than scarce. The logic of the motivational realists' view of security for 
`warning -time' is that it is possible: first, to detect and interpret the intentions/ 
motivations of states (in conjunction with capabilities); second, to distinguish security 
seeking states from greedy states; and third, to respond to the aggressive intentions of 
greedy states in enough time (that is, to mobilise the country for substantial levels of 
conflict). `Warning -time' is also understandable in terms of the optimistic /probability 
assumption described by Brooks (see Chapter Four), which like defensive realism, is 
based on there being more rather than less security. `Warning -time' seems to sit uneasily 
with the thinking of offensive realists, who assume that states are relentlessly 
competitive and that it is necessary to maintain strong and large forces, if not for 
deployment then for deterrence. 
Reference to `warning -time' in the 1994 White Paper was minimal in contrast to the 
Dibb Report35 and the 1987 White Paper,36which had stressed it. Defence planning in 
the 1994 White Paper was guided by the concept of `short- warning conflict'37 rather 
than by the prospect of conflict in the future. The judgment was that: 
We need to maintain forces to deal with short- warning conflict because we would not 
have enough time to develop additional capabilities within the relatively short notice 
we might receive of the development of motive or intention to attack Australia.38 
The elevation of short- warning conflict as the key defence planning concept had the 
effect of downgrading some other defence planning concepts, such as `core- force' and 
`expansion base' which had featured in either the Dibb Report or the 1987 White Paper. 
Like `warning- time', these planning concepts were relevant to conflicts with long 
`warning -times' rather than immediate, short- warning conflicts. The demise of these 
Reference Paper No.94, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1979, pp.1 -39 and especially pp.18 -2I. 
35 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, pp.24 -26. 
36 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, pp.29 -30. 
37 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.24 -25. 
38 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.24. - 
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ideas, which were already contentious, coincided with the view that security in the post - 
Cold War was not a plentiful as it had been.39 
EXPLAINING AUSTRALIA'S SECOND `SECURITY AGAINST' POLICY: THE 
AUSTRALIA -US ALLIANCE 
The 1951 ANZUS Alliance between Australia and the United States can be partly 
explained by realist assumptions, but with some important qualifications. As discussed 
in Chapter One, the original purpose of the alliance, from Australia's perspective, was to 
enhance its security by enlisting US power and military capabilities against the 
perceived threat that Japan might remilitarise. Australia's intention was to engage the 
US in a balance against anticipated Japanese military power. Morgenthau's assumption 
that `[a]lliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a 
multiple -state system'40 throws light on Australia's motivation for an aIIiance at that 
time. However, that assumption does not explain US motivation. The US was not in any 
way trying to balance Japanese power, since it no longer had any. And the US did not 
anticipate that Japan would become a military threat to Australia or any other state 
because the treaty US wanted to install with Japan would make it unnecessary for Japan 
to have an offensive force structure. The US went along with Australia's request for the 
ANZUS Treaty because it facilitated Australian support for a `soft' peace treaty due to 
be discussed at the post -war talks in San Francisco. This in turn was part of a broader 
US design to enmesh Japan in the global alliances against communism. However, 
Morgenthau's explanation does partly inform US motivation for the Australia -US 
alliance once the Cold War started and Soviet and Chinese communism was considered 
a threat. 
The post -war division of most of the world into the Western alliance and the Warsaw 
pact was a bipolar balance of power and the main focus of the Australia -US alliance 
39 The demise of these concepts could also have occurred because, as critics argued, they were 
conceptually flawed. See Ball, `Analysis and Australian Defence Decision Making', pp.1--39 and 
especially pp.18 -25. 
40 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations. p.201. Morgenthau argues that 'Nations A 
and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve their 
relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the 
power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When 
they make the first choice, they embark upon an armament race. When they choose the second and 
third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances'. Ibid., p.201. 
250 
The Documentary Evidence 
became the nuclear balance of power. Australia supported US nuclear policy through 
hosting of the US facilities. North West Cape, for example, provided communications to 
US Polaris submarines armed with nuclear SLBMs and aimed at targets in the Soviet 
Far East and in China. Nurrungar and Pine Gap supported the nuclear balance in other 
ways. The Australia US alliance was an important element in the balance of power and 
can be explained by both classical and neorealist thinking. 
The US invoked balance of power arguments, which Australia agreed with, to engage 
Australian political and military support for several wars in Asia against communists in 
North Korea and Vietnam. From Australia's perspective its commitment to the US was 
akin to paying an insurance premium and served to increase the chance of US combat 
support in the event of direct threats to Australia. Over time the rationale for the alliance 
changed and by the time Labor came into office explanations for the alliance solely in 
terms of balance of power considerations were less convincing. 
The continuation of the alliance under Labor is somewhat problematic in terms of realist 
arguments about alliances. As noted above, according to classical realists `alliances are a 
necessary function of the balance of power'. And according to neorealists states seek to 
balance the preponderant power, often through forming alliances. Yet most theorists 
would agree that the US is now the dominant power. According to Waltz, this will 
provoke other states to try to balance US power. But as Michael Mastanduno has 
pointed out this has not happened. As he argues, `a main security concern for many 
countries in...Asia is not how to distance from an all- too -powerful United States, but 
how to prevent the United States from drifting away'.41 According to Mastanduno, 
Japan and China, the two states which neorealists expect to balance the US, show few 
signs of trying to balance the US. Japan actively seeks to ally with the US and although 
China's record is not as clear as Japan's it does not suggest it is trying either to balance 
the US or become a hegemon.42 In other words the Australia US alliance continues in 
the absence of states trying to balance power. The neorealist response, that balancing is 
inevitable and will occur in the future could explain why the alliance continues- rather 
like an insurance policy for the distant future. But as critics of neorealism point out, this 
41 Michael Mastanduno, `Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy 
after the Cold War', International Security, Vol.21, No.4, 1997, p.58. 
42 Mastanduno, `Preserving the Unipolar Moment', pp.49 -88. 
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is an unsatisfactory explanation because it means that neorealism is at risk of trying to 
explain everything (even the absence of balances of power) and therefore in the end 
explains nothing. 
Balance of threat? 
Can the continuation of the alliance be explained by the other main realist explanation 
that claims that the motivation for alliances is still to balance, but more as a response to 
threat than against the power of other states. Stephen Walt argues that `states that are 
viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them' .43 Yet this 
can hardly explain why Australia continues the alliance since the official judgment is 
that there is no direct threat to Australia. Again some realists will say that, given the 
nature of the international system and states, there will be inevitable and direct threats to 
Australia's security. Yet again this runs into the same criticism as earlier, that explaining 
everything explains nothing. Walt's argument, however, may explain why the US 
continues the alliance. 
According to Mastanduno, Walt's balance of threat logic can partly explain US 
behaviour in the post -Cold War period. As he says `in a world in which balancing 
behaviour is the norm and balancing is a response to threat, it is often rational for states 
to pursue policies that signal restraint and reassurance'.44 US grand strategy, which is 
aimed at preserving US primacy, has pursued a security policy via such means, 
according to Mastanduno. He states that: 
US officials have sought to preserve the United States' dominant position through 
efforts to convince the status quo states of Japan and Germany to remain partial great 
powers, and to integrate the undecided states of Russia and China into an US- centered 
international order.45 
Moreover, US officials, Mastanduno says `have emphasised multilateral coalitions and 
decision -making processes, particularly in cases of military intervention'. 46 In the case 
43 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca New York, 1987, 
p.25. 
44 Mastanduno, `Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.59. 
45 Mastanduno, `Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.66. 
46 Mastanduno, `Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.66. 
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of Japan, he argues '[tike bilateral security treaty remains the key to the relationship'47 
and that `US strategy is designed to convince Japan that the United States will deter 
possible threats from Russia or China'.48 Could this also explain why the US continues 
the alliance with Australia? 
The balance of threat argument does not explain why, from the US perspective, the 
alliance with Australia persists because of course Australia is not a potential challenger 
to US primacy. The US doesn't need to reassure Australia, as it may China, that it is not 
a threat. However, if as Mastanduno argues, the US seeks ways to be regionally engaged 
to show that it is not a threat to states like China, then the alliance with Australia does 
provide that kind of avenue. Australia certainly encourages the US to preserve its 
primacy in the region and in a non -threatening manner. Indeed, one of the key 
arguments made during the Labor period was that the alliance helped to keep the US 
engaged and the region stable. 
Other realists suggest that Mastanduno's reference to the balance of threat theory to 
explain US policy in the post -Cold War period is misplaced and that hegemonic stability 
theory provides a better explanation.49 In that case does this theory explain why the 
alliance continues? It could be argued, from the US perspective, that the alliance is a 
public good which supports US hegemony, while for Australia, US hegemony provides 
regional stability and that the alliance is a means towards that end. The problem with the 
hegemonic stability theory is that the framework is itself flawed. As Mastanduno points 
out, the hegemonic framework addresses both the behaviour of a hegemonic power and 
a declining hegemonic power and as such it is all encompassing. Like the neorealist 
arguments above, it risks explaining everything and therefore in the end it explains 
nothing. 
47 Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.66. 
48 Mastanduno, `Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.66. 
49 According to Mastanduno, hegemonic states supply public goods like international security and 
international economic order and act as balancers and lenders of last resort. But when a hegemonic 
state is in decline it tries to reduce the cost of providing public goods, forcing burdens on other 
states and look out for their narrow, particularistic interests even at the risk of system stability. See 
Mark S Sheetz and Michael Mastanduno, "Correspondence: Debating the Unipolar Moment', 
International Security, Vol.22, No.3, 1997 -98, p.172. 
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The fact remains that the alliance not only continues but also grows and the main realist 
arguments about alliances are only partly helpful in explaining why. Realist assumptions 
that alliances are responses to power balances and direct threats does not apply in 
Australia's case. Indeed, as Australian defence planners repeatedly point out the 
strategic context in which Australia is placed is one of uncertainty, not of power 
balances or threats. The question is, does uncertainty explain the existence of the 
alliance? 
Other explanations of the alliance 
Several arguments can be made that perceptions of uncertainty help to explain the 
alliance and that realist thinking either directly or indirectly underpins such perceptions. 
First, from the perspective of Australian defence planners, uncertainty about regional 
security compels Australia to pursue defence of Australia through self -help. Ironically 
the alliance provides much of the intelligence and technology for self -help. As Hugh 
White, Deputy Secretary of Defence, unambiguously states: 
The country's defence posture depends on that alliance, and will keep depending on it 
for many years to come. 50 
Second, again from the perspective of defence planners, the perception that there is 
growing regional uncertainty increases the prospects that defence of Australia will 
require operations beyond the sea -air gap. Sustained operations beyond the sea -air gap 
would be very difficult if not impossible for the ADF to conduct without assistance, for 
example, transport, logistics and intelligence, from the US. As argued in Chapter One, 
Australia does not have 'deployable units' for this notion of defence of Australia. 
Moreover, to the extent that defence of Australia requires technology derived from the 
RMA then again the US alliance is critical. 
Third, defence planners continue to hope that in the event of a major attack, which 
threatens Australia's survival, the alliance will increase the prospects that the US will 
provide combat support. The presence of Pine Gap is thought to increase US incentives 
for that support. 
50 Hugh White, `New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', in Helen Hookey and Danny Roy 
(eds), Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers, Canberra Papers on Strategy 
and Defence, No.120, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997, p.17. 
254 
The Documentary Evidence 
From the US perspective, uncertainty about security in the region and elsewhere, means 
that aIIies have to be kept on side in the event that US interests need to support by US- 
led political and military coalitions. As discussed in Chapter One, when the US thought 
that the Dibb Report put this plank of the alliance in doubt they reacted strongly. 
These justifications for the continuation of the alliance all relate to uncertainty about the 
future and can be partly explained by realist thinking. Seeking self -help is unequivocally 
a realist assumption. That Australia relies partly on the alliance, or on US intelligence 
and technology, as the practical means to self -help does not detract from the fact that the 
ultimate goal is self -help. The alliance, in other words, supports the realist assumption 
of self -help. The second and third justifications for the alliance, distant operations in 
defence of Australia and a major attack, obviously anticipate future threats. The US 
justification also anticipates future threats. Such views of the future are based on realist 
assumptions about the nature of security. In other words, in a general sense this level of 
uncertainty is based on pessimism or a worse case assumption that there will be a realist 
future, even if there is little evidence in the present. Even so, uncertainty is a vague 
concept and it is necessary to differentiate between levels of uncertainty for defence 
planning purposes. But, despite the vagueness of the concept its existence seems to be 
enough for Australia to want to perpetuate the alliance. 
There may also be another approach to explaining the alliance, As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Martín Wight argues for a much broader understanding of alliances. 
His argument is that: 
Alliances are as various as friendships in their character, their purpose, their occasion, 
their duration, the relative position of those who make them. The oldest classification is 
into equal and unequal, according to the relative status and power of the allies. They 
can be wartime or peacetime, offensive or defensive, political or economic, permanent 
or temporary, bilateral or multilatera1.51 
But although Wight seems to open up other avenues for understanding alliances he does 
not elaborate. His exposition would need to be further developed if it was to be useful 
for explaining the Australia -US alliance. 
51 Martin Wight, `Alliances', in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbrand (eds), Martin Wight: Power 
Politics, Leicester University Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p.122. 
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EXPLAINING AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY WITH' POLICY OF REGIONAL SECURITY 
The third and final dimension of the Labor government's approach to security was its 
regional security policy. As shown in Chapter Two, in 1984 the new Foreign Minister, 
Bill Hayden, publicly announced that Australia would seek `non -military appraisals of 
power problems...[and was] averse to military interventions and solutions' in the 
region.52 This approach to regional security reflects liberal assumptions about security, 
which are discussed in Chapter Four. Efforts by the government to persuade the ASEAN 
states and the US to adopt a cooperative approach to Vietnam, through dialogue in the 
first instance, are also best explained in terms of liberal assumptions. Hayden's failure to 
convince the other states to engage Vietnam in this or any other way was an early set- 
back for the government. On the other hand, Australia's attempts to base regional 
economic relations on a more cooperative basis were gaining ground among regional 
governments. 
Regional security and economics 
Labor's regional economic policy was only indirectly based on assumptions about 
security. Although Australia's domestic and regional economic policies were firmly 
based on Iiberal economic principles,53 this approach was primarily directed at 
improving Australia's own economic development, as well as the region's. It was also 
assumed that a consequence of this approach would be greater stability in the region. As 
the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Stuart Harris, pointed out, 
`the multilateral, non -discriminatory and liberal world trading and economic system... 
[was] constructed...for common economic gain and as a fundamental and necessary 
basis for world peace' .54 
52 Bill Hayden, 'The Australian Government's Foreign Policy Philosophy', AFAR, Vol.55, No.4 
April 1984, p.305 -307. 
53 With respect to the latter, free trade, open regionalism, global and regional multilateral 
institutions -like GATT and APEC -were the foundations of the policy. 
54 Stuart Harris, 'Pacific Economic Co- operation: Australia and Japan', 13th Annual Australia Japan 
Relations Symposium, Sydney, 19 March 1984, AFAR, Vol.56, No.1, January 1985, p.174. Labor 
supported this argument throughout its term in office. For example, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans 
argued that `[blecoming economically more interdependent is one important route to a more 
peaceful regional environment'. See Evans, address to the Asia Society, Hong Kong, 30 March 
1994, p.8. 
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Harris acknowledged that traditional liberal prescriptions for building economic 
institutionalism and multilateralism in the region would need to be modified. Conditions 
in the region were different from those where liberal institutions had first developed, 
namely Europe and North America. In the Asia Pacific the economic, social and cultural 
differences between states appeared greater and so Harris advised that Australia and 
other countries should adopt a `pluralist approach' to economic arrangements -one 
which did not lose sight of liberal goals but was flexible enough to accommodate the 
current conditions in the region.55 
When APEC was established in November 1989, largely as an Australian initiative, its 
institutional base was smalI.56 As Andrew Elek argued, the differences among the 
regional countries meant that, `region -wide economic cooperation could not be built on 
formal inter -governmental structures'.57 Instead, it was agreed that the process would 
imitate the model of cooperation and `institutionalism' pioneered by ASEAN. Some five 
years later it was still the case that, as Elek pointed out, `[APEC] decisions [were] made 
by building consensus rather than formal negotiations'. 58 An APEC secretariat was 
purposely avoided in these early years and when it was formed in 1993, it was to act as a 
`support mechanism and a fund to finance APEC's activities' rather than as a 
conventional institution.59 The Bogor Declaration of APEC Leaders on 15 November 
1994 was a milestone in regional economic cooperation and set the policy agenda for 
dismantling `all policy -based obstacles to trade and investment among the APEC 
economies during the next 25 years'.60 Nonetheless, as Elek points out, `the preferred 
approach for most APEC participants' remained one that `coordinated decisions on 
economic policy by building consensus and the voluntary adherence to non- binding 
55 See Stuart Harris, `Concepts and Objectives of Pacific Economic Cooperation', Pacific Economic 
Papers, No.213, November 1992, pp.1 -22. 
56 See Andrew Mack and John Ravenhíll (eds), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and 
Security Regimes in the Asia -Pacific, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1994, and in particular 
Miles Kahler, `Institution Building in the Pacific', pp.16 -39. 
57 Andrew Elek, 'The Evolution of Asía Pacific Economic Cooperation', paper prepared for a 
symposium on The Development of Cooperation of the Asia's West Pacific Technology and 
Economy, Beijing, August 1990, p.6. 
58 Andrew Elek, `APEC Beyond Bogor an Open Economic Association in the Asia- Pacific Region', 
Asian -Pacific Economic Literature, Vol.9, No.1, May 1995, p.3. 
59 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, `Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation: Briefing Notes', 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, August 1995, p.20. 
60 Elek, `APEC Beyond Bogor', p.1. 
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undertakings' 6I Overall, the level of institutionalism by liberal standards remains low 
and there were only indirect links between Labor's liberal economic policy and its view 
of security (as indeed is the case in many liberal theories). 
Policy concepts for regional security 
Apart from advancing liberal economic principles in the region, Labor introduced a new 
regional security discourse towards the late 1980s that reflected liberal assumptions that 
cooperation enhanced security. As discussed in Chapter Two, in 1987 Foreign Minister 
Hayden proposed that the US and the USSR pursue security dialogue and confidence 
building measures in the North Pacific. The rationale for cooperation, which 
underpinned the new security discourse, were adopted and developed by the next 
Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans. 
Multidimensional means 
As shown in Chapter Two, Foreign Minister Evans and his Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade developed several policy concepts to guide Australia's regional 
security policy. In his landmark 1989 ministerial statement on `Australia's Regional 
Security', Evans argued that '[t]he instruments available to protect Australia's security 
are multidimensional' [emphasis in the original].62 This view became a central plank in 
Australia's regional security policy throughout the 1990s, or at least while Labor 
remained in office. 
The stress on 'multidimensional' means is best explained within the liberal -realist 
framework. Liberalism assumes that there are multiple instruments that may be used to 
enhance security. By contrast most realist theories emphasise military means. The 
classical realist Hans Morgenthau may appear at first glance to be an exception. As was 
pointed out in Chapter Four, Morgenthau also considered that the means to security 
were multidimensional. But, when Morgenthau discusses diplomatic, economic and 
military means he sees them as multiple sources of power that are part of the bigger 
equation of power balancing against other states. By contrast, when liberals talk about 
6I Elek, `APEC Beyond Bogor', p.l. 
62 Gareth Evans, Australia's Regional Security, ministerial statement, December 1989, Management 
Information Processing, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1989, p.2. 
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multidimensional means to security it is generally to avoid the use of military power and 
power balancing. Liberals believe that under some circumstances military power can 
undermine security while cooperation enhances security. In other words, resort to 
multidimensional means is compatible with both liberal and some realist assumptions. 
The conception of security in the ministerial statement is based in part on protection of 
the state using military means. According to Evans, military capabilities are `essential' 
instruments to protect Australia's security. However, his reference to other instruments, 
such as `traditional diplomacy...economic and trade relations, and development 
assistance', is very much in line with liberai thinking on security since each of these 
involves cooperative means to reduce the prospects of conflict. Additional instruments 
which, as he puts it, `extend to immigration, education and training, cultural relations, 
information activities, and a number of other less obvious areas of government activity', 
also seek to enhance security via cooperation. The extent of cooperation in these areas 
does not, however, amount to a `security community', in the sense that is used by Karl 
Deutsch.63 Evans provided no developed discussion or understanding of common 
security or such measures as confidence building and transparency in the ministerial 
statement.64 
Common security 
The security logic behind Australia's regional security policy was, according to Evans, 
that of promoting `security with' other states. The policy concepts, which supported this 
approach, were `common security', `comprehensive security', 'cooperative security' and 
`strategic partnership'. As indicated in Chapter Two, official explanations of these 
concepts has been ambiguous and without much conceptual clarification. All however 
are explicable within the liberal- realist framework. 
As explained by the Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, the policy concept of common 
security denotes a generally more preventive, rather than a deterrent, approach to 
63 Evans suggests that Australia `[participate] actively in the gradual development of a regional 
security community framework based on a sense of shared security interests'. See Evans, 
Australia's Regional Security, p.44. 
64 See Chapter Two. 
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security and applies mostly to inter -state rather than intra -state security.65 Evans' 
understanding was somewhat idiosyncratic. The concept had emerged in Europe and its 
primary concern was to reduce the security dilemma risks. But clearly the concept is 
based on the general liberal assumption that cooperation is both possible and advances 
security relations between states. 
Evans' conception has little similarity with Booth's recent argument that privileges 
individuals above states as the referent object of security and emphasises that `eman- 
cipation' is the end goal. It does however resemble the liberal -realist conceptualisation 
that is evident in Booth's earlier work. Here Booth argues that common security: 
[D]oes not mean that states reject military...[it] involves acceptance of the argument 
that military capabilities, doctrines and postures should be so organised as to maximise 
mutual rather than unilateral security. As a result reciprocity, defensiveness, trans- 
parency, crisis stability, arms restraint and confidence building are emphasised, while at 
the same time offensive capabilities, surprise attack potential and escalation and 
retaliation strategies are eliminated as far as possible.66 
This understanding of common security, which emphasises the continuing relevance of 
military means but `eliminate[s]as far as possible' the use of offensive capabilities and 
tactics, seems to be in accordance with the Australian policy concept. Evans' argument 
in the ministerial statement that Australia maintained the long -range strike aircraft... 
F -1l is and submarines' for `offensive tactics to achieve defensive goals' also appears to 
be based on a similar understanding.ó7 So too is the argument put forward by the 
Defence Minister, Robert Ray, that: 
[C]ommon security is not a policy for wimps. Nothing in the idea implies passivity or 
appeasement in the face of a security threat. It does not involve emasculating military 
forces, it is not about removing the capability to respond to direct threats.68 
This account of the meaning of common security in Australian regional security policy 
raises the question of whether or not it could be understood from a defensive realist 
perspective. Defensive realism also focuses on offensive /defence capabilities and 
65 See Gareth Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper delivered to Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Bonn, 6 
July 1994, p.6. 
66 Ken Booth, `War, Security and Strategy', Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, HarperCollins Academic, London, 1991, p.344. 
67 Evans, `Australia's Regional Security', p.17. 
68 Robert Ray, Opening Address to the RUSI National Seminar, Australian Defence Force Academy, 
Canberra, 27 September 1991, p.2. 
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differentials. Indeed, this is the theory's main focus and, as a result one, of the key 
means to security involves arms control measures. Common security, by contrast, goes 
well beyond arms control and includes numerous other cooperative approaches. 
Common security is aimed, as Booth argues above, at maximising `mutual rather than 
unilateral security'. As it was shown in Chapter Three, in Australia's case, common 
security in practice involved extensive military cooperation between the ADF and its 
regional equivalents which was aimed at establishing mutual security. For these reasons 
defensive realism does not capture all the elements of common security. The policy 
concept of common security is best understood from the liberal -realist perspective, 
which is based on the assumption that security is enhanced by military means and 
extensive cooperation across a wide range of military (and non -military) issues. 
Comprehensive security 
In most respects the policy concept of comprehensive security is based on liberal- realist 
assumptions. According to officials, comprehensive security, is a more general approach 
which emphasizes that security is `multidimensional in character'.69 Security is, by this 
account, not only concerned with political and diplomatic disputes, but also with factors 
such as `economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, unregulated population flows, 
environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism and human rights abuses'.70 
Defined this way, comprehensive security could have two meanings. One could be that 
the factors described are potential causes of military conflict and require cooperative 
approaches to ensure that conflict does not eventuate. The second meaning could be that 
the factors are not causes of insecurity conventionally defined but are in themselves 
different types of insecurity which threaten the state and the individuals within. Official 
statements are vague and give no guidance as to what is meant. What can be said is that 
both meanings of comprehensive can be explained from a Iiberal- realist perspective, 
though the criteria for the inclusion of some of the factors above as insecurities would 
require more clarification. 
69 Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper , p.6. 
70 Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper , p.6. 
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Cooperative security 
Cooperative security is the quintessential liberal -realist concept since it embraces both 
liberal and realist approaches to security. According to Foreign Minster Evans, 
cooperative security is a multidimensional concept which encompasses other security 
concepts like `common security', `comprehensive security' and `collective security'. As 
Evans puts it, `cooperative security [is] a multidimensional concept [that goes] beyond 
traditional concerns with threats of an overly military nature'.71 `Cooperative security 
suggests', he argues, `consultation rather than confrontation; reassurance rather than 
deterrence; transparency rather than secrecy; and interdependence rather than 
unilateralism' 72 (Emphasis added.) 
It is important to note that Evans' argument is that cooperative security suggests 
consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence and so on. In 
other words, he is not arguing that confrontation or deterrence or any other of the realist 
assumptions are irrelevant to regional security. Cooperative security implicitly accepts 
there is a role for military force. In practice the concept did not have the effect of 
discouraging states from pursuing force modernisations and did not involve proposals 
for conventional arms control measures. And, as was shown in Chapter Three, when the 
measures for cooperative security were put into practice they often involved exactly the 
contrasting elements which Evans described: that is, transparency and secrecy, 
reassurance and deterrence and so on. 
Evans also argued that `cooperative security' was relevant to global security, particularly 
in the UN context, and suggested that some UN policy options were relevant to the 
regional agenda. For example, attention was given to `preventive diplomacy' (which 
comes under the general category of 'peace maintenance') and to `peace building', and 
especially to one of the measures which support it, `international regimes' (which 
includes dialogue). Some of these strategies were mentioned in the Australian paper 
tabled at the first meeting of the ARF in Bangkok in 1993 and then again in the 1994 
ASEAN Concept Paper that set the first agenda of activities for the ARF. 
7L Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.6. 
72 Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.6. 
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Human security 
The Foreign Minister also introduced the idea of `human security' as a dimension of 
global security. He argued that 'security...is as much about the protection of individuals 
as it is about the defence of territorial integrity of states' .73 Human security, according to 
Evans, is `prejudiced by major intra -state conflict as it is by inter -state conflict'.74 These 
arguments are similar to those made by some liberal theorists that the referent object of 
security is the individual rather than the state.75 Evans' idea of human security does not 
go this far. As he argues above 'security...is as much about the protection of individuals 
as it as about the defence of territorial integrity of states' [emphasis added]. Evans' 
argument is well described by the liberal -realist framework that, as was argued in 
Chapter Five, privileges both the individual and the state as the referent objects of 
security. 
However, Evans rarely referred to the policy concept of human security in regional 
security policy statements. Human security issues were addressed in Australia's human 
rights policy. From the Australian viewpoint this was the most diplomatic approach 
given regional sensitivities about human rights and outside intervention in domestic 
security issues. It was claimed that Evans later stated that his argument about human 
security had not been Labor policy.76 But it remains the case that he expounded upon the 
idea in numerous official statements in Australia and overseas and discussed it at length 
in a book which he authored with the help of officers working in the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
73 Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.7. 
74 Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.7. 
75 Ken Booth, `Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, Vol.17, No.4, 1991, 
pp.319 -320. As Ken Booth argues, the individual is subjected to many types of threats and thus, 
`security means absence of threats'. He argues that the liberal project of emancipation of the 
individual should be the basis of security since, `emancipation, not power or order, produces 
security'. This liberal argument is supported by the idea that security requires, as Booth argues, `a 
comprehensive approach'. Moreover, in Booth's comprehensive theory of security, states, while 
'important features of world politics' are `unreliable, illogical and too diverse in their character to 
use as the primary referent objects'. 
76 Interview with an official from Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, December 1998. 
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Strategic partnership 
The assumptions underpinning the policy concept of strategic partnership are best 
explained from within the liberal -realist framework. The concept is emphasised in 
the Strategic Review 1993 which claims that `[i]ncreasingly, [Australia's] defence 
relationships...will be characterised by the concept of partnership'77 and that `we will 
seek a stronger strategic partnership with Southeast Asia'.78 The objectives of strategic 
partnership were described in Chapter Three and they are: 'to enhance the capacity of 
the region to exclude hostile influences that could threaten Australia's security'; `to 
reduce the potential for misunderstanding'; `to assist the development of effective self - 
defence capabilities...through cooperation'; and `to move towards interoperability'.79 
On the one hand, strategic partnership can be explained from a realist perspective since 
it is partly based on a concept of security that involves self -help and military 
capabilities. It is also realist in that, as was argued in Chapter Three, strategic 
partnership provides opportunities for Australia to improve its own self -help strategy by 
collecting intelligence about the military capabilities and professionalism of other states. 
But it is not easy to see how strategic partnership can be explained by realism in other 
ways. It is neither an alliance, nor part of a balance of power arrangement, nor a 
response to an immediate threat. One element of strategic partnership makes absolutely 
no sense from a realist perspective, namely Australia's extensive role in helping regional 
states to improve operational and combat skills. From a realist perspective this has the 
effect of reducing Australia's allegedly all- important competitive edge while increasing 
the military capabilities of possible adversaries. One conceivable way such a policy 
would make sense from a realist perspective would be if, as is sometimes argued, 
Australia believes Southeast Asian states provide geographical and military buffer zones 
from threats further north. But even here cooperation that results in improving others' 
warfighting skills might still be self- defeating. Australia could not be sure that regional 
neighbours would not choose to bandwagon, accommodate, or be neutral when faced 
with an outside aggressor. If it is the former then the skills or intelligence gained from 
77 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, Defence Publications, Canberra, December 1993, 
p.22. 
78 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, p.59. 
79 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, pp.22 -23. 
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training with Australia could be used against it. Or another possible explanation for 
Australia's providing extensive military training to regional states could be that it is 
aimed at addressing future unknown threats to both Australia and ASEAN which require 
that middle /small states informally band together now in preparation. However, as in the 
case above, Australia could not be sure that at some time in the future, against some as 
yet unknown enemy, ASEAN would act in Australia's interests.80 
Finally, strategic partnership and the high levels of military cooperation that it entails 
are particularly difficult to explain from a neorealist perspective. If Waltz's argument is 
that, `the condition of insecurity -at least, the uncertainty of each about the other's 
future intentions and actions works against their cooperation',81 then he would be hard 
pressed to explain why Australia has adopted an approach which involves the extent and 
type of cooperation that it does. Neorealists would find it difficult to explain why, 
outside of an alliance arrangement, Australia assumes that increasing the military 
strength of regional states will reduce the level of uncertainty, especially as such moves 
contain security dilemma risks. Neorealists would especially question the two judgments 
of the Defence Minister, Robert Ray, that, `[military] modernisations...will provide a 
basis for...nations to be self -reliant in their defence [and] this will assist regional 
security';82 and that, `[Australia]...contributes to regional security by enhancing the 
capacity of regional countries to provide for their self- defence'.83 
If strategic partnership can only be partly explained by realist assumptions then can any 
of the variants of liberalism help with the task? Cooperation with other states is 
obviously a distinguishing feature of strategic partnership and indeed, as has been 
argued many times before, the level of military cooperation between the ADF and other 
regional militaries was quite extraordinary and appeared not to be directed against any 
other state. This aspect of strategic partnership is consistent with general liberal 
80 Moreover, under the present circumstances, a strategic partnership would be highly unlikely to 
eventuate. ASEAN states are reluctant to develop multilateral military arrangements among 
themselves since this is perceived as being de- stabilising for the region and in addition they do not 
trust each other enough. 
ß1 Waltz, `Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, 
pp.101 -102. 
82 Robert Ray, opening address to the `Australia's Maritime Bridge into Asia' conference, Sydney, 17 
November 1993, p.3. 
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assumptions about cooperation. But at the same time even the extraordinary amount of 
cooperation and the emphasis on a `security with' approach does not approach the 
closeness of a `security community' of the Karl Deutsch model. Deutsch's security 
communities are far more `dense' or characterised by more like- mindedness about a 
range of security issues and other matters such as human rights than is presently the case 
between Australia and its neighbours. Moreover, Deutsch's security communities were 
aimed ultimately at subsuming the state: a goal that strategic partnership certainly does 
not embrace. 
In a similar way, Kantian notions of security do not explain Australia's policy concept 
of strategic partnership with ASEAN states. Republican liberals stress that zones of 
peace are possible among states that adhere to Kant's `three articles'. But Australian 
democratic institutions appear to be quite different from most regional governments' 
practice of democracy.84 Indonesia, Australia's closest and most important partner had a 
decidedly authoritarian regime under President Suharto. In short, liberal thinking, like 
realist thinking, can explain some but not all parts of strategic partnership. 
Strategic partnership is an unusual policy concept from the perspective of either 
mainstream theory. In the first place, it appears to incorporate two time frames, which 
potentially involve two different strategic circumstances -the present in which there is 
not a serious threat, and the future, where there might be. As the Defence Minister, 
Robert Ray, said, the great challenge under the current strategic circumstances is to 
construct a defence policy and `write a White Paper without an enemy and that's not... 
easy'.85 Thus strategic partnership is intended to embrace two different strategic 
circumstances: the present `without an enemy' (which requires cooperation to enhance 
security) and the future which is uncertain (and requires the option of using military 
means). Such a strategic context assumes anarchy and society and competition and 
cooperation. As was argued in Chapter Five, the liberal -realist framework also involves 
these assumptions. 
83 Robert Ray, keynote address o the RAAF air power conference `The War in the Air', Canberra, 29 
March 1994, p.2 
84 See for example Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison and Garry Rodan (eds), Southeast Asia in the 
1990s, Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1993. 
B5 Ray, `The War in the Air', p.7. 
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Multilateralism, regional forums and institutions 
As shown in Chapter Two, Labor was a strong advocate of the liberal notion of 
multilateralism as a means for enhancing security. The government was one of the 
important players in efforts to establish the ASEAN -PMC and then later the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) as organisations for security dialogue. There is little doubt that 
Evans' original goal in the early 1990s was to establish a regional security forum based 
on the CSCE (now the Organisation for Security and Cooperation, Europe) which by 
that time had become quite institutionalised. In response to regional and US criticism 
Evans moderated his rhetoric though not his original goal. When the ARF was 
established in 1994 it had little similarity to the CSCE or to theoretical descriptions of 
institutions in the IR literature. It was simply an informal meeting without any set 
agenda. The goal was to seat regional foreign ministers around a table for the first time. 
However, despite that being the agreed objective, Evans tabled The Australian Paper 
On Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation86, which provided guidelines for the 
ARF agenda and some degree of institutionalisation. By 1996, the ARF had achieved 
many of the goals set out in that paper, including stronger levels of multilateralism and 
institutionalism. Australia actively supported all these moves towards what now 
amounts to an impressive degree of institutionalisation of the ARF at the working level, 
that is in the Senior Official Meetings and the Inter -sessional Meetings.87 
The ARF is an institution that is clearly based on several liberal assumptions. Its central 
function is to promote dialogue and cooperation, it is inclusive in membership, it 
embraces potential adversaries, it is directed against no external enemy, it will never 
form a defence pact and it stresses the importance of non -military means of promoting 
86 Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific Region, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 
1994. 
87 For example, as previously mentioned in Chapter Three, in November 1994, Australia sponsored a 
seminar for officials and non -officials in Canherra that addressed measures for building confidence 
and trust. But even before this Australia had supported moves for an institutionalised infrastructure 
to support the ARF at both the official and the non -governmental levels. In June 1991, the ASEAN 
Institutes of Strategic and International Studies had proposed that there be instituted a `senior 
officials meeting ISOM] made up of senior officials of the ASEAN states and the dialogue 
partners' to support the ASEAN PMC process (e.g., with respect to the preparation of agenda and 
meeting arrangements. The first of the PMC -SOMs was held in Singapore in May 1993, and 
involved extensive discussion of multilateral approaches to regional peace and security. As 
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security. The importance of sociological factors in enhancing security may also help to 
explain elite interaction that is so much part of the ARF. There is a strong emphasis on 
personal interaction and elites `getting to know each other'; and this includes foreign 
ministers, defence representatives88 and senior officials. The term `golf- course 
diplomacy' illustrates the importance of informality and personal contact as ways of 
building links. At the same time this interaction takes place only between state officials 
at the elite level and, unlike any Deutschian model, it is not aimed at superseding the 
state. 
Furthermore, the ARF's apparent liberal concerns do not stretch to cover either 
individual security or human rights issues or conventional arms control measures. The 
ARF is distinctly state -centric and in no way do its members want to curtail efforts to 
modernise military forces deployed for the defence of the state. There have been no 
proposals for addressing destabilising platforms, such as submarines and strike aircraft 
and (yet to be introduced) strike weapons such as cruise missiles. Neither does the ARF 
propose measures for addressing the impact of such weapons on crisis management.89 
On the other hand the ARF encourages openness and transparency about such military 
acquisitions through the publication of White Papers and other military CBMs. 
Finally, the conceptualisation of multilateralism that underpins the ARF does not meet 
the particular liberal standards set by John Ruggie. As argued in Chapter Four, there are 
tensions between liberals about the meaning of multilateralism and according to 
Ruggie's definition it concerns three properties: indivisibility, generalised principles of 
described in Chapter Two Australian officials were closely involved in all the efforts to further 
institutionalise the SOM process. 
88 Originally only foreign ministry officials participated in the ARF meetings since involving military 
personnel was seen to be too sensitive . However, even from the beginning there were arguments 
for the military to be involved and in June 1997 at the Langkawi SOM military officers began 
formally participating in the ARF. 
ß9 Operations involving these weapons and platforms are destabilising for several reasons: for 
example, there are inadequate standard operating procedures within and between some regional 
militaries and a near absence of C3 assets to control the use of such capabilities during a crisis. 
Hence there would be a strong imperative to `use 'em or loose `em'in a crisis. 
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conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.90 There is little evidence that these principles apply to 
the ARF or that Labor sought to apply them. 
The neoliberal- institutionalists provide the best explanation of the assumptions 
underpinning Labor's policy towards the ARF. Australia' s emphasis on state -centric 
approaches involving multilateral institutions and regimes as the basis for regional 
security is very much in line with neoliberal institutionalist theory. The neoliberal 
institutionalists' approach, which combines both liberal and realist tenets, corresponds 
to a major element in the liberal- realist framework. 
Military cooperation 
The assumptions underpinning the military activities between the ADF and other 
military forces in the region are best explained from within the liberal -realist 
framework. As it was shown in Chapter Three, the extent of military cooperation 
between the ADF and regional militaries increased dramatically during the 1990s. One 
of the intentions behind the ADF's efforts was to establish cooperation as a norm for 
regional behaviour and to set the standard by practical example. Exercises, visits, 
training and educational programs were the key activities conducted by the ADF. 
The ADF also sought to establish cooperation as a norm through non -military measures. 
Sometimes called `small "s" security', to distinguish them from full -strength military 
activities such as exercises and training, these measures are intended to build confidence 
through interaction within a particular area. It was assumed that confidence in one area 
would enhance security in another.91 
There was also a very strong assumption among senior defence personnel that personal 
contact between the militaries would enhance the prospects of peace. As Defence 
Minister Ray argued: 
90 John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', in John Gerard Ruggie 
(ed.), Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1993, pp.3 -47. 
91 Some examples of the organisations supported by the ADF which pursued small `s' security 
activities are: the Western Pacific Naval Symposium or WPNS (the RAN was a key player in 
establishing the first WPNS meeting in 1988); the Maritime Studies Program (MSP), often referred 
to as the RAN think -tank and a leading institution for developing naval cooperation among 
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Only direct and personal contact, the sharing of experiences and perceptions can...prize 
open the doors of conservative military establishments...in the end, the trust and 
confidence that really matters is between defence organisations.92 
These kinds of assumptions can readily be explained by liberal arguments about the 
security enhancing effects of cooperation. Liberal arguments about the benefits of 
socialisation between groups and the view that progress is part of the human condition 
could also help to explain this view. So too could another related liberal argument, that 
states can learn to adopt new norms of behaviour. As will be shown in the next chapter, 
interviews with senior defence officials confirmed the conviction with which these 
assumptions are held. 
The second intent of military cooperation was to help regional militaries improve their 
operational and combat skills. As discussed above this was guided by the policy concept 
of strategic partnership which was neither a realist alliance nor a liberal security 
community but which nonetheless was in other ways based on liberal -realist 
assumptions. The realist assumptions are best demonstrated by the fact that during those 
cooperative military activities the ADF gathered intelligence to enhance their own 
measures for self -help. And, that the ADF restricted the access of regional military 
forces to certain operational and combat skills which it deemed necessary for the 
defence of Australia. These latter measures support strategies based on `security against' 
others and in this respect can be explained by realists who seek competitive edges 
against the ever present potential enemy. Overall, the assumptions underpinning the 
military activities are best described as liberal -realist. Having examined the three 
components of Labor's security policy the question is, if they are put together then, can 
the overall policy be explained in terms of the three explanatory options under 
discussion. 
CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING LABOR'S OVERALL SECURITY POLICY: DEFENCE 
OF AUSTRALIA, THE ALLIANCE AND REGIONAL SECURITY 
The first section of this chapter examined whether or not the assumptions that underpin 
defence of Australia could be explained by the theories of realism and liberalism or the 
regional navies; the Air Powers Studies Centre or APSC which is the RAAF think -tank and fosters 
cooperation among the regìonaI air forces. 
92 David Jenkins, Defence Links Only so Strong: Expert', SMH, 17 July 1995. 
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liberal -realist framework. I have argued that, with some qualifications, realism provides 
the best explanation. Defence of Australia is based on realist assumptions that security is 
required against other states, that states have to compete to be secure, and that security 
concerns the military defence of the state and territory against the military forces of 
other states. The means to security in defence of Australia are based on the realist 
assumptions that security is best achieved through self -help: advantages in military 
technology, offensive and defensive capabilities, and a strategy for near and distant 
defence. 
But these are very broad and general realist assumptions and reference to the variants of 
realism, in particular to defensive and offensive realism, give a more accurate 
explanation of defence of Australia. Defensive and offensive realists qualify their 
understanding of many realist assumptions and have different worldviews and practical 
policies. As it happens, the theoretical refinements made by the defensive realists appear 
to provide a better explanation of defence of Australia than do those of the offensive 
realists. For example, the defence of Australia is better explained by the defensive realist 
assumption that security does not involve relentless competition as offensive realists 
claim. The assumptions of defence of Australia, that the security context is one of 
uncertainties rather than threats and that variations in the level of uncertainty affect 
defence planning, are better explained by defensive realism rather than offensive 
realism. Similarly, the assumption of defence of Australia that self -help is best 
implemented through a mainly defensive doctrine, strategy, force structure and defence 
planning concepts is also understandable from a defensive rather than an offensive 
realist perspective. However, the term 'mainly' is used advisedly to indicate that some 
of the elements above involve offensive assumptions. For example, seeking a 
technological edge is an offensive realist assumption. But since the edge is only partly 
focused on offensive capabilities, partly on C31, and not at all on capabilities for 
invasion then it also based on defensive assumptions about security. With qualifications 
of this type it can be argued that the assumptions underpinning defence of Australia are 
best explained by defensive realism. 
The qualifications are important to note because they indicate that in some ways both 
the realist theories and the policy are problematic On the one hand, defensive realism 
assumes that states can be both security seekers and greedy. Ultimately, this creates 
tension in the theory because defensive realists avoid making the choice that, as Charles 
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Glaser claims, demarcates offensive and defensive theories. As Glaser states, `whether a 
theory posits only security seekers or instead posits some greedy states is a pivotal 
choice'.93 On the other hand, the policy is difficult to explain because it too has tensions 
and dilemmas. Ironically, one reason for this is that it is based on both defensive and 
offensive assumptions about the security behaviour of states. Glaser's statement might 
also read, `whether a policy posits only security seekers or instead posits some greedy 
states is a pivotal choice'. As a consequence, defence planners, like defensive realists, 
oscillate between the choices. But nevertheless, the choices are between different 
notions of realism. 
The second section of this chapter examined the extent to which the Australia -US 
alliance can be explained by liberalism, realism or the liberal -realist perspective. It 
concluded that some aspects of the alliance can be explained by realist theories but 
others are more difficult to explain. The realist literature on alliances cannot explain 
why the alliance continues in the absence of states trying to balance power and given the 
claim by officials that Australia has no identifiable threat. However, it can be argued 
that one reason the alliance continues is that Australian defence planners want to be well 
placed in the future if the current strategic context changes. 
The more convincing explanation for why the alliance continues concerns the practical 
fact that Australia depends on the alliance for assets for self -help or self -reliance, 
particularly intelligence and high military technology. Realist explanations in the 
literature do not seem to adequately address those states that have realist self -help aims 
which require practical assets that can be acquired through alliance arrangements at an 
affordable strategic and financial cost.94 
The third section of this chapter examined the extent to which the regional security 
policy can be explained by IR theories. It argued that on the one hand, many aspects of 
Labor's regional security policy can be explained by liberal theories that claim 
cooperation between states is not only possible but that it enhances security between 
93 Charles L. Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited', World Politics, Vol.50, No.1, October 1997, 
p.174. 
94 As Jim Richardson has usefully pointed out, the discussion about realist alliance theory should give 
more attention to unequal alliances and to the issues raised in this chapter about uncertainty and 
dependence on ally's assets. 
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them. All the policy concepts developed by Labor are based on these assumptions and 
likewise the practical measures conducted by the ADE On the other hand, it was argued 
that some aspects of the policy can be explained by realist theory. In practice regional 
security policy involved extraordinary levels of cooperation but nonetheless included 
some activities, such as intelligence gathering, and excluded some other activities, 
which benefited the realist self -help strategy of defence of Australia. 
Overall, the assumptions underpinning regional security policy are best explained from 
within the liberal -realist framework. This argument is further confirmed by examining 
several other aspects of the policy which are difficult to explain from a single theory 
perspective. For example, from a single theory perspective i.e., from either realism or 
liberalism, Foreign Minister Evans often adopted a contradictory position on regional 
security policy. As was discussed in chapter two, he frequently argued that `cooperative 
security' was a supplement to existing `security against' strategies;95 and that 
`cooperative security' co- existed with `traditional balances of power' .96 
Perhaps one of the best demonstrations of the value of a liberal -realist explanation is the 
key policy concept `cooperative security' which, as explained by Evans: 
[S]uggests consultation rather than confrontation; reassurance rather than deterrence; 
transparency rather than secrecy; and interdependence rather than unilateralism.97 
In other words, cooperative security, while emphasising liberal notions of security, does 
not reject realist means for achieving security. Hence, the liberal- realist explanatory 
framework best explains Australia's regional security policy. 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued two main points. First, that Australia's approach 
to security cannot be explained by a single theory. Australia's predominantly, but not 
exclusively, realist policy of defence of Australia and the alliance, is juxtaposed with the 
liberal -realist policy of regional cooperation which nonetheless emphasises liberalism. 
To explain Labor's security policy requires both theories. 
95 Gareth Evans, `The Emerging Asia Pacific Community', speech to the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington, 6 October 1994, p.4. 
96 Gareth Evans, `Australia's Role in East Asia's Future', speech to CEDA Asian Region 
International Association of Cooperating Organisations (ARIACO) Roundtable, Melbourne, 11 
September 1995, p.6. 
97 Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.6. 
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Second, a liberal- realist framework is the most useful to explain Labor's security policy 
as a whole for the following reasons. The worldviews that underpin Australia's security 
policy (in public documents) correspond with the worldviews encompassed within the 
liberal -realist framework. Both the policy and the framework are based on the assump- 
tion that the international system involves inter -state competition and cooperation. The 
worldviews depicted in the framework are often expressed in abstract terms but many of 
these concepts can be recognised in the practical terms of policy. For example, the 
elements of anarchy and society can be understood in practice as competition and 
cooperation; amity and enmity can be understood as cooperation and competition and as 
the policy view that 'friends today could be enemies tomorrow'. 
The assumptions about the object of security in both the policy and the framework are 
very similar. Both assume that the state is the object of security and that security of the 
state is synonymous with the security of the individuals within it. While an argument 
can be made that much of the documentary evidence for Australia's policy discussed in 
this chapter puts more emphasis on the state than on the people within, it would be 
misleading to infer this indicates that one is rated higher than the other. The Defence 
Department makes it clear that its mission is `To promote the security of Australia, and 
to protect its people and interests'.98 Another indication of the fact that security of the 
state and individuals are seen to be synonymous is Evans' statement that 'security...is as 
much about the protection of individuals as it is about the defence of territorial integrity 
of states'.99 In his view the state was remiss if it did not ensure `human security' and 
that he felt the UN could legitimately intervene in such situations.1m Finally, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, the questionnaire and interviews confirmed that policy 
makers do not differentiate between the security of the state and of its individuals. 
The assumption that security is sought from military threats is a common element in 
both Australian policy and the liberal -realist framework. The framework, however, 
makes an additional assumption: namely that there are other external and internal threats 
98 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.3. 
99 Evans, `Cooperating for Peace', paper, p.7. 
too Gareth Evans, `Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict', Foreign Policy, No.96, Fall 1994, 
pp.3 -20. 
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to the state (and the individuals within). The difficulty with this argument is that it is not 
clear if these additional threats are potentially the cause of military threats of if they 
cause the state to be insecure in another way. This aspect of the framework requires 
further clarification. 
In both Australia's security policy and the liberal -realist framework it is assumed that 
the means to security comprise military and non -military measures. Indeed, the 
measures are remarkably similar. The military means consist of self -help, alliances and 
conditional balances of power. There is however, a qualification to be made about the 
reasons for the continuation of alliances. Whereas Australian policy is based on the 
assumption that alliances continue to enhance security even when there is no threat, the 
framework is based on the assumption that alliances may well dissipate if the 
international context is not threatening. However, another assumption underpinning the 
framework is that, as Martin Wight indicates, alliances come in many forms and have 
multiple purposes. This understanding of alliances could perhaps help to explain 
Australia's continuing support for the alliance in the absence of threats. Apart from this 
clarification the other military means in both the policy and the framework are the same. 
Likewise, the non -military means to security in both the policy and framework are very 
similar. For example, in both it is assumed that cooperation, institutions, regimes, 
multilateralism, norms, CBMs, diplomacy and international law will all enhance 
security. 
For all the reasons given above the documentary evidence on Australia's overall security 
policy is best explained from the liberal - realist perspective. The next question to answer 
is whether or not the non -documentary evidence obtained directly from policy makers 
through interviews and a survey /questionnaire can be explained by the liberal -realist 
perspective. 
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EXPLAINING LABOR'S SECURITY POLICY: 
THE NON -DOCUMENTARY SURVEY EVIDENCE 
I consider myself a realist and a liberal -and that's not a contradiction. 
(Interview with senior official from the Department of Defence, 
Canberra, December 1998.) 
The previous chapter examined the assumptions underpinning the three parts of 
Australia's security policy from three perspectives, realism and liberalism and liberal - 
realism. I argued that the latter provides a better explanation of the overall policy than 
do single theories. Australia's predominantly, but not exclusively, realist policies of 
defence of Australia and the alliance, are juxtaposed with the liberal- realist policy of 
regional cooperation, which in fact emphasises liberal tenets. The documentary evidence 
for Labor's security policy is best understood in terms of the liberal -realist framework. 
In this chapter I examine which theoretical framework best accounts for the non - 
documentary evidence i.e., information obtained directly from policy makers in a 
survey /questionnaire and/or interviews.' A questionnaire was sent to senior policy 
makers involved with formulating or implementing Labor's security policy (see 
Appendix 4 ),2 Interviews were conducted with some of the same people and with others 
who preferred to be interviewed rather than complete the questionnaire. The results of 
these surveys are reported and then analysed in terms of the three previously identified 
perspectives. 
As explained in the Introduction, one reason for examining this kind of evidence is that it is a 
source of information which is potentially less politicised than policy statements and documents 
designed for the public forum. When speaking off the record policy makers can, if they wish, speak 
frankly, personally, reflectively and in more detail and depth about their security assumptions. A 
survey on these matters does not appear to have been conducted in the past and hence an analysis 
based on the findings will provide an original contribution. Another reason for the questionnaire 
and the interviews is that policy makers can be directly asked about ways to explain policy and the 
role of theoretical perspectives. 
2 In brief, the questionnaire asked policy makers to describe their general assumptions, if any, about 
security and their particular assumptions, if any, about the three main elements of Australia's 
security policy- defence of Australia, the alliance and regional security. The format posed 
questions about each issue, provided options for answers, and finally, gave policy makers the 
choice of explaining the reasoning behind their answers. The questionnaire also asked policy 
makers to address other issues including why, in their view, the policy was not contradictory and 
what they believed the sources of their security assumptions were. 
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My argument starts with a caveat. Conclusions drawn from the data will be suggestive 
not definitive. Some forty senior policy makers were approached and just over half 
participated in the questionnaire and/or interviews. Despite the relatively small size of 
the sample there is no reason to assume that the respondents' answers were not 
representative of senior policy makers' assumptions more generally.3 The survey 
evidence strongly supports my contention that policy makers' assumptions about 
Australia's overall security policy are, like the documentary evidence, best explained 
from within the liberal- realist framework. 
I also argue that the data shows that policy makers do not consider the liberal -realist 
framework (and of course the policy) to be contradictory. And, finally I argue that 
because there is much similarity between the policy makers' assumptions and the 
liberal -realist framework, policy makers' assumptions about security are indeed 
theoretical, despite their claims to the contrary. 
POLICY MAKERS' GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE MEANING OF SECURITY 
FOR AUSTRALIA 
To establish policy makers' worldviews and general assumptions about security the 
questionnaire posed several questions about the object of security; what security was 
being sought from; and the means which best enhanced it (see Figure 7.1). With regard 
to the object of security the data showed that respondents emphasised the `nation -state 
and its institutions'. Respondents then stressed that `individuals within the state', 
`territory', and `core values' (in that order) were objects of security. One comment made 
by a senior defence official that `the object of strategic policy is the people, and then 
possessing land, and by extension the territory and government' was similar to those 
made by many other policy makers. 
When respondents were pressed further during interviews, it became clear that they 
assumed that the object of security was `multifaceted'. One defence official said this 
3 Many of the participants were very senior officials e.g., Foreign Ministers, Chiefs of Defence, and 
Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade Deputy Secretaries. 
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FIGURE 7.1 POLICY MAKERS' GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY 
The object of security 
Data 
Nearly 3/4 of the respondents consider the object of security is the 'nation -state and its institutions'. 
The next most important objects were 'individuals within the state' and 'territory' followed by 'core 
values'. Respondents were given the choice of omitting any of the suggested objects of security (see 
questionnaire in appendix) and interestingly 1/2 of them omitted the government' per se. 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
A number of respondents qualified their answers with statements such as: 'the object of strategic 
policy is the people, and then possessing land, and by extension the territory and government'; 'there 
is no precedence to people, territory and interest; 'ít is difficult to separate the collective of people 
(the nation), institutions and territory'. Several respondents suggested that the object of Australia's 
security policy also concerns the security of the region and shaping the regional environment. 
Security from what 
Data 
Over 3/4 of respondents stated that Australia's security policy was in the first instance directed 
against external military threats (respondents were not asked to specify the level of threat in the 
questionnaire). Over 1/2 said that in the second instance it was directed against low -level incursions, 
such as illegal immigrants. About 3/4 of respondents chose to omit other external factors, such as 
economic, environmental and health issues, as security threats. About 3/4 of all respondents omitted 
internal factors, such as 'political violence between domestic groups' and 'political violence 
perpetrated by the state on individuals', as threats to Australia's security. 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
A small number of respondents (less than a 1/4) said there were other types of threats to Australia, 
including terrorism and external military threats* to friendly regional countries which could disrupt the 
security and stability of the region. One important point which the questionnaire did not clarify 
adequately, and which several respondents noted, was that there was a strong difference between 
military threats and low -level incursions. This issue was addressed during interviews and is 
discussed below. 
The means to achieving security 
Data 
Half of the respondents said that in Australia's case the prime means to achieving security was 
military capabilities; slightly less than 1/2 said the second most important means was diplomacy; and 
nearly 3/4 said the third means was the alliance. The fourth most mentioned means related to 
cooperative activities -multilateral institutions, military CBMs and cooperative security. Nearly 3/4 of 
respondents chose to omit balance of power arrangements as a means. 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
Several respondents (about 1/4) suggested that means other than those suggested in the 
questionnaire were also important and these included regional arrangements, particularly bilateral 
security dialogues and regional defence arrangements (such as the FPDA and the Indonesia - 
Australia Agreement on Maintaining Security). Several respondents said It would be misleading to 
rank the means available to Australia because specific circumstances dictated what means were 
appropriate in what context and for this reason in practice governments did not have to choose 
between the different means. 
Interestingly none of the respondents suggested that other types of threats should include 
transnational crime. 
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assumption was reflected in the mission statement of the Department of Defence, which 
was `To promote the security of Australia, and to protect its people and interests'.4 
Realism tends to emphasise the state and territory as the referent objects of security; 
Iiberalism tends to emphasise the nation and individual over states. The liberal- realist 
perspective, like that of Australian officials, tends to include both.5 This finding differs 
only slightly from the documentary evidence where more emphasis appeared to be given 
to `territory' as the object of security.6 
With regard to the question `security from what', the data showed that respondents 
assume that the most important threat to Australia's security is external and military 
threats -a traditional realist assumption. However, as wiII be seen in later parts of the 
analysis, policy makers added several qualifications that suggested that defensive 
realism, rather than the variant of offensive realism, provided the best explanation. For 
example, the data shows that most respondents consider the prospects of military threats 
developing in the next five years to be 'unlikely' and beyond that period, most `did not 
know' what the risk was. As I will argue later, this indicates that the assumption 
commonly made by offensive realists -that security is best ensured by adopting `worse - 
case' thinking is of little relevance in Australia's case. The data also shows that policy 
makers assume that other types of external and internal threats are of Iittle important to 
Australia's security.? This tends to be an assumption held by realists from all the 
variants of realism. These findings from the non -documentary evidence about what 
security was being sought from showed no significant difference with the documentary 
evidence. 
4 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1997, p.3. 
5 See Chapter Five for discussion about some unresolved issues concerning states and individuals in 
the liberal- realist framework. 
6 Another related piece of evidence, which supports the view held by policy makers that the object of 
security is both the state and the individuals, is that Australian defence policy also includes intra- 
state peacekeeping activities. Missions have been undertaken in Namibia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and 
Somalia. In addition the ADF supports a regional peacekeeping training program at Williamstown 
in New South Wales. 
7 During interviews, policy makers frequently made the point that other issues, such as illegal 
immigration and fishing, were important but that they did not constitute threats to Australia's 
military security. 
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With regard to policy makers' assumptions about the means to achieving security, the 
data again showed that the liberal - realist framework provided the best account. Half of 
the respondents assumed that military means were the prime means, followed by 
diplomacy, then alliances, and then cooperative security measures, in that order. Several 
senior officials, from the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
stressed that Australia's security was based on three legs (defence of Australia, the 
alliance and regional cooperation) with each leg having its own means. Several 
respondents commented that it would be misleading to rank the means that Australia 
used to achieve its security goals because their importance would vary in accordance to 
circumstance. In terms of theory, this mix of means across the overall policy again 
suggests that policy makers assumptions about means are best understood in terms of 
the liberal -realist framework. 
POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA POLICY 
Questions addressed the following issues: the threat perceptions underpinning the 
policy; the role of offensive capabilities in the force structure; and the relevance of 
power to security policy (see Figure 7.2). The responses showed that policy makers' 
assumptions about defence of Australia policy can be explained in realist terms, but with 
some important qualifications. In general the data confirmed the documentary evidence. 
The assumptions that Australia will always require a military insurance, which all 
respondents held, and that threats could at some stage develop to Australia's security, 
which over 3/4 of respondents held, are both traditional realist assumptions. However, 
as was argued in the previous chapter, these are broad realist assumptions that do not 
always explain important elements of policy. 
The policy is better explained with reference to defensive and offensive realism, and in 
particular the former. Defensive realism helps to explain the pervasive belief among 
respondents that, while threats could develop at some stage, they were unlikely to over 
the next five to ten years. And it also helps to illuminate the answer given by some 
respondents that they simply did not know if threats might come into being. 
Respondents are clearly not as anxious about Australia's security as previous 
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FIGURE 7.2 POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA POLICY 
Threats 
Data 
Over 3/4 of respondents 'agree' with the assumption that underpinned the policy of defence of Australia', namely 
that 'threats to Australian territory could develop and require a military response'. However, between 1/2 and 3/4 
disagree (i.e., either 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree') that threats to Australia will increase in the next five years 
and the rest 'did not know'. Over 1/2 of respondents 'did not know' and the rest either 'disagree' or 'strongly 
disagree' that threats will increase over the next 10 years. All the respondents agree that 'Australia will always 
need a military insurance' (i.e., just under 1/2 'agree strongly' and just over 1/2 'agree'). 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
Respondents stressed that uncertainty rather than threats underpinned the defence of Australia. 
Technological edge 
Data 
All but one of the respondents agree that the 'ADF needs a technological edge over other regional militaries to be 
secure' (i.e., 3/4 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree'). 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
More than 1/2 of the respondents gave practical reasons fo explain why Australia required a technological edge 
over other regional militaries. For example, it was stated that Australia had 'a very small and very low density 
population'; 'vast land area and sea and air approaches'; 'small -size defence forces', 'relative economic wealth'; 
and 'technological sophistication'. According to several respondents such factors meant that maintaining a 
technological edge is a sound assumption because it is economically plausible and militarily effective (the latter 
because it provides a 'credible deterrent' and 'the ability to win'). 
Offensive capabilities 
Data 
All but two of the respondents agree that 'offensive" capabilities (e.g., the Collins submarines and FA -18 and F- 
111 aircraft) are a necessary component of [Australia's] forces' (i.e., over 1/2 'agree strongly'. the rest 'agree', 
and 2 others omitted answers). 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
There were many explanations given for this assumption. Several respondents emphasised the practical military 
advantages including: the ability to strike at an enemy homeland gives a strong deterrent effect'; 'the ability to 
strike an aggressive enemy's bases and forces far from Australia's shores gives valuable additional options in 
mounting an defensive strategy'; that is was 'hard to see any other way of acquiring some capacity for proactive 
defence strategies'; 'it increases our options and earns us respect'; 'it just might save us'; 'we must have the 
ability to project power beyond our shores unless you want to fight on our own territory'; 'it helped to overcome 
Australia's strategic disadvantages'; 'it was insurance against uncertainty', 'it provided not just the kit but the skills 
which take years to acquire'; 'it was a deterrent'. Several respondents had difficulty with the term 'offensive', 
saying it was the 'wrong premise'; that it was misleading to simply name weapons as being offensive. 
Power and Australia's defence policy 
Data 
Nearly 3/4 of respondents 'agree' with 'Hans Morgenthau's assumption that politics is a struggle for power'. The 
rest either 'disagree' or 'did not know'. However, 1/2 said Australia's defence policy is not based on this 
assumption; 1/4 said it was; 1/4 omitted an answer. 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
Several respondents said 'Australia did not seek power but rather security'; 'Australia does not seek power but 
certainly regional influence'; others said 'there are limits to Australia's defence capacity and influence' and that 
'Morgenthau's assumption is more complex and complicated'. 
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generations were depicted to be in several scholarly analyses,8 and therefore the 
concerns of classical and offensive realism are less salient. Respondents seem to share 
the view held by Stephen Brooks (see Chapter Four) who claims that defence decision 
making is conditioned more by the more benign notion of `the probability of conflict' 
rather than by the more dire worst -case notion of `the mere possibility of conflict' (that 
epitomises offensive realists).9 All this suggests that the respondents' perceptions of 
threat/ uncertainties and their rationale for defence of Australia is better explained by 
defensive realism rather than by offensive realism. As the discussion in Chapter Four 
indicates the former assumes that security is `plentiful' and the latter assumes that it is 
`scarce'. 
All but one of the respondents believed that, to be effective, the defence of Australia 
required the ADF to have `a technological edge over other regional militaries'. This 
assumption appears to be best explained by a realist belief that security is enhanced by a 
relative advantage in military capability. Although many policy makers pointed out that 
their support for Australia having a technological edge was a practical response to 
geography, demography and the country's economic standing, this view is still based on 
realist assumptions. However, in practice the technological advantage was not unduly 
focused on offensive platforms and not at all on capabilities for invading and holding 
territory. Hence it could also be explained in terms of defensive realism, which 
advocates a balanced offensive /defensive force structure when security is plentiful. 
All but two of the respondents assumed that - offensive" capabilities...are necessary' for 
the defence of Australia. This assumption, however, can be explained in terms of 
defensive realism rather than offensive realism. The latter assumes that offensive 
capabilities are always required and should comprise the major part of the force 
structure; and the former assumes that such capabilities are sometimes required but 
should be balanced or constitute the minor portion of overall capability (unless it is clear 
that a `greedy' state aims to change the status quo). Since the size of Australia's 
offensive strike capabilities and the number of amphibious landing craft and transport 
helicopters are insufficient to support sustained offensive strikes or invasions, it makes 
8 Alan Renouf, A Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979; Neville Meaney, Trevor 
Matthews, Sol Encel, The Japanese Connection, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1988. 
9 Stephen M. Brooks, `Dueling Realisms', International Organisation, Vol.51, No.3, 1997, p.472. 
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little sense to describe the force structure as being determined by the requirements of 
offensive realism. 
Respondents' assumptions about the relevance of power to Australian defence policy 
can be partly explained by realist thinking. Some 3/4 of the respondents concurred with 
Morgenthau's belief that politics is a struggle for power. But about 1/2 of the respon- 
dents also assumed that Australia's defence policy is not based on this assumption. 
According to several senior defence officials, Australia seeks to be secure and does not 
seek power per se. Moreover, many officials stressed the point that there are clear limits 
to Australia's defence capacity. In other words, given Australia's particular position, the 
kind of power'which offensive realists aspire to is not even an option for defence planners. 
The survey data strongly suggest that Australia's defence policy can be understood 
mostly in realist terms and that the variant of defensive realism is the most appropriate. 
The final point to make is that the respondents' answers in the questionnaire about 
threats appear to based on the more benign view of the region that characterised the pre - 
1994 White Paper period. In interviews however, the overwhelming view of policy 
makers was that, since the end of the Cold War, `new uncertainties' had developed and 
that defence planning should be guided by short- warning conflict. In other words, policy 
makers supported the judgments in the 1994 White Paper. Whether or not this suggested 
that policy makers assumed that security was becoming scarce, as offensive realist 
assume, is an open question, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE AUSTRALIA -US ALLIANCE POLICY 
To determine policy makers' views of the Australia -US alliance policy, questions were 
posed which addressed the alleged strategic benefits of the alliance for Australia and the 
role of balance of power arrangements for Australian security (see Figure 7.3). The data 
showed that all the respondents held the assumption that the alliance conferred strategic 
benefits.10 This assumption can be understood in broad realist terms. However, 
IO Interestingly, respondents had different views about the meaning of a balance of power (see Figure 
7.3): nearly 3/4 assumed it did not mean a situation in which there was a roughly equal balance of 
power among important regional states and about half assumed it did mean a situation which 
avoided a preponderance of power by any one state. In other words policy makers like many 
theorists had varied meanings. 
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FIGURE 7.3 POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF THE ALLIANCE 
Data 
Policy makers were asked if the alliance conferred certain strategic benefits and if so did they include the following. 
1) The likelihood of US military support should Australia be threatened sometime in the future'. All respondents, 
except for two agree (i.e., over 3/4 of respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree'). 
2) 'Privileged access to US military technology'. All respondents agree (i.e., 1/2 of the respondents 'agree strongly' 
and the rest 'agree'). 
3) 'Privileged access to US technical intelligence'. All respondents agree (i.e., over 3/4 of the respondents 'agree 
strongly' and the rest 'agree'). 
4) 'An element of deterrence against potential enemies'. All respondents except for one agree (i.e., over 3/4 of the 
respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree'). 
5) 'US engagement in the region to balance the power of other states'. All respondents agree (i.e., less than 3/4 of 
the respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree'). 
6) 'The provision of nuclear umbrella'. About 3/4 of the respondents agree (i.e., about 1/4 'agree strongly'; 1/2 
'agree'; and the rest 'disagree'). 
7) Other strategic benefits: Several respondents suggested that there were some other strategic benefits provided by 
the alliance, for example: the alliance meant that less money (was) required for defence spending'; the alliance 
provided 'easy access to American thinking in doctrinal and organisational areas that is truly valuable'; the alliance 
provided 'limited opportunity to shape US outlooks and policy prescriptions'. 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
Some respondents stressed that the US would not assist Australia with combat forces but with intelligence and re- 
supply. 
Balance of power 
Data 
Respondents were asked if 'Australia's security would be enhanced by participating in a balance of power 
arrangement with other states'. About 3/4 'disagree'; less than 1/4 agree; and the rest either 'did not know' or the 
answers were unclear. 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
Respondents commented that balance of power arrangements did not assist Australia's security for the following 
reasons: 'it denies the flexibility needed in a dynamic region'; 'freedom of action may be better than being party to an 
arrangement'; 'regional states would not participate; 'it was not an appropriate arrangement for the foreseeable 
future or had been for the recent past'; 'the target of balance of power would be China and it would be counter- 
productive. Constructive engagement with China would be better'. 
Data 
When respondents were asked what they understood by a balance of power the following responses were given. 
1) 'A descriptive term which explains the actual distribution of power (e.g., military, economic, political) among 
important regional states'. About 1/2 said 'no'; about 1/4 said 'yes' and others did not answer. 
2) 'A situation which involves a roughly equal balance of power among important states in the region'. Nearly 3/4 
said 'no' and the rest did not answer. 
3) 'A situation which avoids an apparent preponderance of military power which favours any one state'. Over 1/2 said 
'yes', a 1/4 said 'no' and the rest did not answer. 
4) 'A policy prescription which seeks to establish 2 or 3'. Nearly 3/4 said 'yes' and the rest did not answer. 
respondents endorsed a very wide range of strategic benefits, some of which are difficult 
to understand in terms of the traditional realist arguments about alliances in the 
literature. As discussed in Chapter Six, classical and neorealists realists, like 
Morgenthau and Waltz, assume that alliances are a consequence of the balance of 
power. Defensive realists like Stephen Walt assume that alliances form to counter 
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threats. Yet the US- Australian alliance continues even though neither of these 
conditions is present. But putting aside that issue for a moment, respondents endorsed 
the alliance primarily because, in their view, it enhances Australia's security by 
providing intelligence and technology for defence of Australia and self -help. In other 
words, paradoxically the alliance supports self -reliance or self -help. The interviews with 
policy makers showed that there was universal support for the alliance for this reason. 
That said, some of the reasons why respondents endorsed the alliance were based on 
pessimistic views about Australia's future security environment. For example, support 
for the alliance was based on an expectation that it may provide a security guarantee for 
the future, in the unlikely event that Australia was seriously threatened. There was also 
the view that `US engagement in the region [helped] to balance the power of other 
states' but again, from the interviews, this seemed to be directed more towards the 
future. This concern about the future is of course reflected in policy makers' reference to 
increasing uncertainty in the region. But to explain the alliance as a preparatory 
arrangement for the future when the present circumstances, by realist theory, do not 
support its existence is unsatisfactory. As discussed in Chapter Six, it means that realism 
can explain everything (even periods when the usual explanations are not relevant) and 
therefore it explains nothing in particular." 
The perceived wide -ranging strategic benefits provided by the alliance, which all 
respondents affirmed, may be better explained by Martin Wight's view of alliances, 
which is part of the liberal -realist perspective. As discussed in Chapter Six, Wight has a 
much broader understanding of the nature and purposes of alliances. He argues that, 
[a]lliances are as various as friendships in their character, their purpose, their occasion, 
their duration, the relative position of those who make them'.12 Unfortunately Wight's 
discussion of alliances, rather like that of the realists, is not fully developed. 
Nonetheless, in so far as it goes, Wight's exposition of alliances is useful and an 
element in the liberal- realist framework. In addition to this more flexible approach to 
alliances the liberal -realist framework assumes that the formation of alliances is 
lt 
12 
See Michael Mastanduno, `Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand 
Strategy After the Cold War', International Security, Vol.21, No.4, 1997, pp.49 -88. 
Martin Wight, `Alliances', in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbrand (eds), Martin Wight: Power 
Politics, Leicester University Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p.122. 
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`conditional' rather than being a universal and an automatic outcome of the balance of 
power. 
It is interesting to note that, given its centrality in realist thinking, that balance of power 
arrangements were omitted by most respondents as a means to achieving security. A 
former CDF commented that with respect to balance of power arrangements: `it was not 
an appropriate arrangement for the foreseeable future or had been for the recent past'; 
`[that] the target of balance of power would be China and it would be counter- 
productive. [And that] constructive engagement with China would be better'. When 
policy makers were asked to comment in the interviews, about the questionnaire's 
finding, several of them qualified their original response by saying that a balance of 
power arrangement could become necessary under particular circumstances. This view 
is similar to the liberal- realist assumption that balance of power arrangements are 
`conditional' rather than universal or permanent. Obviously policy makers have mixed 
views about the value of balance of power arrangements though the trend is towards 
scepticism. 
The survey evidence, while not greatly different from the documentary evidence, 
reinforced just how strongly policy makers' were committed to the alliance as a means 
of assisting self -help and self -reliance. They were, however, unwilling to comment on 
the argument made in Chapter One that the Joint Defence Facilities were becoming 
more important to defence of Australia, not just with respect to possible threatre missile 
defences, but in tactical defence. 
POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
Questions addressed the following aspects of the policy: the `security with' logic of the 
policy; the role of multilateral institutions and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the 
practical measures that support strategic partnership; intelligence and cooperation 
activities; and economic interdependence (see Figure 7.4). 
The data showed that respondents' assumptions about the regional security policy can be 
understood in terms of the liberal -realist framework, though liberal tenets are the most 
useful. The most fundamental assumption is that cooperation enhances security and that 
`security with' regional states will enhance Australia's security. According to many 
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FIGURE 7.4 POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 'SECURITY WITH' 
Data 
All except one respondent agree that 'Australia's policy of "security with" enhances Australia's security' (Le., 1/2 
of the respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree'). 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
Many of the respondents made favourable comments about Australia's 'security with' approach, Some examples 
are: 'we are here, they are here, none of us is going anywhere so lets establish modes and habits of cooperation 
that lead us to a shared view of a peaceful future; 'a security relationship provides access and some 
transparency which should enhance overall security in the region': 'to an extent (it provides] us transparency and 
advance warning-but also more concretely ifs, sensible and cheaper'; 'lessens the likelihood of threat 
developing from regional countries, provides opportunities to influence their security policies, enhances 
intelligence opportunities, develops the habit of partnership with Australia'. 
Multilateral institutions 
Data 
All except two of the respondents agree that 'multilateral security institutions enhance security' (i.e., over 3/4 of 
the respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly'). 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
Responses were varied: 'I agree but they are limited in what they can do at the present -and this is unlikely to 
change markedly for many years'; 'agree, but irrelevant as regional countries will not enter multilateral 
arrangements'; 'agree, but should not be overstated-these institutions are weak and will remain so for years', 
'they take decades to mature but they reinforce 'security with'; 'they can be useful but are best suited to a 
situation of clearly recognised common threat e.g., NATO vs Warsaw Pact. This does not apply in our region. 
There is therefore the risk of precipitating the situation you are trying to avoid by isolating one or more nations, or 
of creating a meaningless organisation if everyone is included'. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
Data 
All respondents except one agree that the ASEAN Regional Forum enhances regional security' (i.e., over 3/4 of 
the respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly'). 
Respondents' comments' about their reasoning 
'Any regional dialogue is a positive'; 'it has done much better than its fumbling beginnings suggest'; 'only as a 
CBM'; agree, but not yet an institution -very weak'; 'a useful forum for focusing collective attention on security 
issues and perhaps for bringing moral suasion to bear'. 
Economic interdependence 
Data 
About 1/2 of the respondents agree that 'interdependence and enmeshment of the economies of Australia and 
regional states enhances security' (i.e., that 1/4 of respondents 'agree', about 1/4 'agree strongly', and the rest 
did not answer). 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
'Nations historically do not fight where interdependent economies are established flimly'; 'habits of cooperation 
are developed that benefit mutual understanding and a shared view of the future'; it could be made effective in 
enhancing security if the will of member states was there -at present its not; 'can't realistically be avoided - 
alternative is economic fortress Australia which will be weaker', 'makes it harder for differences to overwhelm 
common interests f the extent necessary to provide the calculated use of force'; 'gives incentives against conflict 
and vested interests against war -on balance'; 'perhaps, up to a point would tend to enhance security. However, 
there is too much disparity to push this too far and there is potential at least for reduced security - perhaps from 
reaction to disappointed expectations'. 
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respondents cooperation establishes modes of behaviour and habits, for example 
transparency, which enhance security. 
Respondents also assumed that the particular institutional and practical measures that 
support 'security with' enhance Australia's security. Nearly all assumed that the liberal 
notion of multilateral security institutions benefited security. However, the comments 
from respondents indicated that many policy makers are still cautious about regional 
institutions. Many stressed that there are limitations at the moment and that it will take 
decades before such institutions will mature. With respect to the key regional security 
institution, the ASEAN Regional Forum, all respondents agreed that the ARF enhances 
regional security. Some cautioned that the ARF is still a weak institution and others 
claimed it is doing well under the circumstances. 
Respondents' assumptions about the alleged security enhancing effects of economic 
interdependence were difficult to assess. The data showed that about 1/2 of the 
respondents agreed that `interdependence and enmeshment of the economies of 
Australia and regional states enhances security' (i.e., that 1/4 of respondents `agree', 
about 1/4 `agree strongly') and the rest did not answer. The comments from the 
questionnaire were also mixed. For example, some of the different representative 
comments were: that `nations historically do not fight where interdependent economies 
are established firmly'; that `it could be made effective in enhancing security if the will 
of member states was there but at present its not'; and that, `there is too much 
disparity to push this too far and there is potential at least for reduced security perhaps 
from reaction to disappointed expectations'. 
As for the particular cooperative activities which constituted 'strategic partnership', all 
the respondents assumed that all the measures listed in the questionnaire enhanced 
Australia's security (see Figure. 7.4 cont.). The one activity where responses varied 
concerned the provision of `training facilities in Australia'. Interestingly the main 
argument here was that this measure did not allow for enough personal contact between 
the ADF and the regional personnel who were using the training facilities. Indeed, the 
importance of personal relationships and contact between Australian and regional 
personnel for enhancing security was repeatedly emphasised by defence officials. The 
assumption that personal contact enhances security because it helps others to learn, not 
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FIGURE 7.4 POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 'SECURITY WITH' cont. 
Practical measures supporting 'strategic partnership' 
Data 
Policy makers were asked if the following practical measures associated with 'strategic partnership' enhance 
Australia's security. 
1) 'CBM transparency measures (e.g., white papers, dialogue)'. All respondents agree (i.e., about 3/4 of 
respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly'). 
2) 'Personal contact among military personnel'. All respondents except one agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 
'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly'). 
3) 'Training and exercising'. All respondents agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree 
strongly'). 
4) Educational exchanges between military establishments'. All agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 'agree' and 
the rest 'agree strongly'). 
5) 'Training regional militaries to improve their own operational and combat skills'. All respondents except two 
agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly'). 
6) 'Providing training facilities in Australia for regional militaries (e.g., Pearce Air Force Base to the Singaporean 
Air Force)'. About 3/4 of respondents agree (i.e., 1/2 of respondents 'agree', a 1/4 'agree strongly' and 1/4 
'disagree'). 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
'I agree all these help -some more than others. That too varies over time and with specific nations. With training, 
we have the opportunity to instill not only techniques but also values and in particular notions of military 
professionalism. With training facilities, the benefits are not as great because the contact is less direct and the 
Australian Defence Force input in minimal. However, the experience of living in a functional liberal democracy 
with all its warts must be a benefit'; 'if we are serious about security with the region anything that improves their 
capability is to our advantage'; `the contact provides /allows access to knowledge which improves transparency'; 
`providing unilateral training facilities does not provide the necessary interaction'; 'provides transparency and early 
warning but also the most practical possible demonstration of 'security with'; 'avoids stereotyping, reduces risk of 
underestimating or exaggerating military capabilities, breeds sense of community, shared interests and respon- 
sibilities, exposure to how the ADF itself, government and society, and how the ADF defines 'professionalism' 
which can rub off to our advantage over time', `Australia's security is much enhanced if we are in a secure and 
stable region. A necessary precondition is capable and sufficient but non- threatening regional military forces. 
Each of these forces should be sufficient to avoid Is country appearing to be an easy target that might attract 
aggressive military action from ambitious neighbours. This desirable end is helped by professional Australian 
military assistance. We have by a long way still the most professional military forces in the region. The measures 
described also provide opportunities to ensure our own policies are clearly understood, to influence regional 
strategic concepts and forces structures and to develop interoperability between forces and perhaps to market 
- Australian products. Importantly they also foster personal relationships that may prove invaluable in future crises 
where the parties are in senior positions. They also provide opportunities for intelligence gathering.' 
Intelligence and cooperative activities 
Data 
Policy makers were asked to explain, in their own words, the security assumptions that underpinned the activity of 
collecting intelligence during cooperative activities. 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
'Its good sense'; 'we do not assume that we could never and up in conflict with any states in the region, except 
the US and NZ'', 'I do not comment on intelligence': 'no comment'; 'we must have secrets to enhance security. If 
we can successfully Team about others' capabilities (and not get caught) we stand to gain in security terms'; 'as 
you approach a condition of genuine partnership and conceivably formal collective security arrangements these 
instincts should weaken. We still are some way from this with Southeast Asia and a layer of mystery and 
uncertainty about how good the ADF would really be remains appropriate'; 'We should always continue to collect 
intelligence (discreetly) as others do to us. Cooperative activities are an effective way of doing so and this is 
widely understood. Indeed, it is a measure of the confidence between countries that they conduct such activities. 
There will always be some operations and combat tactics, particularly involving key technical capabilities that we 
will not share. All countries do this and it reflects the judgment that some things are so sensitive to the national 
interest that the considerable benefits of cooperative activities are insufficient to risk putting them in jeopardy. 
However, there is still a great deal that can be shared and the benefits of doing so are not lessened by the fact 
that we hold back on a small percentage'. 
- 
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just how to cooperate but also, to appreciate Australian values, democratic institutions 
and human rights was universally accepted. This reflects the liberal belief in the value of 
socialisation and liberalism's optimistic view of human nature (as opposed to the 
pessimistic view that realists hold about human nature, see Chapter Four). Indeed, the 
assumptions underpinning these cooperative activities for strategic partnership can be 
explained in liberal terms. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, there are stiII 
aspects of strategic partnership that are best explained from within the liberal realist 
framework that includes realist assumptions. 
For example, during interviews several respondents argued that one the purposes of 
regional cooperation was `shaping' the regional environment to 'mirror Australia' s long 
term strategic and defence interests'. If shaping failed, then the other dimension of 
defence policy, 'hedging', which directly related to defending Australia could be 
adopted. According to one senior defence official shaping and hedging were reflected 
respectively in the terms 'promotion' and 'defence', which were used in Australia's 
Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP '90).13 Shaping/promotion was conducted, it was 
argued, through cooperation and developing interoperability 'across nearly everything - 
operations, combat, tactics, doctrine, communications, frequencies and high level 
dialogue'. One official made the important observation that, over time, shaping often 
supported the development of other states' warfighting skills. Trying to explain this 
element of regional security policy with the standard theoretical models is difficult: it 
involves liberal notions of cooperation, but, as it was argued in the previous chapter, the 
intention was not to build a security community on the Deutsch model and it was not to 
establish an alliance to use against others. This amalgam of shaping/promotion is 
probably best understood in liberal realist terms. 
Some aspects of strategic partnership and regional cooperation are better explained in 
realist terms, notably the cooperative activities that are used to gather intelligence (see 
Figure 7.4 cont.). As one senior defence official emphasised, these activities continue 
13 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Departmental Publications, 
Department of Defence, Canberra, 1992. ASP90 stated that: `The strategy described in this 
document goes beyond the defence of the nation against direct attack to include promotion of our 
security interests. The term as used here encompasses the nation's defence goals, the principles and 
priorities for providing the means of achieving them, and the uses to which these defence 
capabilities should be put, both to defend and promote the nation's security interests'. (Emphasis 
added.) Ibid., p.20. 
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because `we do not assume that we could never end up in conflict with any state in the 
region'; and according to another official, `we must have secrets to enhance security...If 
we can successfully learn about others capabilities (and not get caught) we stand to gain 
in security terms'. Another senior official pointed out that it is widely understood among 
cooperative partners that each will collect intelligence during cooperative activities and 
that no country shares knowledge of operations and combat tactics that are considered 
sensitive to national interest: `we should always continue to collect intelligence 
(discreetly) as others do to us. Cooperative activities are an effective way of doing so 
and this is widely understood.. .Indeed, it is a measure of the confidence between 
countries that they conduct such activities. ..There will always be some operations and 
combat tactics, particularly involving key technical capabilities that we will not 
share...AlI countries do this and it reflects the judgment that some things are so 
sensitive to the national interest that the considerable benefits of cooperative activities 
are insufficient to risk putting them in jeopardy...However, there is still a great deal that 
can be shared and the benefits of doing so are not lessened by the fact that we hold back 
on a small percentage'. The belief that gathering intelligence during cooperative 
activities reflects realist assumptions about the importance of self -help and relative 
gains. 
POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE OVERALL POLICY 
The analysis of the data on respondents' specific assumptions about the overall 
policy - defence of Australia, the alliance and regional security policy -is best 
explained within the liberal realist framework. The assumptions about defence of 
Australia are mostly, but not always, realist. The assumptions about the alliance can be 
partly explained in realist terms, though realism does not adequately account for all the 
reasons why Australia continues to pursue the alliance. Finally, support for regional 
security policy can be explained within the liberal realist framework, though here 
liberal theory explains more of the policy than realism. The overall policy then, is both 
liberal and realist and is best described by the liberal realist framework. 
General assumptions about security 
Policy makers' general assumptions about security can also be explained within the 
liberal realist framework. To briefly reiterate and expand upon some of the arguments 
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already made. First, from the perspective of both Australian defence policy makers and 
the liberal -realist framework the referent objects of security are both individuals and the 
state. (In fact the framework does not adequately address the issue of those states which 
fail to protect their own citizens but this does not affect the analysis of Australia's 
security policy because policy makers do not consider this factor applies in Australia.) 
Second, Australian views on `security from what' are more difficult to understand in 
terms of the liberal -realist framework because the latter assumes the possibility of 
future military threats (even if the timing is unclear) and that of course is strongly based 
on realist assumptions. In addition, policy makers do not consider other types of threats 
(environmental, societal, and economic) are security problems for Australia. The 
framework, on the other hand, assumes external military threats are the most important 
(though it is ambiguous about whether or not threats are imminent or just potential). 
Some liberal -realists, however, particularly those from the `new security' school, 
include other types of external threats and some internal ones. But, as argued in Chapter 
Five, the discussion of threats by the `new security' school is not very clear: particularly 
on such issues as whether or not poverty and/or environmental degradation should be 
considered as security threats. In any case, this ambiguity in the theory does not affect 
the analysis of Australia's security policy because policy makers assume that military 
threats matter the most and other threats are hardly relevant. 
Policy makers' assumptions about the overall means by which security is achieved can 
also be understood in terms of the liberal- realist framework. The assumption that 
security requires a variety of strategies: self -help and `other -help'; self -help and CBMs; 
self -help and alliances; deterrence and reassurance; secrecy and transparency; alliance 
and cooperative security; unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism are consistent 
with the liberal - realist assumptions about the need for both self -help and cooperation. 
Worldviews 
The survey data also make it possible to construct the security worldviews of policy 
makers which are focused on the region and which are based on a number of shared 
assumptions including the following: that the region is a realm in which states both 
compete and cooperate; that although Morgenthau's assumption of power politics may 
apply generally, in Australia's own case, given its geographic position, demography and 
limited economy, there are real limitations on Australia's ability to exercise power; that 
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distinctions have to be drawn, on the one hand, about current relations with states, 
which may be benign and cooperative, and on the other, future relations, which may be 
hostile and conflictual; that the present strategic environment is one where there is no 
direct threat to Australia but that there are `uncertainties' which may have a negative 
impact on Australia's security future, though not to the point where Australia's survival 
is threatened. 
At the end of Labor's time in office the trend in worldviews was towards a more 
pessimistic view of regional security developments based in part on the realist 
assumption that the growing military power of regional states could pose future threats. 
This view is of course quite inconsistent with the frequently reiterated claim that 
enhancing regional capabilities also enhances Australian security. Notwithstanding this 
development, when asked about their general disposition towards security over 1/2 of 
the respondents said `yes' to being `optimistic' and about 1/4 said `no' and remainder 
said neither `yes' or `no' (see Figure 7.5). 
When the assumptions that underpin the worldview policy makers are examined from 
the perspective of the liberal -realist worldview, there is remarkable similarity. Although 
the framework contains abstract notions such as anarchy and society, enmity and amity, 
it is not difficult to relate these to the more practical and focused assumptions of policy 
makers. For example, apart from the similarity between anarchy and competition and 
society and cooperation, the assumption that friends today may be tomorrow's enemies 
is close to the notions of enmity and amity. Indeed, these assumptions of policy makers 
inform (and perhaps should modify) the framework in a practical way by emphasising 
temporality: or distinguishing between the present and future for the purposes of defence 
planning.14 Another worldview assumption of policy makers that can be understood 
from a liberal -realist perspective is that power is important but that in Australia's case 
there are strong constraints. The mix of pessimism and optimism is also characteristic of 
the liberal- realist perspective. 
14 If the framework did emphasise temporal factors it would also support and refine the other 
assumption that state's interests change over time: as is suggested by the shift from the Grotians 
emphasis on the threat of nuclear war to the new security school emphasis on conventional and 
other external threats and internal threats. 
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FIGURE 7.5 POLICY MAKERS' GENERAL DISPOSITIONS ABOUT SECURITY 
Optimistic or pessimistic assumptions about security 
Data 
Policy makers were asked if their own assumptions about security have generally been optimistic, pessimistic or 
neither: About 1/2 said yes they were optimistic; less than a 1/4 said they were pessimistic; less than a 1/4 said 
neither; the rest said they were both optimistic and pessimistic 
Respondents' comments about their reasoning 
'But you have to be both optimistic and pessimistic when developing security policy', 
Competition and cooperation in Australia's security policy 
Data 
Policy makers were asked if Australia's overall security policy consists of approaches which are both competitive 
and cooperative (i.e., on the one hand, defence of Australia and the alliance are based on `security against' 
others; on the other hand, regional cooperation is based on 'security with' others). Three -quarters of the 
respondents agreed that `Australia's overall security policy consists of approaches that are both competitive and 
cooperative. The rest either 'disagreed' or 'did not know', or did not answer. 
Policy makers were then asked "if you think that Australia's overall policy incorporates both competition and 
cooperation do you think this is because the policy': 
1) 'is planned to take account of the present and the 'unknown' future security environments'. All respondents 
agree (i.e., about 1/2 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly'). 
2) keeps 'Australia's options open'. About 3/4 of respondents agree (i.e., less than 1/2 'agree'; about 1/4 'agree 
strongly'; another 1/4 'disagree'). 
3) 'assumes that regional states which are friends now may not be always be our friends and we have to plan on 
the basis of this'. Nearly all respondents agree (i.e., about 3/4 'agree'; less than a 1/4 'strongly agree'; and the 
rest did not answer). 
4) 'aims to train personnel and modernise force structures In the present time -frame to prepare for long term'. 
About 3/4 of respondents agree (i.e., about 1/2 'agree'; less than 1/4 'agree strongly'; less than 1/4 `disagree'; 
and the rest did not answer). 
5) `assumes that the regional context is currently one in which there are conflicting trends i.e., there is evidence of 
both cooperation and competition and thus Australia's policy should be planned on the basis of this'. About 3/4 
of respondents agree (i.e., about 1/2 'agree'; less than 1/4 'agree strongly'; less than 1/4 'disagree'; and the 
rest did not answer). 
6) 'assumes that regional states have mixed motives i.e., they may want to cooperate and compete'. About 1/2 
'agree' and the rest are divided between `disagree', ` strongly agree' and 'don't know'. 
Contradictions in the policy 
Policy makers were then asked 'if Australia's policy contains both competitive and cooperative approaches' does 
it mean the policy is contradictory', All agreed that the policy is not contradictory (i.e., about 1/2 'disagree' and the 
rest 'disagree strongly'). 
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Competition and cooperation 
Apart from examining policy makers' specific and general assumptions as well as their 
security worldviews the questionnaire also sought to establish if policy makers had other 
security assumptions about the overall policy and if they too might be understood in 
terms of the liberal -realist framework. 
Respondents were asked if `Australia's overall security policy consists of approaches 
which are both competitive and cooperative (i.e., on the one hand, defence of Australia 
and the alliance are based on `security against' others; on the other hand, regional 
cooperation is based on `security with' others). (See Figure 7.5.) The data confirmed 
that respondents' assume that Australia's security policy is both competitive and 
cooperative. This is a key assumption of the liberal -realist framework. 
Moreover, the framework can also explain the reasons why policy makers think the 
policy is both competitive and cooperative. The data shows that: the three main 
assumptions are numbers I), 3), 5): the policy `is planned to take account of the present 
and the `unknown' future security environments'; the policy `assumes that regional 
states which are friends now may not be always be our friends and we have to plan on 
the basis of this'; `assumes that the regional context is currently one in which there are 
conflicting trends i.e., there is evidence of both cooperation and competition and thus 
Australia's policy should be planned on the basis of this' .15 
Finally, three other security assumptions held by policy makers that are similar to those 
within the framework are that: the policy assumes different time- frames, that is, the 
relatively benign present and the `unknown' future; that the policy assumes that present 
friendships may not last, that cooperation today may be replaced by competition; that the 
policy assumes a regional context that is characterised by conflicting trends, that is by 
both competition and cooperation. 
To establish policy makers' views about whether or not the incorporation of competition 
and cooperation meant that the policy was contradictory, the questionnaire posed the 
15 Less emphasis was given to the other three assumptions 2), 4), 6): that is, to keeping Australia's 
options open; training personnel in the present to be prepared for the future; and that states have 
mixed motives. 
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question: `if Australia's policy contains both competitive and cooperative approaches 
[does] it mean the policy is contradictory' (see Figure 7.5). The response over- 
whelmingly showed that respondents did not think the policy is contradictory: all agreed 
that the policy is not contradictory (i.e., about 1/2 `disagree' and the rest `disagree 
strongly' ). 
The reasons why policy makers said the policy was not contradictory, despite being both 
competitive and cooperative, are the ones above, which can be understood in terms of 
the liberal -realist framework. The framework assumes a strategic context that consists 
of `contradictions', such as anarchy and society, and competition and cooperation and 
that the means to achieving security need to address that context. 
THE RELEVANCE OF THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING 
POLICY 
If, as has been argued throughout the thesis, the liberal -realist framework helps to 
explain policy makers' security assumptions, and if the answers which policy makers 
give in the questionnaire and interviews confirm this argument, then it is interesting to 
ask policy makers if they think the framework is useful and to investigate in more depth, 
their claims that theory is of little use to them for explaining policy. 
Possible sources of policy makers' security assumptions 
Policy makers were asked about the sources of their security assumptions. The data 
showed that respondents were ambivalent at best about the value of theories. When 
asked to rank the various sources in order of importance about 1/2 of the respondents 
put `contemporary events', about 1/4 put `historical events', and the remaining 1/4 were 
divided between `theories' and `individual philosophies' about security (see Figure 7.6). 
Other factors, apart from security assumptions, which determine security 
policy 
The ambivalence about the relevance of theories for security policies appears to be 
based on two claims: one that security policy is based on other factors not just on 
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FIGURE 7.6 POSSIBLE SOURCES OF POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS 
Data 
Respondents were asked if their own assumptions about Australia's security policy were influenced by the 
following factors. 
1) 'Historical events (e.g., the Pacific war, Indonesia's history)'. Over 3/4 of respondents said 'yes' and the rest 
did not answer. 
2) 'Contemporary regional developments (e.g., the end of the Cold War)'. All said 'yes'. 
3) 'Your knowledge of theories about security (e.g., realism and liberalism)'. Just over 1/2 said 'yes' and about 1/4 
said 'no' and others did not answer. 
4) 'Your own personal philosophies'. About 3/4 said 'yes' and the rest `no'. 
5) Other: 
assumptions about security; the second is that, as Paul Dibb states, the theories are 
themselves problematic when it comes explaining Australia's security policy (as indeed 
the discussion above sometimes shows).16 To explore the first claim, respondents were 
asked the question: `Some people think that Australia's security policy reflects different 
kinds of considerations...which have a different logic to those of security'. Half of the 
respondents said `yes', that security policy does reflect different considerations, and the 
other half said `no' it did not (see Figure 7.6 cont). 
The half who said `yes' were then asked which other factors were `more', `equally', 
'less' important determinants of security policy than assumptions about security. The 
factors which respondents were asked to address were: competition between the 
bureaucracies; competition between the three services; competition between political 
parties; competition between elite personalities; and finaIIy if Australia's economic 
engagement in the region was a factor in formulating security policy. 
The data (see Figure 7.6 cont.) showed that policy makers, contrary to their own claims 
and to popular wisdom, are far from convinced that other factors are highly relevant to 
formulating security policy. To be more precise, although these factors were relevant 
they were less relevant than assumptions about security. The possible exceptions to this 
finding were: Australia's economic engagement in the region, which respondents said 
was `equally important' as security assumptions (i.e., 3/4 of the 1/2 that agreed); and 
competition between the services, which respondents said was 'equally important' as 
security assumptions (1/2 of the 1/2 that agreed). 
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FIGURE 7.6 POSSIBLE SOURCES OF POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS (cont.) 
Other considerations in security policy 
Data 
Some people think that Australia's security policy reflects different kinds of considerations...which have a different 
logic to those of security'. Half of the respondents said 'yes', that security policy does reflect different considerations, 
and the other half said 'no' it did not 
Other factors, apart from assumptions about security, which are 'more', 'equally', 'less' relevant 
for explaining security policy 
Data 
1) competition between bureaucracies: 3/4 of respondents said less' important the rest did riot answer 
2) competition between the services: 1/2 of respondents said 'equally important; 1/4 said less' rest did not answer 
3) competition between political parties: Over of respondents 3/4 said 'less' 
4) competition between elite personalities: 3/4 of respondents said 'less' and rest did not answer 
5) Australia's economic engagement: 3/4 of respondents said 'equally' important and the rest did not answer. 
External and internal factors 
Data 
Policy makers were asked: 'Some people argue that external events are generally more influential determinants of 
Australia's security policy than are domestic issues'. About 1/2 'agreed', and the rest did not answer. 
Importance of policy makers own assumptions for policy 
Data 
Policy makers were asked: 'With respect to Australia's security policy during 1983 -96 do you think that assumptions 
about security similar to yours were 'important', 'very important', 'not important', 'don't know'. All said they were 
important (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents said assumptions similar to the ones they held were 'important'; less than 
1/4 said they were 'very important': and the rest did not know or did not answer). 
Finally, since it is often claimed that domestic issues are more important for explaining 
security policy than the external factors on which many security theories are based, 
policy makers were asked a question about that (see Figure 7.6 cont). In answer to the 
question, `Some people argue that external events are generally more influential 
determinants of Australia's security policy than are domestic issues', the data was 
difficult to assess since about 1/2 `agreed', and the rest did not answer. Collectively this 
data, about other possible assumptions and factors that explain security policy, indicates 
that, in their view, other factors were of less significance than security assumptions. 
Moreover, when respondents were asked 'With respect to Australia's security policy 
during 1983 -96 do you think that assumptions about security similar to yours were 
16 See Introduction. 
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`important', `very important', `not important', `don't know' the data showed that all said 
they were important (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents said assumptions similar to the ones 
they held were `important'; less than 1/4 said they were `very important': and the rest 
did not know or did not answer). (See Figure 7.6.) This suggests that security 
assumptions are important to formulating policy. 
Several points can also be made about the common claim that is made by policy makers 
that they do not refer to theoretical thinking when formulating policy. The data shows 
that policy makers do think and reason in ways that are compatible with, though not 
necessarily the same as, theoretical discourse. Most policy makers and theorists use the 
same language: for example, threats, uncertainty, cooperation, CBMs and so on -all of 
which are either or have become every day terms. Most share the meanings of these 
terms: for example, with regard to security cooperation there is the common 
understanding that as one policy maker argued 'it avoids stereotyping, reduces risk of 
underestimating or exaggerating military capabilities, breeds a sense of community, 
shared interests and responsibilities'. Most share similar thinking and reasoning 
patterns. Most policy makers generalise and assume that there are patterns in state 
behaviour: why else, for example, do all policy makers claim that Australia will always 
need military insurance. 
The fact that the thesis shows that policy makers have unstated assumptions that can be 
explained from a theoretical perspective does not of course show that policy makers 
think that theory is relevant. But showing that their assumptions can be explained in 
these terms has the effect of making explicit what they often assume implicitly. Stephen 
Walt is right when he argues that, `[e]ven policymakers who are contemptuous of 
"theory" must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in 
order to decide what to do'.17 Being clear and explicit about possibly unclear and 
unstated ideas is a help to policy makers as well as scholars. 
17 Stephen M. Walt, 'International Relations: One World Many Theories', Foreign Policy, Spring 
1998, p.29. 
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Policy makers' views of the liberal -realist framework 
In view of the fact that respondents are so cautious about the relevance of theory, and 
presumably this applied to the conventional theories in the literature, they were asked if 
an explanatory framework which takes into account and reconciles apparent 
`contradictions' like the co- existence of cooperation and competition would help to 
explain Australia's policy (see Figure 7.7). The data indicated that there was cautious 
endorsement: over 1/2 said `yes', 1/4 said `possibly', and the rest either said 'no' or did 
not answer. 
Respondents were then asked which assumptions should be taken into account in such a 
framework. Here, as can be seen in Figure 7.7, the answers endorsed the liberal -realist 
framework. 
FIGURE 7.7 POLICY MAKERS' VIEWS ABOUT THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO 
ACCOUNT IN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORKS 
Data 
Respondents were asked which of the following assumptions should be taken into account in explanatory 
frameworks. 
1) international relations are complex and require several theories i.e., liberalism and realism to explain the 
behaviour of states. Over 1/2 said 'yes', 1/4 said ` no' and the rest did not answer 
2) the international system includes both competition and cooperation: Over 3/4 said 'yes' the rest did not answer 
3) states have mixed motives i.e., they cooperate and compete Over 3/4 said 'yes' the rest did not answer 
4) both the state and the individuals within are the objects of security. 1/2 said 'yes' and 1/2 said 'no' 
5) politically motivated violence, either externally or internally, is the main concern of security. About 1/2 said 'no' 
and the rest did not answer 
6) the means to achieving security involve both cooperation and competition. Over 3/4 said 'yes' and the rest did 
not answer 
Respondents were asked for their own suggestions for conceptual frameworks to explain security policy. Only one 
person volunteered an answer: he said that development of a framework for a no- threat environment is 'an idea that 
would be workshopped effectively If you get the right mix of people' 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the non -documentary evidence about the security assumptions 
underpinning Australia's security policy (see Table 7.1). Mindful of the earlier caveats, 
about the small sample size of participants involved in the survey /questionnaire and 
interviews, I have argued several points that in effect confirm the arguments made in the 
previous chapter. In other words, the liberal -realist framework provides a better account 
300 
The Non -documentary Survey Evidence 
Table 7.1 Explaining the security assumptions behind Labor's security policy, 1983 -96 
LIBERAL -REALIST 
FRAMEWORK 
Worldview 
Anarchy and society 
Competition & cooperation 
Enmity and amity 
Power & interdependence 
Sovereignty & 
interdependence 
via medias, straddling, 
middle ways 
Optimism and pessimism 
Security of what 
State and individuals 
within 
Security from what 
Grotian: external military 
force 
NLI: less concerned about 
military threats because of 
the declining utility of force 
NSS: external military 
threats (with 
qualifications) + internal 
threats (with 
qualifications), + other 
threats e.g., economic 
insecurity 
Security means 
Military means 
Grotian: Self -help, 
conditional balance of 
power, collective security 
NLI: Military force with 
limitations on what it can 
achieve 
NSS: Self -help through 
defensive approaches 
Non -military means 
Development of 
society+diplomacy+ 
international 
l aw +regimes +institution s 
`NLf =neoliberal 
institutionalists 
'NSS =new security 
school 
DOCUMENTARY 
EVIDENCE 
Worldview 
Competition & cooperation 
Security against & with 
The specific regional 
outlook stressed a 'no- 
threat' environment' but 
after the '94 White Paper 
there was greater 
pessimism about 'new 
uncertainties' and 
'expanding military 
capabilities throughout 
Asia' 
Security of what 
Explicitly territory, implicitly 
the individuals within and 
the state 
Security from what 
Possible future external 
military threats, effects of 
regional uncertainty, low - 
and escalated low level 
conflict. The '94 White 
Paper stressed 'new 
uncertainties' and 'higher 
levels of conflict' 
Security means 
Military means 
Self -help 
Alliance as a means to 
achieve intelligence and 
technology for self -help 
Other -help i.e., extensive 
military cooperation with 
military forces in the region 
Secrecy and transparency 
Unilateralism, bilateralism 
& multilateralism 
Non -military means 
Norms of cooperation 
Multilateral institutions (the 
ARF) 
CBMs, transparency, small 
`s' security activities 
NON -DOCUMENTARY 
EVIDENCE 
Worldview 
Competition & cooperation 
Security against & with 
Uncertainty & cooperation 
Friends today may be 
enemies tomorrow 
Short & long term views 
Suspicion & trust 
Pessimism & optimism 
Secrecy & transparency 
Security of what 
Nation -state (i.e., the 
people within) and territory 
Security from what 
Possible future external 
military threats, current 
regional uncertainties, but 
no military threats 
expected within 5 years 
and beyond that `don't 
know'. 
Security means 
Military means 
Self -help 
Alliance as a means to 
achieve intelligence and 
technology for self -help 
Other -help i.e., extensive 
military cooperation with 
military forces in the region 
Secrecy and transparency 
Unilateralism, bilateralism 
& multilateralism 
Non -military means 
Norms of cooperation 
Multilateral institutions the 
ARF) 
CBMs, transparency, small 
's' security activities 
COMMENTS 
Worldview 
Common theme of 
anarchy and society, 
competition and 
cooperation 
Security of what 
Common theme of 
individuals within the state 
and territory 
Security from what 
Common theme of military 
threat but not in the near 
future. Strategic 
uncertainty in the region is 
stressed in the empirical 
evidence 
Security means 
Strong common theme of 
means including 
competition and 
cooperation, military and 
non -military measures 
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of the documentary and survey evidence than either liberal or realist theories on their 
own. What variation there is between is more one of emphasis than of substance. 
The most significant finding was that the policy can be explained from a liberal- realist 
perspective and that policy makers think about security in these terms. The data 
suggested that these assumptions about security were more important than other factors, 
such as competition between the different elements of government, for explaining the 
policy. And, also that external factors, on which many security assumptions are based, 
are more important than domestic factors. Finally, when policy makers were asked what 
kind of assumptions should be taken into account in explanatory frameworks none of 
them disagreed that the major elements should include those that constitute the liberal - 
realist framework. 
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There is a stage where realism is the necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, 
just as in other periods utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism... 
Mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis.' 
(E.H. Carr, Political Theorist, 1939.) 
The global system's evolving character encourages considering how a reconstructed theory 
that integrates the most relevant features of both theoretical traditions might be built, or alternatively 
if an altogether different theoretical framework that transcends them needs to be constructed.2 
(Charles W. Kegley Jr, Political Theorist, 1995.) 
This thesis began with three questions about the Australian Labor government's security 
policy from 1983 to 1996. First, what are the security assumptions that underpin it? 
Second, how can they be explained? Third, what does this tell us about the adequacy of 
mainstream International Relations (1R) approaches for explaining Australia's security 
policy in particular and security policies generally? 
Australia's policy comprises three main parts -defence of Australia, the Australia US 
alliance and regional security -and is based on different security principles, which 
embrace competition and cooperation respectively. Conventional theoretical explana- 
tions in the IR security literature -realism and liberalism-are, as single theories, 
insufficient to explain the policy's assumptions. Since each theory is based on different 
security assumptions- realism stresses competition and liberalism emphasises 
cooperation -any explanation that encompasses both appears to be contradictory. 
There are, however, three schools of thought in the IR literature which suggest that 
explanation of security relations requires both liberalism and realism and that the two 
approaches, far from being contradictory, are complementary. The Grotian, neoliberal 
institutionalist and `new security' schools (hereafter the ` Grotian plus' perspective) hold 
that the international system is characterised by both anarchy and society and by both 
competition and cooperation. Assumptions about anarchy /competition and society/ 
cooperation are the intellectual foundations of realism and liberalism respectively. If 
anarchy and society co -exist in reality then the insights of both realism and liberalism 
are required to explain the security problematique. 
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, Macmìllian, London, 1939, 2nd edition, reprinted 1961, p.10. 
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From the foregoing analysis I argued that it is possible to construct what I have called a 
`liberal realist' analytical framework, which encompasses the insights of the three 
schools noted above. I further argued that this framework illuminates the assumptions 
that underpin Labor's security policy better than any single theory. Labor's policy is 
liberal realist in that Labor's defence planners believed that the international security 
environment is characterised by both anarchy and society, and competition and 
cooperation. Moreover, the policy incorporates other liberal realist assumptions: namely 
that the object of security is both the state and the individual; that security planning must 
primarily take into account both military threat and strategic uncertainty; and that the 
means for achieving security involve both military and non -military means, or, in more 
concrete terms, self -help strategies, alliances, extensive military cooperation, multi- 
lateral arrangements and institutions. 
In conclusion I will argue that the liberal realist perspective challenges commonly held 
views in the literature -to the effect that security can be understood in terms of a single 
(usually realist) theory and that Labor's security policy can be explained solely in realist 
terms. The liberal realist framework also enables Australian policy makers to articulate 
a coherent rationale for security policy, in addition to the ad hoc reasons that are so 
common in policy statements. It also helps to make explicit the implicit security 
assumptions and worldviews of policy makers. And finally, the framework provides a 
coherent structure for debate about Australia's security policy.3 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIBERAL -REALIST PERSPECTIVE FOR IR CONCEPTIONS 
AND EXPLANATIONS OF SECURITY 
The argument that security policy, in this case Australia's security policy, cannot be 
explained solely in terms of one of the two mainstream theories challenges conventional 
academic wisdom. The claim that both theories are required for a comprehensive 
explanation challenges it more radically. Although it is sometimes maintained that 
a Charles W. Kegley Jr (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the 
Neoliberal Challenge, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, p.17. 
3 I'm grateful to Andrew Mack, Jim Richardson and Wynne Russell for advice on fine -tuning some 
of the arguments in the Conclusion, though of course I remain responsible. 
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several theories may be required to explain relations generally between states4 this claim 
has rarely been made about security relations between states. 
The assumption usually made in the national security literature is that, of the two 
theories, realism is by far the better explanation of security relations. Indeed, it is 
frequently argued, realism is both a necessary and sufficient explanation. Liberalism's 
role, in this account, is relegated to explaining broader definitions of security, for 
example economic security. But, as this thesis has shown, liberalism can be used to 
explain some traditional understandings of security too. Liberalism, like realism, has 
answers to the three questions -security of what, from what and by what means? 
Liberalism offers a different set of answers to these questions from those of realism and 
in particular it stresses that the means for achieving security should be based on 
cooperation. However, some variants of liberalism, for example republican liberalism, 
do not exclude military means. Liberalism therefore offers not just an explanation of 
broader notions of security, but an alternative to realism. Whatever the notion of 
security being used, bringing liberalism into the picture is justified. 
Integral to the challenge that the liberal realist perspective poses to commonly held 
views in the literature is the argument made in Chapter Five that its two key concepts - 
anarchy and society -are not only the key concepts of realism and Iiberalism 
respectively, but also, that both characterise the international environment and that each 
is important for explaining security relations. As shown in Chapter Four this argument is 
often neglected in the literature or is a `hidden given'. Highlighting the co- existence of 
anarchy and international society should help to correct or, in other cases, clarify the 
assumptions behind many other explanations of security. For example, offensive realists 
argue the case for offence -dominant force structures and strategies because they 
frequently overemphasise the pessimistic implications of anarchy and underemphasise 
(and sometimes ignore) the existence of international society. The reality of society/ 
cooperation is also neglected by classical realists but covertly used by them to 
conceptualise how alliances and some balance of power arrangements (both of which of 
course require cooperation) are possible in what they describe as an overwhelmingly 
anarchical system (see Chapter Four). The existence of society and the potential for 
4 See Chapter Five. 
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cooperation is implied in the defensive realist argument that `security is plentiful' but 
ignored as a theoretical explanation for why security is plentiful and why limited 
cooperation is possible (see Chapter Four). As structuralists, defensive realists should be 
explicit that they assume a structure of both anarchy and society. Liberals also fall short 
since they often overemphasise the society /cooperation elements in their security 
prescriptions and underemphasise the constraints which anarchy imposes (see Chapter 
Four). Even scholars who examine the Grotian school -the intellectual wellspring of 
anarchy and society -often neglect the Grotian assumption about the co- existence of 
anarchy and society (see Chapter Five). Many of these scholars portray the Grotians as 
belonging to either the realist school or the society of states school 5 That the Grotians 
embrace both is not widely recognised. 
Although Martin Wight rejected single theory explanations of international relations, he, 
like other Grotian scholars, did not spell out the implications, of either this rejection or 
the assumption that anarchy and society co- exist, for theorising security. The thesis 
draws out these implications by illuminating what is usually ad hoc or `hidden' in the 
Grotian conception of security and systematically developing these elements into an 
analytical framework. In other words, the implications of the Grotian assumption, that 
there is both anarchy and society in the international context, provide a [re]conception of 
security that is the basis for the liberal realist framework. Although the liberal realist 
perspective shows the need for greater complexity, than realism or liberalism on its own, 
and is hardly parsimonious, it is still confined by the three questions, security of what, 
from what and with what means? 
Focusing attention on the co- existence of anarchy and society may also help to clarify 
the assumptions underpinning some other sub -theories in the IR security literature. Like 
liberal and realist theorists, other scholars assume that anarchy and society co -exist 
without making their assumption explicit. For example, unless the assumption is made 
that both anarchy and society are elements of the international system, then how else can 
s One example, which is discussed below, of how the Grotian school (or English school) is seen to 
be realist is from Jim George, `Quo Vadis Australia? Framing the Defence and Security Debate 
Beyond the Cold War', in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & 
Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 
1996, pp.10 -48. For an example of how the school is seen to be focused predominantly on society 
see Alan James, `System or Society ?, Review of International Studies, Vol.19, No.3, 1993, 
pp.269 -288. 
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foreign policy theorists suggest that coercion and collaboration, for example carrot and 
stick tactics, actually work76 And how else can constructivists, like Alexander Wendt, 
argue that `anarchy is what states make of it' ?7 These arguments implicitly assume that 
there is a dialectic between anarchy and society that legitimises and facilitates strategies 
of competition /coercion and cooperation /collaboration, and, in the constructivists' case, 
that allows for different understandings of anarchy. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO IR EXPLANATIONS OF LABOR'S SECURITY POLICY 
Arguments about the liberal -realist challenge to conventional conceptions of security in 
the IR literature are the basis for a particular challenge to the main scholarly treatments 
of Labor's security policy which assume that it is best explained from the single 
perspective of realism. Both realist and Iiberal thinkers agree on this; the former 
approvingly and the latter disapprovingly. Paul Dibb, despite writing the Dibb Report 
which takes a liberal -realist perspective, acknowledges and endorses the `hard -edged 
realist treatment' taken by the 1994 White Paper.8 Graeme Cheeseman, a liberal security 
analyst, argues that the justification for a book that he and others published and called 
The New Australian Militarism9 was `the trend, evident in government policy 
documents and ministerial statements...towards emphasising and even encouraging 
military solutions to political and strategic problems'.10 Jim George, a critical social 
theorist, argues that in Australia `the great majority of policy analysts and 
practitioners...have "systematically ignored" all other representations of the world but 
the power politics Realist one'.11 George claims that `Defending Australia, and the 
6 For an account of many of the research dimensions in foreign policy analysis, see Deborah J. 
Gerner, `Foreign Policy Analysis: Exhilarating Eclecticism, Intriguing Enigmas', International 
Studies Notes, Vol.16, No.3, 1991 and Vol.17, No.1, 1992, pp.4 -19. 
7 Alexander Wendt, `Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', 
International Organization, Vol.46, No.2, Spring 1992, pp.391 -425. 
8 Paul Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, p.12. 
9 Cheeseman, Graeme, and St John Kettle (eds), The New Australian Militarism, Pluto Press, 
Leichhardt, 1990. 
10 Graeme Cheeseman, The Search for Self -Reliance. Australian Defence Since Vietnam, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993, p.146. 
11 Jim George, `Quo Vadis Australia ?', in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & 
Dread Frontiers: p.12. Other scholars in the volume claim that the security community, which 
seems to include selected scholars and presumably practitioners (since the argument includes the 
claim that these scholars are too close to policy makers) is dominated by realist thinking. For 
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Australian security and defence literature generally, are best understood as reflecting a 
traditional power politics idiom'.12 This official literature, he claims, is in `contrast to 
the more pragmatic contemporary neo- Realism of the foreign affairs community'.13 
Roger Bell, a security scholar, argues that `official Australian strategic planning clung to 
Cold War assumptions during the early 1990s, despite dramatic shifts in global and 
regional power'.14 Quite clearly the view among scholars is that, as Graeme Cheeseman 
and Michael McKinIey argue, `the dominant paradigm within which Australia's overall 
security policies are articulated... [is] essentially realíst',15 
From a liberal -realist perspective these analyses suffer from several shortcomings. First, 
most do not examine the three parts of Australia's security policy together. Although it 
is perfectly justifiable to examine just one part of the policy it is unwise to generalise 
about the whole policy on the basis of any one part. Second, partly as a result of this the 
realist elements of the policy are over -emphasised and the liberal elements are under- 
emphasised, dismissed or ignored. Jim George, for example, dismisses the argument 
that the policy has liberal elements saying that there is a `false distinction between 
Realism and neoliberalism' 16 and that elements of Australia's security policy are a 
`fairy -tale scenario' of "`liberalised" neo- Realism'.17 However, as was shown in Chapter 
example, David Sullivan claims that: `commentary of defence and security is conducted within a 
discourse which legitimises and normalises an approach to security committed explicitly to realism 
and resists alternative discourses on security', See Sullivan, `Sipping Thin Gruel: Academic and 
Policy Closure in Australia's Defence and Security Discourse', p.79. Michael Sullivan, argues that 
`the claims of neo- liberalism never go so far as to question the hegemony of neo- realism's concepts 
of national security and the integrity of the existing interstate system' [emphasis in the originali, 
p.216. In a similar vein to George and to David Sullivan, Michael Sullivan also refers to the 
'artificial divisions between neoliberalism and neo- realism which sustain debate within the defence 
and strategic studies communities', (p.201). See Michael Sullivan, `Australia's Regional 
Peacekeeping Discourse: Policing the Asia -Pacific'. 
12 George, `Quo Vadis Australia ?', in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread 
Frontiers, p.16. 
13 George, `Quo Vadis Australia ?', in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread 
Frontiers, p.16. 
14 Roger Bell, 'Reassessed: Australia's Relationship With the United States', in James Cotton and 
John Ravenhill (eds), Seeking Asian Engagement. Australia in World Affairs, 1991 -95, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1997, p.223. 
15 Graeme Cheeseman and Michael McKinley, `Moments Lost: Promise, Disappointment and 
Contradictions in the Australian -United States Defence Relationship', Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.46, No.2, 1992, p.203. 
16 George, 'Quo Vadis Australia ?', p.33. 
17 Moreover, again at the empirical level, George's criticism of neoliberal elements in the policy as 
actually being neorealist appears to follow from his focus on economic issues and not from a close 
examination of regional security policy. Even his discussion of the former does not include an 
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Five, neoliberalism assumes both anarchy and society, and not just anarchy as George 
infers. If anarchy were the only assumption underpinning neoliberalism then the 
cooperation required to make regimes and institutions plausible would have no 
theoretical basis. George's citation of a quote from Keohane, which ostensibly supports 
his argument that neoliberalism is really neorealism is misleading.ts Despite some 
similarities between the two approaches, which Keohane acknowledges, Keohane's 
argument is that, for neoliberals, anarchy has a different meaning than it does for 
neorealists, such as Waltz and Mearsheimer (as was discussed in Chapter Four). George 
may be right that neo- liberalism and realism share common epistemological assump- 
tions about the world. But he fails to note that fundamentally different practical policies 
flow from the two worldviews. If one assumes anarchy and the struggle for power then 
self -help and alliances are all that makes sense, with very real risks that security 
dilemmas will emerge. Once we assume that the international system has societal as 
well as anarchic characteristics, cooperation becomes a real possibility. 
Third, most other scholarly arguments also ignore the liberal elements in the regional 
security policy. As was shown in Chapters Three and Six, despite its realist elements, 
the policy aimed to establish cooperation as a regional norm both through institutions 
and through defence cooperation. 
Fourth, most explanations of Australia's security policy fail to distinguish between the 
different variants of realism, in particular between offensive and defensive realism. 
Many scholars seem to assume that the policy is based on offensive realist assumptions, 
which assumes that `security is scarce', when in fact, as was shown in Chapter Six, it is 
closer to defensive realism, which assumes `security is plentiful'. The different variants 
have different policy implications, as was shown in Chapter Six. 
Finally, we have seen from the data presented in Chapter Seven that policy makers' 
views about the assumptions behind Labor's policy are best understood from the 
examination of economic policy. Rather it is based on the statements of two well -known economic 
commentators who, according to George, `[invoke] the correlation between neo- liberal free market 
prosperity and peaceful (democratic) coexistence as the keystone of an Australian future in the 
Asia -Pacific without seriously questioning such a correlation' (see p.31). 
18 George quotes Keohane as saying that neo- liberalism does `not call into question the core of the 
realist model of anarchy'. George, `Quo Vadis Australia ?', in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), 
Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p.32. 
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liberal- realist perspective. This data helps to overcome the problem that analyses of 
Labor's policy have not included any studies that formally survey the views of policy 
makers. In sum, the liberal -realist perspective challenges both the theoretical and 
empirical bases of mainstream arguments and it provides a different explanation of 
Labor's security policy. 
QUALIFICATIONS AND CONDITIONS 
Having argued that the liberal -realist perspective challenges both the conventional 
conceptions of security in the literature and academic explanations of Labor's security 
policy it is important to point out what claims I am not making. As was pointed out in 
the Introduction, the claim that the assumptions behind the policy can be `explained' in 
terms of a liberal- realist perspective is different from the task of explaining the 
particular causes of the policy. What the thesis offers is a way of explaining the policy's 
unstated assumptions about security from an IR literature that comprises three schools 
of thought (Grotian plus) and whose security assumptions have to be made explicit. 
Drawing out these assumptions opens up different and more complex considerations for 
theorising security, than one -dimensional approaches based on either realism or 
liberalism. The Grotian plus perspective, in embracing assumptions from both realism 
and liberalism, provides a richer understanding of reality in comparison to the partial 
view of the world that each tradition offers by itself. 
The second point is that if scholars want to use the liberal -realist perspective to explain 
Australia's security policies in earlier periods and other countries' security policies they 
will need to consider what generalisations can be drawn from this single case study. 
Although the liberal -realist perspective reveals the assumptions behind policy during 
the Labor period, security policy then was different from what it had been. As argued in 
Chapter Three, never before had Australia cooperated so closely with so many of its 
regional neighbours. However, since most countries are at peace with each other, 
security cooperation with others is becoming more common. Only in a few cases, on the 
Korean peninsula for example, are security relations so hostile that cooperation is all but 
absent. But, given that we live in a world of change, few states have been prepared to 
follow the example of Costa Rica and reject realist prescriptions by eschewing any 
military capabilities completely. In other words, the world for most states has a Grotian 
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image and this suggests that the liberal realist framework will be a useful tool of 
analysis in most cases. 
The liberal element in the liberal realist framework will be least relevant in situations 
characterised by suspicion and hostility, in bi -polar contexts and in cold wars, and more 
relevant for the post -Cold War period. As argued in Chapter Two, the improvement in 
international relations at the beginning of the end of the Cold War gave Foreign 
Minister Bill Hayden the opportunity to pursue the idea of security dialogue and CBMs. 
The final end of the Cold War brought more changes and gave Australian decision 
makers further opportunities to advance security policies stressing cooperation - 
multilaterally and bilaterally-with other governments in the region. Furthermore, all 
the regional governments, including Australia's, were already increasing economic 
cooperation. It may be that the post -Cold War context, which shows greater 
interdependence and increased transnational relations across a range of issues, provides 
conditions suited to liberal realist conceptions of security. The final consideration for a 
wider application of the liberal realist framework is that Australia enjoys some unusual 
security attributes. Compared with many other countries Australia starts from a position 
of great security. Its geographic position -a moat- continent surrounded by an extensive 
sea -air gap to the north, south, east and west affords it great physical protection and 
inhibits contests with others over land and maritime borders. Unlike many other 
countries Australia has no real or imagined enemies, despite the findings in public 
opinion polls that Indonesia is perceived to pose a threat (see Chapter Three). It is a 
wealthy middle power which threatens no one and which is not threatened from within 
its own borders by violent dissidents. Australia is already secure and usually has been. 
The future is another matter. 
The final qualification is that while providing a corrective to simplistic theorising the 
liberal realist perspective also raises more questions for scholars to answer. The liberal 
realist perspective assumes that there is competition and cooperation, but it does not tell 
us under which conditions it will make sense to pursue one rather than the other.19 As 
implied above, it would be difficult to be unequivocal about the required conditions 
because Australia's policy was developed under unusual circumstances. The framework 
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also does not provide much help with theoretical and practical criteria for allocating 
resources to different elements of security policy. And, like the existing literature, it 
does not indicate precisely how competition and cooperation interact to enhance 
security.20 But other conceptions of security are equally plagued by such unanswered 
questions. The further research needed to develop the liberal- realist perspective will at 
least start from a more sensitive set of considerations about security than is commonly 
presented in the literature. 
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS 
Despite these various qualifications, the liberal- realist perspective makes several other 
contributions. The liberal -realist conception of security offers policy makers a coherent 
rationale for Tabor's security policy. As shown in the Introduction to the thesis and in 
the answers to the questionnaire, policy makers were adamant that the policy was not 
contradictory but they did not explicitly or adequately explain why it was not. To recall 
Hugh White's statement, `the overall structure is [not] contradictory' .21 Yet White and 
others gave only ad hoc reasons for their view. White, for example, argued that `friends 
today may be enemies tomorrow'.22 Likewise, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans did not 
say why he could indeed argue that `we should not assume that cooperative approaches 
are the whole answer to regional security, or that we will ever be able to use them 
without at least a nod in the direction of traditional power balances'.23 There has been 
almost no discussion in the official literature on the nature of the relationship between 
cooperative and competitive elements of security policy. The liberal -realist framework, 
by focussing attention on precisely these relationships and the tensions that may exist 
19 Nonetheless, on a practical IeveI, barring radical changes in the region, regional states can be 
confident that Australia will continue to pursue security in this way. 
20 For example it does not address the recent claim by Lawrence Freedman that 'latent military 
power...can allow political relations to develop without violence'. See Lawrence Freedman, `Power 
and Political Influence', International Affairs. Vol.74, No.4, 1998, p.780. 
21 Hugh White, `Regional Engagement and the Defence of Australia', in Jack McCaffrie and Dick 
Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, Australian Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996, p.63. 
22 White, `Regional Engagement and the Defence of Australia', in McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), 
The Navy and Regional Engagement, p.63. 
23 Gareth Evans, `Australia's Role in East Asia's Future', speech to the CEDA Asian Regional 
International Association of Cooperating Organisations (ARIACO) Roundtable, Melbourne, 11 
September 1995, p.6. 
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between them, may help policy makers to articulate a more coherent rationale for policy 
than currently exists. 
Furthermore, just as the liberal -realist perspective makes explicit the implied security 
assumptions of the Grotian plus school of thought, so too it makes explicit the implied 
security assumptions and worldviews of policy makers. This may be useful for scholars 
and to those policy makers who are not self- conscious of their worldviews. The Iiberal- 
realist framework provides the latter with a checklist of their assumptions24 that helps 
them to know and explain why, for example, it is important to balance competition and 
cooperation, beyond simply asserting that doing so is a good thing. The old dictum of 
`know thyself' should be as helpful to policy makers as it is to rest of us. Finally, the 
framework provides both scholars and practitioners with a structure for further debates 
on Australia's security.25 These contributions of the liberal- realist perspective may help 
to address Paul Dibb's recent claim that 'the two different worlds of international 
relations theory and policy prescription rarely come together in Australia. This is a 
serious deficiency given the strategic challenges ahead',26 
But the most substantial contribution that the liberal- realist perspective makes to Dibb's 
claim is that it orientates scholars towards an approach to security that canvasses more 
complex considerations than are found in the generally one -dimensional theories that 
dominate the literature. Importantly, this approach is the basis of security policy under 
Labor. Perhaps the liberal- realist perspective wiII be a step towards bringing the two 
worlds of theory and policy together. 
24 As two respected IR scholars argued many years ago, `the statements of policy makers...should be 
analyzed to develop a checklist of assumptions which guide their thinking on policy., land] an 
effort should be made to match such assumptions...with assumptions and policies contained in 
theoretically orientated literature on international relations'. See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contending Theories of International Relations, J.B. Lippincott Company, New 
York, 197I, p.394. 
25 As Jim Richardson points out, the work done by Thomas Schelling and others in the 1960s on 
`theory of strategy' and `theory of conflict' is an example of an analytical framework that provided 
a structure for responsible debate on US security policy at that time. See Thomas C. Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, New York, 1968. 
26 Paul Dibb, `Australia's Defence Policies in the Post -Cold War Era', in James Cotton and John 
Ravenhill (eds), Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 1991 -1995, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1997, p.77. 
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MAJOR OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE ADF, 1994 
MAJOR NAVY OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS 
11 destroyers and frigates (3DDGs, 6 FFGs and 2 River Class destroyer escorts) 
4 Oberon Class conventional submarines 
15 Fremantle Class patrol craft 
7 mine countermeasures vessels (2 inshore minehunter and 5 minesweepers auxiliaries) 
1 heavy landing ship and 5 heavy landing craft 
2 underway replenishment ships 
16 S70B2 Seahawk multi -role helicopters 
7 Sea King medium utility helicopters 
6 AS350B Squirrel and 3 Bell 206B Kiowa light utility helicopters 
2 HS748 electronic warfare training aircraft 
2 hydrographie survey ships, 4 survey motor launches and 1 F27 hydrographie survey aircraft 
2 clearance diving teams 
Developments in progress will add a number of important assets, notably eight ANZAC frigates, six 
Collins class submarines, six Huon Class Coastal Minehunters and two heavy ships which are to be 
modified, while some older ships will be decommissioned. 
At 30 June 1994, Navy had a strength of 14,776 permanent service personnel, 4,957 Reserves- including 
108 Ready reserves and 3,528 Reserves with no training obligation and 4,248 civilian staff. 
MAJOR ARMY OPERATIONAL ASSETS 
103 Leopard 1A3 tanks 
771 MI13 armoured vehicles 
15 LAV -25 armoured vehicles 
246 M2A2/L5 105mm Howitzers 
104 Hamel 105mm Howitzers 
33 M -198 155mm medium guns 
31 Rapier surface -to -air missiles systems 
19 RBS -70 surface -to -air missiles 
22 N22 and N24 Nomad light transport aircraft 
38 S70A -9 Blackhawk helicopters 
45 Bell 1JH -1H Iroquois helicopters 
18 AS -350B Squirrel helicopters 
4 CH47 -D Chinook helicopters 
15 Medium Landing Craft 
Regular 
1 Divisional and 2 Brigade Headquarters 
I Armoured Regiment Headquarters and I Leopard Tank Squadron 
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1 Reconnaissance Regiment with M113 and LAV -25 armoured vehicles 
1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles 
1 Field Artillery Regiment with 155mm Howitzers 
I Medium Artillery Regiment with 155 guns 
I Divisional Locating Battery (Integrated with Ready Reserves) 
1 Air Defence Regiment (Integrated with Ready Reserves) with RBS70 surface -to -air missiles 
1 Aír Defence Battery (Integrated with Ready Reserves) with RBS70 surface -to -air missiles 
2 Combat Engineer Regiments and Workshops 
2 Construction Squadrons 
4 Signals Regiments 
8 Independent Signals Squadrons 
4 Infantry Battalions 
I Special Air Service Regiment 
1 Aviation Regiment with Iroquois, Kiowa and Nomad aircraft 
1 Aviation Regiment with Blackhawk, Iroquois and Chinook aircraft 
1 Army Survey Regiment 
Ready reserve 
I Brigade Headquarters 
2 Ground Reconnaissance Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles 
I Tank Squadron with Leopard Tanks 
1 Field Artillery Regiment with 105mm Howitzers 
1 Combat. Engineer Regiment and Workshop 
1 Independent Signals Squadron 
3 Infantry Battalions 
General reserve 
I Divisional and 7 Brigade Headquarters 
1 Tank Squadron with Leopard Tanks 
2 Reconnaissance Regiments with M113 armoured vehicles 
I Reconnaissance /APC Regiment with M113 armoured vehicles 
I APC Regiment with M113 armoured vehicles 
L Reconnaissance Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles 
2 APC Squadrons with MI 13 armoured vehicles 
3 Field Artillery Regiments with 105mm Howitzers 
4 Independent Field Artillery Batteries with 105mm Howitzers 
1 Medium Artillery Batteries with 155mm guns 
1 Field Engineer Regiment and 1 Engineer Support Regiment 
2 Construction Regiments 
3 Field Engineer Squadrons and 1 Divisional Engineer Support Squadron 
1 Signals Regiment 
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5 Independent Signals Squadrons 
14 Infantry Battalions 
3 Regional Force Surveillance Units 
I Commando Regiment 
The total personnel strength of Army at 30 June 1994 was 26,347 Regulars, 2,462 Ready Reserves, 
24,450 General Reserves -including 3,608 with no training obligations -and 5,571 civilian personnel. 
MAJOR AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS 
Tactical fighter group 
3 Tactical Fighter Squadrons with 52 FIA -18 aircraft 
1 Tactical Fighter Operational Conversion Unit with 18 F /A -18 aircraft 
1 Lead -in Fighter Training Squadron with 16 Macchi MB326H and 2 PC9A aircraft 
1 Conversion Training Squadron with 14 Macchi aircraft 
1 Air Defence Radar Wing 
1 Aircraft Maintenance Wing 
Strike/reconnaissance group 
2 Strike/Reconnaissance Squadrons with 17 FIIlC, 15 FI 1G and 4 RFI 11C aircraft, including 
operational level maintenance 
Maritime patrol group 
2 Maritime Patrol Squadrons and 1 Maritime Patrol Training Squadron with 19 PC3 aircraft 
1 Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 
Airlift group 
1 Long -range Transport/In -flight Refuelling Squadron with 5 Boeing 707 aircraft 
2 Medium -range Transport Squadrons with 12 C130E and 12 C130H Hercules aircraft 
2 Special Transport Squadrons with 5 Daussault 900 Falcon and 10 HS748 aircraft 
2 Tactical Transport Squadrons with 14 CCO8 Caribou aircraft 
I Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 
Operational support group 
2 Airfield Defence Squadrons 
I Operational Support Unit 
1 Air Transport Telecommunications Unit 
At 30 June 1994, the Air Force comprised 17,807 Regular personnel, 4,419 Reserves - including 199 
Ready Reserves and 2,967 with no training obligations -and 2,232 civilian staff. 
(Source: Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Directorate of 
Publishing, Defence Centre, Canberra, 1994.) 
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EXERCISES INVOLVING THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE (ADF) 
AND ASEAN DEFENCE FORCES, 1980 -96 
1980 -81 
1981 -82 
1982 -83 
1983 -84 
1984 -85 
New Horizon 80 Maritime exercise with Indonesia in the Java Sea. 
TADS ADEX 80 -5 Minor air defence exercise with Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 80 -6 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 81 -1 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia under FPDA. 
Haringaroo 81 Joint exercise to develop understanding with the Malaysian Army. 
TADS ADEX 82 -1 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Southern Safari 82 Battalion group exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Starfish 82 Combined maritime exercise with Malaysia and Singapore, under FPDA, 
in the South China Sea. 
TADS ADEX 82 -2 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 82 -3 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Haringaroo 4 Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
Haringaroo 5 Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
TADS ADEX 82 -4 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 82 -5 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 82 -4 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Starfish 83 Combined maritime exercise with Malaysia and Singapore, under FPDA, 
in the South China Sea. 
TADS ADEX 83 -1 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Platypus 83 Land exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Cope Thunder 83 -5 Air defence and strike training with fhe Philippines Air Force. 
New Horizons 4 Maritime exercise with Indonesia in the Java Sea. 
ADS ADEX 83 -3 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Haringaroo 7 Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
Haringaroo 8 Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
ADS ADEX 83 -4 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 83 -5 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 83 -4 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 84 -2 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 84 -3 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Starfish 84 Combined maritime exercise with Malaysia and Singapore, under FPDA, 
in the South China Sea. 
TADS ADEX 84 -4 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Haringaroo 9 Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
TADS ADEX 84 -5 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
New Horizon 84 Combined maritime exercise with Indonesia. 
TADS ADEX 84 -4 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 85 -1 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
TADS ADEX 85 -2 Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Haringaroo 10 Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
TADS ADEX 85 -3 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Haringaroo 11 Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
Starfish 85 FPDA maritime exercise with Malaysia and Singapore in the South 
China Sea. 
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1985-86 
TADS ADEX 85 -4 
Cope Thunder 85 -7 
TADS ADEX 85 -5 
TADS ADEX 85 -6 
Haringaroo 12 
TADS ADEX 86 -1 
IADS ADEX 86 -2 
Haringaroo 13 
IADS ADEX 86 -3 
1986 -87 
IADS ADEX 86 -4 
IADS ADEX 86 -5 
Starfish 86 
Southern Tiger 86 
Haringaroo 14 
Pernburn Rusa 
Kiwi Connection 
IADS ADEX 86 -6 
IADS ADEX 87 -1 
IADS ADEX 87 -2 
Tasman Sea 87 -1 
Haringaroo 15 
1987 -88 
IADS ADEX 87 -3 
Cope Thunder 87 -6 
IADS ADEX 87 -4 
Starfish 37 
Temple Jade 87 
[ADS ADEX 87 -5 
Cope Thunder 88 -1 
IADS ADEX 87-6 
Haringaroo 16 
IADS ADEX 88-1 
Haringaroo 17 
IADS ADEX 88-2 
Haringaroo 18 
IADS ADEX 88-3 
Starfish 88 
IADS A0EX88 -5 
Lima Bersatu 
1989 
New Footing 89 
19 Jan -19 Feb Golden Fleece 89 
25 Jan -6 Feb Haringaroo 19 
7 -21 March Nulla Nulla 
20 -30 March BISAM 89 
31 Mar -21 Apr Chapel Gold 89 
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Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Air warfare training exercise in the Philippines. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
FPDA maritime exercise with Malaysia and Singapore in the South 
China Sea. 
Exercise with the Malaysian Army to 'develop interoperability and 
enhance defence relations'. 
Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
Exercise in Malaysia to practice counterinsurgency operations. 
FPDA Exercise in New Zealand, with Malaysia and Singapore, 'to further 
develop interoperability'. 
Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Exercise with Singapore in 'combined maritime operations in [a] mult- 
threat environment'. 
Exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Air defence and strike training exercise with tactical air units of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
FPDA maritime exercise with Malaysia and Singapore in the South 
China Sea. 
Exercise with a company group of the Royal Thai Army. 
Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Air defence and strike training exercise with tactical air units of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Small scale infantry exercise with a Malaysian Army infantry brigade. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Small scale infantry exercise with a Malaysian Army brigade. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Small scale infantry exercise with a Malaysian Army brigade. 
Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
FPDA maritime exercise with Malaysia and Singapore in the South 
China Sea. 
Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. 
Major FPDA air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Long- running exercise at Canungra, Queensland, training units of the 
Royal Brunei Armed Forces. 
Land exercise in New Zealand with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Exercise with Malaysian Army. 
Air defence missile exercise with the Singapore Air Force. 
Shooting exercise with Royal Brunei Armed Forces. 
Exercise with Royal Thai Army (PTA) to develop understanding of RTA 
tactics and interoperability with RTA'. 
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4 -7 April FADS ADEX 89 -2 FPDA air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
8 -27 April Rapid Move 89 Combined airfield defence exercise with Malaysia. 
26 Apr -23 May Cope Thunder89 -6 Combined air defence training exercise in the Philippines. 
28 Apr -17 May Southern Tiger89 Army exercise with Malaysia. 
15 -25 May Haringaroo 20 Land exercise with Malaysia. 
13 -24 June - Haringaroo 21 Land exercise with Malaysia. 
16 -23 June Penguin 89 Patrol boat exercise with Brunei. 
3 -17 July Starfish 89 FPDA maritime and air warfare exercise with Malaysia and Singapore in 
the South China Sea. 
26 -29 Sept TADS ADEX 89 -4 FPDA air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
16 -29 Oct Lion Spirit 89 FPDA army exercise. 
1990 
1 -14 Feb Haringaroo 22 Land exercise with the Malaysian Army. 
13 -16 March TADS ADEX 90 -2 FPDA air defence exercise with elements of Malaysian and Singapore 
air forces. 
8 -26 April Chapel Gold Land exercise with the Royal Thai Army. 
9 April -4 May Night Panther 90 Interoperability with Royal Thai Army Special Forces. 
10 -26 May Haringaroo 23 Land exercise with Malaysian Army. 
20 May -8 June Night Hawk 90 Special forces exercise with Brunei. 
4 -11 June Penguin 90 Patrol boat exercise with Brunei. 
10 -22 June Haringaroo 24 Land exercise with Malaysian Army. 
22 -27 June Aussiam 90 Maritime exercise with the Royal Thai Navy. 
4 -18 July Starfish 90 FPDA exercise with Malaysian and Singapore naval and air forces. 
13 Aug -28 Nov Wallaby 90 Singaporean armed forces exercise in Queensland. 
29 Aug -2 Sept EXTENDEX 90 -4 ASW training exercise In the Philippines. 
25 -28 Sept TADS ADEX 90 -4 FPDA air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
1 -31 Oct Night Tiger Exercise to broaden cooperation between the special forces of Australia 
and Malaysia. 
2 -18 Oct Suman Warrior FPDA exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
3 -25 Oct Nulla Nulla Air defence missile exercise with the Singapore Air Force. 
5 -20 Nov Nulla Nulla Air defence missile exercise with the Singapore Air Force. 
1991 
19 -23 Apr TADS ADEX 91 -2 Major TADS exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
29 Apr -13 May Starfish 91 FPDA maritime exercise in the South China Sea. 
2 -28 July Night Falcon Special forces exercise with Brunei. 
15 -19 July Austhai 91 Exercise with the Royal Thai Navy in the Gulf of Thailand. 
July- Aug Pitch Black 91 Air defence exercise involving Singapore Air Force. 
23 Sept -19 Oct Matilda 91 Training exercise with the Singapore Armed Forces. 
TADS ADEX 91 -4 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Suman Warrior FPDA and command post exercise in Malaysia. 
Penguin 91 Maritime exercise with Brunei. 
Cakrawala Baru/ Maritime exercise with the Indonesian Navy. 
New Horizon 6 
Night Tiger 91 Exercise with Malaysian special forces_ 
1992 
TADS ADEX 92 -2 Major air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Chapel Gold 92 Rifle Company Butterworth training in Thailand with the Royal Thai 
Army. 
Rapid Move A combined airfield defence exercise with Malaysian forces. Coincided 
with TADS ADEX 92 -2. 
Night Panther 92 Exercise with Royal Thai Army special forces in Thailand. 
Night Hawk 92 Exercise with Royal Brunei Armed Forces in Brunei. 
Harpoona: 92 War at sea exercise with Singapore. 
Ausindo Tactical air transport exercise with Indonesia. 
Starfish FPDA maritime exercise. 
Austhai Maritime (ASW) exercise with Royal Thai Navy. 
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1993 
1994 
13 July-1 Aug 
22 July -18 Aug 
30 Aug -2 Sept 
31 Aug -7 Sept 
1 -30 Sept 
4 -18 Sept 
5 -9 Sept 
5 Sept -13 Nov 
Flaming Arrow 
Mallee Bull 
TADS ADEX 92 -4 
Western Reward 
Night Tiger 
Southern Tiger 
Suman Warrior 
Chapel Gold 
TADS ADEX 93 -2 
Kakadu 
Night Panther 
Night Hawk 
Night Mongoose 
Pitch Black 93 
Starfish 13/93 
TADS ADEX 93 -4 
Suman Warrior 4 -93 
Tiger Moon 
Haringaroo 28/93 
Southern Tiger 93 
Flaming Arrow 
Wallaby 93 
Axolotl 
ASWEX 93 
Night Lion 
Ausina 2 -93 
New Horizon 7 
Ausina Petrolex 2/93 
Ausindo 93 
Ausina 9 -93 
Night Leopard 
Chapel Gold 93 
Austhai 93 
Thai Boomerang 
Night Panther 
TADS ADEX 94 -2 
Haringaroo 29/94 
Night Tiger 
Night Komodo 
Axolotl 
Haringaroo 
Temple Jade 94 
Pitch Black 94 
Ausina 3/94 
Austhai 94 
Night Caracha 
Day Tiger 
FPDA ASWEX 94 
Churinga 94 -2 
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Infantry field training exercise with Singapore. 
Infantry company exchange with Brunei. 
FPDA air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
RAAF weapons camp with Singapore. 
Special forces training in Malaysia. 
DCP training with Malaysia. 
FPDA land exercises with Malaysia and Singapore. 
RCS bilateral training in Thailand. 
FPDA air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Fleet concentration period in Darwin with Singapore and Malaysia (and 
Thai Navy observers). 
Special forces exercise in Thailand. 
Special forces exercise in Brunei. 
Special forces exercise in Indonesia. 
Air defence exercise with Singapore (and Thai observers). 
FPDA maritime exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Major FPDA air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
FPDA land exercise in Malaysia. 
Special forces war roles in Malaysia. 
Land exercise in Malaysia. 
Bilateral training with Malaysia. 
Land exercise with SAF in Singapore. 
Armoured exercise with Singapore. 
Combined maritme exercise with Singapore. 
Training for Republic of Singapore Navy in ASW procedures and tactics. 
Special forces exercise in Singapore. 
Maritime exercise with Indonesia. 
Maritime exercise with Indonesia. 
Maritime patrol exercise with Indonesia. 
Air transport seminar with Indonesia. 
Maritime exercise with Indonesia. 
Special forces exercise in Brunei. 
Sub Unit exercise with Thailand. 
Maritime exercise with Royal Thai Navy. 
F /A18 deployment to Korat, Thailand. 
Special forces exercise in Thailand. 
FPDA air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
RCB land exercise with Malaysian Army. 
Special forces exercise in Malaysia. 
Special forces exercise In Indonesia. 
Maritime exercise with Singapore to develop and evaluate RAN /RSN 
interoperability in diving and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). 
To further develop interoperability between the Australian and Malaysian 
armies. 
To further develop interoperability between the Australian and Royal 
Thai Armies. 
Air defence exercise with Singapore. 
Maritime exerise with Indonesia. 
To practice and develop common RAN /Royal Thai Navy maritime tactics 
and procedures (RAN ships). 
Special forces exercise with the Philippines. 
Special forces exercise with Malaysia. 
ASW exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Air defence exercise with Malaysia. 
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9 -16 Sept 
12 -24 Sept 
14 -21 Sept 
17 Sept- 16 Oct 
27 -30 Sept 
27 Sept -4 Oct 
10 -22 Oct 
18 Oct -18 Nov 
24 Oct -14 Nov 
2 -3 Nov 
4 -30 Nov 
9 -14 Nov 
22 -30 Nov 
1995 
6 -30 Jan 
15 Jan -22 Sept 
13 Feb -3 March 
14 -23 Feb 
March 
6 -13 March 
13 -31 March 
13 March -7 April 
3 -23 April 
3 April -2 May 
5 -19 April 
10 -14 April 
17 -21 April 
23April -19 May 
27 April -3 May 
5 -27 June 
23 June -3 July 
3 -10 July 
8 -22 Sep 
25 -29 Sept 
2 -9 Oct 
Oct 
17 -26 Oct 
Oct -Nov 
Oct 
18 -25 Nov 
1996 
11 -22 Mar 
Thai Boomerang 
Starfish 94 
Rajawali/Ausindo 94 
Mallee Bull 94 
TADS ADEX 94 -4 
Ausina Patrolex 94-1 
Suman Warrior 5/94 
Matilda 94 
Night Leopard 94 
Ausina Petro lex 94-2 
Haringaroo 31/94 
Elang Ausindo 94 
Haringaroo 32/94 
Axolotl 
Kangaroo '95 
Day Panther 
Flaming Arrow 
Swift Canopy '95 
lndonex 
Kakadu 2 
Day Tiger 95 -1 
Night Lion 
Chiringa 95 -1 
Haringaroo 33/95 
Ausina 95 -1 
TADS ADEX 95 -2 
Night Panther 
Austhai 95 
Night Komodo 
Penguin 95 
Cassowary 
Starfish 95 
New Horizon 95 
TADS ADEX 95 -4 
Singa roo 95 
Haringaroo 95 
Rajawali Ausindo 
Southem Tiger 95 
Suman Warrior 6/95 
Elang Ausindo 
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Air defence exercise with Thailand. 
To practise and develop operational procedures and tactics with FPDA 
units in a joint and combined maritime exercise (RAN ships and RAAF 
aircraft). 
Air defence exercise with Indonesia 
To develop interoperability between the Australian Army and the Royal 
Brunei Armed Forces. 
TADS air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Maritime exercise with Indonesia. 
To exercise army elements of the FPDA in combined operations. 
To train and confirm the interoperability of the ADF and the Singaporean 
Armed Forces. 
Special forces exercise with Brunei. 
Maritime exercise with Indonesia. 
Land exercise with Malaysia. 
Air exercise with Indonesia. 
Land exercise with Malaysia. 
Maritime exercise with Singapore. 
Land, air and maritime exercise with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 
Special forces exercise with Thailand. 
Land exercise with Singapore. 
Exercise at Shoalwater Bay training area with Indonesian Army. 
Land exercise with Indonesia. 
Fleet concentration period with ships from Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia (and New Zealand and Hong Kong). 
Special forces exercise with Malaysia. 
Special forces exercise with Singapore 
Air exercise with Singapore. 
Land exercise with Malaysia. 
Maritime exercise with Indonesia. 
Air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Special forces exercise with Thailand. 
Maritime exercise with Thailand. 
Special forces exercise with Indonesia. 
Maritime exercise with Brunei. 
Exercise for interoperability in maritime surveillance between 
MPG /RAN/TNI -AL (Indonesian Navy). Held in Darwin and Timor Sea. 
FPDA joint and combined exercise. Starfish 95 was the largest exercise 
yet conducted under FPDA and for the first involved the participation of 
both conventional and nuclear submarines and exercised realistic rules 
of engagement. Held in South China Sea (hereafter SCS). 
Postponed until FY1996 -97 at request of Indonesians 
FPDA exercise to test, evaluate and validate the TADS procedures and 
equipment. Held in SCS. 
Exercise between RAN /SRN to improve interoperability in combined 
maritime procedures and tactics. An Army air defence element also 
gained insight into FPDA procedures. 
Exercise between Australian and Malaysian infantry forces to practice 
interoperability. Held in Malaysia. 
An Indonesian C130 deployed to Richmond and carried out tactical air 
transport operations with the RAAF. 
Exercise to develop interoperability between the Australian and 
Malaysian Armies. 
FPDA Army command post exercise at brigade level. Held in Malaysia. 
Dissimilar air combat missions to improve mutual understandings of 
procedures. Held in Indonesia. 
Axolotl 96 Exercise between RAN /RSN to develop and evaluate interoperability in 
diving and EOD and MCM operations. Held in Singapore. 
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22 -29 Mar TADS ADEX FPDA exercise to test, evaluate and validate the TADS procedures and 
equipment. Held in Singapore, Butterworth and SCS. 
5 -16 Apr Tricab 96 Exercise between RAN /RSN/USN to improve interoperability in surface 
and shipboard EOD procedures. Held in Guam. 
13 -24 May Ex Hunter 96 Combined RAN /RSN exercise in MCM. Held in Townsville. 
10 -17 June Cassowary Exercise for interoperability in maritime surveillance between 
MPG /RAN/TNI -AL (Indonesian Navy). Held in Darwin and Timor Sea. 
13 -17 June Cassowary 96 Exercise between RAN/TNI -AL to improve interoperability in maritime 
surveillance. Series of three combined patrol boat exercises held in the 
Arafura Sea. 
30 Aug -13 Sept Starfish 96 FPDA joint and combined maritime exercise to improve interoperability 
between RAN /RAAF /RNZN /RNZAF /RSN/RSAF /RMN /RMAF /RN. 
Aug -Sept Chapel Gold 96 RCB deployed to Hua Hin for unit level field training with RTA. 
15 -21 Sept !ADS ADEX 96 -4 FPDA exercise involving RAN /RAAF /RMN /RSN/RSAF/RMAF /RN to 
test, evaluate and validate the Integrated Air Defence System 
procedures and equipment. 
Oct Suman Warrior 96 FPDA brigade to unit level exercise. Held in South East Queensland. 
Oct Kokoa Tiger 96 Exercise involving Australian and Malaysian special forces practising 
commando capabilities and individual skills. 
Oct -Nov Mallee Bull 96 Exercise involving Australian and Royal Brunei Armed Forces in an 
infantry sub -unit exchange. 
In addition, the RAN conducts regular 'passage exercises' (PASSEXs) with all navies of the region. 
Source: 'Defence Exercises', Hansard (House of Representatives), 6 May 1987, pp.2751 -2760; 'Defence Force 
Exercises', Hansard (House of Representatives), 21 December 1988, pp.3909 -3913; 'Defence Force 
Exercises', Hansard (Senate), 18 September 1990, pp.2518 -2523; Department of Defence, Defence Annual 
Report 1995 -1996, Government Publishing Service, 1996; Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 
1996 -1997, Government Publishing Service, 1997; and information provided by the Department of Defence. 
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SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THAILAND, 
AND AUSTRALIA AND THE PHILIPPINES' 
Australia's defence cooperation with Thailand, and the Philippines is on a smaller scale 
than with Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, for a variety of reasons.2 Nonetheless, 
during the period that Labor was in office, defence cooperation increased with all these 
countries: in particular individual training programs expanded and new exercise series 
were introduced. 
Individual training and study visits 
As was the case with the other ASEAN militaries, personnel from Thailand, and the 
Philippines were involved in training and study visits organised by the ADF. Indeed, the 
numbers, in many instances, are similar. For example, in 1993 -94 some 119 Thai 
personnel trained in Australia and some 130 were participants at in- country training 
program organised by the ADF, making a total of 249 personnel trained by the ADF.3 
For the same year 120 Indonesian personnel attended Australian institutions and 32 in- 
country programs, making a total of 153 or less than the number of Thais.4 
2 
3 
4 
Efforts to acquire information about Australia- Brunei cooperation were largely unsuccessful. Navy 
to Navy exercises take place under the Penguin series involving patrol boats. The main army 
exercises between Australia and Brunei are the Mallee Bull series, an infantry company exchange, 
which takes place in both Australia and Brunei and the New Footing series held at Canungra in 
Queensland. Special forces operations between the ADF and the Brunei Armed Forces apparently 
began in 1989 with the Night Hawk series and expanded in 1991 to include the Night Falcon and in 
1993, the Night Leopard series. There is little defence industry cooperation with Brunei. 
Thailand and the Philippines are a long distance from Australia, making transit times more 
expensive for the ADF. Both military establishments have been more focused on internal and 
border security than on cooperation with other countries. Brunei, like Thailand and the Philippines 
have limited defence forces with which to cooperate. 
For an account of the wider relationship and a detailed account of training and study visits to 
Australia by Thai personnel during 1989 -95 see The Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Canberra, October 1995, pp.113-114. 
Senate Hansard, Question No. 285,4 December 1996, p.6717. 
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In FY 1994/95, personnel from the Philippines Armed Forces attending Australian 
military institutions numbered 99 and in FY1995/96 there were 125.5 In- country 
numbers for the same two periods were 20 and 30 respectively making total 119 for FY 
1994/95 and 155 for FY 1995/96.6 On average, during 1990 to 1996, some 167 Filipino 
personnel per year were trained in Australia.? 
Unit level training 
Unit training between the ADF and the militaries of Thailand and the Philippines is less 
than that with the other ASEAN militaries, nonetheless it often started from an 
extremely low or zero base line. 
Navy to Navy cooperation 
The RAN began the Ausiam series with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) in 1990 (later re- 
named the Austhai series in 1991). The latter involves the RAN and RAAF with P3Cs 
and Thai Nomads.8 The main purpose of the exercise is combined ASW training, 
maritime surveillance and developing standard operating procedures. RAN ship visits to 
ports such as Songkhla, Phuket and Sattahip take place. The Royal Thai Navy also 
participates in the Kakadu fleet concentration series. 
The RAN conducts the Ausphil exercise series with the Philippine Navy that focuses on 
patrol boat routines. From 1990 to 1996, the RAN and the Philippine Navy conducted 
some 16 Passing Exercises, (PASEXs) 9 Another exercise, Extendex, an ASW training 
exercise with the Philippines Navy apparently began in 1990. The Philippine Navy sent 
observers to the 1995 Kakadu fleet concentration.') 
5 Senate Hansard, Question No. 285, 4 December 1996, p.6717. 
6 Senate Hansard, Question No, 285, 4 December 1996, p.6717. 
7 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. 
B Waters, `Regional Air Power Cooperation-an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), 
Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.185. 
9 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. 
to Another exercise, called Lambas, was held in 1998. Correspondence with the embassy of the 
Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. 
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Air Force to Air Force cooperation 
The RAAF, when deployed in the region for the FPDA Churinga exercises, conducts 
Thai Boomerang with the Royal Thai Air Force (RTF).11 The first exercise took place in 
1992 when F /A -18s were deployed to Korat with the objective of practicing dissimilar 
air combat tactics at the Thai air combat maneuvering instrumentation range. The RAAF 
also conducts air navigator training for the RTF and supports joint special operations 
during the Night Panther series with tactical air transport missions.12 
The RAAF conducted Cope Thunder, an air warfare training exercise with the 
Philippine Air Force (PAF), during the 1980s but its current status is unclear. 
Army to Army cooperation 
Most contact between Australia and Thailand is army -to -army. Training programs with 
Australia focus on skill and professional development courses, basic officer training, 
NCO military skills and technical training.13 Temple Jade is one exercise series and is a 
company level of about 100 personnel.14 Chapel Gold is another exercise, between the 
RTA and the Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB), usually held in Hua Hin in Thailand. 
The ADF observes the large scale Cobra Gold between the US and RTAF and the Thais 
have observed the Pitch Black series between Australia, the US and Singapore.15 
There were no exercises between the Australian and Filipino Armies during 1990 -96.16 
However, some 34 junior officers from the Philippines were sent to Australia for 
training with the Australian Army under the program called the Junior Officer Close 
Country Instructors Training (JOCITT) from 8 March to 3 April 1996.17 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Waters, `Regional Air Power Cooperation -an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), 
Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.185. 
Waters, Regional Air Power Cooperation-an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), 
Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.185. 
Hewitt, `The Australian Army and Regional Cooperation', in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air 
Power Workshop Darwin, p.85. 
Mark Metherell, `Closer Ties With Bangkok Can Become Entanglements', The Age, 21 May 1992, 
p.6. 
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.113 
16 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. 
17 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. 
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Special forces 
Thailand was one of the first countries in the region that Australia established special 
forces exercises with. A major focus of these exercises is counter -terrorism and 
especially the command and control of a terrorist event and disposal of explosive 
devices.18 The special forces exercise Night Panther was first recorded in 1990 and has 
continued notwithstanding the February 1991 and March 1992 military coups.19 
Special forces exercises with the Philippines appeared to take place in 1994 with the 
Night Caracha series. 
Quite clearly, an important development has been the introduction of formal series of 
bilateral special forces operations between Australia and all the regional countries as an 
additional element of defence cooperation. 
Intelligence exchanges 
Australia maintains intelligence exchanges with Thailand and the Philippines. In the 
case of Thailand, ASIS established formal liaison arrangements in July 1974 with the 
Thai Department of Central Intelligence (DCI).20 At that stage discussions ranged from 
regional problems to Thailand's internal security arrangements. ASIS assisted DCI with 
training programs in counter -intelligence. 
In May 1967 ASIS established a relationship with the National Intelligence 
Coordinating Agency (NICA) and this was extended in to include the Joint Intelligence 
Staff (J -2) of the Philippines Armed Forces.21 Later NICA adopted the title National 
Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) and its discussions with ASIS covered internal and 
external issues. 
18 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.113. 
19 Metherell, `Closer Ties With Bangkok Can Become Entanglements', The Age, 21 May 1992, p.6. 
20 Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind:, p.172. 
21 Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind:, p.172. - - 
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Strategic planning 
Early in 1993, two teams of Thai officers visited Australia as part of the preparation for 
Thailand's first defence White Paper,22 which was subsequently published in 1994.23 
Australia also provides advice on strategic guidance to Thai officers during annual visits 
by some 30 Thai officers.24 
To assist the modernisation program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) a 
three -day workshop on force development was conducted in August 1995.25 In the latter 
quarter of 1996, a six -man delegation from the Philippines participated in a workshop 
organised by the Australian Defence Force Academy that discussed the formulation of 
White Paper for the AFP.26 
Defence industry, science and technology cooperation 
Like the other ASEAN countries, Thailand, and the Philippines have little in the way of 
defence industry cooperation with Australia. Discussions about sales to Thailand of the 
Steyr rifle and possible imports from Thailand of 155mm ammunition were ongoing 
during the period under study. During a visit to Thailand in February 1994 by a high - 
level Australian delegation it was agreed by both countries that defence industry 
cooperation should be broadened.27 With this aim in mind the Department of Defence 
now helps to fund a Defence Trade Commissioner in Bangkok.28 Discussions with the 
22 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.1 l4. 
23 Ministry of Defence, The Defence of Thailand 1994, Ministry of Defence, Bangkok, 1994. 
24 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.114. 
25 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. The 
workshop was organised by Dr Ralph Neumann, former Assistant Secretary in the Australian 
Department of Defence. 
26 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. The 
delegation was headed by Commodore Artemio Arugay (ref.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Plans and Programs J5, AFP. The first Republic of the Philippines White Paper was officially 
approved in May 1998. 
27 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.114. 
28 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.114. - 
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Philippines and an acquisition seminar were held in February 1996.29 Science and 
technology collaboration between DSTO and its Thai equivalents was established under 
the Joint Australia- Thailand Defence Coordinating Committee Defence Science and 
Technology Cooperation Working Group (see below).30 Collaborative activities 
included high frequency communications and ionospheric research, surface wave radar, 
propellant surveillance and military clothing and footwear.31 
According to the Defence Department's annual report for FY1996/97 `a number of 
useful initiatives with the Philippines' were established with regard to defence science 
and technology but the relationship is considered to be at a `very early stage'.32 
Outcomes 
Cooperation between Australia and Thailand is long- standing, going back to the period 
when the now defunct SEATO was in operation,33 However, there have been periods of 
tension between the two countries, including during the Labor period. Following the 
1991 military coup relations were downgraded then restored. The following year, after 
the March 1992 coup Australia again invoked a similar response but within three 
months had resumed activities including special forces training. Indeed, special forces 
operations were one of the main advances during this period. 
Likewise, with the Philippines, special forces operations were an important aspect of 
cooperation. 
29 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997. p.142. Also see `Australia - 
Philippines Defense Acquisition Seminar', Digest, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed 
Forces of the Philippines, March -April 1997, pp.1 -2. 
30 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.169. 
31 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.169. 
32 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, p.189. 
33 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995. 
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STRUCTURES FOR POLICY COORDINATION BETWEEN AUSTRALLY AND 
THAILAND, AND THE PHILIPPINES 
During 1995 -96 consultations between Australia and Thailand resulted in a new Joint 
Australia - Thailand Defence Coordination Committee.34 (See above for activities 
conducted by the Science and Technology Cooperation Working Group.) Consultations 
continued with Thailand in 1996 -97 `to review arrangements for managing bilateral 
relationships and cooperative defence activities'.35 
On 29 August 1996, the Republic of the Philippines and the Australian Government 
signed a MoU on Cooperative Activities.36 The MoU established the Philippine - 
Australia Joint Defence Cooperation Committee that provides broad policy direction 
and initiation, co- ordination and monitoring of the different activities. 
34 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995 -1996, p.169. 
35 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1996 -1997, pp.64 -65. 
36 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. 
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THE ASSUMPTIONS POLICY MAKERS HAD ABOUT 
AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY POLICY UNDER LABOR, 1983 -96 
This questionnaire aims to establish the assumptions that were behind Australia's security 
policy during the Hawke- Keating government's time in office (1983 -1996). 
Since you were a policy maker /adviser during this period I would like to ask you some 
questions about your own security assumptions and the extent to which you think 
assumptions similar to yours underpinned Labor's security policy. 
The questionnaire is in five parts. It is designed to elicit: 
(i) your own general assumptions about Australia's security policy during this period 
(ii) your own assumptions about three specific aspects of Australia's security 
policy - defence of Australia, the US- Australia alliance and regional 
security-during this period 
(iii) your own views during this period about the relationship between these aspects 
(iv) if your own assumptions were similar to those which underpinned policy and if so 
how they were derived 
(y) your views about ways to improve existing explanatory frameworks 
The format for the questionnaire is as follows. Most questions state the security assumption 
which underpins a particular aspect of policy and ask you whether you would agree/ 
disagree with such an assumption i.e., you are not being asked if the assumption underpins 
policy but rather whether you would agree /disagree with it. 
Some questions are multiple choice, others require a simple `yes' or `no' answer. Some ask 
you to give a brief answer in your own words but many of these questions are optional. 
This is because, although my analysis would benefit enormously from your written 
answers, I am concerned that you may find this exercise too time consuming 
The information collected will be kept confidential and will not be attributed to you (the 
analysis will be in terms of patterns, e.g., most, less than half of the policy makers 
answered that...etc). 
Thank you in advance for participating in this research project. 
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Part A: Your own general views in relation fo Australia's security policy 
during 1983 -96 
Q. In the literature there is debate about the meaning of security. What, in your view, is 
the meaning of security in Australia's case 
What, in your view, is the object of Australia's security policy: 
1) the nation -state and its institutions; 2) territory; 3) the government; 
4) individuals within the state; 5) core values (e.g., democracy, rule of law); 
6) other, please specify: 
Please give your answer in order of choice 1-61* 
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer 2 * 
What sort of threats, in your view, is Australia's security policy directed against: 
1) external military threats to the state /territory; 2) low -level incursions, boat 
people, etc; 3) political violence between groups within the state; 4) political 
violence perpetrated by the state on its own individuals; 5) other threats to 
individuals posed by economic, environmental, health issues; 6) other, please 
specify: 
Please give your answer in order of choice 1 -6 
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer 
DEEDED 
Via what means, in your view, is Australia's security policy pursued: 
1) military force /capabilities; 2) diplomacy; 3) a balance of power arrangement; 4) 
alliances; 5) military CBMs; 6) multilateral security institutions; 7) cooperative 
security; 8) economic aid; 9) other, please specify: 
Please give your answer in order of choice 1 -9 111=1000011100 
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer 
* For example, ìf `territory' is your first choice then put 2 in the first box starting on the left hand side 
and then continue in order of choice. 
2 
* For example, if you think security has nothing to do with keeping `core values' secure then omit the 
number 5. 
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Part B: Your own views about Australia's security policy - defence of 
Australia, the Australia -US alliance and regional security-during 1983 -96 
Defence of Australia 
Q.l 
Q 1 
Most people think that the doctrine of defence of Australia assumes that threats to 
Australian territory could develop and require a military response 
Do you agree with this assumption Dyes No Please the box giving your 
answer 
If your answer was `no' then please indicate your reasons briefly: 
PTO for more space -s 
Some people argue that military threats to Australia will increase in the next five 
years 
Do you agree strongly El agree disagree D disagree strongly Ddon't know 
Some people argue that military threats to Australia will increase in the next ten 
years 
Do you D agree strongly El agree disagree 12 disagree strongly El don't know 
Some people argue that Australia will always need a military insurance 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
Many defence planners assume that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) needs a 
technological edge over other regional militaries to be secure 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
Please explain your reasoning (optional)3 *: PTO if you require more space -s 
Q. III Some defence planners assume that the inclusion of `offensive' capabilities (e.g., 
Collins submarines and FA -18 and F -I I t aircraft) is a necessary component of our 
forces 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly El don't know 
Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space -r 
Q. IV The political theorist Hans Morgenthau assumed that politics is a struggle for power 
Do you El agree strongly El agree El disagree D disagree strongly don't know 
Do you think Australia' s defence policy is based on this assumption Y N 
My research on policy makers' /advisers' assumptions about security will benefit from understanding 
the reasons why, in security terms, you gave the answer you did i.e, in this case why /why not you 
agree /disagree that offensive capabilities are a necessary component of our forces. However, questions 
which ask you to 'explain your reasoning' are optional, given your time contraints. 
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Q.I 
Further comments for question Q. II 
Further comments for Q. III 
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The Australia -US alliance 
Q. V The Australia -US alliance is often said to confer certain strategic benefits. In your 
own view do the following factors constitute strategic benefits: 
1) the likelihood of US military support should Australia be threatened sometime in 
the future 
Do you D agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
2) privileged access to US military technology 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
3) privileged access to US technical intelligence 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree EI disagree strongly El don't know 
4) an element of deterrence against potential enemies 
Do you E agree strongly El agree El disagree disagree strongly El don't know 
5) US engagement in the region to balance the power of other states 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
6) the provision of a nuclear umbrella for Australia 
Do you agree strongly El agree disagree disagree strongly El don't know 
7) other strategic benefits. Please specify: PTO if you require more space --s 
Q. VI Some officials assume that Australia's security would be enhanced by participating 
in a regional balance of power arrangement with other states 
Do you E1 agree strongly agree El disagree disagree strongly don't know 
Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space -s 
If you agree or agree strongly that Australia should participate in such an 
arrangement, then which countries might be involved: 1) the US; 2) Southeast 
Asían countries; 3) Taiwan; 4) South Korea; 5) Japan; 6) China 
Please give answer in order of choice 1 -6 
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer 
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Q. V 
Further comments for Q. VI 
336 
What do you understand by a `balance of power': 
1) a descriptive term which explains the actual distribution of power 
(e.g., military power, economic power, political power) among important regional 
states Y ON 
2) a situation which involves a roughly equal balance of military power among the 
important regional states DY N 
3) a situation which avoids an apparent preponderance of military power which 
favours any one state 
4) a policy prescription which seeks to establish 2 or 3 
Regional security 
Y N 
Y N 
Q. VI Many officials assume that Australia's policy of `security with' regional countries 
enhances Australia's security 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space --s 
Q. VIII Many officials assume that multilateral security institutions enhance security 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space -a 
Q. IX Many officials assume that the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) enhances regional 
security 
Do you D agree strongly agree El disagree 11 disagree strongly don't know 
Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space -s 
Q. X Many officials assume that interdependence and enmeshment of the economies of 
Australia and regional states enhances security 
Do you El agree strongly El agree disagree ID disagree strongly El don't know 
Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space - 
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Q. VII 
Further comments for Q. VTTT 
Further comments for Q. IX 
Further comments for Q. X 
338 
Q. XI Many officials assume that Australia's strategy of `strategic partnership' with 
regional militaries through the following practical measures enhances Australia's 
security: 
1) CBM/transparency measures (white papers, dialogue) enhances Australia's 
security 
Do you ['agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
2) Personal contact among military personnel enhances Australia's security 
Do you E agree strongly El agree disagree D disagree strongly don't know 
3) Training and exercising with regional militaries enhances Australia's security 
Do you El agree strongly El agree El disagree disagree strongly ID don't know 
4) Educational exchanges between military establishments enhances Australia's 
security 
Do you E agree strongly agree El disagree disagreestrongly El don't know 
5) Training regional militaries to improve their own operational and combat skills 
enhances Australia's security 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
6) Providing training facilities in Australia for regional militaries (e.g., Pearce Air 
Force Base to the Singaporean Air Force) enhances Australia's security 
Do you agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
Where you agree or agreed strongly, can you explain how and why these practical 
measures, and especially 5 and 6, enhance Australia's security: PTO if you require 
more space -> 
If you do not agree that some of these practical measures enhance security then 
please explain why they do not: PTO if you require more space -s 
Q. XII Some commentators suggest that Australia should continue to collect intelligence 
on its regional partners during cooperative activities and most agree that certain 
operational and combat tactics should not be shared. Please comment and explain 
what assumptions about security this suggests: PTO if you require more space -s 
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Q. XI 
Further comments for Q. XII 
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Part C: Your own views about the relationship between the different aspects 
of Australia's security policy 
Q. Which aspect of Australia's overall security policy is the most important: 1) 
defence of Australia; 2) the Australia -US alliance; 3) regional security cooperation 
Please give your answer in order of choice 1 -3 
Q. II Some people argue that Australia's overall security policy consists of approaches 
which are both competitive and cooperative (i.e., on the one hand, defence of 
Australia and the alliance are based on `security against' others; on the other hand, 
regional cooperation is based on `security with' others) 
Do you D agree strongly agree El disagree disagree strongly D don't know if we 
have both approaches 
Q.III If you agree that Australia's overall policy incorporates both cooperation and 
competition do you think this is because the policy: 
1) is planned to take account of the present and the `unknown' future security 
environments i.e., the short and the long term 
agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
2) keeps Australia's options open 
agree strongly agree El disagree disagree strongly D don't know 
3) assumes that regional states which are friends now may not always be our friends 
and we have to plan on this basis 
agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
4) aims to train personnel and modernise force structures in the present time -frame 
to prepare for the long term 
D agree strongly El agree disagree disagree strongly El don't know 
5) assumes that the regional context is currently one in which there are conflicting 
trends i.e., there is evidence of both cooperation and competition and thus 
Australia's policy should be planned on the basis of this 
agree strongly agree disagree disagree strongly don't know 
6) assumes that regional states may have mixed motives i.e., they may intend to 
cooperate and compete 
agree strongly El agree El disagree disagree strongly El don't know 
7) if other, please explain: PTO if you require more space -3 
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Q. III 
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Q.IV Some people think that if Australia's policy contains both competitive and 
cooperative approaches it means the policy is contradictory 
Do you agree strongly agree Edisagree disagree strongly don't know 
Q.V If you agree or agree strongly that the overall policy is contradictory is it because: 
1) it appears to be a policy which is preparing us to fight against the very states we 
cooperate with D Y EN V 
2) in conceptual terms it is a policy which incorporates both competition and 
cooperation, in other words it incorporates opposing security logics Y EN 
3) other, please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space 
Q. VI Do you think that Australia's security policy reflects different kinds of 
considerations: i.e., apart from being based on assumptions about security it is also 
based on other factors (e.g., the government's desire to stay in office) which have a 
different logic to those of security concepts Y N 
Q. VII If your answer is `yes', then which of the following factors are `more', `equally', 
`less' important determinants of security policy than assumptions about security 
(e.g., assumptions about threats) for explaining that policy: 
I) competition between bureaucracies e.g., DFAT & DoD, is 
a more important determinant than assumptions about security Dan equally important 
determinant as assumptions about security a less important determinant than assumptions about 
security 
2) competition between the services e.g., navy, army and air force, is 
Elmore important equally important less important /than assumptions about security 
3) competition between political parties is 
Elmore important equally important less important /than assumptions about security 
4) competition between elite personalities is 
Elmore important equally important less important /than assumptions about security 
5) Australia's economic engagement in Asia is 
more important equally important less important /than assumptions about security 
6) if you think other factors are important, please explain: PTO if you require more space 
Q. VIIISome people argue that external events are generally more influential determinants 
of Australia's security policy than are domestic issues 
Do you agree strongly agree El disagree E disagree strongly don't know 
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Q. V 
Further comments for Q. VII 
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Part D: The influence of your own assumptions on Australia's security policy 
during 1983 -96: plus the derivations of your assumptions. 
Ql 
Q. II 
Q. III 
With respect to Australia's security policy during 1983 -96 do you think that 
assumptions about security similar to yours were: 
very important important not important don't know 
Please explain (optional): PTO if you require more space -* 
Do you think your own assumptions about Australia's security were influenced by: 
1) historical events (e.g., the Pacific war, Indonesia's history) DY ON 
2) contemporary regional developments (e.g., the end of the cold war)DY ENV 
3) your knowledge of theories about security (e.g., realism and 
liberalism) Y ON 
4) your own personal philosophies about security Dy N 
5) other 
Please briefly illustrate your answers (optional): PTO if you require more space 
Which of the factors above are the most important for understanding your own 
assumptions about security 
Please give answer in order of choice 1 -5 
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer 
Please briefly explain: PTO if you require more space -> 
DEED 
Q. IV Do you think your own assumptions about security have generally been: 
Optimistic 
Pessimistic 
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Q. I 
Further comments for Q. II 
Further comments for Q. III 
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Part E: Developing explanatory frameworks for security policy 
Q. I Do you think an explanatory framework which takes into account and reconciles 
apparent `contradictions' like the co- existence of cooperation and competition 
would help to explain Australia's security policy Y N Possibly 
Q. II Which of the following assumptions should be taken into account in such a 
framework: 
I) international relations is complex and requires several theories i.e., liberalism 
and realism to explain the behaviour of states Y ON 
2) the international system includes both competition and cooperation Y N 
3) states have mixed motives, i.e., they cooperate and compete OPEN 
4) both the state and individuals within it are the objects of security Y N 
5) politically motivated violence, either externally or internally, is the main 
concern of security Y N 
6) the means to security involve both cooperation and competition VON 
Q. III If you have suggestions for conceptual frameworks to explain security policy please 
specify (optional): PTO if you require more space -4 
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